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The structural organization of CBNRM in Botswana

by

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### Acronyms

ADF	African Development Foundation
ARB	Agricultural Resources Board
AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
BOCCIM	Botswana Confederation of Commerce Industry and Manpower
BOCOBONET	Botswana Community-Based Organization Network
BWMA	Botswana Wildlife Management Association
CAPC	Community Action Plan Coordinators
CBO	Community Based Organization
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBNRMSS	Community Based Natural Resource Management Support Services
CECT	Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust
CEG	Community Escort Guide
CHA	Controlled Hunting Area
CI	Conservation International
CFLI	Canada Fund for Local Initiatives
CSD	Community Service Division
DAO	District Agricultural Office
DC	District Commissioner
DCEC	Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime
DDC	District Development Committee
DED	German Development Service
DH	District Hospital
DLUPU	Division of Land Use Planning Unit
DoL	Department of Lands
DoT	Department of Tourism
DTRP	Department of Town and Regional planning
DWNP	Department of Wildlife and National Parks
ESS	Eco-tourism Support Services
FAB	Forestry Association of Botswana
FONSAG	Forum on Sustainable Agriculture
GEF	Global Environmental Fund
HATAB	Hotel and Tourism Association of Botswana
HIVOS	Humanist Institute for Development Co-operation
IRCE	Institutional Reinforcement for Community Empowerment
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
JVA	Joint Venture agreement
KCS	Kalahari Conservation Society
KCT	Kalepa Conservation Trust
KDT	Khwai Development Trust
MEWT	Ministry of Environment Wildlife and Tourism
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
ML&H	Ministry of Labor and Home Affairs

MLG	Ministry of Local Government
ML&Ho	Ministry of Lands and Housing
MTIWT	Ministry of Trade, Industry, Wildlife and Tourism
NCBNRMF	National CBNRM Forum
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NMMAG	National Monuments, Museum and Art Gallery
NPAD	National Policy on Agricultural Development
NRMP	Natural Resource Management Project
NWDCBNRMF	North West District CBNRM Forum
OCC	Okavango Community Consultants
PAC	Problem Animal Control
PTB	Permaculture Trust of Botswana
SCI	Safari Club International
SNV	Netherlands Development Organization
STMT	Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust
TGLP	Tribal Grazing Land Policy
TAC	Technical Advisory Committee
TL	Thusano Lefatsheng
TOCaDI	Trust for the Okavango Cultural and Development Initiatives
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USASHF	U.S. Ambassadors' Special Self-Help Program
VDC	Village Development Committee
VPR&D	Veld Products Research and Development
VTC	Village Trust Committee
WMA	Wildlife Management Area
WUSC	World University Service of Canada

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### **Abstract**

The devolution of natural resource management to local community groups is a dominant theme in contemporary discussion of common property natural resource management. Throughout much of Africa and other parts of the developing world Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programs are being implemented. Though governments in Africa and other parts of the developing world embrace the idea of CBNRM, the actual process of devolution of natural resource management to local community groups is problematic. In some countries, like Zimbabwe for instance, the central government devolved natural resource management to district councils which are themselves arms of the central government operating at the district level. In Botswana, the central government issues usufruct rights to local community groups and retain ownership of natural resources. These usufruct arrangements are often susceptible to cancellation and therefore do not provide sufficient incentives for local community groups to invest in long-term sustainability objectives. My study utilizes the advocacy coalition framework and social capital theories to understand how local community groups could through coalitions and networks with other local, national and international CBNRM stakeholders influence government CBNRM policy towards approaches favoring devolution and participation as opposed to centralization and regulation.

## Chapter 1: Introduction

‘The issues of how best to govern natural resources used by many individuals in common are no more settled in academia than in the world of politics’ (Ostrom, 1990:1). Contradictory policy proposals for governing the commons have been suggested and implemented in different parts of the world. At one end of the spectrum are policies favoring central regulation and privatization. On the other are policies that favor devolution and participation. In his argument in support of policies that favor centralization, Ophuls (1973:228) argue that “because of the tragedy of the commons, environmental problems cannot be solved through cooperation... and the rationale for central government with major coercive powers is overwhelming,” since the state has the prerogative to use legitimate physical violence to enlist cooperation, and a bureaucratic structure facilitating centralization and regulation (Weber, 1920). These policies favor government-led processes of decision making. Other policy analysts suggest the enforcement of private property rights (market-led decisions) in circumstances where natural resources are owned in common (Demsetz, 1967; Hardin, 1968; Johnson, 1972; Smith, 1981; Welch, 1983; Sinn, 1984).

Despite the above prescriptions, Ostrom (1990:1) observes that ‘communities of individuals have relied on institutions resembling neither the state nor the market to govern some resource systems with reasonable degrees of success over long periods of time’. In his thesis, "Iron Law of Oligarchy," Michels (1949) postulates that bureaucracies lead to the concentration of power at the top in the hands of bureaucrats that rule in a dictatorial manner. Centralization of power makes participation difficult, if not impossible. The shortfalls of top-down imposition of natural resource policies on local people have been documented (Chambers, 1983; Blaikie, 1985; Richards, 1985; Poffenberger, 1990). Studies by Murphree, 1997; Drinkwater, 1991; Lawry, 1989; Murombedzi, 1989; 1990; and Ostrom, 1990 indicate that centralization and privatization of natural resource management does not lead to improved natural resource management. The call for empowering local communities to become valuable participants in the natural resource policy and management decisions seems the plausible option to centralization and privatization policies. Participatory, bottom-up approaches understand that ecological health is not to be considered in isolation from community economic, social, and cultural health (Gary et al., 2001; NCRCD, 1999).

Through advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), other actors, disempowered in the bureaucratic, centralized top-down processes of natural resource policy and management can interact to accumulate political capital by forming advocacy coalitions to contend with the predominant paradigm and push forward an alternative agenda. Community power can be augmented by connections with the outside (Flora and Flora (2004:109). According to Gary et al. (2001:14), the ability to reach out enables local communities to share information, build capacity, and develop networks and coalitions. Theories of social capital (Putnam, 1995b; Woolcock, 1998; 2001; Narayan, 1999; and Woolcock and Narayan, 2000) highlight the importance of networks for information sharing between state, civil society and market actors and capacity building for local communities. My study investigates evidence of coalitions and networks between CBNRM CBOs and other CBNRM institutional actors in Botswana. The activities of local communities and their organizations are channeled and limited by decisions taken beyond the local level. For my study, the concepts of bridging and linking social capital provide a useful paradigm for the interaction of disparate stakeholders. The guiding hypothesis for my study is that the higher the bridging and linking social capital, the lower the conflict between local and central government and market actors, and that similarity in desired future conditions and in mental causal models will predict current and potential coalitions.

### **1.1 Rationale for Study**

My study contributes to the literature on social capital and natural resource management by specifying how community-based organizations that develop bridging and linking social capital can lower social conflict and environmental degradation. The study analyzes the degree to which coalitions and networks between community-based organizations and institutional actors at higher levels of decision-making facilitate local voices finding their way into higher level policy decisions. There are also practical applications of my study. By identifying all the institutional actors involved in CBNRM in Botswana and their desired future conditions and mental causal models, coalitions can be forged to increase political capital for community-based organizations. Inter-sectoral policy integration presumes that the way to achieve increased efficacy in actual outcomes is through improved integration of policy across multiple sectors. In Botswana at present, cross-sectoral



policy coordination remains a challenge. For instance, implementation of the CBNRM program by a central government department with village level organizations, bypassing district level planning processes, makes it difficult for cross-sectoral policy coordination at the district level. My study determines the utility of specific actions to ensure local and district political support to CBNRM projects and the integration of CBNRM into district development plans. It is necessary that CBNRM organizations mesh within local government structures and development processes.

This research was conducted in Botswana, in Southern Africa, where issues around common property and multiple function rangelands management are pertinent. Rangeland degradation and resulting conflicts in African rangelands and strategies to reverse the trend remain major challenges. Different programs, ranging from privatization of the commons and CBNRM, have been implemented in Botswana. Botswana exhibits little consistency in strategies to reduce ecosystem degradation and social conflict. Policies implemented to date are contradictory. Some are geared towards privatization of the commons, while the CBNRM policy is oriented towards community benefit from management of common property natural resources. While the CBNRM program supposedly promotes the strengthening of common property regimes, other policies (e.g. the Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975) emphasize privatization of communal rangelands. The CBNRM program is project based as opposed to a comprehensive strategy guiding management and utilization of common property natural resources.

## **1.2 Research Questions**

- a) What are the major market, state, and civil society stakeholding institutions around CBNRM in Botswana at the international, national, district, and local level?
- b) What are the desired future conditions, mental causal models and actual participation in CBNRM by institutional actors?
- c) To what degree do those that share desired future conditions share similar mental causal models on how to achieve those conditions?
- d) What mechanisms are in place to increase bridging and linking social capital among the different scales with CBNRM CBOs?

e) What differences are there in terms of conflict for those CBNRMs CBOs with high bridging social capital (dense and diverse advocacy coalitions) and those with low bridging social capital?

### **1.3 Research Hypothesis**

a) CBNRM CBO's with high and diverse bridging social capital are more successful in resolving social conflict than those with low and homogeneous bridging social capital.

b) CBNRM institutional actors at different levels share desired future conditions.

c) CBNRM institutional actors at different levels have different mental causal models of how to reach those desired future conditions.

### **1.4 Organization of Study**

This report is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 is the theoretical framework which gives the theoretical basis of the study. The theories reviewed in this chapter range from theories of the state, decentralization, participation, stakeholder theory, social capital and advocacy coalitions. Chapter 3 details the CBNRM context and approach in Botswana. The first section of the chapter presents primary and secondary CBNRM context data, followed by a discussion. Chapter 4 describes my study's methodology. Chapter 5 is the assessment of CBNRM at the national level. The chapter identifies national CBNRM stakeholders and their participation in the CBNRM program. The stakeholders are categorized into state, civil society (NGO), donor and market (private sector). The first section of the chapter presents the different CBNRM institutional actors and their desired futures and mental causal models. The last section of the chapter discusses the different CBNRM network organizations in Botswana. Each of these sections are followed by a discussions section. Chapter 6 is the assessment of CBNRM at the community level. This section is based on data from my four study cases (Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT), Kalepa Conservation Trust (KCT), Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust (STMT), and Khwai Development Trust (KDT), all of which are wildlife-based CBNRM CBOs. Data from the four study cases have been analyzed using the community sustainability capitals model (Narayan, 1999; Flora and Flora, 2004). At the end of this chapter are sections on analysis and discussions. Chapter 7 and 8 presents my conclusions and recommendations respectively.

## Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

### 2.1 Theories of the State

Social contract theorists like Hobbes (1968), Locke (1960), and Rousseau (1967) perceive the state as representing the social collectivity or the common good, hence portraying the state as an entity that does not privilege certain individuals and or groups interests over others. In his interpretation of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, Carnoy (1984, p.47) observe that the social contract theorists have a vision of the state as representing the social collectivity, as transcending specific interests and classes and as a guarantee for orderly competition among individuals and groups while simultaneously ensuring that collective interests of the social whole are preserved in the actions of the state itself. While the social contract theorists construe the state as the guardian of the social collectivity, Marxists and neo-Marxists perceive the state as an instrument of class domination and a constellation of class interests. In Marxist understanding, the state emerges from the relations of production and not from the collective will of the people (Carnoy, 1984:46).

Weber (1920) proposes that the state should be characterized by the means that are unique to it, that is, legitimate physical violence. However, Weber was quick to note that legitimate violence is not the only means available to the state, but it is the means exclusive to the state. Weber defines the state as a type of human community that has prerogative to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory. The legitimacy of the state is premised upon the consent of the ruled in the authority that is claimed by the rulers. Weber (1968) argues that political power is attained through balancing legitimacy, on one hand, and accumulation on the other. The role of the state therefore centers on balancing legitimacy and accumulation functions. In the case of accumulation, the state facilitates the accumulation of capital for those classes that through their resources have the power to provide resources for the state in the form of economic wealth. Simultaneously, the state has the responsibility to protect its citizens from outside threat and to provide basic public goods to its citizens. According to Weber (1968) the adequate provision of these goods permits the state to retain legitimate monopoly of the use of force to maintain order and ultimately power (Weber, 1922/1968).

Weber (1920) discusses the increasing role of bureaucracy in the administration of the modern state. Weber (1968:957) describes a bureaucracy as 'the principle of office hierarchy and the channels of appeal stipulate a clearly established system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones'. One of the important features of bureaucratic administration is the power of bureaucrats derived from their possession of technical knowledge. The power of bureaucrats is further enhanced by knowledge acquired from experience in the service. The bureaucrat has at his/her disposal accumulated data/information from years of service for aiding decision making. Turner and Hulme (1997:151) observe that a major obstruction to the effective performance of public bureaucracies in most developing countries is the excessive concentration of decision-making and authority within central government. They observe that concentration of decision-making within a bureaucracy is one of the legacies of European colonization of the Third World (Turner and Hulme, 1997:85).

Smith (1983:49) maintains that state actors have interests of their own, and, in certain circumstances, they have the ability to transform these interests into policy. He further argues that even within liberal democracies, state actors have the ability, through their authority, control over legislation and control over coercive apparatus, to act without negotiation on those affected (Smith, 1993:52). Reuschmeyer and Evans (1985:47) maintain that the state's ability to act in a unified way is constrained by the fact that it is also an arena of social conflict. Society consists of a variety of social groups which often have divergent interests. These social groups endeavor to take advantage of the state for fulfilling their group interests. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) propose the Advocacy Coalitions Framework to explain how social groups in society can interact to accumulate power to influence the quasi-political process of decision-making and public policy.

## **2.2 Decentralization**

Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:18) define decentralization as the transfer of planning, decision-making, or administrative authority from central government to its field organizations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments, or nongovernmental organizations. These types of decentralization differ with regard to the degree of power transfer from the center to lower levels of governance

(Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983:18; Cohen and Peterson, 1999). Justification for decentralization is often built around the assumption that greater participation in public decision making is a positive good in itself or that it can improve efficiency, equity, development, and resource management (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999:475). Cohen and Peterson (1999:24), Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:18), and Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) identifies three types of decentralization: deconcentration, delegation and devolution. Deconcentration is the transfer of authority over specified decision-making (political), financial (fiscal), and management (administrative) functions by administrative means to different levels under the jurisdictional authority of the central government (Cohen and Peterson, 1999). Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:18) and Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) define deconcentration as involving the redistribution of administrative responsibilities only within the central government.

Delegation is the transfer of government decision-making and administrative authority for clearly defined tasks to organizations or firms that are either under its indirect control or are independent (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:27). Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:20) define delegation as the delegation of decision-making and management authority for specific functions to organizations that are not under the direct control of central government ministries. Thus, while Cohen and Peterson (1999:27) see delegation as involving delegated authority to both organizations under the direct control of central government and independent organizations, Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:20) see delegation as involving delegated authority only to organizations outside the direct control of central government. Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) argue that it is important to understand the structures of accountability in which actors are located. For Agrawal and Ribot (1999), there is no real difference between deconcentration and delegation, since the lower level actors/organizations receiving delegated power are accountable to central government.

Devolution is the transfer of authority by central government to autonomous local-level governmental units holding corporate status granted under state legislation (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:26). Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:22) define devolution as entailing autonomous local government units over which central government exercises little or no control, local governments exercising authority and performing public functions within

boundaries of their jurisdiction, local government units with corporate status and power to secure resources to perform their functions, and local government units providing services and accountable to their constituents. Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) equate devolution to what they called political decentralization. According to Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475), political decentralization is said to have occurred when powers are transferred to local government who are downwardly accountable. Elections are seen as the mechanism that ensures downward accountability in political decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999:475).

Rondinelli (1983:89) and Uphoff (1986) make a distinction between local administration and local government. Local administration is associated with deconcentration and delegation, and local government is associated with devolution or political decentralization. According to Uphoff (1986), local administration and local government differ in that local administration is responsible to higher levels of decision making, whereas local government is accountable at least in principle to constituents. Local administration is a bureaucratic institution, while local government is a political institution (Uphoff, 1986). In India, Pakistan and Thailand, Friedman (1983:380) found that local government is seen as an arm of the central ministries. In the three countries, the perception of local government as an extension of central bureaucracy is dominant. Mathur (1983:68) observes that one remarkable feature of decentralization is that such policies have usually emanated from the center. It is the central government that has accepted the necessity of decentralized administration and designed institutions and processes to provide it. Central government sees decentralization as a mechanism to increase central government effectiveness. Consequently, the process is accompanied by elaborate supervision and control (Mathur, 1983:68).

Fisher (1999) notes that often there is decentralization of responsibility to local government units and local communities without devolution of power to make independent decisions or to take action outside parameters set by government authorities. He argues that in forestry projects, for instance, major forest management objectives are continuously decided upon by governments or bureaucracies, and the decision making authority of local government units and local communities is restricted to decisions that meet these objectives (Fisher, 1999). He suggests that in genuine devolution, those to whom responsibilities are

devolved ought to be permitted to make contribution in the setting of objectives, rather than expected to meet objectives set by others (Fisher, 1999). When local communities participate in government programs, they often receive responsibility and certain benefits but not much or no authority (Fisher, 1999). Fisher argues that evaluating a local community's competence in executing a management plan designed by someone else is not a justifiable assessment tool for the local community management capacity (Fisher, 1999).

### **2.3 Participation**

Community-Based Natural Resource Management literature details the need for a shift from classifying communities as resource users to considering communities as resource managers. Langton (1978:13–24) makes a distinction between public action and public involvement. Public action refers to activities initiated and controlled by citizens for some purpose, and public involvement refers to activities initiated and controlled by central government for administrative purposes (Langton, 1978:13–24). Kakoyannis et al. (2001) observe that natural resource agencies concentrate too much on the social acceptability of their decisions as opposed to the acceptability of their decision making process. Kakoyannis et al. (2001) is concerned with issues of process. NCRCRD (1999:4) maintains that traditionally, success has been measured by input-output analysis. But for sustainable development, activities and outcomes need to be included as indicators of process.

In their study in Indonesia, Fay and de Foresta (2001:186), found that state-community alliance with regard to natural resource management is not based on the state's conviction that communities' participation in natural resource management can bring about sustainable natural resource use. They argue that the state in developing countries believe that local people are the main cause of forest degradation. For that reason, any effort to work with local people must focus on imposing a new land-use system. Thus state-community alliance in natural resource management is meant to regulate or guide community utilization of natural resources. Fay and de Foresta (2001:186) further argue that state agencies do not only consider local people as liabilities in their endeavor to protect natural resources, but also perceive of local people as liabilities that have to be and can turn out to be assets in state's efforts to restore degraded forest lands and boost tourism revenue. With this mindset, the state is progressively opening up to involving local people in predetermined state agency's

activities (Fay and de Foresta, 2001:186). However, Strong (1992) observes that local level actions in natural resource management are the very foundations of successful sustainable development policy.

Ophuls (1973:228) argue that “because of the tragedy of the commons, environmental problems cannot be solved through cooperation... and the rationale for government with major coercive powers is overwhelming.” The presumption that an external Leviathan is necessary to avoid tragedy of the commons leads to recommendations that central governments should control most natural resource systems (Ostrom, 1990). The policy advice to centralize the control and regulation of natural resources, such as grazing lands, forests, and fisheries, has been followed extensively, particularly in Third World countries (Ostrom, 1990). Murphree (1997) observes that the regulation of natural resource use by central government agencies has not halted the persistent environmental decline in Africa.

Guha (1989), Gadgil and Guha (1992; 1995), and Shiva (1989) argue that the continued espousal of ‘Western science’ by post-colonial governments for developing forestry policies and practices contributes to the alienation of communities from nature and intensifies the processes of deforestation and ecological degradation. Meinzen-Dick and Knox (1999) observe that if devolution programs simply seek to engage natural resource users in implementing regulations that are set by outsiders, such programs will not draw on the knowledge of users about their own resource situation. Riker (1993:1) argues that agenda setting by outsiders foreshadow outcomes, since the nature of an agenda shapes the alternatives made from it. Thus agenda setting by central government agencies for natural resource management by users limits the users and they can only implement generic programs. Mazur and Tittola (1992) express concern about such generic programs, since they often lack local input.


According to Flora et al. (2000), there ought to be a change in community development approaches from community development to community building. Flora et al. (2000) associate community development with a specialist model, premised upon the presence of individual experts helping the community identify problems and then solving the problems for the community. Community building entails the involvement of a wide range of participants who develop a shared vision of what the community should be like in the future,



looking at the whole and not just a few parts (Flora et al. 2000). Community building forms the conceptual framework for assessing my study's CBNRM study cases using Narayan's (1999) and Flora and Flora's (2004) community sustainability capitals. While Narayan (1999) identifies four types of community sustainability capitals – human, social, financial, and natural, Flora and Flora (2004) make an additional two types – cultural and political capital. According to Flora and Flora (2004:165), capital is any resource used to produce new resources. Flora and Flora (2003:215) maintains that favoring only one form of capital can deplete all capital within a community in the future, and each form of capital has the potential to enhance the productivity of the others. For instance, Putnam (1993b:35-36) observe that social capital enhances the benefit of investment in physical and human capital (Putnam, 1993b:35-36).

Human capital includes those attributes of individuals that contribute to their ability to earn a living, strengthen community, and otherwise contribute to community organization, to their families, and to self-improvement (Flora and Flora, 2004:80). Putnam defines social capital as those features of social life – networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (1995b: 664 – 665). Financial capital consists of money that is used for investment rather than consumption. Thus financial capital can be transformed into built capital (Flora and Flora, 2004:9). Built capital is the permanent physical installations and facilities supporting productive activities in a community. Natural capital is the landscape, air, water, soil, and biodiversity of both plants and animals (Flora and Flora, 2004:9). Cultural capital can be thought of as the filter through which people live their lives, the daily or seasonal rituals they observe, and the way they regard the world around them (Flora and Flora, 2004:9). Political capital is the ability of a group to influence the distribution of resources within a social unit, including helping set the agenda for what resources are available and who is eligible to receive them. Figure 2.1 below shows six forms of capitals for measuring community sustainability.

Figure 2.1 Community Capitals and Systems Sustainability




Source: Flora and Flora 2004

## 2.4 Stakeholder Theory

Brenner and Cochran (1991) suggest that stakeholder theory can be used to describe how organizations function in varying situation, and to assist in predicting organizational behavior. Stakeholders are groups, constituencies, social actors or institutions of any size or aggregation that act at various levels (domestic, local, regional, national, international, private and public), have a significant and specific stake in a given set of resources, and can affect or be affected by resource management problems or interventions (Chevalier, 2001). Stakeholders possess some combination of three critical attributes: Power, Legitimacy and Urgency (see figure 2.2 below). All three factors must be considered simultaneously in that "power gains authority through legitimacy, and it gains exercise through urgency" (Mitchell et al. 1997: 869). Mitchell et al., (1997) argue that much of the management literature on stakeholder theory fails to address the issue of salience, the degree to which one stakeholder can succeed in getting its claims or interests ranked high in other stakeholders' agendas.

Figure 2.2 Stakeholder salience



1. Dormant stakeholders (Power, no legitimacy and no urgency)
2. Discretionary stakeholders (Legitimacy, but no power and no urgency)
3. Demanding stakeholders (Urgency, but no legitimacy and no power)
4. Dominant stakeholders (Power and legitimacy, but no urgency)
5. Dangerous stakeholders (Power and urgency, but no legitimacy)
6. Dependent stakeholders (Legitimacy and urgency, but no power)
7. Definite stakeholders (Power, legitimacy and urgency)
8. Nonstakeholders (No power, no legitimacy and no urgency)

1,2,3 are low salience classes, which are referred to as “latent” stakeholders, identified by their possession or attributed possession of only one of the attributes; 4,5,6 are moderately salient stakeholders (expectant stakeholders) – they are stakeholders who expect something and they possess or are attributed to possess two of the attributes. 7 are highly salient stakeholders and possess or are attributed to possess all the three attributes. Latent stakeholders can increase their salience and move into the expectant category by acquiring just one of the missing attributes. This could be made possible through coalition building (Mitchell et al., 1997).

## **2.5 Social Capital**

My study adopts Putnam’s (1995b) conceptualization of social capital with modifications from Woolcock (1998; 2001), Narayan (1999), and Woolcock and Narayan (2000). Putnam defines social capital as those features of social life – networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (1995b: 664 – 665). Social capital involves building mutual trust, constructing shared futures, strengthening collective identity, working together and forming groups (Flora and Flora, 2003). While Woolcock (1998; 2001), Narayan (1999), and Woolcock and Narayan (2000) identify three dimensions of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking social capital), Putnam (1995b; 1993a; 1993b) identifies two (bonding and bridging social capital). Bonding social capital consists of connections among homogeneous individuals and groups, which may be based principally on class, ethnicity, gender, or another social characteristic (Flora and Flora, 2003:217). Bridging social capital connects diverse groups within community to each other and to groups outside the community (Flora and Flora, 2003:217). Woolcock and


Narayan's concept of linking social capital refers to associations of exchange produced among groups which are conscious about their dissimilarities, as in the case of bridging social capital, and in addition, are cognizant of their power disparities. Narayan (1999) observe that both bridging and linking social capital are crosscutting ties, but differ in the sense that bridging social capital is horizontal and linking social capital is vertical.

In their seminal 1993 work, Putnam et al. (1993) consider horizontally organized networks to support social capital, whereas vertical relationships are thought to stall its formation. They perceive concentrated horizontal interactions as an essential form of social capital. According to Putnam et al. (1993:173 – 174) vertical networks, no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation. Fox (1996:124) is pessimistic about the results of vertical networking, since he perceives that it has the capacity to sideline the base. His argument is that if local organizations only establish vertical networks, local stakeholders will ultimately have little capacity to monitor the activities of their leadership and therefore little capacity to hold them accountable (Fox, 1996:124). However, Narayan (1999:13) maintain that “when power between groups is asymmetrically distributed, it is cross-cutting ties, the linkages between groups that are critical to both economic opportunity and social cohesion”. Narayan (1999) suggests that the development of “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973) is important for breaking down inequalities of power and access. Flora and Flora (2003) use the concept bridging social capital to refer to both bridging and linking social capital. According to Flora and Flora (2003), both horizontal and vertical dimensions of networking are important. Flora and Flora (1993:56) observe that communities tend to learn best from those that are at the same level as themselves. Flora and Flora (1993) call this, horizontal networking lateral learning. Besides horizontal networking, it is important for communities to be linked to regional and national resources and organizations. Flora and Flora (2003:219) caution that community organization's vertical linkages should not be based upon one gatekeeper who makes that linkage.

Figure 2.3 below is an effort by Flora and Flora (2003) to understand how bridging (which is inclusive of linking social capital) and bonding social capital interact at the community level in order to determine the extent of collective action that takes place in those communities. Flora and Flora (2003) maintain that bridging and bonding social capital

reinforce one another, and when both are high there is effective community action. Figure 2.3 captures the different outcomes from the different combinations of bridging and bonding social capital.

