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The alienation of the individual from society:
A social-psychological theory and cross-cultural comparison

by

Sidney Joe Jackson

A Dissertation Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the
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According to C. Wright Mills (1959) the promise of sociology lies in its ability to make clear the connections between history, society, and the individual. There is perhaps no field of inquiry within sociology which takes this task upon itself moreso than that of alienation studies. From Marx to Seeman, sociological writers on alienation have made it their aim to understand these relationships. How do vast historical events which transform entire social structures affect the individuals within them? Their answer: alienation, the severing of the social bond; and alienness, a feeling and cognizance of one's separateness from others, of one's powerlessness in the face of monumental bureaucracies and political systems, of anomia and meaninglessness, of self-estrangement.

Alienation studies make fascinating reading because they deal with such crucial issues. And in the reading, one comes away with an almost overwhelming wealth of insights and new perspectives on the interdynamics of socio-historical change and individual life and experience.

One also comes away, however, with a sense of perplexity and confusion. Despite its ability to stimulate and excite, if, after one has read through some of the literature, one draws back and looks at the field, it can only be said to be in near chaos. The relations between the great socio-historical transformations and individual life become not nearly as
clear as once thought. The term "alienation" itself comes to be seen as encompassing historical, sociological and psychological phenomena. It refers to different subject-object relationships, to both structure and process. In a word, a host of problems beset the alienation field in sociology.

From the confusion that follows initial excitement in the reading of alienation literature grows a sense of frustration; and from this sense of frustration comes a host of criticisms of alienation studies and the suggestion that the term is scientifically useless and ought to be dropped. In the hue and cry that follows this, the importance of alienation studies is lost sight of and part of the promise of sociology is lost.

This study is an attempt to bring order and scientific standing to the field of alienation studies in sociology. It does so first by attempting to solve certain semantical problems that surround the term. It does so secondly by attempting to solve certain substantive problems which themselves exist as a result of the semantic issues. These problems are problems of theory and so the first part of the study is an attempt to work out a theoretical framework. This part of the study constitutes the major effort and is viewed as its major contribution.

An attempt is also made, however, to assess the empirical basis of the theory. This attempt addresses another major criticism of alienation studies, i.e., that they are "histori-
cally blind." This blindness is said to exist, moreover, de-
spite the fact that alienation theory has its roots in Marx's
theory of dialectical materialism and that a major proposi-
tion in the theory is that alienation occurs in the transfor-
mation of traditional society to modern society. This problem
of historical substantiation no doubt is related to the first
set of problems, that is, to those of theoretical ambiguity
and vagueness, to the diversity of usages and conceptualiza-
tions of the term and certain other substantive problems
arising therefrom. Empirical and historical substantiation
awaits, to some degree at least, the development of sound
theory before they can be adequately undertaken.

I do not profess to have empirically substantiated the
theory put forward in this study. My attempts here are ex-
ploratory and illustrative. They do not meet the rigorous
canons of scientific research. What I hope to have done is
brought some order to the field by addressing certain theoret-
ical issues and providing methodological guidelines by which
the propositions of the theory may be tested. Otherwise, this
study is mostly a personal journey into the field of individ-
ual and society, an attempt to unravel the complex ways in
which an individual can become identified with society or, as
seems to be more and more the case today, become alienated
from it.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have tried to acknowledge my general indebtedness to all the people who have influenced my thought by making references to them in the footnotes and bibliographies. Where I have unconsciously omitted such acknowledgments, those familiar with the literature will recognize the mere restatement of established ideas and concepts.

I would like to express my gratitude especially to my major professor, Harry Cohen, of Iowa State University, whose views coincided almost perfectly with my own, both with regard to the topic of this study and the methods to be used, but who differed enough to provide a creative spark. His understanding, scholarship, and discipline were highly inspirational.

I would like to express my gratitude also to my other major professor, Dr. Robert Richards of Iowa State. It was he who, through tactfully constructed critiques, led me to cut away the extraneous materials and to sharpen the arguments. I am deeply grateful for his efforts.

I am also grateful to the other members of my advisory committee but especially to Dr. Robert Hollinger who, as a philosopher, provided me with some invaluable reading material and instruction, both within and without his course in the philosophy of the social sciences. I found these readings and the instruction in the philosophy of science to be absolutely invaluable in the conduct of this study.
PART ONE:

PERSISTENT PROBLEMS IN THE
FIELD OF ALIENATION THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY
CHAPTER I:
THE DIVERSITY OF ALIENATION LITERATURE IN
SOCIOLOGY AND A PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK FOR ITS ORGANIZATION

Ours has been called the age of alienation. In America, Eric Fromm (1972) has been the person, perhaps, who has been most responsible for popularizing the term "alienation." According to Fromm, alienation is very widespread. Man is said to be alienated from others, from nature, from society and culture, and, perhaps most significantly, from himself.

