Dangerous liaisons An endogenous model of international trade and human rights

dc.contributor.author Chyzh, Olga
dc.contributor.author Chyzh, Olga
dc.contributor.department Political Science
dc.contributor.department Statistics
dc.date 2018-02-17T18:18:24.000
dc.date.accessioned 2020-06-30T06:24:15Z
dc.date.available 2020-06-30T06:24:15Z
dc.date.copyright Fri Jan 01 00:00:00 UTC 2016
dc.date.issued 2016-01-01
dc.description.abstract <p>This article applies recent advances in network analysis to highlight a central tension faced by policymakers – balancing the benefits of engaging with the international system and the associated domestic policy costs. International trade rewards certain domestic practices, such as respect for human rights. Enforcing such practices, however, is politically costly and sometimes prohibitive to state leaders who rely on political repression to stay in power. In such cases, domestic elites often resort to an alternative strategy of securing the benefits of international trade – setting up indirect trade channels through intermediary states. These competing incentives are modeled within a single framework using a formal network game in which states form trade-links (direct or indirect) with other states, while simultaneously choosing their optimal level of domestic human rights protections. The model suggests that there may be an inverse relationship between a state’s embeddedness within a network of indirect trade and respect for human rights: indirect trade channels serve as loopholes that allow domestically troubled states to enjoy the benefits of trade without pressure for domestic improvement. The predictions are supported by the results of the empirical analyses of the international trade and repression data (1987–2000), conducted using a coevolutionary actor-oriented longitudinal-network model – a statistical estimator that closely mimics the theoretical model.</p>
dc.description.comments <p>This is a manuscript of an article from Journal of Peace Research 53 (2016): 409, doi:<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343316629605" target="_blank">10.1177/0022343316629605</a>. Posted with permission.</p>
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.identifier archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/pols_pubs/34/
dc.identifier.articleid 1031
dc.identifier.contextkey 8803088
dc.identifier.s3bucket isulib-bepress-aws-west
dc.identifier.submissionpath pols_pubs/34
dc.identifier.uri https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/handle/20.500.12876/57846
dc.language.iso en
dc.source.bitstream archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/pols_pubs/34/2016_Chyzh_DangerousLiaisons.pdf|||Fri Jan 14 23:40:52 UTC 2022
dc.source.uri 10.1177/0022343316629605
dc.subject.disciplines International Relations
dc.subject.disciplines Models and Methods
dc.subject.disciplines Other Statistics and Probability
dc.subject.disciplines Statistical Models
dc.subject.keywords human rights
dc.subject.keywords indirect trade
dc.subject.keywords network analysis
dc.subject.keywords network game
dc.subject.keywords repression
dc.title Dangerous liaisons An endogenous model of international trade and human rights
dc.type article
dc.type.genre article
dspace.entity.type Publication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication 28ea2f1f-8c1e-4a0a-a2e2-a41d9c027840
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relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication 264904d9-9e66-4169-8e11-034e537ddbca
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