Figure 2.3 Dimensions of social capital and their implications for community building




Source: Flora and Flora, 2003

Woolcock (1998) uses the concepts embeddedness and autonomy to describe the desirable interactions within and between community organizations and private and public organizations at the micro and macro levels. According to Woolcock (1998) the concepts of embeddedness and autonomy denote different things at the different scales. At the micro level embeddedness refers to intra-community ties (integration), whereas at the macro-level it refers to state-society relations (synergy); autonomy at the micro-level refers to extra-community networks (linkages), while at the macro-level it refers to institutional capacity and credibility (integrity). Woolcock's (1998) model of micro and macro level embeddedness and autonomy is an attempt at understanding the creation of social capital based on both top-down and bottom-up processes. Bottom-up processes of social capital creation entail linkages, which involve bridging and linking social capital, and integration, which involves

bonding social capital. Woolcock (1998) maintains that for development outcomes to be achieved in poor communities, linkage needs to be combined with integration. Too much or too little of either dimension at any given moments undermines economic advancement. Woolcock (1998:176) observe that the internal dynamics and development of economic groups in poor communities does not occur in isolation, but rather in the context of a particular history and regulatory framework that can itself strengthen or undermine the capacity of independent groups in civil society to organize in their own collective interest. The performance of bottom-up processes can be affected by state integrity and the state's willingness to invest in synergy. Woolcock (1998) maintains that organizational integrity without synergy and vice versa is unproductive. Figure 2.4 below shows the top-down and bottom-up processes of social capital creation.

Figure 2.4 Top-down and bottom-up development and forms of social capital



Source: Woolcock, 1998

Evans (1996:189) observes that endowments of social capital are essential for synergy. According to Evans (1996:189) synergy as endowments is an outcome that hinge on the prior existence of social and cultural patterns historically rooted in particular cultures and societies. In his analysis of the Italian case, Putnam (1993a) observes that stocks of social capital accumulated over longer periods of time was the key ingredient in generating the 'virtuous circle' in which civic engagement encouraged good government and good

government in turn enhanced civic engagement. Synergy as constructability recognizes the potential and possibility to create synergy among actors who do not have past synergic relations and or endowments. “Synergy becomes a latent possibility in most contexts, waiting to be brought to life by the institutional entrepreneurship” (Evans, 1996:190).

## **2.6 Advocacy Coalition Framework**

A central feature of the advocacy coalition framework is its focus on the belief systems of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993:41). An advocacy coalition’s objective is to translate its beliefs into policy by altering the behavior of governmental institutions in order to achieve its policy goals over time. Hence, within the Advocacy Coalition framework, policy formulation and change is a function of competing advocacy coalitions within a subsystem. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993:37) maintain that the Advocacy Coalition Framework completely rejects the ideology that there exists a unified, relatively autonomous state – as proposed by Skocpol (1979). The advocacy coalition framework sees the state sphere as highly contested. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) as interpreted by Flora et al. (2000), argue that public and private institutional actors or organizations form advocacy coalitions around specific issues to realize shared desired futures. According to Flora et al. (2000:2) “these public and private institutional actors at various geographic scales share certain beliefs that anchor common desired futures (outcomes), mental causal models (implicit and explicit means for reaching those futures), and rules of evidence that allow for members of the coalition to mutually ascertain progress towards the goals” (Flora et al. 2000:2).

Schlager (1995) and Schlager and Blomquist (1996) criticize the advocacy coalition framework as proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) of not accounting for how actors with similar belief systems overcome collective action problems and cooperate to pursue common strategies and common goals. Flora et al. (2000:3) caution that having similar desired futures (beliefs) does not guarantee cooperation between institutional actors, since such actors might have different mental causal models. Zafonte and Sabatier (1998:479) acknowledge that the advocacy coalition framework as proposed in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) is justifiably criticized by Schlager (1995) and Schlager and Blomquist (1996) for assuming that shared beliefs constitute a sufficient reason for coordinated



behavior. Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) acknowledge that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1993) premise that common beliefs will lead to coordinated collective action ignored the temptations to free-ride as identified by Olson (1965). If there is no coordinated behavior, there is no advocacy coalition. To address the issues of collective action, Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) adopted Chisholm's (1989) explanation on functional interdependencies among organizations as an alternative explanation to coordinated behavior in addition to shared beliefs. Table 2.1 below shows coalition behavior as the result of belief congruence and functional overlap.

Table 2.1 Coalition behavior as the result of belief congruence and functional overlap

Functional overlap	Beliefs	
	Congruent	Divergent
High	(1) Strong coordination	(2) Strong conflict
Low	(3) Weak coordination	(4) Weak conflict

*Source: Fenger, Menno and Klok Pieter-Jan (2001)*

## 2.7 Justification for Community Based Natural Resource Management

Literature on CBNRM is fairly recent, developed as part of general processes of devolution and democratization. However, community based natural resource management is not a new invention (Folke and Berkes, 1995; North, 1990, Bromley, 1991; Fortman, 1989). CBNRM is a revival of old practices in a modified form as guided and constrained by state policy. Croll and Parkin (1992) and Berkes et al. (1998) argue that rather than being new, CBNRM can be viewed as a modern attempt to resuscitate traditional local and indigenous cultural and institutional mechanisms for managing and conserving the natural environment. In Africa, colonial policies and later, post-independence state policies took away control over natural resources from local communities and their traditional institutions and placed these resources under state control. The customary rules and knowledge systems for natural resource management of traditional institutions were undermined. New bureaucratic and technocratic state institutions emerged to replace the traditional institutions. This implies a shift from local authority to national authority as guarantor of public interest (Dubois, 1999).

Baker and Gathundu (2002) argue that the bureaucratic state resource management institutions evolved with a bias towards exploiting natural resources for supporting economic growth. Comparatively, traditional institutions' exploitation of natural resources was based on local experiences and knowledge regarding resource resilience and sustainability (Baker and Gathundu, 2002). Baker and Gathundu (2002) observes that while the state objectives of attaining economic growth were met in some instances, the alienation of local communities from the resources they depended on for their livelihood led to escalating levels of poverty and environmental degradation. The fruits of economic growth from the exploitation of natural resources have not filtered down to the local community level, hence the escalating levels of poverty. With regard to environmental degradation, state institutions often pursue policies that are sectoral and not comprehensive in managing the natural resource base. According to McNeill (2000:82) state institutions are driven mainly by economic potential of resources and do not incorporate the management of those resources that are of value to the communities' livelihood, especially those without market value.

The failure by state institutions to address the problems of persistent rural poverty and environmental degradation necessitate the revival, at least in modified form, of traditional natural resource management practices. CBNRM is seen as better placed to achieve and reconcile two persistent and rarely achieved objectives; the alleviation of rural poverty and the conservation of biodiversity (Parker, 1997; Butler, 1998; Mehta and Kellert, 1998; Wainwright and Wehrmeyer, 1998). The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development recognizes the contribution of local knowledge on natural resource management to sustainable development (UNCED, 1992). Traditional knowledge generation systems can be revitalized through CBNRM initiatives that give local communities authority to manage the resources (Baker and Gathundu, 2002). According to Baker and Gathundu (2002), approaches that employ scientific knowledge to fill in the gaps of traditional knowledge systems have a higher probability of nurturing sustainable local institutions that also benefit from community support (Baker and Gathundu, 2002).

Though governments in Africa and other parts of the developing world embrace the idea of CBNRM, the actual process of devolution of natural resource management to local communities is problematic. There is disparity between rhetoric, policy and implementation.

It is unclear whether CBNRM can proceed without reversing the resource centralizing legislation of the past. According to Lynch (1998), the challenge is to overcome legislative impediments to CBNRM and to set up in their place incentives that create and foster appropriate legal, regulatory and economic relationships between local communities and state institutions. Lynch (1998) proposes recognizing private community-based rights on land and the resources therein as a starting point for reversing the land tenure centralizing policies of the past. Usufruct agreements such as certificates, leases or other restrictive tenurial instruments are not conducive to the promotion of long-term sustainability objectives (Lynch, 1998). They are susceptible to arbitrary cancellation and, thus, fall short of providing leaseholders or recipients of privileges with adequate incentives to make the costly investments of time and labor required to realize long-term benefits (Lynch, 1998). There is a role for the state in CBNRM, and that role ought to be facilitative than obstructive. The state's facilitative role may include assistance and guidance to local groups; protection against broader forces and/or other economic sectors; clear legal framework which clarifies group rights and benefit, as well as rules for conflict resolution; direct economic incentives and mechanism to disseminate information (Vira et al., 1998).

Table 2.2 Forms of Joint Forest Management

<b>Mode of Participation</b>	Co-opted	Cooperating	Consulted	Collaborating	Co-learning	Collective action
<b>Role of Officials</b>	Political	Directive	Intermediation	Enabling	Participant in the process	Full subsidiary
<b>Assumptions about sources of solutions</b>	Expert based on best technical means	Expert based on best technical means	Expert taking into consideration socio-economic and cultural factors	Expert taking into consideration socio-economic and cultural factors	Emergent, based on shared discovery, learning, pooling local and expert knowledge	Local experience informed by multi-source expertise
<b>Assumptions about the role of the state</b>	Has the right to determine the public interest	Has the right to determine the public interest	Has the right to act as the guardian of the public interest	The public interest lies in adaptive management	The public interest is formed by aggregation of local interests	

*Source: Jiggins, 1998*

## **Chapter 3: Botswana CBNRM Context and Approach**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter gives an overview of the CBNRM context in Botswana. It presents information on policies guiding the implementation of CBNRM in Botswana, procedures followed by CBNRM CBOs to acquire resource use leases from the state, CBNRM activities of the CBNRM CBOs and the local government framework upon which CBNRM operates. Since the CBNRM program is implemented in the rural areas, this chapter explains in details the local government setup in Botswana. This chapter's section 3.3 summarizes Zimbabwe's CBNRM program for comparison purposes with the Botswana case.

In Botswana, wildlife inhabit approximately 37% of the surface area, comprising National Parks and Game Reserves (17%) and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) (20%) (MFDP, 2003:246). According to National Development Plan 9 2003/04 – 2008/09 (MFDP, 2003:246), WMAs inhibit expansion of grazing land, development of boreholes/watering points and access to land for cultivation. In Botswana, wildlife is owned, controlled and managed by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP). Prior to the adoption of the CBNRM program in CBNRM areas, individuals interested in hunting had to apply for hunting licenses from the DWNP. Hunting licenses were not bundled together and given to a community, but rather, individuals had to obtain individual hunting licenses. Safari operators obtained commercial hunting concessions and photographic lodge operating licenses from the relevant Land Boards and DWNP. With the adoption of the Wildlife Conservation Policy in 1986, there was a shift in the wildlife utilization model in CBNRM areas, conceived under the catch phrase Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM).

The Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986 converted stretches of land that were formerly designated as "reserved" under the Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975 into WMAs (see Appendix 5 for timeline of CBNRM related events). According to NDP 9 2003/04 to 2008/09 (MFDP, 2003:246), WMAs were established by the DWNP and Division of Land Use Planning to serve as migratory corridors for wildlife between the protected areas as they allowed for movement that is essential for the survival of Botswana's wildlife in the arid environment. The WMAs were further sub-divided by DWNP and the Division of Land Use Planning into Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs), and these CHAs were subsequently

earmarked for various kinds of management and utilization. In all, the WMAs were subdivided into one hundred and sixty-three CHAs (see Appendix 2). The CHAs are today the major land units utilized for CBNRM activities. Under CBNRM, community refers to communities of place residing within a CHA and these communities of place could involve one village or several villages. Communities of interest residing outside the physical boundaries of the managed CHA often have their interests manifested by their involvement as either facilitator, member of network organizations or as financiers.

As the central government agency responsible for Botswana's wildlife resources, DWNP spearhead the development and implementation of the CBNRM program. At its inception phase, the CBNRM program was developed and implemented through the Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP), a jointly funded project by the central government and USAID. NRMP was housed within DWNP office blocks in Gaborone, Botswana's main administrative center. NRMP-DWNP CBNRM activities started in 1989 and NRMP support for CBNRM ceased in 1999. In 1995, the NRMP obtained the support of PACT, a US-based NGO interested in issues relating to community capacity building. PACT initiated a program called Institutional Reinforcement for Community Empowerment (IRCE), which spearheaded the community and institutional development component of CBNRM projects. In implementing the IRCE program with CBNRM CBOs, PACT solicited assistance from both local and international NGOs to perform the role of CBNRM CBO facilitators. It is important to note that there has been no formal CBNRM policy from the inception of CBNRM activities to present. Currently there is a Draft CBNRM Policy, which is yet to be endorsed by Parliament.

### **3.2 CBNRM Procedure**

The projects I selected for research are all wildlife-based CBNRM projects. In addition to wildlife based CBNRM projects, there are veld products<sup>1</sup>-based and cultural and or natural sites CBNRM projects in Botswana. Wildlife based CBNRM projects are in CHAs. Veld product-based CBNRM projects may operate without any special permission as

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<sup>1</sup> Veld products are non-timber forest products including foods, medicines, craft materials, tannings, gums, resins, dyes, essential oils, florist materials, ornamental plants, insects, horns, hides, skins and many other renewable natural resources.

long as the project does not harvest grapple<sup>2</sup> and other veld products governed by the 1974 Agricultural Resources Conservation Act (Arntzen et al., 2003). Cultural and or natural sites CBNRM projects involve CBNRM community based organization (CBO) utilization of cultural sites and natural sites for tourism purposes. Cultural and/or natural sites CBNRM projects are regulated by the Department of National Museum, Monuments and Art Gallery; veld products CBNRMs are regulated by the Agricultural Resource Board; and wildlife based CBNRM projects are regulated by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks.

Regarding wildlife based CBNRM, the Division of Land Use Planning Unit (DLUPU) and Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) agree on the optimal uses from a listing of uses for each Wildlife Management Area and Controlled Hunting Area (CHA). The list of potential uses encompasses hunting, photographic safaris or multiple purpose uses. Though most CHAs are on land zoned as Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs), several others are on multiple purpose areas, which include both wildlife management and livestock grazing (Gujadhur, 2000). According to the statement from the Tawana Land Board Secretary, a CHA that is zoned for CBNRM activities, even if it is in a multiple purpose area, cannot be used for large-scale grazing, as it is not zoned for grazing (Gujadhur, 2000). Leases offered by the Land Board for the purposes of a wildlife-based project in a multi-purpose area specify that there should be no new cultivation and settlement and no introduction or expansion of livestock activities and numbers. Gujadhur (2000) observed that because of these restrictions on agricultural activity, CBNRM thus has to provide a substantial alternative source of income to agriculture, although agriculture yields individual income and CBNRM yields income to the CBNRM CBO.

Once CHAs are zoned by the Division of Land Use Planning and DWNP, villages within the geographic area are subsequently mobilized by the DWNP/NRMP and other CBNRM facilitating NGOs and workshops are conducted with these villages to discuss procedures, roles and responsibilities of villages in CBNRM (Cassidy and Madzwamuse, 1999). The ultimate goal of these workshops is to help target village/s within the CHA to put

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<sup>2</sup> Grapple or devil's claw (*Harpogophytum procumbens*)(medicinal plant whose local name is sengaparile) is predominantly found in the Kgalagadi District and is harvested by local people who sell it to an NGO, Thusano Lefatsheng, which processes it for the local market.

together a CBNRM community based organization (CBO) which spearheads the village/s wildlife utilization program. The facilitators of these workshops also help village/s conduct need assessments. The general membership of the CBNRM CBO elects a CBNRM CBO Trust Board to perform the administrative work of the CBNRM CBO. The general membership of the CBNRM CBO usually consists of all adults (18 years and over) who are residents of a village/s with which the DWNP and the Land Board has signed a resource use lease. Before the CBNRM CBO can be registered with the Deeds Office (Botswana), the CBNRM CBOs' constitution must be approved by local government authorities. Once registered, the CBNRM CBO is entitled to a resource use lease from the Land Board and DWNP. The resource use lease entails a tourism concession and a wildlife off-take quota (Cassidy and Madzwamuse, 1999).

The resource use lease awarded to the CBNRM CBO offers the CBNRM CBO an opportunity to utilize resources inside a CHA in accordance with DWNP and Land Board guidelines. The CBNRM CBOs' right to utilize wildlife resources within a leased CHA is regulated by the DWNP by awarding annual wildlife off-take quotas. The CBNRM CBO has exclusive rights for the leased resources, and this exclusivity of rights does not extend to resources within the CHA that have not been included in the lease agreement. The resource use lease is awarded for a period of fifteen years and has to be renewed after every five years. The resource use lease permits a CBNRM CBO to sub-lease some or all leased resources to a third party. The DWNP and Land Board have set the sublease conditions for CBNRM CBOs to follow. According to the Joint-venture guidelines (1999) prepared by the DWNP, if a CBNRM CBO desires to sub-lease use of their CHA to a safari company, they ought to keep to a 1-1-3-5-5 year contract model. That is, the first and second subleases should last for a one year period, the third for three years and the fourth and fifth each for five years. The justification for the 1-1-3-5-5 year contract model was given by the DWNP as the desire to protect CBNRM CBOs that do not have much experience in business from being trapped with an undesirable partner or in an undesirable contract (Gujadhur, 2001).

At the district or sub-district level, the Central government created a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), consisting of personnel from the District Council, District Administration, Land Board and DWNP. TAC members hold ex-officio position on



community trust boards. TAC members are expected to attend community trust board meetings in an advisory role and have no vote within the community trust board. Much of the TAC influence on community trust boards has been visible in the area of joint venture development (Cassidy, 2000). The TAC's role is to obtain detailed information about each prospective joint venture partner and to acquaint private sector companies with each CBNRM CBOs' joint venture objectives through the publication of tender documents (Cassidy, 2000). The TAC is in addition responsible for overseeing the election of the community trust board. The TAC works in close liaison with a review committee appointed by the community trust board in reviewing and shortlisting all joint venture proposals from safari companies. Once potential joint venture partners have been short-listed, the list is presented to the general membership of the CBNRM CBO. On a given date, at the kgotla<sup>3</sup>, the general membership of the CBNRM CBO votes for the joint venture partner of their choice from the short-listed safari companies presented to them. The vote at the kgotla culminates with the selection of the Safari Company to sublease or 'partner' with the CBNRM CBO. The CBNRM CBO could either sublease all or part of their leased resources to the safari company.

The joint venture guidelines of 1999 developed by the DWNP encourage CBNRM CBOs to enter into joint venture agreements with a safari company. According to the guidelines, a joint venture agreement is an agreement between a CBNRM CBO and private sector company that does not involve the merging of assets. Joint Venture Agreements normally entails any one of the following;

i) The CBNRM CBO leases the land from the Land Board and in turn sub-leases it, and the resources contained therein, to a safari company or companies which pay an annual rental fee to the village/s organization.

ii) The CBNRM CBO sub-leases specific areas to one or more safari companies for the development of tourism infrastructure. The CBNRM CBO manages the natural resources of the remaining area and benefits from the income derived from hunting, fishing, wildlife

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<sup>3</sup> The kgotla is both a place and also an organizational form. It is the traditional administrative place within the village or is the chiefs' office. The chief is the leader of this organizational form.

viewing and other activities; while safari operators aim to profit from tourist lodge or camp income.

iii) The safari company or companies sub-lease the land from the community organization and provide their services at an agreed daily rate per tourist. The remainder of the daily rate income (gross profit) is then equally divided between the partners (Cassidy, 2000).

### **3.3 CBNRM in Zimbabwe**

CAMPFIRE is a CBNRM program that is based on devolution of power from central government to Rural District Councils (RDCs). Through section 95 of the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 as amended in 1982, the Minister can gazette a district as having appropriate authority (Arntzen et al., 2003). Appropriate authority confers full rights for wildlife to the RDC. At the district level, a District CAMPFIRE Coordinating Committee is formed to coordinate the program. Ward and village level CAMPFIRE committees are formed at the ward and village level. The Village level CAMPFIRE committee forms the basic unit of natural resource management and is responsible for controls of veld fires, apprehending poachers, problem animal control and participates in off-take quota setting (Arntzen et al., 2003). Revenue generated by the Village CAMPFIRE committee is managed by the RDC. The RDC keeps fifty percent of CBNRM proceeds in district coffers (Hill, 1996) and the remainder is disbursed to the Ward and Village CAMPFIRE committee. According to Mandondo (2000), the RDC is where effective decentralization ends, at least in terms of legal framework. RDCs consist of elected Councilors representing the interests of their constituent wards, district heads of line ministries, council executives, and chiefs as ex-officio members. Councilors often owe allegiance and are upwardly accountable to the major political party that endorses their candidature (Mandondo, 2000).

The local government in Zimbabwe, just as in Botswana, is upwardly accountable. However, in Botswana, CBNRM bypasses district councils and is implemented by central government departments working directly with CBNRM CBOs at the community/village level. In Zimbabwe, CBNRM involves devolution of natural resources to RDCs and not directly to ward and village CAMPFIRE committees. However, though the RDCs are supposed to be a form of local government, just as in the case of Botswana they are

dominated by central government and are accountable to it than the local people within the district. While revenue earned in CBNRM in Botswana goes directly into CBNRM CBOs' coffers, revenue generated by the CBNRM activities of ward and village CAMPFIRE committees in Zimbabwe are handled by the RDC. However, ward and village CAMPFIRE committees in Zimbabwe have more natural resource management responsibilities than is the case in Botswana. In Botswana, CBNRM CBOs just utilizes their annual wildlife quota set by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, while in Zimbabwe, ward and village CAMPFIRE committees are involved in the actual setting of the off-take quota. From this comparison, it is clear that local communities involved in CBNRM in the two countries occupy a subordinate position to central government and central government dominated district councils.

### 3.4 Number of CBNRM CBOs involved in CBNRM over the years in Botswana

There has been a significant increase in the number of CBNRM CBOs in Botswana over the years. This increase has meant that more villages have become involved, and almost all districts have one or more CBNRM CBO projects. Only five villages and one district were involved in CBNRM in 1993; by 2003, 120 villages and nine districts were involved. The geographical spread of CBNRM activity has been made possible by the adoption of non-wildlife based CBNRM. Wildlife based CBNRM is restricted to the four districts of Ngamiland, Chobe, Kgalagadi and Ghanzi. Table 3.1 below shows the cumulative number of CBNRM CBOs and villages and districts in CBNRM.

Table 3.1 Cumulative number of CBNRM CBOs in Botswana

	1993	1995	1997	1999	2001	2003
# of CBOs involved in CBNRM	2	6	19	45	61	83
# of CBNRM CBOs registered (or in the final process of registration)	1	4	10	26	46	67
# of CBNRM CBOs involved in Wildlife-based CBNRM	1	3	6	11	18	26
# of CBNRM CBOs which are not wildlife based	0	1	4	15	28	41
% of CBNRM CBOs which are wildlife based	100	75	60	42	39	39
% of CBNRM CBOs which are not wildlife based	0	25	40	58	61	61
# of Villages in CBNRM	5	12	30	91	99	120
# of Districts with CBNRM CBOs	1	3	6	8	8	9

### 3.4.1 Range of CBNRM CBO activities with regard to *CBNRM*

A majority of CBNRM CBOs are involved in veld products related activities followed by those involved in hunting joint venture agreements with hunting safari operators. A small percentage of the wildlife based CBOs auction their wildlife quota. Other CBNRM CBOs are involved in agro-forestry, campsite development, cultural tourism, game farming, integrated development, photographic tourism and subsistence hunting. In most cases CBNRM CBOs are involved in more than one of these activities. For the wildlife-based CBNRM CBOs only a portion of the annual wildlife quota is set aside for subsistence hunting, while the greater percentage is apportioned to hunting joint venture agreements. There is very little CBNRM activity on game farms. Table 3.2 below shows a range of CBNRM CBOs' activities with regard to CBNRM.

Table 3.2 CBNRM CBO Activities and Number of CBNRM CBOs Involved

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Number of CBNRM CBOs</i>
Joint Venture Agreement with hunting safari operator	15
Subsistence hunting of part of the quota	11
Auction wildlife quota	2
Photographic tourism	7
Cultural tourism	10
Veld products	35
Campsite	9
Agro-forestry	5
Integrated development	8
Game farming	3

### **3.5 Safari Hunting in Botswana**

CBNRM CBOs engaged in CBNRM are faced with the challenge regarding ways to earn money from their annual wildlife quota. The options that these CBNRM CBOs have is either to carry out the hunting themselves for local consumption or follow the DWNP guidelines on joint venture agreements with safari companies. Most CBNRM CBOs have opted for the joint venture agreements. Scout Wilson Consultants (2001) found that safari hunting in the Okavango Delta in Botswana commences in the United States where individual hunters from all over the world attend the Safari Club International (SCI) convention in January of every year. At the SCI conference, safari hunting companies, including those operating in Botswana, sell their hunts to prospective hunters for up to 2 to 3 years in advance (Mbaiwa, 2003). Once safari companies enter into a sublease agreement with a CBNRM CBO, they are entitled to the wildlife quota within the leased CHA and subsequently market it at the SCI Convention in the United States: <http://www.safariclub.org>

### **3.6 Botswana Local Government Structure**

#### **3.6.1 Local Government Institutions**

The Government of Botswana functions through a two-tier system of government: central government and local government. Central government operates at the national level and local government at the district and sub-district level. There are nine districts in Botswana. In large districts, local government has decentralized some of their functions to sub-districts. Local governments are comprised of the district administration, district council, tribal administration and land board. The district administration consists of central government offices operating at the district level, having the status of a local authority without corporate status. An Act of Parliament (Parliamentary Act Chapter 40) established the district councils with statutory powers to exercise governance and take responsibility for development in their districts. The tribal administration is responsible for the administration of justice under the system of customary law. The land boards derive their statutory responsibilities to hold land in trust for the citizens of Botswana from the Tribal Land Act of 1968.

### 3.6.1.1 District Administration

The District Commissioner (DC), who is chosen by the Minister of Local Government, heads the district administration. The Office of DC was created during the colonial period. The office of DC acted as the center of colonial administration in the tribal areas, which today make up districts and sub-districts. It operated as the administrative body over tribal chiefs and headmen (Government of Botswana, 2001). When Botswana gained independence in 1966, the office of DC remained, but this time to service the new central government. At independence, in addition to the DC's office, district councils were established. The DC became ex-officio member of the district council. The DC is the highest-ranking central government representative at the district level (Government of Botswana, 2001). The DC has the following responsibilities:

- Chairs the Land Board selection committee
- Chairs the staff committee of the Tribal Administration.
- Coordinates the preparation and implementation of district development plans (MFDP, 2002).

According to the report of the Second Presidential Commission on the Local Government Structure in Botswana (Government of Botswana, 2001), the decision by the central government to have the DC as supervisor of all district level institutions has infuriated other local government institutions, particularly District Councils, who find that the central government is insensitive to their establishment as a body of governance at the district level. District Councils argue that since they are the bodies of governance at the local level, elected by the people and granted mandate to govern, they cannot accept the central government imposition of control over them by a single employee of central government (Government of Botswana, 2001).