Although Fromm, a social psychologist, gave the term its greatest impetus in modern America, the subject of alienation has a long history in sociology as well. According to Nisbet (1966), the subject of alienation represents one of the major substantive areas of sociology. Deriving their concerns mostly from Karl Marx, the classical writers like Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber devoted much of their energies to it, both directly and indirectly. The indirect way in which these writers were concerned about alienation was through their analyses of the impacts of industrialization upon the social order of the European Feudal societies. To many of these writers, alienation was one result of the crumbling feudal system and its replacement by the capitalist system of the bourgeoisie. Contemporary sociological writers have taken up this theme and have elaborated it in various ways.

The subject of alienation, of course, has not been limit-
ed to the fields of social-psychology and sociology. Indeed, as indicated above, it was introduced into social science generally via Marx (Israel 1971:5) who was a philosopher by training. Before Marx, Rousseau's (1915) and Hegel's (1970) works in philosophy were obviously about alienation. Today, also, contemporary philosophers like Marcuse (1964), Sartre (1956) and Schacht (1970), as well as many others, have contributed to alienation studies. In religion, there is Tillich (1951; 1957; 1963). In literature, Camus (1946) and Kafka (1974) have made contributions among others too numerous to mention. In theatre, there is Pirandello (1952), Ibsen (1935) and Ionesco (1960). Alienation is a theme that permeates the humanities as well as social science.

The Present State of Alienation Studies in Sociology

Despite the fact that the subject of alienation has received so much attention, both within and without the field of sociology, the field of alienation studies can only be characterized as in chaos. Even in the confines of sociology a host of problems beset the attempts at understanding and explanation of this phenomenon. Most of the problems surrounding this term in sociology stem from its ambiguity and vagueness. As a term derived from such a diversity of fields, alienation has been treated in a variety of ways, as a phenomenon of many kinds and dimensions.
One of the more volatile issues surrounding the alienation term in sociology has to do with whether it should refer to an objective condition of society or a subjective condition of the individual (Schweitzer and Geyer, 1981). While the trend in past sociological literature has been to treat alienation as a societal condition (Marx, 1959; Durkheim, 1964; etc.) contemporary literature tends to treat it psychologically (Seeman, 1959). This ambiguity in the reference of the alienation term has led to a continuing split between those writers of a Marxist orientation and those of a social-psychological—or of a so-called "empiricist"—orientation. The Marxist oriented writers argue that reduction of the term "alienation" to psychological dimensions transforms its meaning and severs it from its classical roots in Hegel and Marx. It thus shifts analysis away from historical-structural levels to social-psychological levels. This, in turn, robs the concept of much of its critical and normative thrust. Of course, to strip the term of its normative definitions is precisely what the writers of a social-psychological orientation have tried to do. The issue of whether the term should refer to subjective or objective phenomena is perhaps one of the more crucial among the researchers in the alienation field.

Recently, an attempt has been made to solve this problem by treating alienation as a social process (Twining, 1980). However, while this attempt is a step forward in many ways, in my opinion it raises another issue as to whether alienation is
to refer to static or dynamic phenomena in addition to whether it is considered psychologically or sociologically and historically. The problem of whether alienation refers to a structure or a process thus takes its place alongside that of the subjective-objective controversy.

As indicated, most contemporary sociologists tend to view alienation as a subjective condition of individuals. However, even when this position is taken the issue again arises as to just what the term should refer to. Seeman's (1959) work is an attempt to specify the psychological dimensions of the alienation phenomenon: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation and self-estrangement; but the problem has arisen as to whether the term should refer to all of these traits as a set of interrelated dimensions (or as a "syndrome") or whether each is a type of alienation independent of the others. Most measurement scales (Srole, 1956; Nettler, 1957; Rotter, et al. 1962) tend to be only selective of these various dimensions. Seeman (1975) himself has tended to focus on the dimension of powerlessness.

Another issue arising among those who treat alienation as a subjective condition of the individual is the choice of the type of object from which the individual is alienated. This is a problem of whether the term should refer to the relation of the individual to a particular object or a diversity of objects. As Schacht (1970:168-197) has pointed out, sociologists have conceived of the individual as being alienated
(1) from other individuals; (2) from work and its product; (3) from "events and structures which affect him;" and (4) from society and culture. Further differentiations of objects from which the individual is alienated are made within each of these categories. Of course, there are good reasons for these different functions to which the term is put in sociology for much of the variety of usages stem from the fact that the term is a **relational** one and can thus be applied to a multiplicity of subject-object relationships. Sociological usage merely reflects this relational aspect of the term.

These semantical issues have led to another problem in alienation studies, i.e., the problem of substantiating the proposition, derived primarily from Marx's writing, that it is the emergence of the capitalistic societies which are the cause of alienation. The contemporary literature tends to substitute "modernization" in general for the variable of capitalism. It is modern society in general that brings about alienation. Still, there appears to be very little empirical substantiation of this problem.

