Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems Morelli, Massimo
dc.contributor.department Economics 2018-02-16T05:03:56.000 2020-06-30T02:04:28Z 2020-06-30T02:04:28Z 2015-04-16 1998-08-01
dc.description.abstract <p>This paper provides a game-theoretic model of representative democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections, and the expected payoffs from the after-election majority game affect incentives-to form parties before the elections. In this way Duverger's hypothesis can be formally explained by the strategic behavior of political elites. If politicians care primarily about private benefits, the equilibrium policy outcome under a proportional electoralsystem coincides with the median party's position. On the other hand, with quasilinear utility, the.distance from the median voter outcome may be lower with plurality rule.</p>
dc.identifier archive/
dc.identifier.articleid 1044
dc.identifier.contextkey 6993964
dc.identifier.s3bucket isulib-bepress-aws-west
dc.identifier.submissionpath econ_las_economicreports/47
dc.source.bitstream archive/|||Sat Jan 15 00:24:38 UTC 2022
dc.subject.disciplines Business Administration, Management, and Operations
dc.subject.disciplines Comparative Politics
dc.subject.disciplines Economic Policy
dc.subject.disciplines Graphics and Human Computer Interfaces
dc.title Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems
dc.type article
dc.type.genre report
dspace.entity.type Publication
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication 4c5aa914-a84a-4951-ab5f-3f60f4b65b3d
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