The report of the Second Presidential Commission on the Local Government Structure in Botswana (Government of Botswana, 2001) noted that central government departments in the districts operate with little or no direct contact with either the DC's office or any of the local government authorities. They report directly to their ministries in the capital city, Gaborone, and get their work directives from there, with no local control. Though the DC is expected to oversee the work of all central government staff operating at

the district level, that has been difficult to implement, since different ministries hand down orders from their head offices to their personnel in the district with no consideration for the DC's office or the elected District Council. Other constraints regarding coordination of district activities pertain to the fact that administrative boundaries of central government departments, such as education, agriculture, health, etc. often do not coincide with district boundaries (Government of Botswana, 2001). Hence coordination of activities at the district levels remains a major challenge. Though the office of DC was initially thought of as responsible for linking up local government and central government, it is failing in this regard, as central government offices at the district level continue to maintain 'hot lines' with their ministries in the capital city.

To facilitate the complementarity of programs and projects between central and local government, District Development Committees (DDCs), responsible for district planning, were set up. The DDC consist of representatives of the District Council, Land Boards, Tribal Administration and District Administration. The DDC prepares District Plans, which are often subordinated to National Plans. District councils complained to the Second Presidential Commission on the Local Government Structure in Botswana (Government of Botswana, 2001) that development planning and decision-making, in spite of DDCs, remain centralized, constituting an obstacle to creative responses to local issues by local government institutions. Another issue raised by the district councils was the over-representation of central government employees within DDCs.

### **3.6.1.2 District Council**

District Councils have a legislative and administrative branch. The legislative branch consists of elected councillors. District Councillors represent both their political parties and their constituency. The Minister of Local Government, who is himself/herself a politician and member of the ruling party, nominates additional district Councillors, and often nominates District Councillors from his/her own political party. Such a practice neutralizes the political will of the local people, since the ruling party can achieve a majority in District Council through such nominations. District Councillors provide upward channels of communications from their constituents to the government at the district level. Members of Parliament provide upward channels of communication from their constituents to the government at the national

level. Fortmann (1986) observes that upward channels of communications from rural residents to government at both the district and national level function poorly.

Since most district boundaries are drawn along tribal lines, the tribal chief is an ex-officio member of the District Council. In districts where there are more than one chief and more than one tribe, like in the Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, Chobe and North East Districts, none of these chiefs hold ex-officio membership to the District Council (Government of Botswana, 2001). District Commissioners (DC) are members of the District Council. The Local Government Act (CAP 40:01) assigned the DC supervisory role over the District Council. The District Council Chairperson is the head of the legislative branch of the district council. District Councillors select the district council chairperson from among themselves.

The administrative branch of the District Council consists of the district council secretary, who is the chief executive, and supporting staff recruited by the Department of Local Government Service Management. The Department of Local Government Service Management is a central government department based within the Ministry of Local Government. The Second Presidential Commission on the Local Government Structure in Botswana observes that the legislative branch of the district council have little control over delivery capacity and performance of District Council staff since these are handled directly by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government (Government of Botswana, 2001). The District Council is responsible for primary education, health and sanitation, rural roads, rural water supplies, social and community development, physical planning and remote area development. The source of revenue for District Councils is the revenue support grants from central government. In addition to central government funding, District Councils raise their funds through trade license fees, stray cattle sale (matimela), water levy and investment income from general fund balances (MFDP, 2003).

### **3.6.1.3 Tribal Administration**

After Botswana's independence in 1966, the development and governance responsibilities of chiefs within their tribal territories were assigned to District Councils. Tribal territory boundaries that formed the chiefs' areas of influence were re-demarcated in some cases and maintained in others, as new district administrative boundaries were drawn. In addition to the chiefs' loss of power to District Councils, they also lost custody over tribal



land through the Tribal Land Act of 1968, as power over tribal land was transferred to the Land Boards. Chiefs traditionally played a role in land allocation and management of communal resources (Zufferey, 1986). Zufferey (1986) observes that early land use practices show that land management was a community affair based on the traditional chief-ward<sup>4</sup> relationship in which the chief was expected to be the provider or manager of the common patrimony, subject, however, to common decisions taken with the people through the kgotla system. The Tribal Land Act of 1968 stripped the chiefs of their land management functions and responsibilities and transferred such functions to the Land Board, an institution located outside the community and accountable to the central government and not the community, though controlling community resources. Zufferey (1986) observes that with the loss of control over resources, chieftainship and the kgotla system were weakened as traditional community decision making institutions.

The current functions of the chiefs are:

- To exercise his/her powers under the Chieftainship Act to promote the welfare of the members of his/her tribe – with limited resources after being stripped of most of his/her powers
- To carry out any instructions given to him/her by the Minister of Local Government.
- To ensure that the tribe is informed of any development projects in the area which affects the tribe
- To convene kgotla meetings to obtain advice as to the exercise of his/her functions under the chieftainship act
- To perform such other functions as may be conferred on him/her by or under the Chieftainship Act.
- To preside over the customary courts (Government of Botswana, 2001)

The Chieftainship Act subordinated the chiefs to the Minister of Local Government, who is their supervisor, and their role has been reduced to informing and winning support from their subjects for government programs and projects. The chiefs are on the central

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<sup>4</sup> Ward - kin-based residential areas. Each ward was assigned by the chief, cultivation and cattle grazing areas and was responsible for its management. Each ward was headed by the wardhead. Today, cultivation and grazing areas are occupied by people not just from different wards but from different villages, or in some cases, districts (Fortmann, 1986)

government's payroll, making them government employees answerable to the Minister of Local Government. The Minister of Local Government has the power to suspend a chief who contravenes the Chieftainship Act and/or other Ministry of Local Government statutes pertaining to their roles and responsibilities. In a way, the chief merely endorses government programs in the community he leads.

#### **3.6.1.4 Land Board**

There are twelve Main Land Boards in Botswana. Main Land Boards have decentralized some of the land allocation functions to Sub-Land Boards. There are currently 38 Sub-Land Boards in Botswana. A Land Board has a membership of ten, half of whom are elected by members of the public and the other half appointed by the Minister of Lands and Housing. The minister may appoint his/her half from his/her political party to neutralize those elected by members of the public. The Land Board derives its statutory responsibilities from the Tribal Land Act of 1968. The Land Board chairperson heads the Land Board. The Land Board secretary is a paid employee of the central government's Department of Local Government Service Management and is responsible for coordinating the administrative work of the Land Board. The Land Board Chairperson and locally elected members of the land board have no control over the land board personnel since the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government controls them. The functions of the Land Board involves granting of rights to use land, cancellation of the grant of any rights to use any land, imposition of restrictions on the use of tribal land, authorizing any transfer of tribal land and hearing appeals from decisions of Subordinate Land Board in respect of any of its functions conferred on such Sub-Land Boards (Government of Botswana, 2001).

The Land Board allocates land, rather than land planning. The central government's Department of Town and Regional Planning (DTRP) is responsible for land use planning in Botswana. This Department is housed within the Ministry of Lands and Housing. DTRP is responsible for the physical planning process through the preparation of Regional Master Plans, District Settlement Strategies and Settlement Development Plans. At the district level, the District Physical Planner, who reports directly to the Director of DTRP in Gaborone, represents DTRP. Besides the DTRP plans, a committee composed of staff from the District Administration, the District Council and the Land Board also draw up district land use plans.

This committee makes up the District Land Use Planning Unit (DLUPU). The secretariat of DLUPU is the central government's Department of Lands as represented by the District Officer (Lands) at the district or sub-district level. It is not clear how DTRP and DLUPU plans are coordinated. The Land Boards allocate land in accordance to these plans.

### **3.6.1.5 Village Development Committees (VDCs)**

A Presidential directive established VDCs in 1968 to be the main institution for development planning at the village level (Government of Botswana, 2001). From the general membership of the village, ten individuals (both men and women eighteen years and over) are elected at a public meeting at the kgotla into the VDC. Membership to the VDC used to be on voluntary basis, but today, the district council pays VDC members a sitting allowance, making them 'employees' of the district council. The Village Councillor, who is an elected representative of the village at the district council and member of a political party and the Village chief are ex-officio members of the VDC. VDCs in most cases do not have offices to work from, and in most cases just convene at the kgotla for their business. For their projects, VDCs are required to raise a contribution of up to 10% of the estimated cost of their projects before assistance funds from district council are released for those projects. The VDC receives technical advice from extension workers, especially the Community Development Officer, who is an employee of the Social and Community Development Division of the District Council. VDC projects are supported through VDC-raised funds and through district council funding. The following are functions of VDCs, as provided in the District Planning Handbook:

- a) Identify and discuss local needs
- b) Help villagers to prioritize their local needs.
- c) Formulate proposals for the solution of identified local needs
- d) Determine the extent to which the people can satisfy their identified needs on self-help basis
- e) Develop a plan of action for their village area
- f) Solicit the assistance of donors and other development agencies
- g) Mobilize the community and its institutions for development action

- h) Provide a forum for contact between village leaders, politicians, extension workers, the private sector and district authorities, to enhance the flow of development information
- i) Represent villagers in development matters and act as a source and reference point in matters pertaining to village development (Ministry of Local Government Lands and Housing, 1997).

### **3.7 Discussion**

The establishment of districts and sub-district councils by the Government of Botswana and the subsequent creation of 'local government institutions', in most cases replacing or modifying existing ones, have all been established under the process of decentralization. According to Mathur (1983:68), decentralization programs emanate from a central government that has accepted the necessity of decentralized administration and as such, design institutions and processes to provide it. Mathur (1983:68) argues that a central government adopts decentralization programs as a mechanism to increase the central government effectiveness and not necessarily because decentralization promotes greater participation in public decision making or that it can improve equity, development, and resource management, as observed by Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475). Thus, in line with Mathur's (1983) argument, the creation of 'local government institutions' is geared towards improving central government's administrative efficiency. Hence, Mathur (1983:68) concludes that such decentralization is accompanied by supervision and control.

In Botswana, decentralization was preceded by centralization. For instance, the chiefs were stripped of their decision making powers and resources by the Tribal Land Act of 1968, and a central government regulatory institution, the Land Board, was created to substitute for the chiefs' role. Half of the Land Board members are elected by the local people and receive their sitting allowances from central government, and the other half is appointed by a central government minister and the Land Board administrative work is carried out by employees of the central government. Thus, utilizing Agrawal and Ribot's (1999:475) terminology, it is clear that the Land Board is upwardly accountable. Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) argue that it is important to understand the structures of accountability in which actors are located in order to understand whether institutions or organizations are local administrative units or

local government units. Rondinelli (1983:89) and Uphoff (1986) make a distinction between local administrative and local government units. According to Uphoff (1986), local administrative units and local government units differ in that local administrative units are responsible to higher levels of decision making, whereas local government units are accountable at least in principle to constituents. The Land Board is a local administrative unit as opposed to a local government unit.

Besides the Land Board, other 'local government institutions' in Botswana include the District Administration, Tribal Administration and the District Council. The District Administration was created through the process of deconcentration as central government ministries and departments in Botswana created regional offices in the districts to facilitate implementation of their policies and programs at the district level. Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:18) and Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) define deconcentration as involving the redistribution of administrative responsibilities only within the central government. The District Administration is upwardly accountable. The Tribal Administration was created after the tribal chiefs were stripped of their development and governance responsibility within their tribal territories, which was transferred to the District Council. The chiefs also lost custody over tribal land in 1973, as the Tribal Land Act of 1968 transferred power over tribal land to the Land Boards. The Tribal Administration is upwardly accountable since the chiefs are responsible to the central government's Minister of Local Government and are paid employees of the central government. Therefore, the Tribal Administration is a local administrative unit as opposed to a local government unit.

In Botswana, an Act of Parliament (Parliamentary Acts Chapter 40:01) established the District Councils with statutory powers to exercise governance and take responsibility for development in their districts. Cohen and Peterson (1999) perceive devolution as entailing the creation of local government institutions with statutory powers and corporate status. Despite their creation as statutory bodies with corporate status, District Councils in Botswana are subordinated to central government authority. Gasper (1990), argue the Government of Botswana changed its position after the 1969 national elections, as ruling party politicians became worried that District Councils' could possibly develop into centers of opposition and criticism. To neutralize the District Councils, the District Administration was accorded the

status of a local government institution without corporate status. The District Commissioner, who is the head of the District Administration, was given supervisory powers over the District Council. In fact, the District Commissioner has supervisory responsibility over all 'local government institutions'. The District Council's predicament is further compounded by the fact that District Councils rely on the central government for their funding. The District Council's administrative staff is on the payroll of the central government's Department of Local Government Service Management. The only organ within the District Council that is in principle downwardly accountable is the legislative branch. The legislative branch is made up of locally elected Councillors. However, the legislative branch of the District Council have little control over delivery capacity and performance of District Council staff, since these are handled directly by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government (Government of Botswana, 2001). In Agrawal and Ribot's (1999:475) terminology, the administrative branch of the District Council is upwardly accountable. Thus, the fact that District Councils have been created as statutory bodies with corporate status does not make them local government institutions, but like other 'local government institutions', they are more like local administrative units.

The implementation of CBNRM in Botswana is not mindful of the fact that District Councils have statutory powers to exercise governance and take responsibility for development in their districts. A central government department, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, working with villages within the districts with little participation by 'local government units', implements the alleged devolution of natural resource management and utilization to villages within districts. In a way, it is a blessing that CBNRM projects are implemented outside the local government structure as it is today, since the implementation of such projects under the current local government structure means that CBNRM-generated resources might end up in central government coffers or District Council coffers and yet District Councils are not accountable to the communities generating these resources. This does not mean that the alleged devolution of natural resource management and utilization to villages can itself be classified as devolution, as chapter five of my study will show. The answer lies in the creation of local government units, not just local administrative units, in which CBNRM projects could be enmeshed.

### **Chapter 4: Methodology**

In this study, I identify local and extra-local institutional actors impacting CBNRM in Botswana. I then analyze the institutional actors' political and institutional culture, in particular their desired futures and mental causal models. By identifying similarities in desired future conditions and differences in mental causal models used by different institutions in making decisions, my study's findings will help groups that have hitherto not worked together or viewed each other as enemies to analyze alternative paths of action that could create coalitions to implement those actions. CBNRM-related networks have been analyzed. The study identifies decision makers (institutional actors) that participated in CBNRM decisions and their implementation. The study also assesses the networks that exist between levels and institutions to facilitate decision-making and/or to give advantage to one group over another.

Content analysis of official documents and institutional interviews to determine how issues regarding CBNRM were framed, the sequence of decisions taken by various actors, major points of negotiation, and the information and processes that are most helpful in reaching the decisions are all data for my study. Using these data sources, I was able to determine the desired future conditions the institutional actors seek for the area and their mental causal models of how to achieve them. The principal units of analysis are the institutional actors: CBNRM CBOs, Local Government Agencies and NGOs; National Agencies (central government, donors and NGOs); and International Agencies (government, donor and NGOs). The study undertakes a content analysis of central government policy documents, development plans (national and district plans), sectoral plans, ministerial and departmental reports, organizations and associations records and meeting minutes, and CBNRM Support Services publications. The data have been classified into nodes (theme areas). The organizing themes for the data include mental causal models; desired future conditions; activities; and number of networks.

Besides the content analysis, interviews were held with the leadership of the four study CBNRM CBOs in the month of June 2004. Interviews were held at Pandametenga with the KCT leadership; Kasane, with the CECT leadership; Khwai Village with the KDT leadership; and Sankuyo Village with the STMT leadership. The interviews with CECT and

KCT both of which more than one village is involved, were held with the Trust Board Chairperson and Coordinator respectively. The KCT Chairperson and the CECT Coordinator pointed out that it is difficult and expensive to bring all the Trust Board members together for an interview. At KDT and STMT, interviews were held with the full Trust Board members and members of the VDC. At STMT the Sankuyo Village Chief was also present for the interview. For KDT and STMT it was easy to bring together the complete Trust Board members for an interview since all of them live in the village. All, interviews lasted for one and half hours and were tape recorded and later transcribed. For these interviews, there was no formal questionnaire, but a compiled list of key theme areas to guide the interview.

#### *Selecting study CBNRM CBOs*

Presently, there are in Botswana 67 registered CBNRM CBOs, 26 of them wildlife-based CBNRM CBOs. Due to limited resources, only a sample of these projects could be examined. A purposive sample of four wildlife based CBNRM CBOs was drawn. Besides the wildlife-based CBNRM projects there are also veld products and cultural tourism based CBNRM projects in Botswana. I chose only wildlife-based CBNRMs, since this category is the most developed in terms of legislation and policy and has been in place for over a decade. In fact CBNRM has been perceived in some quarters as a “wildlife thing” (Arntzen et al., 2003). I selected the four wildlife-based CBNRM CBOs because they are among the oldest. Logistics also influenced the selection. CECT is the oldest CBNRM CBO in Botswana; KCT was selected for logistical reasons (since it is located closer to CECT, my first choice study case) and would therefore cut on transport costs considering the fact that my study was self-funded. STMT and KDT are also some of the oldest CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. CECT, KCT, STMT, and KDT are all located in almost the same region and therefore saved on travel expenses. I initially intended to also study CBNRM CBOs in the Kgalagadi District, like the Ngwaa Khobee Xeya Trust, but I was constrained by resources. The selected study CBNRM CBOs are located in the North-West District and Chobe Sub-District of Botswana. The other selection criteria for the study CBNRM CBOs were single versus multiple village and differences in ethnic composition between the study CBNRM CBOs. For each study CBNRM CBO, I coded the data collected by context, process and impact indicators of five of the seven community sustainability capitals (Flora, 2001; Narayan, 1999). The study carries



out a baseline study of the characteristics of the CBNRM CBO (context) in an effort to detect the pertinent indicators that can characterize community organizational success in decreasing conflict both inside the community and between the community and outside institutional actors.

The study also examines the activities (process) undertaken by study CBNRM CBOs in implementing the CBNRM program. My study's analysis of the participation by state, civil society, market and donor institutional actors in Botswana is guided by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) theoretical framework on advocacy coalitions. By identifying similarities and differences in desired futures and mental causal models within and between state, civil society, donor and market stakeholders in Botswana, my study seeks to demonstrate how these actors in Botswana complement and/or conflict with one another along those aspects pertinent to CBNRM. The assessment of CBNRM at the community level is guided by Flora (2001) community sustainability capitals - natural capital, financial/built capital, social capital and human capital. This section of my also study assesses the level of bonding, bridging and linking social capital of the study CBNRM CBOs.

## **Chapter 5: Assessment of CBNRM at the National Level**

### **5.1 Participation by a range of stakeholders in CBNRM: State (Government), Civil Society (NGO), Market (Private Sector) and Donor (Funder) Institutional Actors**

My study's analysis of the participation by state, civil society, market and donor institutional actors in Botswana is guided by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) theoretical framework on advocacy coalitions. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) observe that institutional actors, both public and private, sharing policy beliefs within a subsystem form advocacy coalitions to influence government policy to realize their beliefs. Flora et al. (2000) observe that advocacy coalitions form around specific issues to realize shared desired futures. According to Flora et al. (2000:2) public and private institutional actors share certain beliefs that anchor common desired futures (outcomes) and mental causal models (implicit and explicit means for reaching those futures). By identifying similarities and differences in desired futures and mental causal models within and between state, civil society, donor and market stakeholders in Botswana, my study seeks to demonstrate how these actors in Botswana complement and/or conflict with one another along those aspects pertinent to CBNRM.

The Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986, which currently guides the implementation of CBNRM in Botswana, holds that CBNRM CBOs ought to economically benefit from CBNRM. The expectation is that, such economic benefit for CBNRM CBOs will lead to their supporting state wildlife conservation efforts. Botswana's CBNRM desired future outcomes are expressed under this policy in terms of natural resource conservation and economic development. There is a general agreement between CBNRM institutional actors that CBNRM entails conservation of natural resources that supports community economic development. However, the mental causal models for achieving natural resource conservation and economic development differ between state institutional actors and non-government actors. Flora et al. (2000:3) caution that having similar desired futures (beliefs) does not guarantee cooperation between institutional actors, since such actors might have different mental causal models.

Table 5.1 below summarizes the mental causal models of state, NGO, donor, study CBNRM CBOs, and market institutional actors for attaining natural resource conservation and economic development.

Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators

Actor	Activity	Activity	Mental Causal Model
Desired Future	<i>Natural resource Conservation</i>	<i>Economic Development</i>	
<b>MARKET (SAFARI OPERATORS)</b>			
<b>HCH Hunting Safaris</b> – has joint venture agreement with STMT <b>Rann Hunting Safaris</b> – has joint venture agreement with CECT. <b>Blackbeard and Hepburn Hunting Safaris</b> – has joint venture agreement with KCT	Undertaking safari hunting within subleased CHAs according to the hunting guidelines provided by the DWNP and enforced by Community Escort Guides <sup>5</sup> (CEGS)	Subleasing the CHA from the CBNRM CBO to setup hunting camps and lodges  Purchasing the annual wildlife quota from the CBNRM CBO for safari hunting.  Providing employment for CBNRM CBO members in their hunting camps and lodges  Involvement in community development projects for the CBNRM CBO with which they have a joint venture agreement	Through joint venture agreements between CBNRM CBOs and safari operators, CBNRM CBOs can benefit from the safari operators' skills in tourism development

<sup>5</sup> Community Escort Guides – members of the CBNRM CBO trained by the DWNP to monitor hunting by safari operators within their CHA

Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators

Actor	Activity	Activity	Mental Causal Model
Desired Future	<i>Natural resource Conservation</i>	<i>Economic Development</i>	
<b>STUDY CBNRM CBOs</b>			
<b>CECT, KCT, STMT &amp; KDT</b>	Utilization of the annual wildlife quota coordinated by the CBNRM CBO Trust Board	Sale of the annual wildlife quota to a hunting safari operator	For sustainable management and use of natural resources in CHAs, CBNRM CBOs ought to be involved in utilization, protection, conservation and monitoring of natural resources
	Monitoring hunting operations of safari operators within the CHA	Subleasing land within CHA to a safari operator for tourism development	
	Establish a monitoring committee with powers to monitor utilization activities, investigate instances of non-compliance and to make recommendations to the general membership for resolution	Developing tourism enterprises within the CHA (e.g. camps and lodges)	
	Cooperate with any other body in relation to any matter intended to advance the objectives of the CBNRM CBO	Investing money generated from the sale of the annual wildlife quota, land sublease and CBNRM CBO tourism enterprises into community development projects	
	Draw up a body of resource governance by-laws and institute sanctions governing management and utilization of natural resources within the area by the CBNRM CBO Trust Board		

Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators

Actor	Activity	Activity	Mental Causal Model
Desired Future	<i>Natural resource Conservation</i>	<i>Economic Development</i>	
<b>DONOR</b>			
<p><b>USASHF</b> - There is need to address issues of democracy and democratic institutions as a means of promoting social welfare and self-help endeavors of local communities</p> <p><b>SNV</b> - regards CBNRM as a means towards empowering poor communities to take control over their land and resources, to tap their potential and acquire skills to design their own development.</p> <p><b>ADF</b> - believes that local communities are a vital source of ideas and energy for development</p> <p><b>CFLI</b></p>	<p>Funds CBNRM CBO capacity building for utilization of CBNRM leased resources</p>	<p>Providing grants for CBNRM CBO and local NGO capacity building programs</p>	<p>Local people are the primary actors in their own development, and any assistance accorded them is geared towards building their capacity to plan, implement and monitor their development activities</p>
<p><b>PACT</b> - Local communities must be the driving force in ending poverty and injustice</p> <p><b>GEF</b> - The program operates on the premise that people will be empowered to protect their environment when they are organized to take action, have a measure of control over access to the natural resource base, have the necessary information and knowledge, and believe that their social and economic well-being is dependent on sound long-term resource management.</p> <p><b>AWF</b> - Through community based conservation, wildlife can be conserved while people's well being is also improved.</p> <p><b>HIVOS</b> - aim at a world in which people are equal and in which no limits are set on people's opportunities for development</p> <p><b>IUCN</b> - Livelihoods of the poor depend on the sustainable management of natural resources.</p> <p><b>DED</b></p>	<p>Provide grants to CBNRM CBOs to help them obtain training from service providers (NGOs included) on sound natural resources management practices</p> <p>Develop partnerships and networks of local stakeholders supporting and strengthening CBNRM CBOs and NGOs capacity to address environmental challenges.</p>	<p>Providing grants for CBNRM CBO and local NGO capacity building programs</p>	<p>The sustainable management of natural resources should be linked with improved livelihoods of the local people i.e. sustainable natural resource management has to be linked to sustainable livelihoods</p>

Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators

Actor	Activity	Activity	Mental Causal Model
Desired Future	<i>Natural resource Conservation</i>	<i>Economic Development</i>	
<b>NGO</b>			
<b>CI, FAB, FONSAG, PTB, TL, and VPR&amp;D</b>	<p>Developing and implementing environmental education programs</p> <p>Provision of tree seedlings to local communities</p> <p>Community skills training in agro-forestry project management</p> <p>Provision of extension support and training on soil conservation, water harvesting, seed conservation, agro-forestry, and organic gardening with farmers and home gardeners</p> <p>Facilitation of community-based veld products domestication trials</p> <p>Training CBNRM CBOs in veld resources monitoring and management</p> <p>Developing community based veld products monitoring tool</p> <p>Facilitation on community natural resources assessments</p> <p>CBNRM CBO organizational capacity building and facilitation for utilization of CBNRM leased resources</p>	<p>CBNRM CBO organizational capacity building and facilitation for utilization of CBNRM leased resources</p>	<p>The sustainable management of natural resources should be linked with improved livelihoods of the local people i.e. sustainable natural resource management has to be linked to sustainable livelihoods</p>

Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators

Actor	Activity	Activity	Mental Causal Model
<i>Desired Future</i>	<i>Natural resource Conservation</i>	<i>Economic Development</i>	
<b>STATE</b>			
<b>MEWT</b> - CBNRM Policy (Draft June 2004) if implemented will encompass natural resource management, utilization and monitoring by CBNRM CBOs	The DWNP, ARB and NMMAG will lease out resources under their jurisdiction to CBNRM CBOs for utilization and monitoring. CBNRM will widen activities from just being wildlife based (as is the case with the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986) to a strategy that encompasses a wider range of natural resources.	CBNRM CBOs involved in wildlife off-take quota setting, utilization and wildlife monitoring	CBNRM CBOs' participation in the management, utilization and monitoring of state owned natural resources is essential for sustainable natural resource management and use
<b>MoA</b> - Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975 favors private cattle ranch creation in communal rangelands	The Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975 converted communal land into fenced privately owned ranches for effective management	Commercial cattle farming is expected to increase agricultural output create employment and raise rural incomes.	Private cattle ranch creation in communal rangelands is an essential requirement for the effective management of communal rangelands and for increased agricultural output
<b>MoA</b> - National Policy on Agricultural Development of 1991 favors private cattle ranch creation in communal rangelands	The National Policy on Agricultural Development of 1991 just like the TGLP of 1975 converted communal land into fenced privately owned ranches for effective management	Commercial cattle farming is expected to increase agricultural output create employment and raise rural incomes.	Private cattle ranch creation in communal rangelands is an essential requirement for the effective management of communal rangelands and for increased agricultural output
<b>MEWT</b> - Game Ranching Policy of 2002 supports the creation of private wildlife ranches	The policy does not give a conservation justification of how freehold game ranching in fenced farms supports conservation of wildlife resources.	The game ranches are expected to create rural employment by developing local processing of products of the game industry	Private game ranching will result in increased returns from wildlife resources
<b>NGO</b>			
<b>ACORD, KOMKU, and TOCaDI</b>	CBNRM CBO organizational capacity building and facilitation for utilization of CBNRM leased resources	CBNRM CBO organizational capacity building and facilitation for utilization of CBNRM leased resources	Local people are the primary actors in their own development, and any assistance accorded them is geared towards building their capacity to plan, implement and monitor their development activities