The existence of this problem in alienation literature is illustrated by the following criticism of Walter Kaufman (1970:xxviii-xxix):

> The question is whether the conditions that loom so large in the contemporary literature on alienation and in the seminal books published in the fifties can be found in earlier periods and in non-capitalistic societies. One might suppose that those who deplore
alienation and blame it on modernity or, more specifically, on our economic system, would have considered these matters with some care. After all, there is no other way of establishing that their diagnoses are right; and if they are wrong, their prescriptions would scarcely merit much attention.

... What is needed is historical perspective.
But although the vogue of "alienation" has its roots in the early writings of the founder of so-called historical materialism, one of the most striking features of the vast literature on alienation is its historical blindness.

This problem persists because, as they focus on the individual's subjective condition, the researchers in the social-psychological (or empirical) tradition of sociology are "... unable to make grounded judgments about the determining structural or material conditions of alienation in the larger society" (Schweitzer, 1981:13). Conversely, because they focus on social structure, the Marxists are unable to specify, in more direct ways, the linkages between this structure and its subjective manifestations.

Both of these problems, i.e., the semantical as well as the empirical, are interdependent. Until the differences in conceptualization and terminology are resolved there will continue to be no uniform or cohesive theory of alienation. And until a theory is established empirical substantiation will remain unobtainable. The persistence of these issues insures that the field will continue to be split between the
Marxist oriented writers and those of a social-psychological persuasion and that the term will continue to function in a variety of ways. As long as these varied usages continue, any attempt at establishing empirical facts, even within the empirical tradition itself, will continue to be of somewhat dubious undertaking. Such "facts" will, of necessity, continue to be classified in their own special categories according to the "kind" of alienation to which they refer, and the problem of the relation of these facts will continue to persist.¹ The more substantive problem of the development of a theory of alienation will thus continue to exist also because each facet of the field will be dealing with its own area, oblivious, more or less, to the others.

The Need for a Comprehensive Framework
in the Field of Alienation Studies

The chaotic nature of the field of alienation studies has led to rather severe criticism of the field. Some writers have called for the abandonment of the term altogether and the substitution of other, more direct, terms in its place, such as those by Seeman, i.e., powerlessness, meaninglessness, etc., or such as the term "reification" (Israel, 1971).

¹For example, Seeman's (1975) review of the empirical studies in the alienation field classifies such studies into his five categories of alienation and he rates the problem of ascertaining the unity between these various alienations as of top priority.
Perhaps the criticism of Feuer (1969:95-96) expresses the attitudes of many writers who at first, perhaps, entered the field with enthusiasm but soon found themselves enmeshed in the issues just enumerated. He writes: "Alienation lies in every direction of human experience where basic emotional desire is frustrated, every direction in which the person may be compelled by social situations to do violence to his own nature. 'Alienation' is used to convey the emotional tone that accompanies any behavior in which the person is compelled to act self-destructively; that is the most general definition of alienation, and its dimensions will be as varied as human desire and need." And in a further passage he states: "Alienation is the dramatic metaphor of the intellectual who has left the political Garden of Eden and projects his experience as the exemplar of all human frustrations." Apparently, according to Feuer, like the concept of "instinct" in early behavioral and social science, the concept of alienation seems to explain so much it ends up explaining nothing, seems, in fact, to merely be the projection of politically frustrated intellectuals.

One can certainly sympathize with Feuer's criticisms. Even a cursory reading of the literature leaves one almost completely at a loss as to just what the essence of the field is. There is little doubt that such literature is dealing with a very important phenomenon, yet is so varied in its treatment that very little sense can be made of it. What is
wrong with the field, of course, is that there simply is no theory of alienation as such. That is, there is no overall framework which can tie the variety of studies together into a single, related whole. Although most sociological studies derive eventually from the Marxian tradition, in the course of the development of the field this tradition has become extremely variegated. This is due, in no small measure, of course, to the fact that Marxism itself gave the alienation term several possible interpretations. The situation has only gone from bad to worse.

What is needed to bring coherency to the field of alienation studies is a clarification of conceptualizations and terminology and, building from this terminology, the construction of a system of propositions and hypotheses which relate these concepts and variables within an overall theoretical framework or format. This overall format, moreover, must be capable of comprehending the various usages and special considerations of the various divisions and efforts in the field. These varied usages and the divisions within alienation studies are, it is true, formidable. As Schweitzer (1981:12) has said: "What is at stake here is a strategic choice between competing paradigms and departure points in the study of alienation--a choice which determines not only the way questions and answers about alienation are formulated and researched, but also the strategies for change, action and de-alienation."
However, I believe the issues that divide the field, even including that of the subjective vs. objective approaches, can be reconciled. My feeling is more in line with Peter Ludz who "... underlines the stress that Marx placed on both the objective conditions for, and the subjective manifestations of, alienation and points to many of the parallels between psycho-analytic concepts (i.e., Horney's 'neurotic personality,' Erikson's concept of 'identity crisis') and the psychological elements of alienation in Marx's early works. Ludz shows that Marx's general theory of alienation contains statements on many different levels, including what might be referred to as 'subjective' or 'psychological' ones" (Schweitzer, 1976:xv). Thus, while the variety of alienation studies is such that no theoretical framework can encompass them all (Schacht, 1970), nevertheless a framework that can capture most usages and can include most levels and types of phenomena alluded to by use of this term is, I believe, possible.

