The Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard Marette, Stéphan
dc.contributor.department Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 2018-02-16T14:48:48.000 2020-06-30T01:04:50Z 2020-06-30T01:04:50Z 2015-06-18 2005-12-01
dc.description.abstract <p>This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers' cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium.</p>
dc.identifier archive/
dc.identifier.articleid 1436
dc.identifier.contextkey 7235617
dc.identifier.s3bucket isulib-bepress-aws-west
dc.identifier.submissionpath card_workingpapers/438
dc.source.bitstream archive/|||Sat Jan 15 00:16:36 UTC 2022
dc.subject.disciplines Agricultural and Resource Economics
dc.subject.disciplines Agricultural Economics
dc.subject.disciplines Industrial Organization
dc.subject.disciplines Public Economics
dc.subject.keywords cost of regulation
dc.subject.keywords information
dc.subject.keywords standard
dc.title The Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard
dc.type article
dc.type.genre article
dspace.entity.type Publication
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication 1a6be5f1-4f64-4e48-bb66-03bbcc25c76d
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