Table 5.1 Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators

Actor	Activity	Activity	Mental Causal Model
Desired Future	<i>Natural resource Conservation</i>	<i>Economic Development</i>	
<b>STATE</b>			
<b>Land Board</b> – Tribal Land Act of 1968 transfers the authority over the administration of land from the tribal chiefs to the Land Board	The Land Board regulates the use of tribal/communal/customary land by granting land use rights, imposing restrictions on the use of land, cancellation of the grant of any rights to use land and authorizing any transfer of tribal land	The Land Board is expected to allocate land for income generating activities like commercial, subsistence and industrial enterprises	State ownership and regulation of land resource use is key to sustainable land management and development
<b>ARB</b> – Agricultural Resources Conservation Act of 1974 brings commercial veld product resources under Agricultural Resource Board	ARB regulate the utilization of veld product resources by individuals and communities by issuing harvest licenses and permits	ARB issues licenses and permits to individuals and CBNRM CBOs to harvest veld product resources for processing and sale	State ownership and regulation of veld product resource use is key to sustainable management and use of veld products
<b>NMMAG</b> – The Monuments and Relics Act of 1984 confers authority over monuments and relics to the Department of National Museum, Monuments and Art Gallery	NMMAG licenses CBNRM CBO cultural and or natural sites tourism activities.	NMMAG issues licenses and permits to CBNRM CBOs to develop and utilize cultural and or natural sites for tourism purposes	State ownership and regulation of cultural and natural sites use for tourism purposes is essential for their sustainable management and use
<b>DWNP</b> – The Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 brings every wild animal, as well as insects under the jurisdiction of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks	DWNP regulates the utilization of wildlife resources by giving hunting licenses or permits to individuals and wildlife resource use leases to CBNRM CBOs.	DWNP issues licenses or permits to individuals and resource use leases to CBNRM CBOs for commercial and subsistence utilization of wildlife resources.	State ownership and regulation of wildlife resource use is essential for sustainable wildlife management and use
<b>DWNP</b> – The Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986 regulates the commercial and subsistence use of wildlife resources	DWNP regulates utilization of wildlife resources by awarding annual wildlife off-take quotas	DWNP awards annual wildlife quotas to CBNRM CBOs which in turn auction the quota to a safari company	State ownership and regulation of wildlife resource use is essential for sustainable wildlife management and use
<b>DoT</b> – The Tourism Policy of 1990 regulates tourism related activities by issuing operation licenses – issued by the Department of Tourism	DoT regulates tourism activities	Establishment of tourism enterprises in rural areas that will create rural employment. Infrastructure provided for tourism expected to benefit rural development	State regulation of tourism enterprises is essential for eco-tourism

### *State*

Government legislation and policies presented on table 5.1 show similar desired futures of natural resource conservation and economic development. For these legislations and policies, however, there are two identifiable mental causal models for achieving natural resource conservation and economic development, which are;

i) *Centralization and regulation of natural resource use* – the Agricultural Resources Conservation Act of 1974, the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992, Monuments and Relics Act of 1984, Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986, and the Tribal Land Act of 1968 all aim at regulating the use of natural resources as a means for achieving desired future. These legislative and policy documents can be best described as expropriatory and regulatory. The Agricultural Resources Conservation Act (CAP 35:06), the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992, the Monuments and relics Act (Cap 59:03) and the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986 expropriate veld products, wildlife and cultural and or natural sites resources and put them under the central government Department of Agricultural Resource Board, Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the Department of National Museum, Monuments and Art Gallery respectively. These expropriatory legislations and policies brings natural resources under the jurisdiction of the central government which then mandates central government departments to regulate the use of such resources by issuing licenses, permits and leases. Under these pieces of legislation and policies, CBNRM CBOs and individuals benefit from natural resources by obtaining resource use leases, permits and licenses from regulatory central government departments. However, the Draft CBNRM Policy (2004) as proposed gives some degree of natural resource management responsibility to CBNRM CBOs, though such resources still remain the property of the state.

ii) *Privatization of natural resources* – the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) of 1975 and the National Policy on Agricultural Development (NPAD) of 1991 view private cattle ranch creation in communal rangelands as an essential requirement for the effective management of communal rangelands and for increased agricultural output, while the Game Ranching Policy of 2002 hold that private game ranching will result in increased returns from wildlife resources. These policies are expropriatory in the sense that natural resources are

taken away from communal use for private use with no compensation for displaced communal resource users. The central government maintains that in the long term, such private ventures will benefit rural development in terms of employment creation and raising rural incomes. TGLP has been evaluated and was found to be a failure since the expected improvement in rangeland management and employment creation was not realized. White (1993) argues that, the poor performance in TGLP ranches does not warrant the adoption of NPAD, for there is no justification in expanding private farm areas. Consultants engaged by the Botswana Wildlife Management Association (BWMA), an association of the hunting industry in Botswana reported that the introduction of game ranching will negatively affect CBNRM CBOs (Mead, 2001). Mead (2001) reports that the hunting of plains game in CBNRM CBO areas of Botswana will suffer with the implementation of this policy. He argues that there is no reason why outfitters will pay license fees, on top of royalties to the District Council and payments to communities, for game which they can hunt on ranches with none of these costs (Mead, 2001).

#### *Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)*

The local NGO sector was not involved in the initiation of the CBNRM program, and was therefore not involved in setting its objectives. The local NGO sector was invited by the Natural Resource Management Project<sup>6</sup> (NRMP) at the implementation stage to facilitate the implementation of the program and to help provide organizational capacity building for the newly formed CBNRM CBOs and to assist in the formation of new ones. Thus, the local NGO sector did not give rise to the CBNRM program, their role was crafted by the proponents of the CBNRM program. The framework for the program was provided by the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986. It is not unexpected therefore, that the activities for the CBNRM facilitating NGOs are restricted to CBNRM CBO organizational capacity building for utilization of natural resource use leases. There is a discrepancy between the mental causal models of NGOs and their CBNRM activities as a result of the framework within which they operate.

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<sup>6</sup> Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP) - a jointly funded project by the Government of Botswana and USAID to spearhead the implementation of the CBNRM program

NGOs involved in Botswana's CBNRM program have natural resource conservation and/or economic development in their mission statements. Table 5.1 shows similar desired futures of natural resource conservation and economic development for the different NGOs. The mental causal models for NGOs tend to be both expert-based and participatory. I have identified two groups of NGOs as follows:

a) *Environmental NGOs* – CI, FAB, FONSAG, KCS, PTB, TL and VPR&D place emphasis on natural resource conservation. Their mental causal models have a component that deals with natural resource conservation. This group of NGOs sees natural resource conservation and economic development as inseparable. For them, CBNRM CBOs ought to be involved in both. Their approaches to CBNRM CBO facilitation are both expert-based and participatory. Their mental causal models emphasize that the sustainable management of natural resources should be linked with improved livelihoods of the local people i.e. sustainable natural resource management has to be linked to sustainable livelihoods. Their CBNRM activities involves developing and implementing environmental education programs, conducting ecological research and natural resource monitoring, provision of tree seedlings, facilitation on community natural resources assessments, developing community based veld products monitoring tool, training CBNRM CBOs in veld resources monitoring and management, facilitation of community-based veld products domestication trials, and community skills training in agro-forestry project management, strategies which are both expert-based and participatory. For this group of NGOs, the conservation of natural resources is within the domain of their organizational interests. The environmental NGO group sees CBNRM as a conservation strategy that supports rural development.

b) *Socio-economic empowerment NGOs* - ACORD, KOMKU, and TOCaDI's desired futures in addition to economic development, emphasize community empowerment and poverty reduction. Unlike the environmental NGOs, natural resource conservation is implied but not stated. Their mental causal model state that local people are the primary actors in their own development, and any assistance accorded them is geared towards building their capacity to plan, implement and monitor their development activities. This group of NGOs sees CBNRM as a stepping-stone towards economic development and socio-economic

empowerment of marginalized groups. The socio-economic empowerment NGOs sees CBNRM as a rural development strategy that supports conservation.

#### *Donor Agencies*

There is a discrepancy between the mental causal models of donor agencies and their CBNRM activities that could be attributed to the framework within which they operate. Though all donors listed on table 5.1 favors community ownership and participation in natural resource management, they have continued to financially support CBNRM CBOs, NGOs and other CBNRM related activities, despite the fact that there is no community ownership and participation in the management of natural resources. I have identified two types of donor agencies as follows:

a) *Environmental donor agencies* – PACT, GEF/SGP, AWF, HIVOS, DED and IUCN places emphasis on natural resource conservation. The mental causal model for these donor agencies state that the sustainable management of natural resources should be linked with improved livelihoods of the local people i.e. sustainable natural resource management has to be linked to sustainable livelihoods. The IUCN, for instance, holds that the livelihoods of the poor depends on the sustainable management of natural resources, and GEF maintains that communities ought to know that their social and economic well-being is dependent on sound long-term natural resource management. This group of donors sees natural resource conservation and economic development as inseparable. The conservation of natural resources is within the domain of the organizational interests of this group of donors. For this group of donor agencies, CBNRM is perceived as a conservation strategy that supports rural development.

b) *Socio-economic empowerment donor agencies* – USASHF, CFLI, SNV, and ADF's desired futures in addition to economic development, emphasize community empowerment and poverty reduction. Their mental causal model state that local people are the primary actors in their own development, and any assistance accorded them is geared towards building their capacity to plan, implement and monitor their development activities. For instance, USASHF believes that there is need to address issues of democracy and democratic institutions as a means of promoting social welfare and self-help endeavors of local communities. This group of donors sees CBNRM as a stepping-stone towards economic

development and socio-economic empowerment of marginalized groups. The empowerment process entails CBNRM CBO and NGO capacity building. The socio-economic empowerment donor agencies see CBNRM as a rural development strategy that supports conservation.

#### *CBNRM CBOs*

CBNRM CBOs are the CBNRM program target group. CBNRM CBOs selected for my study express their desired future outcomes in terms of natural resource conservation and economic development. Like the other non-government CBNRM institutional actors, CBNRM CBOs role in the CBNRM program was crafted for them by the central government. Though the CBNRM CBOs depend on their local natural resources for much of their livelihood, they had not had decision making input into the drawing up of the Wildlife and National Parks Act of 1992, which brought all wildlife resources under the DWNP and the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986, which converted communal hunting land into Wildlife Management Areas administered by the DWNP. CBNRM CBOs mental causal models for CBNRM state that, for sustainable management and use of natural resources in CHAs, CBNRM CBOs ought to be involved in utilization, protection, conservation and monitoring of natural resources. However, under the central government CBNRM framework, CBNRM CBOs' activities are limited to regulated utilization of the DWNP awarded annual wildlife quota or resource use lease or license. Though the CBNRM CBOs express their mental causal models for natural resource conservation in terms of natural resource utilization, protection, conservation and monitoring, none of my study CBNRM CBOs has followed through with their mental causal model for natural resource conservation partly because of the CBNRM structural constraints. Lynch (1998) argues that usufruct agreements such as natural resource leases to local community organizations are not conducive to the promotion of long-term sustainability objectives, since such tenurial agreements are susceptible to arbitrary cancellation.

#### *Safari Operators*

The Joint Venture Guidelines of 1999, developed by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks encourages wildlife-based CBNRM CBOs to enter into joint venture agreements with safari operators. The safari operator buys from the CBNRM CBO, the

annual wildlife quota awarded to the CBNRM CBO by DWNP. The safari operator then undertakes hunting according to the hunting guidelines provided by the DWNP and enforced by the DWNP trained Community Escort Guides (CEGS). The joint venture agreement also involves subleasing the CHA from the CBNRM CBO for setting up hunting camps and lodges. The safari operators' mental causal model states that, through joint venture agreements between CBNRM CBOs and safari operators, CBNRM CBOs can benefit from the safari operators' skills in tourism development. Safari operators are business ventures and do not express their desired futures in terms of natural resource conservation. However, the safari operators see themselves as contributing to economic development by providing employment and in some cases financially supporting CBNRM CBO community development projects. The relationship between safari operators and CBNRM CBOs is clientelistic.

## **5.2 Discussion**

The Government of Botswana is predisposed towards centralization and privatization of natural resources under central government and private ownership respectively. The central government supposes that communal management and utilization of natural resources result in natural resource degradation. Demsetz, 1967; Hardin, 1968; Johnson, 1972; Smith, 1981; Welch, 1983; Sinn, 1984, all argue that because of the 'tragedy of the commons' private property rights ought to be enforced in circumstances where natural resources are owned in common. Parsons (1981) and Picard (1980) observed that the formulation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) in 1975 and the National Policy on Agricultural Development (NPAD) in 1991 and the resultant land grab by the national elite, demonstrate the ability of the national elite to allocate resources to its own advantage. Besides the fact that the privatized communal land and all other natural resources therein fall into the hands of the national elite, the privatization drive expropriates communal resources from communal use to private use, even though such resources are major sources of income for rural communities. The Game Ranching Policy of 2002 is expected to result in the decline in CBNRM CBO revenues and increase in revenue for the privately owned game ranches (Mead, 2001).

Ophuls (1973:228) argue that “because of the tragedy of the commons, environmental problems cannot be solved through cooperation... and the rationale for central government with major coercive powers is overwhelming.” Weber and social contract theory helps us understand why the state is proposed as the best placed actor to solve common property resource problems. Social contract theory sees the state as representing the social collective or the common good and therefore acts in the interest of the social collective or common good. For Weber, the state is the legitimate authority within a territorial boundary and its responsibilities involve balancing accumulation and legitimation – that is, the state has to facilitate the accumulation of financial capital and at the same time has the responsibility to protect its citizens from outside threat and to provide basic public goods to its citizens. Hence the state has the power to decide how natural resources within its territorial boundaries are to be used for it to achieve its functions. Weber (1920) also sees the state as the only institutional actor with permission to use legitimate violence. Thus, for those who suppose that there is a ‘tragedy of the commons’, the state, with its privileges to use legitimate violence, is able through its bureaucratic structure to enlist the cooperation of the natural resource users for the common good. Thus state control of natural resources is seen as the solution to the ‘tragedy of the commons’. The idea that the state represents the common good assumes that the state knows what the common good is.

The perception of the state as the epitome of the common good has been contested. Marxist and Neo-Marxist theorists perceive of the state as an instrument of class domination. In Marxist understanding, the state emerges from the relations of production and not from the collective will of the people as social contract writers suggest. The advocacy coalition framework as proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) sees the state sphere as highly contested and generally not representing the common good, but representing dominant advocacy coalitions. Thus seeing the state as the neutral adjudicator in issues of common property natural resource management and utilization is flawed. My study utilizes the advocacy coalition framework to understand how local communities can increase their political capital by forming or getting involved in advocacy coalitions that help them have an input into natural resource policy decision-making that affects them. Flora and Flora (2004:106) define political capital as the ability of a group to influence the distribution of



resources within a social unit, including helping set the agenda of what resources are available. Though rural communities depend on local natural resources for their livelihood, natural resource use decisions are taken beyond the locality with little input from the local communities. Ostrom (1990:1) argues that issues of natural resource governance in communal areas are political and are resolved through political processes. Thus, CBNRM CBOs ought to find means of participating in the political process of natural resource governance, and can do this by building their political capital through advocacy coalitions and social capital building.

Research work conducted in developing countries by Chambers, 1983; Blaikie, 1985; Richards, 1985; Poffenberger, 1990; Murphree, 1997; Drinkwater, 1991; Lawry, 1989; Murombedzi, 1989; 1990; and Ostrom, 1990 all point to the shortcomings of natural resource centralization and the subsequent imposition of top-down natural resource policies. Studies by Murphree, 1997; Drinkwater, 1991; Lawry, 1989; Murombedzi, 1989; 1990; and Ostrom, 1990 reveal that centralization and privatization of natural resource management does not lead to improved natural resource management. If centralization and privatization are not the cure for common property natural resource management problems as empirical studies in the developing world has shown, then other alternative strategies ought to be explored. The most credible option to centralization and privatization requires the empowerment of local communities to become participants in natural resource policy and management decisions.

According to Gary et al. (2001); NCRCD (1999); Narayan(1999) and Flora and Flora (2004) participatory, bottom-up approaches recognize that ecological health is not to be measured in isolation from community economic, social, and cultural health. According to Flora and Flora (2003:215), favoring only one form of capital can deplete all capital within a community in the future, and each form of capital has the potential to enhance the productivity of the others. In a study of one of the CBNRM CBOs in Botswana conducted by Boggs (2000), twenty-one residents of Sankuyo Village (which is one of my study's cases) were asked to explain the purpose of CBNRM. Only 2% of the respondents mentioned natural resource management as a component of CBNRM. 76% reported that it was designed to improve the living standards of the local community and bring employment and 14% could not explain CBNRM (Boggs, 2000). According to Boggs (2000), empowerment,


economic development and improved lifestyles are all discussed outside of the context of wildlife management (Boggs, 2000). Thus addressing common property natural resource management problems and devising solutions to it ought to be contextualized and holistic.

As is currently the practice in Botswana's CBNRM program, the central government expropriates local natural resources, centralizes them, and devises regulatory ways to be followed by local communities in utilizing local natural resources. Arntzen et al. (2003) observe that before the adoption of the CBNRM program, it was not clear who was managing and controlling wildlife resources outside wildlife protected areas. With the adoption of the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986 and the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992, the DWNP formally endorsed its authority over wildlife resources in areas outside protected wildlife areas. Consequently the CBNRM CBOs depend upon state agencies that own, control and manage the wildlife resources. The livelihoods of those communities living in the vicinity of wildlife protected areas have come to depend upon the state agencies' ability to manage these resources and willingness to make the resources available to communities in the long term. In a way, these communities have no control over their destiny with regard to the availability and use of these resources – there is an impending threat of withdrawal of use rights and mismanagement by those managing on 'behalf' of the communities.

The relationships that CBNRM CBOs develop with NGOs and the safari operating firms have been structured by the central government. The NGO role is limited to building community capacity to adopt and implement the CBNRM program. The safari operating firms' participation is limited to entering into joint venture agreements with CBNRM CBOs, agreements that are regulated by the central government. The relationship between the safari operators and CBNRM CBOs is clientelistic. Mitchel et al. (1997) observe that stakeholders possess different combinations of critical attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency. According to Mitchel et al. (1997) highly salient stakeholders are those in possession of all the above attributes. In the case of Botswana's CBNRM program, state agencies are the most salient stakeholders. In Mitchel et al. (1997) categorization, state agencies fall within the category of definitive stakeholders. NGOs and the donor community falls into the category of dangerous stakeholders and CBNRM CBOs fall into the category of dependent and or

demanding stakeholders. Figure 5.1 below shows the categorization of CBNRM stakeholders in terms of stakeholder salience.

Figure 5.1 Stakeholder salience



The NGO and donor community do have resources (power) in the form of money and expertise and an interest (urgency) in CBNRM issues but lack legitimacy. Most of the local NGOs, if not backed by aid from donor agencies will most likely fall into the category of demanding stakeholders. CBNRM CBOs have a limited degree of legitimacy and an interest (urgency) in CBNRM but do not have power. The legitimacy that CBNRM CBOs have is premised upon the natural resource use lease accorded to them by the central government, the owner of these resources. In reality, therefore, the legitimacy that CBNRM CBOs have does not give them authority over any natural resources, hence the broken line arrow on figure 5.1 indicating that CBNRM CBOs might be categorized as demanding stakeholders, implying

that they do not have legitimacy. The possession of legitimacy would imply that CBNRM CBOs hold the power to govern, and that other organizations consent and submit to their authority, which is not the case in the Botswana CBNRM program. According to Weber (1968), legitimacy begets authority.

Mitchel et al. (1997) observed that stakeholders can increase their salience by acquiring one or two of the missing stakeholder salience attributes. For instance, CBNRM CBOs have limited legitimacy and urgency and lack power and could access power through coalition building. As argued above, CBNRM CBOs do not have authority over any natural resources, therefore a coalition between CBNRM CBOs who are supposed to have legitimacy and urgency and NGOs and the donor community who has power and urgency does not increase the salience of any of these non-government stakeholders since the government has authority over all natural resources. The government remains the most salient stakeholder as a result of their possession of all the stakeholder salience attributes. CBNRM CBOs do not bring to the NGO-Donor-CBNRM CBO coalition the needed legitimacy to increase the coalitions' salience. As such, the government continues to 'call the shots', issue orders and memorandums without negotiating with any of the less salient stakeholders. The power that the central government has emanates from its natural resource centralization policies and subsequently ownership of all natural resources. Thus advocacy coalitions of the excluded ought to develop around the issues of natural resource ownership i.e. centralization that favors regulation versus community ownership that favors participation. The mental causal models of NGOs and donor agencies involved in Botswana's CBNRM program favor community ownership and participation. Despite the fact that Botswana's CBNRM program is not based on community ownership and participation, NGOs and donor agencies continue to participate in the program as it is. The donors and NGOs are too closely linked to the government, and therefore not in a position to provide the power and leadership for a true coalition that support community ownership and participation. However, the non-government institutional actors are actively involved in building network organizations to foster bridging and linking social capital between the disparate CBNRM institutional actors. The section that follows discusses the different CBNRM network organizations in Botswana.

### 5.3 CBNRM Networking in Botswana

The preceding section reveals that local communities have little power over decisions concerning their own local natural resources. They also often have no forum and or information to challenge decisions taken outside their locality by the central government and to present an alternative paradigm. Theories of social capital help us understand how local communities can build bridging and linking social capital that helps them move out of their isolation. Often, local community power can be augmented by connections with the outside (Flora and Flora, 2004). Narayan (1999) observes that bridging and linking social capital differ in the sense that bridging social capital is horizontal and linking social capital is vertical. According to Flora and Flora (2003), both horizontal and vertical dimensions of networking are important. Horizontal networks are important for lateral learning and vertical networks for accessing regional, national and international resources and organizations (Flora and Flora (2003). Increased communication by local communities can result in increased availability of information that isolated local communities often lack.

Evans (1996:189) and Putnam (1993a) observe that social capital is essential for synergy. In his analysis of the Italian case, Putnam (1993a) observes that stocks of social capital accumulated over longer periods of time was the key ingredient in generating the 'virtuous circle' in which civic engagement encouraged good government and good government in turn enhanced civic engagement. Even in situations where there is no history of synergy, Evans (1996:189) maintains that synergy can be constructed. This section of my study will help in answering the research question; what mechanisms are in place to increase bridging and linking social capital among the different scales with CBNRM CBOs? There are three CBNRM network organizations in Botswana that CBNRM CBOs are involved in or represented. These are the Botswana Community Based Organization Network (BOCOBONET), the National CBNRM Forum (see Appendices 3 and 4 for attendance at the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> National CBNRM Forum and Forum Steering Committee composition) and the CBNRM Support Services.

### 5.3.1 The Botswana Community Based Organization Network (BOCOBONET)

Table 5.2 Brief history, desired futures, mental causal models and activities of BOCOBONET

Brief history	Desired futures	Mental causal models	Activities
<p>BOCOBONET registered as an association in 1999 that represents the interests of CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. BOCOBONET offices are in Gaborone, Botswana's major city. BOCOBONET was initiated by the Natural Resource Management Program (NRMP). In 1997 PACT traveled around the country and met with different CBNRM CBOs to promote the idea of an association. The PACT promotion drive was followed by a workshop held to discuss the idea and resulted in the formation of an interim committee with representatives from 10 CBOs. Three follow-up workshops were held to discuss the constitution and the final document was adopted in 1998. The association today has a membership of 55 CBNRM CBOs out of 67 registered CBNRM CBOs (82%), which means 12 (18%) registered CBNRM CBOs are not members of the association. The association holds Annual General Meetings (AGM) of member CBNRM CBOs. The AGM elects a Committee of 14 members, which meets quarterly in a year. The committee appoints an Executive Secretary who acts as the secretariat.</p>	<p>Voice for CBNRM CBOs in policies that affect them</p>	<p>Through advocacy and networking by BOCOBONET, the voices of the CBNRM CBOs can be represented in CBNRM policy discourses, CBNRM relevant information accessed regarding CBNRM opportunities, capacity building and empowerment training offered to CBNRM CBOs</p>	<p>Publication of a bi-monthly newsletter <i>Matlhowa</i> started in 2000 - funding and staffing constraints led initially to irregular publication of the Newsletter and finally production was halted in 2002</p> <p>Through the CBNRM Support Program BOCOBONET published in 2002 the Botswana CBNRM Services Directory – which provides contact information to CBNRM CBOs of CBNRM related service provider firms and organizations</p> <p>Lobbying and advocacy on issues of concern in CBNRM such as the central government savingram requiring CBNRM CBOs to surrender their CBNRM related revenue to the District Council. BOCOBONET sent a letter to the Ministry of Local Government seeking audience – several follow-ups were made and there was no response from the Ministry of Local Government</p> <p>Provides training courses in financial and business management, leadership and governance to CBNRM CBOs</p> <p>Participated in reference groups on important studies such as the Rural Development Policy Review, formulation of the Poverty Alleviation Strategy, National Development Plan 9 discussions as well as in the reference group for Botswana's Vision 2016 (Arntzen et al., 2003).</p>

### 5.3.1.1 Relationship between BOCOBONET and other CBNRM Institutional Actors

BOCOBONET relies upon donor funding for much of the organizations operations. Donor agencies fund CBNRM CBOs, CBNRM network organizations like BOCOBONET and the National CBNRM Forum and also fund local NGOs. In addition to donor funding, BOCOBONET member CBNRM CBOs pay a membership registration fee of P750.00 and an annual subscription of P200.00. Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 below show donor sources of funding for BOCOBONET and for CBNRM CBOs, NGOs and CBNRM network organizations respectively.