At this point, then, I wish to present an overall theoretical framework, in outline form, for the purpose of bringing the alienation studies together within a common format. In doing so, I shall be attempting to provide a set of terms and concepts and a system of propositions that will tie these studies together in various ways, in turn providing solutions to the various issues already enumerated, thereby bringing order to an almost completely chaotic field. Only when this is done can the truly substantial problems remain-
ing in the theory be ascertained and an attempt at empirical substantiation be undertaken.

A Preliminary Theoretical Framework for the Assessment of Alienation Studies in Sociology

To begin to establish an alienation framework, we must distinguish between alienation as a process and as a state and specify the objects of the alienated relationship. I shall adhere to the basic meaning of the term "alienation" by using it to refer to the process\(^1\) by which the individual becomes psychologically separated from others.\(^2\) The state of the alienated individual, his subjective condition at the end of the process, shall be referred to as "alienness." Thus, the process of alienation results in the state of alienness, the latter a psychological or subjective condition of separation of the individual from others.

The opposite side of the coin, of course, is the process by which individuals become psychologically joined or bonded to others. I shall refer to the process by which an individ-

\(^1\)"Process" is defined here as "... a series of interdependent events that begin, operate, and conclude with certain defined and recognizable entities or properties" (Williams, 1972:1).

\(^2\)While I use the term "other" to refer primarily to human individuals, the term is general enough to refer to any "object" of the individual's environment, including social groups, cultural values, artifacts, etc. By "object" I am referring to any symbolically designated phenomenon produced or created out of social interaction. These ideas are developed at greater length in this chapter and in the next.
ual is psychologically bonded to others as **identification** and the end state of this process as **identity**. Thus, through identification an individual achieves an identity with others.

These processes, of identification and alienation, are, of course, more complex than these statements indicate. In order to develop a preliminary alienation framework for the assessment of the literature, therefore, I shall try to describe these processes and their collateral psychological states in some detail.

The essential problem involved in understanding these processes is the nature of the "linkage" between individuals. For purposes of this study, the identification with or alienation from others shall be theorized as involving a subsidiary process of formation of the self. In this sense, identification more specifically will refer to the process of the merging of the self with others, i.e., to the process of the emotional and cognitive "attachment" of the self to others of the individual's society. Identity, concordantly, will refer to the state of such an attachment, i.e., to the psychological traits (affective and cognitive) that characterize an individual when this attachment or merger occurs. Conversely, alienation shall refer to the process of separation of the self from others, i.e., the process of the cognitive and emotional detachment of the self from others. Accordingly, alienness shall refer to the set of traits, mental and
emotional, that characterize a person who has experienced this alienation process.

These processes, of identification of the self with others and of alienation of the self from others—along with the corresponding states which are their outcomes—may be theorized to proceed by way of an interactional process as depicted in Figure 1. My view is that interaction is always embedded in a "situation" involving an exchange of sanctions, positive or negative (Homans, 1974) and in which the individual is often attempting to actualize the self. By "actualize the self" I mean the overt activity of the individual as he attempts to fulfill self needs. "Needs" here must be understood as referring to both the subjective-self needs and the objective-self needs.²

As is shown in Figure 1, two different outcomes occur for the individual depending upon the sanctions he receives from "another" with respect to actualization of self: if he is positively sanctioned self-fulfillment results; if he is negatively sanctioned self-disillusionment is the result. Self fulfillment will refer to either or both the affective and cognitive satisfaction of the individual whereas self-

---

¹A situation is defined as "... an intersection of [meaningful] time and space within which people act ... " and which exists as a matter of social definition (Hewitt, 1979:121).

²These ideas, of "self" and "need" are developed at greater length in the pages following.
disillusionment shall refer to either or both the affective and cognitive dissatisfaction of the individual. These feelings (or emotions) and cognitions function as motivational factors and lead back into overt attempts to actualize the self in a continuous way. I have indicated this by the arrows running back to the self-actualization block. Each, however, when established as a mode of feeling concomitant with a pattern of positive or negative sanctioning produces two different psychological states, that of identity of the self

Figure 1. The Interactional Basis of Identification/Alienation
with others or alienness of the self from others. In the former, the individual's self is defined by ego as "like" or "one of" the others; in the latter it is defined as "unlike," contradistinctive, or not one of the others.

