Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities
| dc.contributor.author | Frankel, David | |
| dc.contributor.author | Morris, Stephen | |
| dc.contributor.author | Frankel, David | |
| dc.contributor.author | Pauzner, Ady | |
| dc.contributor.department | Economics | |
| dc.date | 2018-02-17T21:48:05.000 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-30T02:09:21Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-06-30T02:09:21Z | |
| dc.date.copyright | Wed Jan 01 00:00:00 UTC 2003 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2003-01-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | <p>We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove <em>limit uniqueness</em>: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (Econometrica 61 (1993) 989–1018) for two-player, two-action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.</p> | |
| dc.description.comments | <p>NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Theory. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Theory, [108, 1, (2003)] DOI: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531%2802%2900018-2" id="x-ddDoi">10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00018-2</a></p> | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier | archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/98/ | |
| dc.identifier.articleid | 1098 | |
| dc.identifier.contextkey | 9045449 | |
| dc.identifier.s3bucket | isulib-bepress-aws-west | |
| dc.identifier.submissionpath | econ_las_pubs/98 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/handle/20.500.12876/21964 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.source.bitstream | archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/98/2002_Frankel_EquilibriumSelection.pdf|||Sat Jan 15 02:37:57 UTC 2022 | |
| dc.source.uri | 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00018-2 | |
| dc.subject.disciplines | Growth and Development | |
| dc.subject.disciplines | International Economics | |
| dc.subject.disciplines | Other Economics | |
| dc.subject.keywords | equilibrium selection | |
| dc.subject.keywords | global games | |
| dc.subject.keywords | strategic complementaries | |
| dc.subject.keywords | supermodular games | |
| dc.title | Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities | |
| dc.type | article | |
| dc.type.genre | article | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 52727f27-6141-430c-a095-d23b3abf0d68 | |
| relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication | 4c5aa914-a84a-4951-ab5f-3f60f4b65b3d |
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