Table 5.3 Funding sources for BOCOBONET over the years

Source	Year	Amount	Purpose
USAID	1999 - 2000	P202, 696.00	Used to set up and establish the BOCOBONET Office and employ the Executive Secretary
ADF	1999 - 2001	P1,100 000.00	Used for programs aimed at capacity building for CBNRM CBOs; Leadership and Governance programs, CBO strengthening program (Nonotsho), Business and Finance Training and PRA for newly formed CBOs
SNV	2000 - 2002	P100, 000.00	Contribution towards the setting up and establishment of the BOCOBONET Office
AWF	2002 - 2004	P880, 000.00	For CBO capacity building Programs

Table 5.4 CBNRM support of selected international donors

	SNV (1995 – 2003)	GEF (1995 – 2003)	ADF (2000 – 2003)	WUSC/SIDA (1995 – 2003)
Support to CBOs	9 137 500:4 Kgalagadi CBOs benefit	1 345 95:8 CBOs benefit	2 819 898	70000 + 2 TAs 2 CBOs benefit
Support to NGOs	3 450 000:5 NGOs benefit	267 421	1 478 540	152 739 + 3 Tas: 5 NGOs benefit
Support to other CBNRM institutions	5 325 000. incl. Support Program and SNV project costs	0	0	1 35 174: benefits to 9 organizations
Total CBNRM related support	17 990 278	1 613 416	4 298 438	357913 + 5 TAs
Average annual support	1 990 278	403 354	1 074 609	

Source: Arntzen et al., 2003

Figure 5.2 % of donor funding given to CBOs, NGOs and to other CBNRM institutions by selected international donors






Figure 5.2 above shows CBNRM support from SNV, GEF, ADF and WUSC/CIDA for the funding period 1995 to 2003 except for ADF funding, which is for the period 2000 to 2003. Figure 5.2 shows that ADF has the highest proportion of its total funding going to CBOs (66%), followed by SNV (51%), GEF (33%) and WUSC/CIDA (19%). Figure 5.2 also shows that GEF has the highest proportion of its funding going to NGOs (67%), followed by WUSC/CIDA (43%), ADF (34%) and SNV (19%). Thus CBOs and NGOs rely and compete for the same sources of funding.

Despite BOCOBONET's dependency on funding from external sources, the association would like to take a leading role in CBNRM in Botswana. Their argument is that local communities and/or their associations, are the primary beneficiaries of the CBNRM program, and are, therefore, supposed to be in charge of the activities intended to help them. As the representative organization for CBNRM CBOs, BOCOBONET feels that it should perform central functions within the CBNRM program if CBNRM CBOs are to be seen as primary in the CBNRM process (Jones, 2002). However, after the election of the National CBNRM Forum members at the third National CBNRM forum (2003), CBNRM CBO representatives noted that the current situation where fourteen BOCOBONET Board members were automatically members of the National CBNRM Forum did not lead to the desired representative result, as other CBNRM CBOs were usually not informed of decisions taken at forum meetings. The CBNRM CBOs also suggested that consideration be given to increasing their membership on the national forum, because BOCOBONET Board does not represent all CBNRM CBOs.

At the fourth National CBNRM Forum (2003) the forum expressed that CBOs were sometimes confused about the different roles of BOCOBONET and facilitating NGOs. Both BOCOBONET and NGOs offer advisory services and direct project implementation at the community level. However, while most NGOs work at the local level, BOCOBONET works at the national level and in most cases does not have first-hand information about member and non-member CBOs. The fourth National CBNRM Forum (2003) noted there are instances of conflict between NGOs and BOCOBONET and CBOs are caught in between. During the second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum, BOCOBONET suggested that proper agreements ought to be drawn up between service providers (NGOs) and clients

(CBNRM CBOs) (National CBNRM Forum, 2001). BOCOBONET decided to regulate the relationship between the NGOs and CBNRM CBOs by having them sign a memorandum of understanding that states exactly what kind of services they are providing to CBNRM CBOs and for how long. The fourth National CBNRM Forum (2003) advised BOCOBONET to involve NGOs in the process of developing a partnership agreement between NGOs and CBOs, which BOCOBONET agreed to do (Fourth National CBNRM Forum, 2003).

According to BOCOBONET, there is competition between them and the IUCN over projects and activities (Fieldwork, 2004). BOCOBONET feels that the IUCN should be advisors and facilitators at the regional level and now they seem to be competing with local NGOs and working on local work than regional work. BOCOBONET maintains that IUCN is now competing with the local NGOs on local issues. The conflict between BOCOBONET and the IUCN is over the control of the National CBNRM Forum. According to BOCOBONET, the National CBNRM Forum ought to be housed at BOCOBONET and the IUCN is 'taking away' the National CBNRM Forum from them. The IUCN maintains that BOCOBONET does not have the capacity to operate as the National CBNRM secretariat (Fieldwork, 2004). The IUCN through its CBNRM Support Services is the secretariat of the National CBNRM Forum. BOCOBONET maintains that IUCN was supposed to empower them on documentation and capacity building and that has not happened. According to BOCOBONET, the CBNRM National Forum secretariat is supposed to be rotational, but the IUCN has kept it ever since the inception of the forum, and intends to hand it over to KCS (a local NGO) instead of BOCOBONET, a network organization for CBNRM CBOs.

### 5.3.2 National CBNRM Forum

Table 5.5 showing the brief history desired futures, mental causal models and activities of the National CBNRM Forum

Brief history	Desired futures	Mental causal models	Activities
<p>The National CBNRM Forum is a national network organization which brings together state, civil society, market and donor CBNRM institutional actors together. The forum is an initiative of SNV and the IUCN and has in the past been funded by GEF and HIVOS. The National CBNRM Forum was officially established during its inaugural meeting on the 30<sup>th</sup> to 31<sup>st</sup> of May 2000. The 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> National CBNRM Forum meeting was held in June 2001; November 2001; June 2003 and November 2003.</p>	<p>Improved dialogue between CBNRM stakeholders</p>	<p>Through collaboration by CBNRM stakeholders (state, civil society and market actors) CBNRM information can be exchanged, CBNRM constraints identified and mitigated and CBNRM stakeholders can have an opportunity to contribute to CBNRM policy development</p>	<p>Recommended to the DWNP to consider utilizing community monitoring information by community escort guides and consult communities in setting annual wildlife hunting quotas – DWNP now send draft annual quotas to communities for comment though such comments are never really considered in the final setting of the quota.</p> <p>Recommended that the central government consider the establishment of a Ministry of Environment and Natural resources - The President announced the creation of a new Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism – established in 2004</p> <p>Lobbied central government to withdraw the Ministry of Local Government's savingram requiring all CBNRM CBOs to surrender their CBNRM generated revenue to district councils (savingram appendix 1) – resolution pending</p> <p>In June 2001 the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the National CBNRM Forum was successful in inviting the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government to discuss the savingram with CBNRM stakeholder groups.</p> <p>During the National CBNRM Forum Steering Committee meeting in October 2002, the forum decided to target Members of Parliament directly and lobby for their support in convincing the government to finalize the CBNRM policy and submit it to parliament. The National CBNRM Forum organized an informative meeting with the Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and Environment on February 2003. At this meeting, the Members of Parliament were briefed on CBNRM by three National CBNRM Forum representatives from the NGO sector (IUCN, KCS and Thusano Lefatsheng).</p>

### ***5.3.2.1 Example of National CBNRM Forum advocacy - the Ministry of Local Government's Savingram***

On January 30<sup>th</sup> 2001, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government under the direction of the Minister of Local Government sent out a savingram (Appendix 1) addressed to all District Commissioners, Council Secretaries, Land Board Secretaries, Tribal Secretaries, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Director of the DWNP, Senior Private Secretary to the Vice-President, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Affairs, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and Permanent Secretary Ministry of Lands, Housing and Environment. The savingram required that all CBNRM CBOs surrender their CBNRM generated revenue to District Councils. Some of the concerns raised in the savingram with regard to CBNRM CBO projects were that:

- a) Only a few people benefit from CBNRM funds, and yet they are meant to benefit larger sections of the community
- b) That these funds are earned from natural resources, and as such there is a strong feeling that there shouldn't be a departure from the policy of these resources benefiting the whole nation as is done with diamonds and other revenue earning natural resources
- c) That the original intention whereby funds from these projects could be used in undertaking development projects in the participating localities is not working. Quite often project identification, formulation and implementation are either deficient or duplicating what government is providing through District Councils (Ministry of Local Government Savingram, 2001).

It is important to note that copies of the savingram were neither sent to the affected CBNRM CBOs, their network organization (BOCOBONET), the donor agencies, nor the CBNRM facilitating NGOs. Correspondence regarding this issue was only sent to government departments and CBNRM CBOs were to be informed by district authorities. There is no evidence of this issue having been discussed within and between government ministries and departments before the issuing of a savingram, despite the fact that CBNRM cuts across government departments. The affected CBNRM CBOs, BOCOBONET, the

donor community, and the facilitating NGOs learned about the savingram from the government media, and yet they are CBNRM stakeholders who have been involved with the program from the onset.

BOCOBONET was the first to respond to the Ministry of Local Government's Savingram on February 14<sup>th</sup> 2001 by sending a letter of protest to the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government and requesting audience with the ministry. On February 20<sup>th</sup> 2001, BOCOBONET convened a meeting that was attended by CBNRM participating NGOs and Donor agencies in Botswana. There were no representatives from government departments nor was there a written or public reaction to the savingram by government departments involved in CBNRM in Botswana. The February 20<sup>th</sup> 2001 meeting reinforced the need for a broad-based network organization to address the savingram issue and other future issues of concern to CBNRM. This broad-based network organization came in the form of a National CBNRM Forum, which took on board civil society, market and state institutional actors. While the state institutional actors never reacted to the savingram outside the National CBNRM Forum, they do participate in Forum activities that lobby for the withdrawal of the savingram. Market actors, in this case, safari operators, are not affected by the savingram and did not render any written or public reaction to the savingram. Their participation in National CBNRM Forum activities is minimal. The NGOs and Donor community who invested time and/or financial capital into CBNRM projects seem to have played a behind the scene role and were instrumental in the formation of the National CBNRM Forum.

Despite the fact that the savingram was sent out on the 30<sup>th</sup> of January 2001, audience was accorded to the CBNRM institutional actors on June 6<sup>th</sup> 2001 at the second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum. Table 5.6 below shows the attendance at this meeting.

Table 5.6 Attendance by stakeholders Groups at the Second Meeting of the National CBNRM Forum held 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> June 2001

<b>Stakeholder</b>	<b>Number of participants</b>	
	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the National CBNRM Forum</b>	
	<b>#</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Civil Society</b>		
CBNRM CBO	11	41
NGO	5	19
Network Organization	3	11
Donor	7	26
Media	1	3
	<b>27</b>	<b>82</b>
<b>Market</b>		
Private Sector	1	3
<b>State</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>
Ministry of Lands and Housing	2	6
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning	1	3
DWNP	1	3
Donor	1	3
	<b>5</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>100</b>

On the 5<sup>th</sup> of June 2001 (the first day of the second National CBNRM Forum meeting), participants prepared a joint statement to be presented to the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government the next day (6<sup>th</sup> June 2001). The statement was presented to the Permanent Secretary by one of the members of the National CBNRM Forum, Conservation International (CI), an international NGO supporting CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. Some of the issues raised in the statement prepared by members of the National CBNRM Forum were as follows:

- a) CBNRM is a tool for the conservation and management of state-owned natural resources and the benefits that accrue to the local communities are because of the costs they incur in living with state owned natural resources. Hence CBNRM cannot be compared to other natural resources like diamonds.
- b) The savingram is jeopardizing the substantial (inter) national donor support that was received over ten years and as such tarnishes the image of Botswana as a reliable development partner.

- c) The savingram seems to overlook established government policies and procedures, for instance, the Wildlife Conservation Policy (1986), Tourism Policy (1990), the Draft CBNRM Policy (2000), Community Based Strategy (1997) etc (Second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum, 2001).

In response, the Permanent Secretary argued that local authorities (District Councils) were better placed to ensure good governance and sustainable resource management. He also argued that communities involved in CBNRM are in remote areas where people are largely illiterate and are easily tricked. He maintained that District Councils are better placed to protect remote area communities (Second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum, 2001). The Permanent Secretary further noted that CBNRM should benefit the larger population and the savingram represents the feeling of the central government and not just the Ministry of Local Government (Second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum, 2001). At the same meeting, the Permanent Secretary expressed a contradictory position from his earlier statement by stating that communities should not fear that their revenue from resource management would be taken and spent elsewhere if managed by District Councils. The idea by the central government that natural resources are to be used for national development has been expressed in different fora. However, it is important to note that this position has been flouted by the same central government by adopting policies converting communal rangelands into private farms (e.g. the Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975, the National Policy on Agricultural Development of 1991 and of late the Game Ranching Policy of 2002, which give land and wildlife resources rights to individuals for private benefit, though such land and wildlife resources constitute national resources).

Botswana's National Development Plan 9 2003/04 to 2008/09 (2003:246) maintains that a government policy on the utilization and management of fees earned from CBNRM projects should be put in place and related to the current policies on national revenue. In his official opening address to the third National CBNRM Forum, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism observed that the official government policy states that all natural resources belong to the state, hence the challenge to find a way in which CBNRM becomes compliant with central government policy (3<sup>rd</sup> National CBNRM Forum, 2003). Later on, at the same meeting, a Botswana ruling party Member of Parliament

indicated that the benefits from CBNRM should be ploughed back to the communities and not be diverted into government coffers (3<sup>rd</sup> National CBNRM Forum, 2003). In his official opening of the 8<sup>th</sup> North West District CBNRM Forum on March 2003, a Botswana Government minister noted that there is need for CBOs to start searching for answers to the increasing number of questions as to why CBNRM programs benefit only a few communities, which are located near respective renewable natural resources. He felt that utilization of renewable natural resources such as wildlife should be viewed in the same light as utilization of non-renewable natural resources such as minerals. He suggested that perhaps some revenues obtained from CBNRM activities could be channeled to the public coffers. Such a move may address some of the queries from the general public (North West District CBNRM Forum, 2003). There are no documented queries from the general public with regard to CBNRM. The contradictory position of the central government with regard to CBNRM still haunts the program. Other CBNRM institutional actors feel that communities should not be dependent on government, but that CBNRM should empower the communities; hence communities should keep revenue generated from CBNRM activity and use it in an accountable manner for community development (3<sup>rd</sup> National CBNRM Forum, 2003).

The second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum impasse with the Permanent Secretary over the savingram did not altogether resolve the situation. The Permanent Secretary assured the National CBNRM Forum that they will be allowed input into the Draft CBNRM Policy, and that their input ought to address those concerns his ministry raised in the savingram with regard to CBNRM. If those issues are addressed adequately through policy, then the savingram will become obsolete. The National CBNRM Forum had an input into the Draft CBNRM Policy. To date the policy has not been finalized and is yet to be brought before Parliament for endorsement. The first CBNRM draft policy was put together in 2000. Amazingly, a conflicting policy, the Game Ranching Policy, has been brought before Parliament and was approved in 2002. When National CBNRM Forum members enquired from the Permanent Secretary as to when the savingram will be implemented, the Permanent Secretary indicated that an officer in his ministry would have to be appointed to consult with the District Councils, but, in the mean time, implementation would be postponed until the CBNRM Policy is finalized (Second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum,



2001). The future of CBNRM in Botswana is uncertain, especially with the drive towards privatization of communal rangelands and a clear government inclination towards private game ranching.

### 5.3.3 CBNRM Support Services

Table 5.7 showing the brief history, desired futures, mental causal models and activities of the CBNRM Support Services

Brief history	Desired futures	Mental causal models	Activities
<p>The CBNRM Support Services is an initiative of SNV and IUCN, established in May 1999. The CBNRM Support Program Phase 1 (May 1999 - December 2003) was a joint initiative by SNV and IUCN. The CBNRM Support Program Phase 2 started on January 1<sup>st</sup> 2004 and is planned up to the end of December 2006. The Phase 2 activities are funded by WWF. Quite a sizeable number of CBNRM publications can be found at the CBNRM Support Services website at (<a href="http://www.cbnrm.bw">http://www.cbnrm.bw</a>). However, it is important to note that such publications are not accessible to CBNRM CBOs since they do not own computers let alone internet-connection. Of the four CBNRM CBOs that my study surveyed, none of them have received publications from the CBNRM Support Services. This does not mean that the publications are not useful. The CBNRM Support Services publications are accessible to researchers, potential business investors in rural areas, government decision makers and potential donors.</p>	<p>Improved dialogue and co-ordination between CBNRM CBOs, NGOs, private sector and Government</p>	<p>Through dialogue and information sharing between CBNRM institutional actors, CBNRM lessons and experiences are shared that help improve CBNRM in Botswana</p>	<p>The CBNRM Support Services has been instrumental in improving the dialogue between CBNRM agencies at various levels through technical and financial support to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The National CBNRM Forum;</li> <li>- The District CBNRM Forum in Ngamiland</li> <li>- Various workshops and CBNRM related conferences.</li> </ul> <p>In arguing the case on behalf of CBNRM CBOs, the CBNRM Support Services in response to the Ministry of Local Government savingram, provided the central government with detailed information on CBNRM performance as well as justifying the need for CBNRM</p> <p>The CBNRM Support Program functions as the secretariat of the National CBNRM Forum</p> <p>CBNRM Support Services published 23 papers for CBNRM practitioners in Botswana</p> <p>A CBNRM web site (<a href="http://www.cbnrm.bw">http://www.cbnrm.bw</a>) has been developed</p> <p>Provided partial funding for the CBNRM review study carried out in 2003</p>

Section Break (Next Page)

#### 5.4 Discussion

BOCOBONET was formed as an advocacy coalition for CBNRM CBOs, but has since evolved to become in addition to its advocacy role, a network organization as well as a CBNRM CBO extension service provider. As an advocacy coalition, it is interested in affording CBNRM CBOs voice on central government policies that affect them as was the case with the Ministry of Local Government savingram. As a network organization, BOCOBONET is interested in disseminating key information regarding CBNRM opportunities and new developments to CBNRM CBOs. In its role as a CBNRM CBO service provider, it is interested in organizational capacity building of CBNRM CBOs. This array of responsibilities is undertaken despite the fact that BOCOBONET is poorly funded and relies upon foreign sources of revenue and often finds its resources overstretched. BOCOBONET works more like an NGO and therefore compete with NGOs instead of facilitating NGO work with member CBNRM CBOs. It duplicates the work of NGOs and has not made much impact in its advocacy role. It also has not made much impact in its information dissemination role, as evidenced by the irregular publications of their newsletter, which ultimately stopped publications in 2002.

Competition between NGOs and BOCOBONET is over funding. BOCOBONET, NGOs and CBNRM CBOs obtain funding from the same sources and this creates potential for competition and conflict. A CBNRM review study commissioned by the National CBNRM Forum carried out by Arntzen et al. (2003) came to the conclusion that the relationship between BOCOBONET and NGOs is characterized by conflict and competition. According to Arntzen et al. (2003) NGOs have come to believe that BOCOBONET “owns” CBNRM CBOs. Donors fund organizations that offer organizational capacity building to CBNRM CBOs and both BOCOBONET and NGOs want to be seen to be doing just that. Hence the functional overlap. Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) argue that coordination is possible when there is belief congruence and functional overlap between organizations. In the case of BOCOBONET and NGOs, there is some degree of belief congruence (in terms of community empowerment and participation) and functional overlap (in terms of organizational capacity building for CBNRM CBOs), but the results do not point towards coordination, but rather, competition and conflict. There is no network organization between NGOs, donor and

CBNRM CBOs outside the National CBNRM Forum. Since NGOs, Donors, CBNRM CBOs and BOCOBONET seem to have similar desired futures and mental causal models, it could be helpful if they had a coalition outside the National CBNRM Forum. However, competition over funding between these institutional actors currently makes it hard for the formation of such a coalition.

The National CBNRM Forum is not an advocacy coalition, instead, it is a place where different coalitions can discuss and negotiate their different mental causal models. The CBNRM institutional actors are brought together into a National CBNRM Forum by similar desired futures or common goals. However, though they have common goals, their mental causal models for attaining those goals are different. The Ministry of Local Government Savingram challenged the common goals of these CBNRM institutional actors facilitating the emergence of an issue-based advocacy coalition to defend those common goals. Hence, in addressing the savingram incident, the National CBNRM Forum operated like an advocacy coalition. The savingram incident illustrated the need for a coalition. BOCOBONET sent a letter of protest, but did not get the audience from the Permanent Secretary, which was only accorded once a coalition was in place involving civil society, market and state actors. However, it is important to note that state institutional actors seem to shy away from criticizing government directives, especially those given from high up in the bureaucratic hierarchy, as was the case with the savingram.

Other issues that I find interesting for my discussion are those raised by the Ministry of Local Government savingram. One of the issues raised by the savingram is that the original intention whereby funds from CBNRM projects could be used in undertaking development projects in the participating localities is not working since often project identification, formulation and implementation are either deficient or duplicating what government is providing through local authorities (Ministry of Local Government Savingram, 2001). This observation by the central government is more like 'victim blaming'. Referring back to the Botswana local government structure (Chapter 3), it is important to note that district authorities accountable to the central government carry out district planning. The district development plans are drawn with no input from local communities (villages). Local communities are therefore not to blame for conflicting district

and village level development plans. It is the responsibility of district authorities to integrate village level plans into district plans by allowing input from below.

In his meeting with the National CBNRM Forum, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government argued that local authorities (District Council) were better placed than CBNRM CBOs to ensure good governance and sustainable resource management. He maintained that District Councils are better placed to protect remote area communities. Who is local authority in Botswana? Who is local government? And who is District Council? What is termed local government (local authority) in Botswana, as Chapter 3 of this study has shown, are upwardly accountable administrative units that do not account to the district residents. Thus in a way, local government is an arm of the central government at the district level. Essentially, the central government's argument is that, central government is better placed to ensure good governance and sustainable resource management and is better placed to protect remote area communities, thus reinforcing its centralization tendencies. If CBNRM CBOs were to surrender their CBNRM generated funds, such funds would end up in central government coffers and used for 'national development' as the savingram proposes. There would therefore be no incentives for CBNRM CBOs to engage in CBNRM projects. For local government to be seen as a legitimate participant in CBNRM within their district, truly local government structures ought to be put in place that are accountable to the district residents instead of the central government. Today, two central government departments (DWNP and Department of Tourism) plan for the CBNRM program without proper integration with agencies overseeing district development.

## **Chapter 6: Assessment of CBNRM at the Community Level**

Flora (2001) community sustainability capitals guide my assessment of CBNRM at the community level. Flora (2001) argues that community development approaches ought to move away from community development to community building. The community building aspect forms the conceptual framework for assessing my study's CBNRM study cases using five community sustainability capitals (Flora, 2001) - natural capital, financial/built capital, social capital and human capital). Figure 2.1 shows seven forms of capitals for measuring community sustainability. For my study only five of the seven community sustainability capitals are assessed. This chapter assesses the level of bonding, bridging and linking social capital of the study CBNRM CBOs. Results from this chapter will help answer my study's research question: "What differences are there in terms of conflict for those CBNRMs with high bridging social capital (dense and diverse networks) and those with low bridging social capital?"

## 6.1 Context Indicators for study CBNRM CBOs

Table 6.1 Context Indicators for Study CBNRM CBOs

	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Population</b>	Mabele Village = 696 Kavimba Village = 519 Satau Village = 730 Kachikau Village = 881 Parakarungu Village = 806  Total Population = 3632	Pandamatenga Village = 1,545 Kazungula Village = 1,665 Lesoma Village = 410  Total Population = 3620	Sankuyo Village = 372	Khwai Village = 395
<b>Year started</b>	1994	1999	1995	1995
<b>Total Land Area</b>	2984km2	1085km2	1870km2	1995km2
<b>Name of CHA</b>	CH1 and CH2	CH8	NG 33 and NG34	NG18 and NG19
<b>CBNRM Activities</b>	Ch 1 - Multi-purpose in communal grazing area (Hunting & Photographic)  CH 2 – Forest Reserve	Multi-purpose in communal grazing area (Hunting & Photographic)	Community multi-purpose CHA (Hunting & Photographic)	Community multi-purpose CHA (Hunting & Photographic)
<b>Ethnic composition</b>	The Chobe Enclave is inhabited by three major ethnic groups of which 70% of households are Basubiya, 27% are Batawana, and 1% are !Xo (a Basarwa/Bushman group)	The kalepa area is inhabited by Basubiya, Batawana, Basarwa and Bakalanga	Sankuyo Village is primarily a Bayei community with minority groups of Basubiya, Bananjwa, Basarwa, and Batawana	The majority of the residents of Khwai Village are a section of the Basarwa (Bushman) known as the Babukakhwae. There is also a small number of Bayei living in Khwai Village.
<b>Number of villages involved</b>	5	3	1	1

Table 6.1 (contd) Context Indicators for Study CBNRM CBOs

	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Organizational Structure</b>	<p>CECT Board has 10 members – 2 from each of the 5 VTC's</p> <p>VTC's have 10 elected members</p> <p>VTC members are elected at the village kgotla by the village residents</p> <p>Each VTC then nominates 2 members to serve on the executive committee of the CECT i.e. the CECT Board</p> <p>Elections are held every 2 years</p> <p>Besides the elected members, the CECT Board has ex-officio members: 5 chiefs and Councillors from the 5 member villages and members of the TAC</p> <p>VTC also has ex-officio members as follows: Village Chief and Councillor, VDC chairperson and secretary.</p> <p>The general membership - residents of the Chobe Enclave ages 18 +</p> <p>The general membership only vote at the VTC AGM and have no vote at CECT AGM accept when voting for joint-venture partner as per the Joint venture guidelines</p>	<p>KCT Board has 10 members</p> <p>Prior to the election of the KCT Board, a general meeting is convened to nominate candidates to the KCT Board.</p> <p>The nominated names are subjected to a vote at one of the member villages' kgotla by the general membership of KCT</p> <p>Besides the KCT Board, the three member villages elect at individual village level a Village Trust Committee (VTC)</p> <p>Elections to the KCT Board and VTCs are held every 2 years</p> <p>Besides the elected members, the KCT Board has ex-officio members: 3 chiefs and Councillors from the 3 member villages and members of the TAC</p> <p>VTC also has ex-officio members as follows: Village Chief and Councillor, VDC chairperson and secretary</p> <p>The general membership - residents of the three KCT villages ages 18 +</p> <p>The general membership vote at the KCT AGM and VTC AGM as well as for joint-venture partner as per the Joint venture guidelines</p>	<p>STMT Board has 10 members</p> <p>Elections to the STMT Board are held every 2 years</p> <p>Besides the elected members, the STMT Board has ex-officio members: Sankuyo Village Chief, VDC chairperson and secretary and Councillor and members of the TAC</p> <p>The general membership - residents of Sankuyo Village ages 18 +</p> <p>The general membership vote for the STMT Board as well as for joint-venture partner as per the Joint venture guidelines</p>	<p>KDT Board has 10 members</p> <p>Elections to the KDT Board are held every year</p> <p>Besides the elected members, the KDT Board has ex-officio members: members of the TAC</p> <p>The general membership - residents of Khwai Village ages 18 +</p> <p>The general membership vote for the KDT Board</p>
<b>Composition of Board</b>	<p>3 Women</p> <p>7 Men</p>	<p>3 Women</p> <p>7 Men</p>	<p>7 Women</p> <p>3 Men</p>	<p>5 Women</p> <p>6 Men</p>



Figure 6.1 Organizational Structure of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust





Figure 6.2 Organizational Structure of the Kalepa Conservation Trust



## **6.2 Process and Impact Indicators for study CBNRM CBOs (also see Appendix 6)**

### **6.2.1 Outcome 1: Sustainable, healthy ecosystems with multiple community benefits**

*Indicator:* Investment in natural resource management

#### **6.2.1.1 Environmental/Natural Capital**

The CECT, KCT, STMT and KDT's mental causal models have their organization responsible for protecting, conserving and monitoring the natural resources in the leased community hunting areas. However, as my study's indicators for environmental capital point out, none of these CBOs has undertaken any conservation related projects or invested money in conservation or natural resource protection to date. The closest that these CBOs has come towards monitoring of natural resources is represented by the activities of the community escort guides (CEGs). However, CEGs activities are limited to monitoring the hunting activities of the contract hunting safari operator to ensure that they abide with the hunting guidelines offered by the DWNP. CEGs monitoring activities are limited to enforcing the DWNP hunting guidelines. Despite the fact that the CEGs are expected to produce reports at the end of the hunting season, their reports are rarely referred to by DWNP in setting the annual wildlife quota. Though DWNP circulates draft wildlife quotas to community trusts for comments, DWNP is nonetheless not expected to integrate those comments into the final decision on the wildlife quota awarded (Arntzen et al., 2003). CEGs are not monitoring natural resources, but are monitoring the utilization activities of the contract safari operator.