The formation of either of these states is not a short term process but one occurring over a considerable period of the individual's lifetime during which one or the other of these feelings and cognitive modes is established. Looking at the development of the self over the individual's life-cycle it appears that we may differentiate two major phases or stages of the alienation/identification process. The reader is referred to Figure 2.

---

**Figure 2. Stages of Self-development and Their Correspondence to Identification/Alienation Processes**
As shown, I have divided the process into two major phases with respect to identification/alienation: the infancy phase and the childhood phase. For purposes of brevity, I have referred to the process of identification/alienation during infancy as primary. By the same token I have called the identification/alienation process during the childhood phase as secondary. I shall try to make these distinctions clearer as follows.

It is a well-established view in sociology that the infant does not possess a sense of himself as object when he is first born (Mead, 1934). Of course, this does not mean that he cannot perceive the difference between his own body and that of another person, or his own hand and that of the toy within it at least to some degree. But, on the other hand, he probably does not conceive of his body as "himself" and the other person and the toy as "other." Thus, it may be said that, in this sense, the infant probably does not separate himself from the rest of the world but is "one" with it. He exists, at first, in a state of psychological unity with his environment, i.e., a state of subjective identity.

The identification/alienation process in its overall sense is the process of the individual's transformation from this original state of subjective identity to a state of either objective identity with, or objective alienness from, others. The primary phase of this process is marked by the
initial differentiation of the subjective self into the objective self, together with the development of an emotional mode accompanying such a differentiation. Both of these developments, i.e., of the objectification of the self and of the establishment of a concomitant emotional mode are brought about by the basic interactional process portrayed in Figure 1. Of course, in the primary phase of the identification/alienation process, self-actualization can only refer to the attempts by the individual to fulfill the subjective self since the objective self has not yet fully developed. By "subjective self" I am referring to what Cooley (1967:137) calls the "my feeling or sense of appropriation." It is what Mead referred to as the "I" aspect of the self. It consists primarily in terms of a feeling state or "... personal emotion and sentiment." At the same time, this subjective self is "... set free by the act of communication" (Cooley, 1967:46). As Cooley says, the individual "... needs to express himself" and this need "... is for something more than sensory or muscular activities."

The objectification of the subjective self is accomplished as the infant learns symbolic speech. The subjective self becomes objectified by its representation in symbols, specifically personal names and personal pronouns. This objectification of the self, in my view, is the fundamental aspect of the primary alienation process because it establishes the basis for a conceptual differentiation between the
individual and his environment and thereupon produces the grounds upon which all the existential questions with respect to the self arise, i.e., of the meaning of being and existence, of the meaning of life and death, of good and evil, etc. All such questions presuppose a creature who is self-aware, who makes a distinction between himself and his environment in more than a mere perceptual sense, and who seeks to establish the meaning of his own existence in a variety of ways.

The objectification of the self during the primary phase is insufficient, however, in and of itself, to result in alienness. It must be accompanied by the establishment of an emotional mode of fear and anxiety, of insecurity. Conversely, the development of identity with others is accompanied by an emotional security.

These emotional modes are established as a result of the pattern of significant other's sanctioning responses to the infant's actualization of self. If a pattern of negative sanctions develops, the infant comes to possess a relatively modal insecurity and basic anxiety. This is the alienation route. If a pattern of positive sanctions develops the infant builds up an emotional security. This is the route of identification.

The end of the infancy phase is marked, therefore, by the emergence of the objective self, together with an emotional security or insecurity, depending on the type of sanctioning of self-actualization the individual has received.
during this stage. These emotional states act as the conditioning factors predisposing the individual toward either the development of an identity with others, or an alienness from them. They set the stage for the further development of the self in the next phase of the identification/alienation process.

The secondary phase of the identification/alienation process is marked by the gradual emergence and "filling out" of the self-concept. This concept is formed largely upon the emotional base established earlier in the primary phase. The individual now begins to think of or conceive of himself as a certain kind of person. That is, he begins to conceive of himself as having certain identities, or, conversely, as not having these identities. The latter case, of course, is the essence of alienness.

In the secondary phase of identification/alienation, self-actualization is more than the attempt to gratify subjective self needs: it has become, in addition, the attempt to fulfill the needs of the more fully objectified, conceptualized self. Hence, it is as much a "presentation of self" as it is a subjective sense of gratification; it is, as well, an attempt to satisfy the acquired needs of the newly emerging objective self. At its base is an attempt to realize or fulfill an ideal self-conception through its actualization in a situation comprised of two interacting individuals. Thus, the basic interactional process depicted in Figure 1 still
pertains, but now both individuals are communicating symbolically. Consequently, new dimensions are added. We depict the identification and alienation process at the secondary level, or childhood phase in Figure 3.