### **6.2.2 Outcome 2: Increased use of the skills, knowledge and ability of local people**

*Indicator:* Using and enhancing skills, knowledge and ability of local people

#### **6.2.2.1 Human Capital**

##### *Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust*

The CECT constitution states that CECT will strive to educate the residents of the Chobe Enclave as to the importance of and in the wise management of their natural resources. In my study's assessment of training programs undertaken by and for CECT by different service providers, none of them touches on the subject of natural resource management or building the community's capacity to manage natural resources. The only training program that is remotely close to that is the training program offered to CEGs by the DWNP and only 15 CEGs have been trained. All other training programs are geared towards

community capacity building for governance, leadership and financial and business management. For instance, PACT/IRCE and later BOCOBONET trained the CECT Board, VTCs, CECT Coordinator and Community Action Plan Coordinators (CAPCs) in the above stated areas. Besides the training programs, CECT CBNRM activities generated employment for some residents of the Chobe Enclave. CECT's current employment stands at 36 and the contract safari operator have 50 employees from the Chobe Enclave. In all, there are 86 people employed in CECT CBNRM related activities out of a total population of 3632. Note that this is the total population of the Chobe Enclave and not just the adult population or adult population seeking employment. This is because Botswana's population census is aggregated for villages.

#### *Kalepa Conservation Trust*

No data available, because during my fieldwork, KCT had problems (discussed under social capital – next section) and records were not accessible. In fact there has been no formal hand over of KCT administrative records from the KCT Board that misappropriated the funds to later KCT Boards. Kalepa is one of the least studied CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. It is hard to find any past studies done on KCT. However, the KCT constitution states that KCT will strive to educate the residents of the Kalepa area as to the importance of and in the wise management of their natural resources. The little information that my study obtained from KCT suggests that no training programs geared towards natural resource management or building the community's capacity to manage natural resources were undertaken by KCT. The only training program that is remotely close to that is the training program offered to CEGs by the DWNP.

#### *Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust*

The STMT constitution states that STMT will strive to educate the residents of Sankuyo as to the importance of and in the wise management of their natural resources. In my study's assessment of training programs undertaken by and for STMT by different service providers, none of them touches on the subject of natural resource management or building the community's capacity to manage natural resources. The only training program that is remotely close to that is the training program offered to CEGs by the DWNP, and only 10 CEGs have been trained. Mogodu Consultancy offered capacity building training for the

STMT Board on governance and leadership. Concorde Agencies (Pty) Ltd trained the STMT bookkeeper. Other training programs covered the areas of production, for instance, leather works training and on the job cookery skills offered by the contract safari operators. Besides the training programs, STMT CBNRM activities generated employment for some residents of Sankuyo. STMT current employment stands at 55 and the contract safari operator have 86 employees from Sankuyo Village. In all there are 141 people employed in STMT CBNRM related activities out of a total population of 372.

*Khwai Development Trust*

The KDT constitution states that KDT will strive to educate the residents of Khwai as to the importance of and in the wise management of their natural resources. In my study's assessment of training programs undertaken by and for KDT by different service providers, none of them touches on the subject of natural resource management or building the community's capacity to manage natural resources. The only training program that is remotely close to that is the training program offered to CEGs by the DWNP, and only 10 CEGs have been trained. Eco-tourism Support Services (ESS) trained the KDT Board on financial and administrative management. BOCOBONET conducted a leadership-training workshop for KDT. Besides the training programs, KDT CBNRM activities generated employment for some residents of Khwai. KDT's current employment stands at 14 employees from the Khwai Village out of a total population of 395. It is important to note that before the financial mismanagement problem at KDT and the subsequent withdrawal of the wildlife quota by the DWNP, KDT had a total employment of 65. This means that 51 jobs have been lost.

Table 6.6 Summary of Human Capital Measures for Case Study CBNRM CBOs

<i>CBNRM CBO</i>	<b>Human Capital</b>				
	No. of people employed by CBNRM CBO	No. of people employed by safari operator	Total employment	% of the total population employed in CBNRM	No. of training/capacity building programs
CECT	36	50	86	2	5 (Training by PACT, DWNP, BOCOBONET and RHS)
KCT	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
STMT	55	86	141	38	6 (Training by private consultants, PACT, DWNP, BOCOBONET and on the job training by safari operator)
KDT	14	8	22	6	3 (Training by private consultants – ESS, BOCOBONET and DWNP)

### 6.2.3 Outcome 3: Strengthened relationships and communication

*Indicator: Participation, communication and relationships*

#### 6.2.3.1 Social Capital

The CECT, KCT, STMT, KDT constitutions state that these organizations strive to equitably share the benefits of the use of natural resources of the leased areas without discrimination. To achieve this, CECT, KCT, STMT, and KDT sought to establish a representative community based organization, in which the member villages (in cases of more than one village) are represented by their VTCs. This kind of representation is premised on the belief that the people in the villages have similar interests that can be represented by their VTCs. The organizational structures are not based on the representation of identified interest groups.

#### *Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust*

Decision-making within CECT is made mainly within various committees, although the general members make decisions on some issues, such as choice of joint venture partner,

since this is one of the DWNP guidelines. The general membership is also responsible for electing officers and for voting for proposed community projects. The Community Action Plan Committee led by the Community Action Plan Coordinator is responsible for proposing community projects at the village level. The proceeds from CBNRM activities are invested in these projects. For the most part, the CECT Board makes all the major decisions within CECT, while the general membership's participation is restricted to voting for officers and projects put before them by the Community Action Plan Committee.

The CECT maintains contacts with a number of CBNRM institutional actors at different levels. At the community level, CECT maintains weak contacts with the VDC and the Kgotla by having the VDC chairperson and secretary as ex-officio members of the VTCs and the five member village chiefs as ex-officio members of the CECT Board. The CECT has a joint venture agreement with Rann Hunting Safaris. At the district level, the CECT maintains contact with the TAC, which is expected to provide technical advice to the CECT. The CECT also has contacts with the CSD of the DWNP, which offers extension services to the CECT, and with the Land Board, which is the district land authority. At the national level, CECT is a registered member of BOCOBONET and the National CBNRM Forum. CECT has contacts with the DWNP that awards the annual wildlife quota and trains the CECT CEGS. At the international level, CECT's contacts are with funding, capacity building and financial auditing organizations like PACT/IRCE, ADF, AWF and Deloitte and Touch. CECT also get and send exchange visitors from/to other CBNRM CBOs in Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Relationships within and between CECT and other institutional actors are not always cordial. Examples of conflictual relationships include;

- a) Within the CECT
  - i) In 2000 a group of people from the Chobe Enclave came together to form what was called 'the concerned group'. The concerned group complained about the lack of transparency with regard to CECT Board expenditures and investments (for more information see appendix 6). Despite the fact that the relationship between the CECT Board and some of its members is conflictual, the CECT Board maintains a good relationship with Rann Hunting Safaris – the safari operator that has a joint venture

agreement with the CECT.

- ii) Alexander et al. (1999) reported power struggles between some VTCs and VDCs - conflicts as to whether VDC should be given money by the VTCs from the sale of the hunting quota

b) CECT versus State

- i) Although the CECT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quotas set by DWNP, they no longer do, so since the DWNP does not take their comments into account
- ii) CECT is frustrated with the Land Board's delay in approving their Timber Salvage Harvesting and Community Lodge projects

*Kalepa Conservation Trust (KCT)*

The general membership of KCT is responsible for electing officers and for voting for community projects. The proceeds from CBNRM activities are invested in these projects. The general membership also votes for the joint venture partner since this is one of the DWNP guidelines for joint venture agreements between CBNRM CBOs and safari operators. KCT has contacts with other CBNRM institutional actors at different levels. At the community level, KCT maintains weak contacts with the VDC and the Kgotla by having the VDC chairperson and secretary as ex-officio members of the VTCs and the three member village chiefs as ex-officio members of the KCT Board. KCT has a joint venture agreement with Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris. At the district level, KCT maintains contact with the TAC, which is expected to provide technical advice to KCT. The KCT Board complained that the TAC is inactive i.e. they rarely attend KCT Board meetings even though they are ex-officio members of the Board. The KCT also has contacts with the CSD of the DWNP, which offers extension services to the KCT, and with the Land Board which is the district land authority. At the national level, KCT is a registered member of BOCOBONET, and therefore represented by BOCOBONET at the National CBNRM Forum. KCT never sent a representative to the National CBNRM Forum meetings. KCT has contacts with the DWNP which awards the annual wildlife quota and trains the KCT CEGS. Information on KCT international connections could not be established because of the current problems at KCT.

There seems to be a general lack of social capital at KCT, as evidenced by the mismanagement of KCT funds by the KCT Board. The mismanagement of funds bred



mistrust between the KCT Board and the general membership of KCT. It also bred conflict between succeeding KCT Boards with the DWNP and the joint venture safari operator. The conflict between the succeeding KCT Boards with the DWNP ensued after the DWNP withheld the annual wildlife quota from KCT pending the production of an accountability report, which the KCT Board failed to produce. While the KCT accountability report remains pending, the DWNP decided to release the KCT annual wildlife quota directly to Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris without the consent of KCT, the legal leaseholder to CH 8. The DWNP instructed Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris to withhold the sublease money due to KCT until KCT produces an accountability report. KCT has since demanded that Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris release the sublease and wildlife quota funds and threatened to expel the safari hunting company from CH8 if they do not comply. The DWNP CSD convened a mediation meeting in Kasane at the Kasane DWNP offices on June 9, 2004 to resolve the KCT-Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris conflict in which TAC members were invited, and none of them showed up except DWNP. During the mediation meeting by the Kasane Community Service Division of the DWNP, the DWNP Community Liaison Officer wondered as to whether KCT has the power to suspend Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris' activities in CH 8, since they had the permission to do so from the Director of the DWNP. This is despite the fact that KCT is the legal leaseholder to CH 8. During the course of my fieldwork, the KCT problem remained unresolved.

#### *Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust*

During my fieldwork (Fieldwork, 2004), the chairperson of STMT was reluctant to grant me an interview in the absence of other Trust Board members, as he felt that all Board members ought to be there on any business concerning STMT. I had to drive around the village together with the STMT chairperson to roundup STMT Board members. According to Arntzen et al., (2003) the general membership of STMT is to a very large extent involved in management decisions of STMT. A representative of the Natural Resource Management Project has described the STMT as "too democratic" and thereby inefficient, in that the committee has virtually no authority to make a decision without community consultation (Boggs, 2000). HCH Hunting Safaris (safari operating firm which currently has a joint venture agreement with STMT) also accused the STMT Board of being overly concerned

with issues of consensus building, which, according to HCH, is not good for a business venture (Arntzern et al., 2003). STMT argues that HCH does not understand community needs (Arntzern et al., 2003). During the 2<sup>nd</sup> National CBNRM Forum (2001) the Forum Chairperson from the private sector noted that the private sector and central government find it difficult to work with a big entity, they would prefer to work with one person who has decision-making power.

STMT holds regular meetings with the general membership to discuss progress, problems as well as recruit personnel for both STMT and HCH Safaris. STMT benefit distribution has been to individual households, community projects and to charity organizations. At their annual general meeting, the general membership suggests and put forward a list of projects to be carried out by STMT and it is the responsibility of the STMT Board to prioritize the proposed projects. The general STMT membership is responsible for electing the STMT Board office bearers. The general membership also votes for the joint venture partner, since this is one of the DWNP guidelines for joint venture agreements between CBNRM CBOs and safari operators.

STMT maintains contacts with a number of CBNRM institutional actors at different levels. At the community level, STMT maintains weak contacts with the VDC and the Kgotla by having the VDC chairperson and secretary and the Sankuyo Village chief as ex-officio members of the STMT Board. STMT has a joint venture agreement with HCH Hunting Safaris. At the district level, the STMT maintains contact with the TAC, which is expected to provide technical advice to the STMT. STMT also has contacts with the CSD of the DWNP, which offers extension services to STMT, and with the Land Board which is the district land authority. STMT also receives capacity building training and services from Concorde Agencies (Pty) Ltd, Design Consultancy, Chadwick, Anderson and Partners (Pty) Ltd, Mogodu Consultancy, People and Nature Trust, and WhiteCap Agencies (Pty) Ltd. STMT is a member of the Northwest District CBNRM Forum. At the national level, STMT is a registered member of BOCOBONET and the National CBNRM Forum. STMT has contacts with the DWNP which awards the annual wildlife quota and trains STMT CEGS. At the international level, STMT contacts are with funding and capacity building organizations like PACT/IRCE and the AWF

Most of the conflicts involving STMT are with external institutional actors including state and the joint venture agreement safari operator. Though issues of conflict within CBNRM CBOs was not thoroughly investigated at any of the four study CBNRM CBOs, internal conflicts at CECT, KCT and KDT were reported during the institutional actors interviews. At STMT, none such instances of internal conflicts were reported. Examples of conflictual relationships with other institutional actors include;

a) STMT versus State

- i) The Sankuyo community believes that wildlife resources are stable in their area (Arntzen et al., 2003), and do not understand why wildlife quotas keep changing year after year. STMT holds that the unpredictability of the annual revenues due to changing wildlife quotas makes it hard to plan STMT activities (Arntzen et al., 2003). Their views are based on wildlife monitoring efforts of the CEGS (Arntzen et al., 2003). Although STMT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quota, they no longer do so. STMT finds it difficult to understand why the quotas are being reduced by the DWNP (Arntzen et al., 2003)
- ii) The STMT Board complained that the TAC is inactive i.e. they rarely attend STMT Board meetings even though they are ex-officio members of the Board

b) STMT versus HCH Safaris

- i) HCH argues that STMT does not understand business. While the private operator wants to get on with business, the STMT spends a lot of time on meetings and consensus building, which is considered unproductive by HCH (Arntzen et al., 2003).
- ii) Training to community members and STMT Board promised by HCH Hunting Safaris as part of their tender promises has not been fulfilled
- iii) HCH often make late payments and not according to the agreed payment schedules.
- iv) HCH promised to support the village soccer team in their tender documents with P68, 000.00 per annum and to date only P19, 000.00 has been paid or given.

*Khwai Development Trust*

Unlike CECT and STMT, which were mobilized by DWNP/NRMP, a University of Botswana Sociologist, Dr. Gaborone, mobilized the Khwai community for CBNRM activities. During the KDT interim phase, a number of interest groups were formed to begin

activities that would later be incorporated into KDT activities once registered. The idea behind forming these interest groups was to give some organizational form to existing informal and traditional activities undertaken by individuals in Khwai – interest groups to be created by members of the Khwai community already interested or earning a living from similar activities. For instance, those community members involved in grass cutting formed the grass-cutting interest group. Some of the interest groups that were to be created included the following:

- Thatching Grass Interest Group
- Craft Making Interest Group
- Traditional Dance Interest Group

It is important to note that ‘though the initiative of developing interest groups was offered to the Khwai community by their advisor Dr. Gaborone, these projects never really took off except the thatching grass interest group’ (Potts, 2003). According to Potts (2003), the above proposal was problematic as a result of disagreements on how funds and revenues generated should be used and managed. With regard to craft making, there is limited access to craft-making raw materials in the Khwai area. However, the thatching grass interest group was able to initiate its activities from 1996 to 1998, generating on average P6,000.00 per annum. During my study’s fieldwork, none of these groups were operating.

The General Membership of KDT is responsible for the election of the KDT Board and the KDT Board mainly makes all other major decisions within KDT. by the KDT Board. KDT maintains contacts with a number of CBNRM institutional actors and individuals at different levels. At the community level, unlike the CECT, KCT and STMT, KDT has no links with the VDC and the Kgotla. KDT worked with individual researchers interested in community capacity building like Dr. Gaborone and Bell. KDT auctions its annual wildlife quota to the highest bidding safari company and has no joint venture agreement with any safari operator. At the district level, the KDT maintains contact with the TAC, which is expected to provide technical advice to KDT. KDT also has contacts with the CSD of the DWNP, which offers extension services to KDT, and with the Land Board, which is the district land authority. KDT receives capacity building training and services from Eco-Tourism Support Services (ESS) and the Okavango Community Consultants. KDT is a

member of the Northwest District CBNRM Forum. At the national level, KDT is not a registered member of BOCOBONET, but does send representatives to the National CBNRM Forum. KDT has contacts with the DWNP, which awards the annual wildlife quota and trains KDT CEGS. At the international level, STMT contacts are with funding and capacity building organizations like the Global Environmental Fund (small grant program under the UNDP).

There seems to be a general lack of social capital at KDT, as evidenced by the mismanagement of KDT funds by the 2002 KDT Board. The mismanagement of funds bred mistrust between the KDT Board and the general membership of KDT. The DWNP withheld the KDT annual wildlife quota, which was only released in August 2003. KDT activities were suspended between September 2002 and February 2003 because of the withholding of the KDT wildlife quota by the DWNP. The DWNP required KDT to account for the financial mismanagement before the quota could be released. KDT reported the matter of mismanaged funds to the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) for investigation. In August 2003, KDT Board succeeded in persuading the DWNP with the help from Eco-Tourism Support Services (ESS) to have the wildlife quota released. With the help from ESS, KDT was able to prepare a report entitled "*Steps taken to improve the management and functioning of Khwai Development Trust.*" Examples of KDT conflictual relationships with other institutional actors include;

a) KDT versus State

- i) Although the KDT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quotas set by DWNP, they have never commented. KDT feels that their comments will not make any difference
- ii) KDT applied to the Land Board to open and run the Machaba Camp in 2002 (which is within the leased area) and their application was not approved by the Land Board
- iii) KDT Board noted that they always invite the TAC to their meetings but TAC members often don't honor the invitation. For the Community Liaison Officer interview that was going on just before my meeting with the KDT Board, TAC was invited and none of the TAC members showed up to assist with the interview

Figure 6.3 showing CECT networks




Figure 6.4 showing STMT networks





Figure 6.5 showing KDT networks





..... This network represents the ex-officio positions held by the VDC and the Kgotla (Village Chief) in the activities of the CBNRM CBO and is characterized as a weak connection since the VDC and the Chief do not have decision-making powers in CBNRM CBO activities. There are non-voting members of the CBNRM CBO Board.


———— This network represents the business joint venture agreements or auctions that CBNRM CBOs have with safari operating companies.

———— This network represents the connections between CBNRM CBOs and the resource regulating and supervisory central government agencies. The networks involves guidelines and guideline enforcement

This network represents the connections between CBNRM CBOs and private company capacity building firms that provide services to CBNRM CBOs for a fee.

———— This network represents the connections between CBNRM CBOs and NGOs and Donor agencies that provide capacity building services to CBNRM CBOs and the CBNRM CBOs is not required to pay for the service.

———— This network represents the extension services provided by the DWNP and the regulatory nature of the relations between the DWNP and CBNRM CBOs



Multi-Stakeholder Organization



Civil Society Organization



State Organization



Business Enterprise/ Private Company

#### **6.2.4 Outcome 4: Appropriately diverse and healthy economies**

*Indicator: Increasing community resident assets, reducing poverty, and increasing business diversity*

##### **6.2.4.1 Financial/Built Capital**

###### **i) CECT**

There has been an increase in incomes generated by CECT over the years from their CBNRM activities (for details see appendix 6). CECT invested some of the income generated in the construction of office buildings, vehicles and into VTC identified projects. Most such VTC projects are income-generating ventures like general dealers, brick making and campsites. CECT does not have a relief program targeting its disadvantaged members. Though an estimated 20 tonnes of game meat per hunting season is divided between the CECT communities, most VTCs sell the meat instead of giving it to community members. Groups like the !Xo usually do not have the cash to purchase meat from the VTC (Van der Jagt et al., 2000). CECT does not have a community development program requirement in its joint venture agreement terms with Rann Hunting Safaris.

###### **ii) KCT**

No data on financial resources generated from CBNRM activities were available, because during my fieldwork, KCT had problems and records were not accessible. Projects conducted by KCT could not be ascertained during my study's fieldwork. The general impression however, is that like CECT and KDT income from CBNRM activities have tended to be channeled into community investment projects and none has been channeled to individual households as household benefits. However, Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris who have a joint venture agreement with KCT pointed out that their company undertook the following projects for KCT as part of their community development program: bought 25, 000 bricks towards the building of Pandamatenga Community Hall, which during my fieldwork was not completed. Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris also undertook relief programs targeting disadvantaged groups in the KCT villages. These projects include building six houses in Lesoma for destitute, establishing a feeding kitchen for destitute in Kazungula (project currently suspended) and giving out game meat to the Kazungula, Pandamatenga and Lesoma community.

### iii) STMT

There has been an increase in incomes generated by STMT over the years from their CBNRM activities (for details see appendix 6). STMT invested some of the income generated in the construction of office buildings, individual household benefits (e.g. building of toilets in each household in Sankuyo Village), vehicles and community investment projects (Kazikini Campsite, Shandereka Cultural Village and Santawani Lodge). STMT invested in programs for the disadvantaged, including funeral assistance to bereaved families in Sankuyo Village, supply of meat rations to the destitute, supply of firewood and water as well as transport to community members, elephant, warthog and ostrich meat are rationed to all members of the community at no cost and donated P50 000 (about \$10,000.00) to be shared equally between Masiela (Orphans) Trust Fund and the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA). STMT set aside a portion of their annual wildlife quota for subsistence hunting.

### iv) KDT

KDT has generated income from the auctioning of their annual wildlife quota. However, the KDT income, which in 2000 substantially benefited from the sale of lions, was in 2001 affected by the ban in lion hunting. Lions were removed from the 2001 KDT wildlife quota and this resulted in a loss of about P355, 000.00 (about \$54,615.00). Income from CBNRM activities have tended to be channeled into community investment projects and none has been channeled to individual households as household benefits. KDT has invested in building office blocks, craft shop (not operating), vehicles, and constructing and improving hunting camps. However, KDT does not have a relief program targeting its disadvantaged members except for the subsistence hunting of part of the annual wildlife quota.

## 6.3 Discussion

Examining social capital is critical for recognizing the social forces at work in the course of development. The impetus to establish networks is to promote the development of shared values and trust-based relationships that transcend purely market transactions. Flora (2001: 6) observed that communities of place do not have neat, tight boundaries, but

influence and are influenced by other parts of society. Communities of place are shaped by three sets of institutions: the market, the state, and civil society (Flora, 2001:6). These institutions influence the resources available to local access and control (Flora, 2001:6). The institutional spheres of market, state and civil society all are critical for communities to flourish (Tester, 1992; Zijderveld, 1999). Communities of place establish horizontal and vertical networks with market, state and civil society actors at the different levels. Woolcock (1998) uses the concepts embeddedness and autonomy to describe the desirable interactions within and between community organizations and private and public organizations at the micro and macro levels. Woolcock's (1998) model of micro and macro level embeddedness and autonomy is an attempt at understanding the creation of social capital based on both top-down and bottom-up processes. Bottom-up processes of social capital creation entails linkages which involve bridging and linking social capital and integration which involves bonding social capital. Woolcock (1998) maintains that for development outcomes to be achieved in poor communities, linkage needs to be combined with integration.

Utilizing Woolcock's (2001) theoretical proposals therefore, it is essential for CBNRM CBOs to enhance their horizontal/bridging and vertical/linking networks and bonding/integration networks. Bridging and bonding social capital is essential for building consensus among institutional actors with approximately similar levels of power and desired futures while linking social capital helps them access resources, ideas and information from institutions higher in the institutional power hierarchy. In the case of my study CBNRM CBOs, little attention has been given to horizontal scaling. As figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 indicates, the study CBNRM CBOs have weak links with other village institutions and no direct links between themselves or with any other CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. The connection between the VDC (the village institution recognized by the central government as the development arm of the local government at the village level) and the CBNRM CBO is limited to having the VDC chairperson and secretary holding ex-officio positions within the CBNRM CBO.

The VDC representatives to the CBNRM CBO are not involved in decision making since they do not have a vote in matters concerning the CBNRM CBO. In none of the study CBNRM CBOs do VDC and CBNRM CBOs have coordinated village/community

development projects. Alexander et al. (1999) reported conflicts between some VTCs and VDCs over whether VDC projects should be funded by the VTC from the sale of the hunting quota. None of the study CBNRM CBOs has funded VDC projects. Rather, the CBOs have undertaken independent development projects of their own. The savingram from the Ministry of Local Government (Appendix 1) correctly observed that CBNRM CBOs projects duplicate local government development efforts. However, district planning is the responsibility of local government, which in Botswana has closer ties to the central government than to the local communities, and therefore should take the blame on uncoordinated planning. The VDC is an arm of the District Council and CBNRM CBOs are independent village institutions, with very weak links with the District Council. It is not clear how this independent village institutions can work in a coordinated manner with District Council linked VDC.

The connection between the study CBNRM CBOs and the kgotla (Chief) is limited to having the chief with ex-officio representation within the CBNRM CBO Board. The chief is not involved in decision making, since he/she does not have a vote in matters concerning the CBNRM CBO. In Botswana, the kgotla and chieftainship are recognized as the legitimate leadership structure at the village level and command a lot of respect within their community. The active participation of this institution is likely to increase the legitimacy and enhance community confidence in CBNRM CBO Trust Boards. The kgotla and the chief are the guardian of the traditions and norms of the local community and are the legitimate institutions for sanctions at the village level. Thus the kgotla and the chief embody some of the important components of social capital. It is essential to situate CBNRM CBOs within the existing institutional context. Pre-existing social capital, networks and norms of reciprocity support common property management by granting the social relationships and trust as the basis for rules and monitoring. Fox (1996:125) noted that horizontal scaling helps promote collective action in defense of common interests. CBNRM CBOs connection to the kgotla and chief, an institution that has a long history of promoting collective action, is likely to offset locally confined solidarities. Once horizontal networks have been established with and between village institutions, the CBNRM CBO could then look out for potential allies in

other communities. For instance, alliances could be forged with other CBNRM CBOs in the district and beyond.

It is important to note that none of the study CBNRM CBOs has CBNRM alliances with any other CBNRM CBOs within their district except through the District CBNRM Forum, which is part of the National CBNRM Forum. For instance, KDT and STMT are less than fifty miles apart and CECT and KCT are about one hundred miles apart and yet they do not have any CBNRM connections whatsoever outside those provided by the District CBNRM Forum, National CBNRM Forum and BOCOBONET. The District CBNRM Forum, just like the National CBNRM Forum, is a place where different coalitions can discuss and negotiate their different mental causal models. Rozemeijer (2002) argue that:

The impact of networking in Botswana on the participation of communities in CBNRM is limited. The community organizations who are supposed to be part of the CBNRM networks hardly participate, let alone benefit in terms of sharing information, enhanced co-ordination of services and co-operation with other organizations. The CBNRM Support Services web site obviously not, but also written documents appear not to be very accessible for community organizations. With the communication between Forum and individual communities being virtually non-existent one can doubt the level of participation of communities in CBNRM-related information sharing and decision-making (Rozemeijer, 2002).

According to Flora and Flora (1993:56) communities tend to learn best from those most like themselves in a process they call horizontal networking lateral learning. They argue that people learn more from people like themselves than they do from experts (Flora and Flora, 1993:57). Communities that are entrepreneurial form groups to visit other communities where they have heard that something important is going on that they wish to emulate (Flora and Flora, 1993:57). Other communities also visit them, with those visits serving as both learning for the visitors and consultancies for the communities visited (Flora and Flora, 1993:57). Of my case study CBNRM CBOs, only CECT has had exchange visits with other CBNRM CBOs. However, those visits were with CBNRM CBOs in other countries, and there had been no such visits with Botswana-based CBNRM CBOs. CBNRM CBO contact in Botswana has been through BOCOBONET. Of my study CBNRM CBOs,

the CECT, KCT and STMT are members of BOCOBONET and KDT, just like a handful other CBNRM CBOs in Botswana, is not a member of BOCOBONET. BOCOBONET is based in Gaborone, Botswana's major city and has little real touch with member CBNRM CBOs, partly because most CBNRM CBOs are in remote areas of Botswana and mostly because it is poorly funded. For instance, though KCT is a member of BOCOBONET, located about one thousand kilometers from Gaborone, there has been no BOCOBONET assistance to KCT in their struggle with the DWNP over the withholding of their annual wildlife quota and the subsequent release of the quota directly to Blackbeard and Hepburn Hunting Safaris without the consent of KCT. BOCOBONET is too far away from the member CBNRM CBOs for it to be effective, and might need to set up regional offices in the districts.

The study CBNRM CBOs tend to have vertical, rather than horizontal social capital. The District CBNRM Forum and the National CBNRM Forum are examples of networks that study CBNRM CBOs are involved in. The District CBNRM Forum and National CBNRM Forum involve state, civil society and market stakeholders, all of which tends to have more power than the CBNRM CBOs. Fox (1996:124) notes that vertical social capital without sufficient horizontal social capital can sideline the base. He argues that if local organizations just have vertical social capital, local stakeholders will ultimately have little capacity to monitor the activities of their leadership and therefore little capacity to hold them accountable (Fox, 1996:124). In his seminal 1993 work, Putnam (1993) found that horizontally organized networks support social capital and vertical organized networks stall its formation. Putnam (1993:173 -174) observes that vertical networks, no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation. This argument is not meant to minimize the role of vertical networks, but to show that vertical networks without horizontal networks stall social capital at the community level. Figure 2.3 shows the dimensions of social capital and from this figure it is clear that too much vertical networking with little or no horizontal networking results in clientelism. Horizontal networking would give CBNRM CBOs a sense of identity and common purpose. The desirable situation as portrayed in figure 2.3 is that characterized by a positive balance between vertical networking and horizontal networking, characterized as participatory

community action, where community action arises from objectives determined through participation, with links to external institutions and resources.

It is important to note that, in addition to the shape of networks, other aspects of social organization such as the demographic composition of the organizations membership, organizations membership size etc. are also important determinants of social capital. In the case of my study CBNRM CBOs, two of the study cases involve more than one village while the other two involve one village, hence a smaller population compared to the first two. The differences in population size might contribute to disparate levels of social capital within the study communities. However, since my study's unit of analysis was institutional actors, the contribution of such demographic differences between CBNRM CBOs has not been thoroughly studied. Whatever indicators of social capital assessed at the community level was based on the information obtained from interviews with community level institutional actors and not sampled individuals within the community. From these interviews and existing literature, it was possible to get an account of the level of social capital at the community level. For instance, CECT has low levels of social capital as evidenced by the existence of the 'concerned group', and KDT and KCT have low levels of social capital as indicated by the mismanagement of funds and the subsequent conflict that ensued. CECT and KCT involve more than one village and KDT involves one village. In a way, for my cases, the level of social capital at the community level doesn't seem to be determined by the size of the population involved. KDT has a small population and almost dominated by one ethnic group and still lacks social capital. STMT has a small population and composed of more than one ethnic group and seems to enjoy some degree of social capital at the community level. The differences in social capital at the community level between the four study cases appear to stem from the differences in the degree of community participation, level of consultation and the nature of benefit distribution at the community level. For instance, of the four study cases, STMT has more women than men within the STMT Board and distributes benefits directly to households compared to the other three study cases. Flora and Flora (1993:56) noted that the strength of entrepreneurial social capital is found in diversity, where all voices are heard including those of women who are normally marginalized. STMT has been criticized by their joint venture partner, HCH Safaris for spending too much time on



consensus building, while CECT for instance, has maintained a closer relationship with Rann Hunting Safaris than with its constituency. In a way, STMT as compared to CECT has worked on bonding and linking social capital, while CECT emphasizes on linking social capital with little bonding social capital.

The other aspect of Botswana's CBNRM that warrants discussion at this stage is the disjointing of the five capitals of community sustainability in implementing CBNRM in Botswana. The way CBNRM is perceived in Botswana detaches the CBNRM CBO from the initiative to invest in natural capital. The CBNRM CBOs do not have the mandate to manage natural resources, but are limited to utilizing the annual wildlife quota. CBNRM CBOs lack secure tenure to the resources they are utilizing. The state regulations, in fact, do not address the long-term rights of CBNRM participating communities. According to Flora (2001) and Petty (1998) community sustainability is premised upon community investment in community sustainability capitals. Flora (1998) defines sustainability as investing in the forms of capital that do not deplete other forms, but rather enhance other forms of capital. In Botswana's CBNRM, only four forms of capital have received attention. The state, NGO extension services and in some instances market actors have engaged in capacity building programs at the community level (human capital); networks have been forged between state, market and civil society actors with CBNRM CBOs (social capital); and financial resources have been generated and invested in community development projects (financial/built capital). There has been no investment either by the CBNRM CBO, state, market and civil society into community level natural resource management, conservation and monitoring efforts (natural capital). The human, social and financial/built capital aspects of CBNRM are not connected to the enhancement of natural capital. Flora (2001:10) argues that successful actions to enhance natural capital start from human capital (recognizing the skills, knowledge, and abilities of local people) and build social capital (increased communication and networks and increased initiative and responsibility). Cortner and Moote (1999) and Pomeroy and Beck (1999) observed that these activities are performed as predecessors of actions to improve natural capital. In Botswana, the skills and knowledge of the local people with regard to natural resource management is disregarded – no attention is paid to issues of

cultural capital. Instead human capital development focuses on organizational capacity building to oversee utilization of natural resources.

## Chapter 7: Conclusion

This study identifies the major institutional actors in Botswana's CBNRM program, their desired future conditions, mental causal models and actual participation in the program. One of the major findings of this study is that state institutional actors tend to dominate the program by setting its objectives and determining the role that all other CBNRM institutional actors play in the program. The state's ability to dominate the program is premised upon its claim to represent the common interest and the existence of a bureaucratic structure that supports centralization and top-down decision processes. To understand issues on community based natural resource management, it is essential to investigate issues of natural resource ownership, which this study did. The Government of Botswana, through legislations and policies centralize the ownership of natural resources and subsequently regulate activities by local communities, even on land designated as communal, tribal or customary. The Tribal Land Act of 1968, for instance, took away control of communal land from tribal chiefs and handed it over to central government created Land Boards. My study shows that Land Boards, though considered local government institutions are in reality creations of the central government and are upwardly accountable. The Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986, which gave rise to the CBNRM program, converted communal/tribal/customary land into WMAs and CHAs to be administered by the central government's DWNP. In fact, the DWNP owns the wildlife within the WMAs and CHAs and the Land Board owns the land where the wildlife is found. CBNRM CBOs apply for use rights from the owners of the wildlife and the owners of the land. As my study shows, dispossession and centralization of natural resources preceeded the so-called natural resource devolution policies as represented by the CBNRM program in Botswana.

At this point, I will assess my study's research questions and hypothesis proposed at the beginning of the study as a way of summarizing the findings of my study.

### *Research Question 1*

*What are the major market, state, and civil society stakeholding institutions around CBNRM in Botswana at the international, national, district, and local level?*

This study identifies the major stakeholding institutions in Botswana's CBNRM program as state - represented by government departments, legislation and policies mostly operating at the national level with little local government participation; civil society, as represented by CBNRM CBOs involving single and multiple villages, national and international NGOs and international donor agencies all interested in CBNRM CBO capacity building for CBNRM activities; and market, as represented by safari operating firms who enter into joint venture business agreements with CBNRM CBOs.

### *Research Question 2*

*What are the desired future conditions, mental causal models and actual participation in CBNRM by institutional actors?*

There is a general agreement between Botswana's CBNRM institutional actors regarding the desired futures of the program. All CBNRM institutional actors express natural resource conservation and economic development as desired futures for the program. The mental causal models for the different CBNRM institutional actors for achieving natural resource conservation and bringing about economic development are:

#### State

- a) State ownership and regulation of natural resource use is key to sustainable management and use of natural resources
- b) Privatization of natural resource management and use is an essential requirement for the effective management of communal rangelands and for increased output from the use of natural resources

#### NGOs and Donor Agencies

- a) The sustainable management of natural resources should be linked with improved livelihoods of the local people i.e. sustainable natural resource management has to be linked to sustainable livelihoods
- b) Local people are the primary actors in their own development, and any assistance accorded them is geared towards building their capacity to plan, implement and monitor their development activities

### CBNRM CBOs

- a) For sustainable management and use of natural resources in CHAs, CBNRM CBOs ought to be involved in utilization, protection, conservation and monitoring of natural resources

### Safari Operators

- a) Through joint venture agreements between CBNRM CBOs and safari operators, CBNRM CBOs can benefit from the safari operators' skills in tourism development

The activities for state institutions in CBNRM are to devise off-take regulations and award off-take quotas, licenses and permits to user groups. The activities for the CBNRM facilitating NGOs and Donor agencies are restricted to CBNRM CBO organizational capacity building and funding for utilization of natural resource use leases. CBNRM CBOs activities are limited to regulated utilization of the DWNP awarded annual wildlife quota or resource use lease or license. The safari operators' activities are limited to buying from the CBNRM CBO, the annual wildlife quota for safari hunting.

### *Research Question 3*

*To what degree do those that share desired future conditions share similar mental causal models on how to achieve those conditions?*

Despite the fact that all the CBNRM institutional actors in Botswana's CBNRM program share desired futures of natural resource conservation and economic development, it is clear that their mental causal models of how to achieve these broad goals differ. While the state agencies favor centralization, regulation and privatization of natural resources, civil society consisting of NGO, Donor and CBNRM CBOs all favor local community participation in the planning, implementation and monitoring of CBNRM activities. My study findings confirm my research hypothesis that CBNRM institutional stakeholders at different levels share desired future conditions, but have different mental causal models of how to reach those desired future conditions.

*Research Question 4*

*What mechanisms are in place to increase bridging and linking social capital among the different scales with CBNRM CBOs?*

Chapter 5 section 5.3 and Chapter 6 of my study discusses the mechanisms that are in place to increase bridging and linking social capital among the different scales with CBNRM CBOs. My study details out those network organizations that link CBNRM CBOs with other CBNRM institutional actors. These network organizations are essential to CBNRM CBOs to tap into resource rich networks, but since there are mostly vertically organized, CBNRM CBOs ought to balance these with horizontal networks. My study found out that CBNRM CBOs have weakly developed horizontal networks and that most of their networks are vertical. Putnam (1993) sees vertical networks as stalling the development of social capital in the absence of horizontal networks. Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 of my study shows that case study CBNRM CBOs mostly have linking social capital and very little bridging social capital.

*Research Question 5*

*What differences are there in terms of conflict for those CBNRM CBOs with high bridging social capital (dense and diverse advocacy coalitions) and those with low bridging social capital?*

All of my study's CBNRM CBOs have very little bridging social capital: however, they do have linking social capital. Because of the general lack of bridging social capital, it is not possible to determine whether the presence or absence of bridging social capital for my study CBNRM CBOs contributes to conflict or not. There is also no evidence to suggest that the high linking social capital contributed to minimizing or fueling conflict for my study CBNRM CBOs. The differences in conflict for my study CBNRM CBOs appear to stem from the differences in the degree of community participation in CBNRM CBOs' activities, level of consultation by the CBNRM CBO leadership of their constituents and the nature of benefit distribution by the CBNRM CBO to its general membership. From my study findings, it is not possible to confirm or refute my research hypothesis.

## **Chapter 8: Recommendations**

### *Recommendation 1*

My study findings indicate that there is no real power transfer in Botswana's CBNRM program to local-level institutions. Local-level institutions are only involved in implementing rules created by the central government. Studies by Agrawal, 1999; Agrawal, 1995b, 1996; Dahlman, 1980; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom and Schlager, 1995, and Schlager and Ostrom, 1992 all point to the desirability for devolving authority and control over the management of natural resources at the local level to local-level institutions. My study recommends that the central government devolve authority and control over natural resources to local-level institutions. The example of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Program cited in this text is an example of devolution of natural resource authority and control to local government institutions. The shortcomings of the Zimbabwe model however, is that local government units are not accountable to the local community, but to the central government. Thus, stalling the desirable devolution of authority and control to truly local-level institutions. In Botswana too, local government units are accountable to central government than to the local community. Devolving natural resource authority and control to current local government structures in Botswana will not result in the desirable outcomes of local-level authority and control. My study does not recommend that CBNRM CBO activities be meshed into district level decision making processes because district level administrative units are extensions of the central government. Meshing CBNRM CBOs into district level decision making processes would be like centralizing the CBNRM program. However, my study does recognize the need for integrated planning at the district level. My study also recognizes the need for a true devolution process that creates local government units with a mandate over district natural resources that CBNRM CBO activity could be meshed into. Thus, local government has to be reformed such that it is accountable and represent the local community, than the central government. Local government reforms might include the revival of traditional institutions that were undermined by colonial and the post-colonial government, institutions that have their roots in the community.

Table 8.1 Proposed State and Local Community Relations in Natural Resource Management

	Shift from	Shift to
	Current Practice in Botswana	Desirable
<b>Mode of Participation</b>	Cooperating	Co-learning
<b>Role of Officials</b>	Directive	Participant in the process
<b>Assumptions about sources of solutions</b>	Expert based on best technical means	Emergent, based on shared discovery, learning, pooling local and expert knowledge
<b>Assumptions about the role of the state</b>	Has the right to determine the public interest	The public interest is formed by aggregation of local interests

*Source: adapted from Jiggins (1998)*

### *Recommendation 2*

The devolution of authority and control over the management of natural resources at the local level to local-level institutions as suggested in recommendation 1 does not imply that the state has no role to play in natural resource management. The state has an important facilitative role to play in CBNRM.

#### *Role of the State*

a) Provide clarifications on local community territorial rights. I propose that the central government recognize private community-based rights on land tenure and resources therein, just as is the case with individual private land tenure and resources rights.

b) Develop a legal framework that clarifies local community natural resource rights and benefits

c) Develop a legal and policy framework that will provide the parameters within which interactions between CBNRM institutional actors can take place



### *Role of Donors*

Donors need to invest in:

- a) Capacity building for NGOs working with CBNRM CBOs on organizational, financial, and natural resource management and monitoring
- b) Strengthening BOCOBONET in its advocacy role
- c) Funding CBNRM CBO to obtain services from private sector service providers
- d) Funding CBNRM network and advocacy organizations – the National CBNRM Forum, District CBNRM Forums, and BOCOBONET

### *Role of NGOs*

a) Provide capacity building services to CBNRM CBOs on organizational and financial management. NGOs with knowledge and expertise with natural resource management to also provide technical support in that field. However, there is need to respect and recognize the role of local knowledge in natural resource management. Local knowledge should be phased into technical support programs. Government agencies involvement in technical support to CBNRM CBOs should only be in those areas where government departments have specialized knowledge and expertise which support NGOs do not have.

b) The NGO support to CBNRM CBOs should not be indefinite, since this could create a dependency situation. There has to be a memorandum of understanding between the support NGO and the CBNRM CBO. The memorandum of understanding should clearly outline the services to be provided and the time frame.

### *Role of BOCOBONET*

BOCOBONET to remain an advocacy organization for CBNRM CBOs and should not be involved in extension service provision. To be more effective, BOCOBONET ought to open up regional offices in the different districts where there are registered BOCOBONET member CBNRM CBOs. These regional BOCOBONET offices can help promote the horizontal networking between CBNRM CBOs within districts and across districts.

*Recommendation 3*

There ought to be more CBNRM CBO to CBNRM CBO horizontal networking outside BOCOBONET, District CBNRM Forum, and National CBNRM Forum to promote horizontal lateral learning.

*Recommendation 4*

Since NGOs, Donors and CBNRM CBOs tend to share desired futures and mental causal models for conservation of natural resources and economic development, they ought to form an advocacy coalition based upon their congruency of beliefs and/or a network organization bringing together all the non-state CBNRM institutional actors. The District CBNRM Forum and National CBNRM Forum should be the next upper stage where the non-government institutional actors can engage and negotiate their mental causal models with state agencies.

## **Appendix 1: Savingram from Ministry of Local Government**

**From:** Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government

**To:** All District Commissioners

All Council Secretaries

All Land Board Secretaries

All Tribal Secretaries

**Reference:** LG/3/6/2/1 IV (46)

**Date:** 30th of January 2001

cc: Permanent Secretary MCI

Director DWNP

Senior Private Secretary to the VP

Permanent Secretary MoA

Permanent Secretary MME&WA

Permanent Secretary MF&DP

Permanent Secretary MLH&E

**Subject:** Management of funds realized from the Community Based Natural Resources Management Project


Concerns have come at various times and in various forms on the management and use of funds accrued from the above mentioned projects all over the country. These concerns have included the following: -

1. Only a few people benefit from these funds and yet they are meant to benefit larger sections of the community.
2. These funds are earned from natural resources and as such there is a strong feeling that there shouldn't be a departure from the policy of these resources benefiting the whole nation, as is done with diamonds and other revenue earning natural resources.
3. The handling and use of funds earned is suspect as in some cases, there are not even audited reports on their management.
4. These projects tend to be discriminatory in that if, for instance, there are job opportunities, they are wholly reserved for participating localities to the exclusion of other citizens from outside these.
5. The original intention whereby funds from these projects could be used in undertaking development projects in the participating localities is not working. Quite often project identification, formulation and implementation are either deficient or duplicating what Government is providing through local authorities. It has now been decided that funds earned from these projects should be managed in trust by the District Councils and whatever is decided regarding their use should be done in consultation with the affected communities. Full audits must be undertaken before these funds are handed over to the Councils. The

participating localities shall with the assistance of the addressees continue to market these resources. Any legitimate running costs will, of course, have to be paid out of these funds.

Addressees are therefore required to act accordingly, and with immediate effect.

## Appendix 2: Map of Botswana Showing Controlled Hunting Areas Zoned for Community Management



**Appendix 3** Attendance by CBNRM stakeholders at the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> National CBNRM Forum

	<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Number of participants</i>			
		<i>3<sup>rd</sup></i>		<i>4<sup>th</sup></i>	
		#	%	#	%
Civil Society	CBNRM CBO	32	28	11	18
	NGO	12	10	8	13
	Network Organization	4	4	3	5
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>48</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>36</b>
Market	Private Sector	10	9	6	10
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>
State	District Administration/ District Council	10	9	3	5
	National Assembly/Parliament	3	3	0	0
	Ministry of Agriculture	4	4	2	3
	Ministry of Local Government	1	1	0	0
	Ministry of Lands and Housing	1	1	0	0
	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning	0	0	1	2
	National Museum, Monuments and Art gallery	1	1	1	2
	Ministry of Environment, Wildlife & Tourism	5	4	5	8
	DWNP	11	10	7	12
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>36</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>31</b>
Other	DONOR	12	10	9	15
	Research Organization	4	4	5	8
	Media	3	3	0	0
	Other	3	3	0	0
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>116</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Proceedings of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> National CBNRM Forum*

**Appendix 4** Organizations Elected to be Members of the National CBNRM Forum for a Period of Two Years as per Adopted National CBNRM Forum Terms of Reference

<i>Years</i>	<i>Stakeholders</i>				
	<i>CBOs</i>	<i>NGOs</i>	<i>Private Sector</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>District Forums/TAC</i>
2002/2003	14 BOCOBONET Board members + BOCOBONET Executive Officer	Thusano Lefatsheng, KCS, Permaculture, Chobe Wildlife Trust, VPR&D, Conservation International + IUCN (Secretariat)	HATAB, BOCCIM, BWMA, Representative of CBNRM related consultants	DWNP, ARB, DoL, DoT (Chair), MFDP/RDCD, NCSA National CBNRM Forum Chairperson: DoT (NMMAG interested to become a member)	Ngamiland, Ghanzi, Kgalagadi, Chobe and possibly Kweneng
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>
2003/2005	14 BOCOBONET Board members + BOCOBONET Executive Officer + Mmadinare Development Trust and Botlhale jwa Phala (Steering Committee members) + Khoenaphu CBO (Chair)	PTB, ACCORD, Kuru Family and VPR&D + KCS and CI (Steering Committee Member) + IUCN (Secretariat)	BOCCIM and Consultants (ECOSURV and Peer) + HATAB and BWMA (Steering Committee Members)	MLG, MLHA (Museum), MOA, MFDP (RDCD), MEWT (DOT, DWNP, ARB, Forestry, and NCSA), MLH (DOL)	Ngamiland District CBNRM Forum, TACS in Central, Kgalagadi, Southern and Kgatleng Districts + Ngamiland and Kweneng TAC (Steering Committee Members)
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>

Source: Proceedings of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> National CBNRM Forum

### Appendix 5 Timeline of CBNRM Related Events Over the Years

Year	Event
1966	Botswana Independence, District Councils established, Chiefs lost their development and governance responsibilities to District Councils
1968	Tribal Land Act
1969	Critical national election, fear of D Councils developing into centers of opposition and criticism – DC given supervisory role over D Council
1974	Agricultural Resources Conservation Act
1975	Tribal Grazing Land Policy
1978	Netherlands Development Organization (SNV)
1981	Veld Products Research and Development (VPR&D)
1982	Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS)
1983	Forestry Association of Botswana (FAB)
1984	Monuments and Relics Act, Thusano Lefatsheng (TL), IUCN
1986	Wildlife Conservation policy
1989	Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP), Permaculture Trust Botswana (PTB)
1990	Tourism Policy, Conservation International (CI)
1991	National Policy on Agricultural development (NPAD)
1992	Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act, The U.S. Ambassadors' Special Self-Help Program (USASHF), Global Environmental fund (GEF)
1993	1 registered CBNRM CBO
1994	Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT)
1995	NRMP links to PACT for community capacity building - Institutional Reinforcement for Community Empowerment (IRCE), 4 registered CBNRM CBO, Sankuyo Tshwaragano Conservation Trust (STMT), Khwai Development Trust (KDT)
1996	CBNRM Policy consultation process
1997	10 registered CBNRM CBOs
1999	Joint Venture Guidelines developed, 26 registered CBNRM CBOs, KOMKU, Kalepa Conservation Trust (KCT); Botswana Community Based Organization Network (BOCOBONET)
2000	National CBNRM Forum established, first Draft CBNRM Policy
2001	First National CBNRM Forum meeting (June), Second National CBNRM Forum (November), lion hunting ban, 46 registered CBNRM CBOs
2002	Game Ranching Policy
2003	Third National CBNRM Forum (June), Fourth National CBNRM Forum (November), National Development Plan (NDP) 9, 67 registered CBNRM CBOs
2004	Draft CBNRM Policy, lion hunting ban lifted



Financial/Built Capital - Income Generation and Investment into Community Projects and Activities by Study CBNRM CBOs

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Benefit distribution</b>	<p>- The VTCs have considered distribution of cash payment to households but it has never been selected as the top priority and therefore it has never been done (Van der Jagt et al., 2000). CECT funds are channelled into community projects</p> <p>- An estimated 20 tonnes of game meat per hunting season is divided between the CECT communities and most VTCs sell the meat instead of giving it to community members</p> <p>- Sell all of the annual wildlife quota to Rann Safaris</p>	<p>- There has been no distribution of cash benefits to households, KCT funds were channeled into community projects e.g. building of the Pandamatenga Community Hall</p> <p>- Sell all of the annual wildlife quota to Blackbeard and Hepburn safaris</p> <p><u>NB</u> Not much data is available on KCT because of the current problems discussed under 'cases of conflict' in sections below. In fact there has been no formal hand over of KCT administrative records from the board that misappropriated the funds to later boards.</p> <p>Kalepa is one of the least studied CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. It is hard to find any past studies done on Kalepa.</p>	<p>- Besides the investments into community activities, STMT distributes benefits to individual households and to charity as follows:</p> <p>- Construction of toilets/pit latrines for all households in Sankuyo Village</p> <p>- Cash payment of P250.00 and P300.00 per family in the years 2002 and 2003 respectively</p> <p>- Funeral assistance to bereaved families: cash of P1000.00 for children and P3000.00 for adults</p> <p>- Supply of firewood and water as well as transport to community members</p> <p>- Supply of meat rations to the destitute</p> <p>- Elephant, warthog and ostrich meat are rationed to all members of the community at no cost</p> <p>- On 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2004, STMT donated P50 000 to be shared equally between Masiela (Orphans) Trust Fund and the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA)</p> <p>- Keeps part of the annual wildlife quota for subsistence hunting</p>	<p>- There has been no distribution of cash benefits to households, KDT funds are channeled into community projects e.g. construction of campsites, KDT office, Craft shop and vehicles.</p> <p><u>NB</u> At the end of the 2002 financial year, the KDT Board could not produce an audited report of the trust's finances as a result of misappropriation of trust funds.</p> <p>- Keeps part of annual wildlife quota for subsistence hunting</p>

Financial/Built Capital - Income Generation and Investment into Community Projects and Activities by Study CBNRM CBOs