The interactional process as it is now portrayed in Figure 3 involves two or more individuals whose interaction is based on each's interpretation of the meaning of the other's acts for themselves, and which meaning comes to define the individual negatively or positively with respect to some ideal self-conception. This ideal is drawn from the

![Diagram](image-url)

Figure 3. The Interactional Basis of the Secondary Phase of Identification/Alienation
various status-roles which the society has to offer (Rosenberg, 1979). Each status-role of the society carries with it an idealized stereotype of the person who occupies the status and plays the role. Through socialization, individuals learn this ideal stereotype and when they assume the status-role this stereotype becomes the ideal to which they compare themselves and which, if they are committed to it (or if they fear negative sanction), they attempt to fulfill through actualization.

The idealized conception of the self is composed of three major elements: the identity element, the image element and the esteem element. The identity element "places" the individual in the social structure relative to others. It indicates to him who and what he is. The image element indicates the physical and psychological traits the individual should ideally possess. The esteem element ranks the individual with respect to others.

Within any situation every individual is usually not only playing a role of that situation specifically but is simultaneously playing a variety of other roles, e.g., with respect to sexual gender, age grades, racial or ethnic categories, etc. (depending on the complexity of the society). The individual thus, in playing these roles, conceives of himself as having not only a "situated" identity and image but a "general" identity and image as well (Lauer and Handel, 1977:176), which provide sets of ideals which he more or less
compares himself to as he acts them out and with respect to which he more or less seeks confirmation from other persons. Confirmation consists in receiving a positive sanction in the interaction, "positive" being a response from the other person perceived and interpreted (cognized) as defining his presented self concordant to his ideal-self. A disconfirming response would be the opposite. Any discrepancy between the presented self and the ideal self represents the individual's own level of self-esteem. In this study I conceive of self-esteem as purely a cognitive judgment. The emotional concomitants of this judgment, itself derived from the interaction, fill out and complete the experience of self-fulfillment or self-disillusionment, i.e., states of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, with these terms now referring to the fulfillment or disillusionment of the objectified self as well as the subjective self.

Again, my conception is that the individual's self-needs are recurrent and so attempts to fulfill these needs are recurrent. The lines going back to self-presentation in Figure 3 represent the relatively continuous attempts by the individual to gratify these needs. It is the pattern of interaction, i.e., as confirming or disconfirming, that results in the different states of identity or alienness. In the childhood phase of self-development, if either a confirming or disconfirming pattern of interaction becomes modally established and, concomitantly, a modal state of
self-fulfillment or disillusionment prevails, then the outcome will be a psychic state of identity or of alienness respectively.

As indicated previously, these states may be described as a set of characteristic traits. The state of alienness, in addition to the trait of emotional insecurity left over from the infancy phase of alienation, is marked foremostly by what I shall later call a "negative essence." By "negative essence" I mean the individual's feeling and belief that he is somehow inferior or abnormal when compared to others. As a result of long-term self-disillusionment he secretly feels and cognizes himself not to be one of the others, i.e., he feels and believes himself to be contradistinctive, or negatively different and separate from them. This is the essence of his alienness from them. The individual excludes himself from, does not identify himself with, others of his society. This contradistinction of the self from others in turn promotes an almost constant defensive orientation, signified by the D-cognition (Maslow, 1968) dimension indicated in Figure 3. The individual becomes acutely self-conscious, mostly concerned with defending the self against disillusionment, attempting to live up to an idealized self he has constructed from the social statuses and roles to which he has committed himself. His activities are an almost constant attempt at receiving confirmation from others that he is what he wants to be. This trait, of acute
self-consciousness, in turn leads to the set of other traits, or "dimensions," frequently iterated in Seeman's work, i.e., feelings of powerlessness, meaningfulness, etc.; but I shall not elucidate upon these at this time.

In contrast to the state of alienness, identity is characterized as a feeling and cognizance of oneself as "like" or "one with" others. This feeling and cognizance, in turn, promotes a non-modal objectification of the self, i.e., an awareness in consciousness of the self as object only as a phase of the cognitive process (the internalized conversation of gestures between the "I" and the "Me"). This state is characterized by (using Maslow's terms again) a being-cognition (the being-cognition in Figure 3), a cognition wherein the self as object is not constantly under protection but operates as part of a process within the individual's consciousness. The state of identity is thus characterized as a state of emotional security--still present from infancy--as well as a lack of self-consciousness. The individual is not so concerned with avoiding self-disillusionment, and the actualization of his self-conceptions seems to occur without the conscious attempt to do so. His behavior is more spontaneous. As a result of long-term self-fulfillment, though he feels himself to be distinct from others, he does not feel different from them in any alien, or "negative," or contradistinctive sense. He recognizes himself to be one with humanity, i.e., he identifies himself
with his fellow men.

With these conceptualizations laid out, the basic scheme of identification/alienation at the social-psychological level is essentially complete. However, the wider social, cultural and historical contexts within which this social-psychological process occurs still remain to be conceptualized before a complete framework can be accomplished.

I have indicated that the social-psychological process of alienation/identification, in both its primary and secondary senses, is imbedded within a situational context. That is, like all social interaction, the interaction involving the alienation of the individual from or identification with others takes place within a social situation. At this level of interaction within a context the analysis of alienation/identification is social-psychological.