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Programs targeting the disadvantaged</b>	<p>The !Xo San group are traditional hunters, and have always depended upon hunting. During the household survey conducted by Alexander et al. (1999) respondents reported that poorer households that depended heavily on hunting for a living strongly protested at the decision by CECT to sell practically the entire hunting quota to the Rann Hunting Safaris, thus leaving fewer animals for local hunting – these groups might have had Special Game Licenses for hunting before CH1 and CH2 were leased out to CECT. Though an estimated 20 tonnes of game meat per hunting season is divided between the CECT communities, most VTCs sell the meat instead of giving it to community members. Groups like the !Xo usually do not have the cash to purchase meat from the VTC (Van der Jagt et al., 2000).</p> <p><u>NB</u> CECT does not have a community development program requirement in its joint venture terms</p> <p>No wildlife from the quota is set aside for subsistence hunting</p>	<p>The below programs were undertaken by Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris for the KCT community as part of the joint venture agreement community development program. These programs have been suspended due to the current conflicts between KCT and Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris.</p> <p>The community development program included:</p> <p>Establishment of a feeding kitchen for the destitute in Kazungula</p> <p>Building of six houses in Lesoma for the destitute</p> <p>Giving out game meat to the KCT community - when an animal is killed Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris hires 10 people from the villages to cut it up and the meat is transported to the village by the safari company and handed over to the VDCs to be distributed in the villages</p> <p>No wildlife from the quota is set aside for subsistence hunting</p>	<p>Funeral assistance to bereaved families: cash of P1000.00 for children and P3000.00 for adults</p> <p>Supply of meat rations to the destitute</p> <p>Supply of firewood and water as well as transport to community members</p> <p>Elephant, warthog and ostrich meat are rationed to all members of the community at no cost</p> <p>On 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2004, STMT donated P50 000 to be shared equally between Masiela (Orphans) Trust Fund and the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) – the Masiela (Orphans) Trust Fund and National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) are National Relief Programs based in Gaborone.</p> <p>Part of the wildlife quota is set aside for subsistence hunting</p>	<p>Part of the wildlife quota is set aside for subsistence hunting</p>

# Financial/Built Capital - Income Generation and Investment into Community Projects and Activities by Study CBNRM CBOs

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>CBNRM CBO's investment into community activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CECT constructed an administrative office in Kavimba, and has a caravan office for marketing purposes in Kasane</li> <li>- CECT income from CBNRM activities have tended to be channeled into community investment projects and none has been channeled to individual households as household benefits.</li> <li>- Kavimba VTC- invested in a campsite serviced with flush toilets and showers, a small tuck-shop and a tent site. During my study's fieldwork, the campsite was non-operational.</li> <li>- Mabele VTC built and opened a community general store in 2000 though there were already two other general stores in the village. The VTC owns and manages the store, which has two full-time employees and a night watchman</li> <li>- Kachikau VTC planned to invest in a gas station. To be able to run the gas station, the VTC had first to find suppliers of petrol and diesel and to date have not been able to find any since the suppliers do not think it's a financially viable project. Whilst the gas station project is pending, the Kachikau VTC used the gas station site for brick making (not operational during my study's field work)</li> <li>- Satau VTC invested in a Hardware and brick making</li> <li>- Parakarungu VTC invested in a sorghum/maize Grinding mill and community shop</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris offered the following services to KCT as part of their community development program:</li> <li>- Established a feeding kitchen for destitutes in Kazungula – project currently suspended</li> <li>- Built six houses in Lesoma for destitute</li> <li>- Bought 25, 000 bricks towards the building of Pandamatenga Community Hall</li> <li>- Donated a van to KCT</li> <li>- Giving out game meat to Kalepa community</li> </ul> <p>NB Projects conducted by KCT could not be ascertained during my study's fieldwork. The general impression however, is that like CECT and KDT income from CBNRM activities have tended to be channeled into community investment projects and none has been channeled to individual households as household benefits</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- STMT income from CBNRM activities have tended to be channeled into community projects and also to individual households as household benefits</li> <li>- In 1999 Crocodile Camp Safaris built the Sankuyo community hall and equipped it with a television set with DSTV and furniture for use by the community</li> <li>- Plans exist to build houses for destitute and orphans</li> <li>- Financial support for the local soccer team</li> <li>- STMT has constructed the Kazikini campsite, Shandereka Cultural Village, Santawani Lodge, STMT office in Sankuyo Village and rented an office space in Maun for marketing STMT CBNRM activities</li> <li>- In 1999, trust offices were constructed through a cost-sharing arrangement between STMT and Crocodile Camp Safaris (safari operator who had a joint venture agreement with STMT before HCH hunting safaris)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- KDT income from CBNRM activities are channeled into community investment projects and none has been channeled to individual households as household benefits:</li> <li>- KDT has set up two hunting camps (Zou or Lechwe and Nxamtese) serviced with ablutions and skinning sheds</li> <li>- KDT constructed chalets and a dinning room at Zou (Lechwe) camp.</li> <li>- KDT constructed a craft shop (Itekeng Craft Shop) and was non-operational during my study's fieldwork</li> <li>- KDT constructed an administrative office building in Khawi Village</li> <li>- KDT has a website (<a href="http://www.khwai.org">www.khwai.org</a>) developed by a researcher from Duke University in the United States and has not been updated since construction by the researcher. Some of the KDT Board members did not know about the existence of such a website. In any case KDT does not have computers let alone Internet service.</li> </ul>

Financial/Built Capital - Income Generation and Investment into Community Projects and Activities by Study CBNRM CBOs

MEASURE	CECT		KALEPA		STMT		KDT	
	Year	Income (\$)	Year	Income	Year	Income (\$)	Year	Income (\$)
Financial revenues generated	1994	13,000.00	1994	No data	1994	-	1994	-
	1995	40,000.00	1995	No data	1995	-	1995	-
	1996	64,400.00	1996	No data	1996	43,846.00	1996	-
	1997	92,800.00	1997	No data	1997	53,077.00	1997	-
	1998	92,800.00	1998	No data	1998	69,231.00	1998	-
	1999	186,000.00	1999	No data	1999	71,077.00	1999	-
	2000	189,000.00	2000	No data	2000	80,935.00	2000	184,615.00
	2001	192,650.00	2001	No data	2001	91,609.00	2001	92,307.00
	2002	196,303.00	2002	No data	2002	193,077.00	2002	186,389.00
	2003	200,224.00	2003	No data	2003	299,456.00	2003	220,000.00

Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Cases of conflict</b>	<p>f) No report of complaints by CECT about the TAC</p> <p>g) According to RHS; "RHS leases the land and concession rights from CECT and gains access to the hunting quota. In return, CECT receives cash for land rental and the quota rights. Rann Hunting Safaris provides nothing else and CECT asks for nothing else. We are happy and the community is happy. We have one formal meeting with the CECT Board at the end of each year, ending with a big party to review progress and to address any concerns" (Arntzen et al., 2004).</p>	<p>f) The KCT complained that the TAC was inactive i.e. they rarely attend KCT Board meetings even though they are ex-officio members of the Board</p> <p>g) The DWNP instructed Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris to withhold the sublease money due to KCT until KCT produces an accountability report after the mismanagement of trust funds at KCT. KCT has since demanded that Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris release the wildlife quota funds and threatened to 'expel' the safari hunting company from CH8 if they do not comply.</p>	<p>f) The STMT Board complained that the TAC is inactive i.e. they rarely attend STMT Board meetings even though they are ex-officio members of the Board</p> <p>g) HCH argues that STMT does not understand business. While the private operator wants to get on with business, the STMT spends a lot of time on meetings and consensus building, which is considered unproductive by HCH (Arntzen et al., 2004).</p>	<p>f) KDT Board noted that they always invite TAC to their meetings but TAC members often don't honor the invitation. For the Community Liaison Officer interview that was going on just before my meeting with the KDT Board, TAC was invited and none of the TAC members showed up to assist with the interview.</p> <p>g) KDT auctions its annual wildlife quota and therefore has no joint venture agreement with any safari company</p>

Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
Cases of conflict	e) In an interview with Mr. Steven Rann of Rann Hunting Safaris, Arntzen et al. (2003) found out that the safari company was happy with the fact that the chairperson and secretary of the CECT Board have remained on the Board since 1994, seeing this as a sign of stability and continuity. Mr. Steven Rann reported the working relationship between the CECT Board and Rann Hunting Safaris as good	e) KCT annual wildlife quota from 2003 to 2004 was withheld from them by the DWNP due to mismanagement of trust funds by trust board and subsequently released to Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris. The DWNP released the KCT wildlife quota directly to Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris (KCT JVA partner) without the consent of KCT, the legal leaseholder to CH8. Blackbeard and Hepburn had written a letter to the Director of DWNP and to the Vice President of Botswana requesting them to release the wildlife quota directly to them pending the KCT accountability report. Their argument was that they already have marketed the wildlife quota abroad and hunters were already on camp. During My fieldwork, I had the opportunity to attend a meeting between the KCT Board, Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris and the Community Service Division of the DWNP at the DWNP offices in Kasane. The meeting was to address the ensuing conflict between the KCT Board and Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris. The KCT Board had written a letter to Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris to the effect that their hunting activities within CH8 (KCT's leased area) were illegal and has to stop with immediate effect. One of the major arguments at the meeting was whether KCT has the power to suspend Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris hunting activities. KCT argued that they do have the power since they are the legal leaseholders to CH8. Blackbeard and Hepburn Safari's argued that if KCT is not able to get the wildlife quota for them as agreed in the sublease agreement that constitute a breach of contract.	e) STMT has the following complaints against HCH:  - HCH often make late payments and not according to the agreed payment schedules. - HCH had promised to support the village soccer team in their tender documents with P68, 000.00 per annum and to date only P19, 000.00 has been paid or given. - Training to community members and STMT Board which has been promised by HCH Hunting Safaris as part of their tender promises has not been forthcoming	e) KDT auctions its annual wildlife quota and therefore has no joint venture agreement with any safari company

Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Cases of conflict</b>	<p>d) CECT is frustrated with the Land Board's delay in approving their Timber Salvage Harvesting Project – CECT planned to undertake this project since 1994</p> <p>CECT is also frustrated with the Land Board over its community lodge project – CECT applied for land within the leased resource use area for the construction of a lodge since 2001 and CECT was informed by the Land Board that the area they have applied for has some cultural significance, and an archaeological impact study has to be carried out before approval could be granted or denied. CECT has ever since been awaiting the Land Board's response - <i>indicates lack of social capital/synergy between CBNRM CBOs and regulatory departments</i></p>	d) No information	d) No report of problems between Land Board and STMT	<p>d) KDT applied to the Land Board for the Machaba camp in 2002 and the Land Board did not approve KDT's application. Initially KDT operated these two campsites after the private owners left and the Land Board instructed KDT to stop operating those camps without a license. KDT then put through an application to the Land Board for permission to operate the two campsites on the 12<sup>th</sup> February 2003 and did not get a response until June 2004. Their application was not successful. The reason given by the Land Board for not approving KDT's application was that the carrying capacity of the area would be exceeded because more lodges will mean more people (visitors, tourists etc) in that area. KDT Board members wonders why that was not the case when the two lodges were run by private operators - <i>indicates lack of social capital/synergy between CBNRM CBOs and regulatory departments</i></p>

Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Cases of conflict</b>	<p>b) Alexander et al. (1999) reported power struggles between some VTCs and VDCs - conflicts as to whether VDC should be given money by the VTCs from the sale of the hunting quota - <i>indicating a lack of bridging social capital between village institutions.</i></p> <p>c) Although the CECT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quotas set by DWNP, they no longer do so since the DWNP does not take their comments into account – <i>indicates lack of social capital/synergy between CBNRM CBOs and regulatory central government departments</i></p>	<p>b) No information</p> <p>c) No information</p>	<p>b) The STMT Five-Year Strategic Plan (2004 – 2008) outlines plans for STMT Board and Sankuyo VDC working closely together to facilitate development plan processes in the village – <i>this shows an attempt by STMT to build bridging social capital with other village institutions though currently there is no real connection between the VDC and the STMT</i></p> <p>c) STMT holds that the unpredictability of the annual revenues due to changing wildlife quotas makes it hard to plan Trust activities. The Sankuyo community believes that wildlife resources are stable in the area (Arntzen et al., 2003). Their views are based on wildlife monitoring efforts of the CEGS. Although STMT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quota, they no longer do so. STMT finds it difficult to understand why the quotas are being reduced by the DWNP (Arntzen et al., 2003) – <i>lack of social capital between CBNRM CBOs and regulatory central government departments</i></p>	<p>b) All the study CBNRM CBOs allow VDC chairperson and secretary ex-officio position the CBNRM CBO Board, and this is not the case at Khwai – the VDC is not involved at all - <i>indicating a lack of bridging social capital between village institutions.</i></p> <p>c) Although the KDT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quotas set by DWNP, they have never commented. KDT feels that their comments will not make any difference – <i>indicates lack of social capital/synergy between CBNRM CBOs and regulatory central government departments</i></p>



Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Cases of conflict</b>	<p>a) In 2000 a group of people from the Chobe Enclave came together to form what was called 'the concerned group'. The concerned group wrote a letter to the Office of the Vice President and the TAC alleging mismanagement of trust funds by the CECT Board. The concerned group voiced that auditing work should not only involve inspection of accounting books submitted by the Trust Board, but also an assessment and valuation of all CECT assets. To be able to do this, the auditors have to be brought to the Chobe Enclave. The concerned groups' concern was that auditors were in the dark as to whether the assets invested in as alluded to by the CECT Board were actually there. They felt that it would be better if auditors were brought down to the Chobe Enclave to do the auditing and see the assets. According to the CECT coordinator, all these had led to increased costs and delays as auditors required asset reports necessitating the need to engage valuers – <i>lack of social capital leading to increased transaction costs</i></p>	<p>a) During fieldwork for my study, KCT CBNRM activities had been suspended due to misappropriation of funds by the KCT Board. The trust funds for the financial year 2001 to 2002 were misappropriated in the estimated sum of two million Pula and there is a bank overdraft of P2254.96 (on an account with Barclays Bank Botswana) – <i>the misappropriation of funds by the KCT Board is a source of mistrust hence declining social capital at KCT</i></p>	<p>a) According to Arntzen et al., (2003) the general membership of STMT is to a very large extent involved in management decisions of the Trust. STMT has been described by a representative of NRMP as "too democratic" and thereby inefficient, in that the committee has virtually no authority to make a decision without community consultation (Boggs, 2000). HCH, the safari company with a joint venture agreement with STMT accused STMT of spending too much time in consensus building. <i>The consensus building efforts of STMT have resulted in some degree of social capital at the community level</i></p>	<p>a) The 3<sup>rd</sup> KDT Board's term in office (2002) was characterized by mismanagement of KDT funds and at the end of the Board's term in office, the Board couldn't account for missing KDT funds resulting in the suspension of KDT activities. KDT activities were suspended because of the withholding of the KDT wildlife quota by the DWNP. The quota was later released August 2003. <i>The misappropriation of funds by the KDT Board is a source of mistrust hence declining social capital at KDT</i></p>

Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
National level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- CECT is a registered member of BOCOBONET</li><li>- CECT Board members attend the National CBNRM Forum</li><li>- Contacts with DWNP which awards the annual wildlife quota</li><li>- The DWNP trained CECT (CEGs</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- KCT is a member of BOCOBONET</li><li>- KCT Board members have never attended the National CBNRM Forum</li><li>- Contacts with DWNP which awards the annual wildlife quota</li><li>- The DWNP trained KCT (CEGs</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- STMT is a member of BOCOBONET</li><li>- STMT Board members attend the National CBNRM Forum</li><li>- Contacts with DWNP which awards the annual wildlife quota</li><li>- The DWNP trained STMT (CEGs</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Eco-tourism Support Services (ESS) assisted KDT to develop financial and administrative management systems</li><li>- KDT is not a member of BOCOBONET</li><li>- KDT Board members attend the National CBNRM Forum</li><li>- Contacts with DWNP which awards the annual wildlife quota</li><li>- The DWNP trained KDT (CEGs</li></ul>
International level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Much CECT mobilization and other related support was offered by DWNP/NRMP and PACT/IRCE</li><li>- Deloitte and Touch audits CECT accounting books</li><li>- ADF funded CECT's management plan</li><li>- PACT/IRCE helped in training Community Action Plan Coordinators for each VTC</li><li>- AWF funded the development of CECTs' management plan in 2004</li><li>- CECT get and send exchange visitors from CBNRM CBO in Namibia and Zimbabwe</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Much CECT mobilization and other related support was offered by DWNP/NRMP and PACT/IRCE</li><li>- PACT assisted STMT to finalize their deed of trust, develop a Policies and Procedures Manual and establish a vision and long-term strategic development plan.</li><li>- AWF provided advice and funding to STMT in renovating Santawani lodge</li><li>- STMT has recently developed a Five-Year Strategic Plan for the years 2004 – 2008 with the assistance from AWF and BOCOBONET</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- KDT in its formative stage was assisted with financial aid from Global Environmental Fund (GEF) small grant program under the UNDP</li></ul>	

Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Contacts with other institutional actors at:</b>  <b>a) Community level</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CECT has a joint venture agreement with Rann Hunting Safaris</li> <li>- VDC Chairperson and Secretary are ex-officio members of VTCs</li> <li>- Village Chief and Councilor are ex-officio members of the CECT Board</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- KCT has a joint venture agreement with Blackbeard and Hepburn Hunting Safaris</li> <li>- VDC Chairperson and Secretary are ex-officio members of VTCs</li> <li>- Village Chief and Councilor are ex-officio members of the KCT Board</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- STMT has a joint venture agreement with HCH Safaris</li> <li>- Village chief, Councillor and VDC chairperson and secretary are ex-officio members of the STMT Board</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- KDT has worked with individual researchers like DR. Gaborone and Dr. Richard Bell</li> <li>- KDT auctioned their wildlife quota to several safari operators over the years</li> </ul>
<b>b) District level</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The District Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) is expected to provide support to CECT</li> <li>- CSD of DWNP offers extension services to CECT</li> <li>- CECT maintains contact with the Land Board</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The District Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) is expected to provide support to KCT</li> <li>- CSD of DWNP offers extension services to KCT</li> <li>- KCT maintains contact with the Land Board</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The District Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) is expected to provide support to STMT</li> <li>- CSD of DWNP offers extension services to KCT</li> <li>- STMT maintains contact with the Land Board</li> <li>- STMT is a member of the Northwest District CBNRM Forum</li> <li>- Concorde Agencies (Pty) Ltd trained bookkeeper and performed financial statements and auditing for STMT</li> <li>- Design Consultancy facilitated the design and implementation of the STMT Shandereka Traditional Village</li> <li>- Chadwick, Anderson and Partners (Pty) Ltd a legal firm in Botswana draw up STMT joint venture agreements</li> <li>- People and Nature Trust worked with STMT in setting up Kazikiini campsite and Shandereka Cultural Village</li> <li>- Mogodu Consultancy worked on STMT Board training and capacity building</li> <li>- WhiteCap Agencies (Pty) Ltd carried out a leather products marketing consultancy work for STMT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The District Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) is expected to provide support to KDT</li> <li>- CSD of DWNP offers extension services to CECT</li> <li>- KDT maintains contact with the Land Board</li> <li>- KDT is a member of the Northwest District CBNRM Forum</li> <li>- Management plan for NG 18 and NG 19 was prepared by Okavango Community Consultants</li> <li>- ESS offers advisory services on financial and administrative management to KDT</li> </ul>

Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within Study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders

MEASURE	CECT	KALEPA	STMT	KDT
<b>Community participation in CBNRM CBO activities</b>	The process that led to the formation of CECT involved a series of consultation meetings and workshops conducted by DWNP/NRMP and PACT/IRCE to familiarize Chobe Enclave residents with the idea of CBNRM	No data is available on KCT because of the current problems discussed under 'cases of conflict' in sections below. In fact there has been no formal hand over of KCT administrative records from the board that misappropriated the funds to later boards.	The process that led to the formation of STMT involved a series of consultation meetings and workshops conducted by DWNP/NRMP and PACT/IRCE to familiarize Sankuyo residents with the idea of CBNRM	Unlike CECT and STMT, the mobilization of the Khwai community for CBNRM activities was carried out by Dr. Gaborone, an academic at the University of Botswana
	The general membership participates in voting for office bearers and for projects at the VTC AGM and for joint-venture partner as per the Joint venture guidelines	Kalepa is one of the least studied CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. It is hard to find any past studies done on Kalepa.	The General Membership of STMT is also responsible for the election of the STMT Board. The general membership of STMT vote for a Joint Venture Partner at the beginning of each joint venture agreement	The General Membership of KDT is also responsible for the election of the KDT Board.
	Major decisions within CECT are made mainly by the CECT Board		STMT holds regular meetings with the general membership to discuss progress, problems as well as recruit personnel for both the Trust and the joint venture partner.	Major decisions within KDT are made mainly by the KDT Board

# Human Capital - Enhancing and Utilization of Local People's Skills

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
Local people employed by partner Safari company	<p>Rann Safaris employs 50 seasonal and temporary workers for the hunting camps</p> <p><b>No. of people employed by Rann Safaris = 50</b></p>	<p>No data is available on KCT because of the current problems discussed under 'cases of conflict' in sections below. In fact there has been no formal hand over of KCT administrative records from the board that misappropriated the funds to later boards.</p> <p>Kalepa is one of the least studied CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. It is hard to find any past studies done on Kalepa.</p> <p><b>No. of people employed in the past = Unknown</b></p> <p><b>No. of people employed now = 0</b></p>	<p>HCH Safaris employs 56 Sankuyo residents on a seasonal basis</p> <p>Game Safaris (subcontracted by HCH) employs 30 Sankuyo residents in its hunting and photographic operations</p> <p><b>No. of people employed by HCH and Game Safaris = 86</b></p>	<p>3 people were employed by Kyriacou, Visser, De Graaf and Eaton safari operators in 2000 as trackers and skimmers"</p> <p>12 people were employed by Jordan Calitz, Greg Butler and Game safaris in 2001 as trackers and skimmers</p> <p>NB KDT's does not follow the joint venture agreement strategy promoted by the DWNP, but opted to auction their wildlife quota to the highest bidder.</p> <p><b>Average No. of people employed by safari operators = 8</b></p>

## Human Capital - Enhancing and Utilization of Local People's Skills

MEASURE	CECT	KCT	STMT	KDT
<b>Local people employed</b>	<p>5 Community Action Plan Coordinators trained by PACT have been employed by CECT as VTC project managers</p> <p>1 CECT Coordinator who is from the local community</p> <p>15 CEGs trained by the DWNP employed by CECT (3 from each of the 5 CECT Villages)</p> <p>1 General Duties Assistant (GDA) from the local community</p> <p>1 Driver from the local community</p> <p>1 Administrative Secretary running the CECT office in Kasane</p> <p>5 Radio operators – one in each of the CECT villages</p> <p>Parakarungu VTC – 4 employees (2 for the sorghum/maize grinding mill and 2 for the general dealer store)</p> <p>Mabele VTC – employs 3 people at its general dealer store</p> <p><b>No. of people employed = 36</b></p>	<p>No data is available on KCT because of the current problems discussed under 'cases of conflict' in sections below. In fact there has been no formal hand over of KCT administrative records from the board that misappropriated the funds to later boards.</p> <p>Kalepa is one of the least studied CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. It is hard to find any past studies done on Kalepa.</p> <p><b>No. of people employed in the past = Unknown</b></p> <p><b>No. of people employed now = 0</b></p>	<p>1 Bookkeeper</p> <p>1 Community Liaison Officer</p> <p>10 CEGs trained by the DWNP employed by STMT</p> <p>2 administrative assistants</p> <p>2 drivers</p> <p>2 security guards</p> <p>1 Sales and marketing Officer</p> <p>1 assistant sales and marketing officer based in the Maun office</p> <p>15 Sankuyo residents working at Kazikini Campsite</p> <p>20 employees at Santawani Lodge</p> <p><b>No. of people employed = 55</b></p>	<p><b>NB</b> Due to the KDT financial problems resulting from mismanagement of funds and the temporary close down of KDT activities in the late 2002 and early 2003, all the KDT employees lost their jobs.</p> <p><i>Lost jobs:</i></p> <p>40 Khwai residents employed to open new hunting tracks on seasonal basis</p> <p>22 Khwai residents who worked in hunting camps as waitresses, managers, escort guides and tent ladies</p> <p>1 KDT Manager</p> <p>1 KDT Administrator</p> <p>1 KDT Accounts Officer</p> <p><b>Total lost jobs = 65</b></p> <p><i>Current jobs</i></p> <p>10 CEGs trained by the DWNP employed by KDT</p> <p>2 Bookkeepers</p> <p>1 Driver</p> <p>1 Community Liaison Officer</p> <p><b>No. of people employed = 14</b> NB No. of jobs lost = 51</p>

## Human Capital - Enhancing and Utilization of Local People's Skills

MEASURE	CECT	KALEPA	STMT	KDT
<b>Capacity building/training programs</b>	<p>PACT/IRCE helped each VTC by training Community Action Plan Coordinators (CAPC) who are responsible for supervising the implementation of village projects</p> <p>CEGs trained by the DWNP</p> <p>Besides CAPC's PACT/IRCE trained the CECT Board, the CECT Coordinator, and some members of the Community on financial management, business management skills, governance, leadership skills, meeting skills, understanding joint ventures and the CBNRM concept</p> <p>BOCOBONET also trained the CECT Board and VTC on leadership and financial management skills</p>	<p>No data is available on KCT because of the current problems discussed under 'cases of conflict' in sections below. In fact there has been no formal hand over of KCT administrative records from the board that misappropriated the funds to later boards.</p> <p>Kalepa is one of the least studied CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. It is hard to find any past studies done on KCT.</p>	<p>Capacity building by PACT, DWNP and BOCOBONET.</p> <p>STMT Board training and capacity building by Mogodu Consultancy</p> <p>Concorde Agencies (Pty) Ltd trained the STMT bookkeeper</p> <p>CEGs trained by the DWNP</p> <p>In 1996, 5 STMT members were trained in bookkeeping, 6 were sent for leatherwork training in Zimbabwe, and 3 were sent to Kenya for training in PRA in Kenya.</p> <p>Training in cookery and camp management by Crocodile Camp Safaris (had a joint venture agreement with STMT before HCH hunting safaris)</p>	<p>Eco-tourism Support Services (ESS) trained the KDT Board on financial and administrative management</p> <p>CEGs trained by the DWNP</p> <p>BOCOBONET helped KDT by conducting a leadership training workshop</p>

## Appendix 6 Process and Impact Indicators for study CBNRM CBOs

### Natural Capital - Community Wildlife Conservation and Monitoring Related Efforts

MEASURE	CECT	KALEPA	STMT	KDT
Conservation projects undertaken	0	0	0	0
Money invested in conservation	0	0	0	0
Community management & monitoring	Community Escort Guides (CEGs) Activities: to ensure that hunting safari operators abide to hunting guidelines offered by the DWNP i.e. enforcing DWNP hunting guidelines	Community Escort Guides (CEGs) Activities: to ensure that hunting safari operators abide to hunting guidelines offered by the DWNP i.e. enforcing DWNP hunting guidelines	Community Escort Guides (CEGs) Activities: to ensure that hunting safari operators abide to hunting guidelines offered by the DWNP i.e. enforcing DWNP hunting guidelines	Community Escort Guides (CEGs) Activities: to ensure that hunting safari operators abide to hunting guidelines offered by the DWNP i.e. enforcing DWNP hunting guidelines



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