However, in addition to the immediate situational context, I identify a wider "socio-cultural" context within which the interactional process also takes place. By this term I am referring to successively wider social collectivities, groups, categories, classes, etc., i.e., to the successively more general systems of social-organization in which situations are more or less implicated. These systems, in turn, are accompanied by and reflect an underlying set of values, beliefs, knowledge and norms widely shared by the individual members, which I restrict the term "culture" to refer to. The term "socio-cultural context" will be used to
refer to both the social and the cultural context within which any individual acts. These two classes of phenomena shall constitute the purely sociological phenomena from which I shall later draw in an attempt to construct a fuller theory of alienation.

Beyond the socio-cultural context there is a "socio-historical context," that is, a phase of socio-historical development of society that may conceptually be delimited for purposes of analyzing any particular structural state of any particular society from the standpoint of the development of societies in general. These "socio-historical contexts" are merely structural configurations of the particular society that constitute a phase in its ongoing development within a framework of general social change and development. This idea will, of course, require further elaboration later in the study.

These concepts, of "situation," of "socio-cultural context" and "socio-historical context," may be thought of as successively larger and larger fields of space and time within which causal factors may be sought with regard to the overall process of alienation/identification. Thus, the full explanation of this process requires analyses of the situation in which it occurs as well as the socio-cultural and socio-historical contexts in which it occurs. While these analyses are not a study of the alienation and identification process, per se, they form a necessary adjunct to the overall theory
in the sense of tracing out socio-historical and socio-cultural causes.

Conclusion

These comments constitute the essential features of my general theoretical framework which I shall use in this study. Four substantive areas within the theory of alienation have thus been delineated: (1) the area of the initial identity state of the individual at birth and until he acquires language, i.e., the state of subjective self-consciousness; (2) the area of the identification/alienation process by which this initial subjective self-consciousness is transformed, either into a state of identity with or alienness from, society; (3) the area of the states of identity and alienness which are the products of the identification/alienation process; (4) the area of the socio-cultural and socio-historical contexts of identification/alienation.

Although some detail has been presented with respect to each of these substantive areas in the preliminary framework, introducing them at this time is not meant, obviously, to be anything more than a preliminary statement for the purpose of providing a framework for organizing and assessing the sociological literature on alienation whether it be of a sociological or social-psychological nature. With this framework in mind it will be easier to determine what part or parts of it any particular study is dealing with and how the
study differs from or resembles others. From these com­parisons a more adequate assessment of the substantive theoretical problems remaining can then be made.
CHAPTER II:
AN APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
AND AN ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS REMAINING

With the foregoing framework in mind, I have conveniently divided the sociological literature basically into two parts: first there is the literature of a more sociological bent dealing primarily with socio-structural conditions and socio-historical contexts of alienation. Secondly, there is the literature dealing primarily with the social-psychology of alienation. The classical literature stemming from Marx (1959), including Durkheim (1964), Simmel (1950), and Weber (1964), and the neoclassical literature of Mills (1956; 1959), Riesman (1977), White (1957), Goffman (1959) and Martindale (1963; 1966), may be classed in the first genre.¹ The more recent and contemporary literature of sociology, stemming

¹The inclusion of Goffman's studies within the sociological or structural literature may be surprising to some readers. However, as I have indicated, the central principle underlying the alienness and alienation concepts is self-objectification and self-exclusion, and the self-conscious anxiety and self-preoccupation which are produced in turn. Anxiety and self-preoccupation are thus the marks of modern man's alienness from his society, and it is the growth of this anxiety (over the self) and self-preoccupation that I shall particularly attempt to trace out in the review of the literature as well as the structural conditions giving rise to it. The attempt to do so thus brings Goffman's and perhaps others' studies as well under review which are not ordinarily associated with structural studies; but its relevance, in light of our contention of the importance of self-consciousness and self-preoccupation to alienness, is quite clear.
from Seeman (1959), and others may be classed in the second.

An Assessment of Alienation Studies in Sociology within the Framework

The classical literature

It is Karl Marx (1959) who first introduced the concept of alienation to sociological analysis and whose works have thus become a major reference point. Marx viewed the individual's alienation in several ways: (1) as an alienation from his self; (2) as an alienation from his labor; (3) as an alienation from his product; and (4) as an alienation from others. We are not so much interested in one through three as we are in four, i.e., the alienation from others, although the same basic self-processes are involved in all of them.

Marx viewed the alienation process itself as a process of the detachment of something which was originally a part of human nature from it. He used the German word entausserung. Marx's view is that the human being is by nature a social, a communal being. Society in the early history of man was a communal society, or, in Tönnies's language, a gemeinschaft society, based on natural will. Thus, society had a "mechanical" (to use Durkheim's phrase) solidarity and nature of which the individual was an integral part. Alienation from others, or from society, is hence the detachment of the individual from that which is part of his own nature, the
splitting of society into a mere set of individuals.

Marx viewed this alienation from others as stemming from "egoism" which in turn produces the institutionalization of private property. The private ownership of property divides society into two classes, the owners, or capitalists, and the workers or proletarians. The workers lose control over their labor and are forced to sell it to the owners and thus their labor is no longer their own and it too becomes alienated from them, as does the product of their labor. Furthermore, since labor, or work, and the product of it are no longer their own, they do not really express the self of the laborer; they are, in fact, expressions of the selves of the owners. The individual in this sense is "self-estranged," also.

Marx believed that private ownership of property, at least of that property which serves as the means of production, transforms social relations between persons into economic relations in which each individual views and uses the other as a means to obtain wealth. In this way, too, persons are estranged from one another. For Marx, civil society, organized as it is around the institution of private property, causes persons to view one another as rivals, rather than as fellows, in a "war of all against all." Marx (1963:26) describes man in civil society as:

... an individual separated from community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied
with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice. The only bond between egoistic men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic persons. (Italics mine.)

Marx thus more generally, perhaps, anticipates later neoclassical analysts who deal with the rise of narcissism and self-preoccupation as the major characteristic of modern man, and shows these to be major characteristics produced by alienation, which in turn is produced by certain structural conditions in society.

Marx tries to account for the initial rise of egoism (which ultimately resulted in civil society and private property) by tracing it to Judaism metamorphised through Christianity, which produced a "spiritual egoism" which "in practice becomes a material egoism." Marx was not overly successful in this particular analysis and seems to have abandoned it (Schacht, 1970:118). I shall show later, however, how Max Weber elaborated this idea.

To Marx, the materialist struggle between the classes represents the dialectical nature of social history and thus the essential dynamics of society. Only when the working class overthrows the bourgeoisie, abolishes private property and establishes communism, will man live in harmony and in unalienated relations with one another once again.

Marx's analysis, in terms of my framework, is primarily structural in the sense that it describes the historical
transformation of society and the ensuing structural conditions, namely capitalism, which bring alienation about. Although Marx offers vital elements to the conceptualization of the alienation process and the state of alienness (which are incorporated into my own framework) he does not fully describe them, hence analyzes primarily at the sociological level. Nevertheless, the essential elements of these concepts are provided by Marx and help to fill in the framework.

At the same time, however, in terms of my framework, Marx's analysis poses several major problems that essentially render his theory inadequate. Basically, these problems stem from Marx's emphasis upon economic factors in alienation. Most writers since Marx have also emphasized the economic changes in society as the major factors. As I shall show later, this emphasis poses some problems but I shall indicate these problems more specifically later in this chapter.

As previously said, other classical writers in sociology have not addressed the alienation phenomenon with anything like the directness of Marx, but they all addressed the problems emerging with the dissolution of traditional society, and their studies may be connected to Marx and to alienation in this way (Nisbet, 1966).

Durkheim's work, for instance, especially his *Division of Labor* (1964) and *Suicide* (1951), deal with the structural transformation of society as it changes from a traditional form to a modern form, from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*, to
use Tönnies's terms again.

Durkheim's (1964) work posits the division of labor and the resulting anomie, or a state of normlessness, as causes of alienation, though he does not use the alienation term. Contemporary writers usually refer to the subjective side of anomie as anomia. Presumably, with the increasing division of labor, a mechanical solidarity and integration, based on the sharing of values, beliefs and norms, is replaced by an organic solidarity and integration, based on functional interdependence. If the division of labor occurs rapidly then anomie is a result, and the sense of sharing and participation in, and of belonging to, a common social and cultural life is reduced (anomia). Durkheim's work on suicide (1951) was ample illustration of the personal consequences of this lack of sense of sharing, belonging and participation.

Durkheim uses the term moral anomie, and it is important in terms of the implications for alienation theory to point out the fact that Durkheim thus includes not only norms, per se, but also values and beliefs in this usage. Norms, as behavioral prescriptions or proscriptions, issue from values and beliefs; they translate them into action, so to speak. Thus, moral anomie denotes a condition in which the very framework or structure of social life is rendered vague or non-existent and subjected almost purely to economic, or purely rational (in the Weberian sense), values.

The degree of alienness under this condition, of course,
depends directly on the degree of division of labor and its consequent social differentiation and the reduction of the sharing, belonging and participation among individuals. It is impossible to ascertain this degree from Durkheim's writings for he does not describe the various divisions either in kind or in number. He only notes the fact that the economic sector of society is characterized by moral anomie. However, for anomie to produce the alienated state in which the individual feels himself not to belong to at least some social category or group it would have to result in absolute dissolution of all forms of social life which might provide this sense of belonging, including, even, the family. I shall later contend that a high degree of such family dissolution is precisely what has happened in modern, industrialized society and that it has, indeed, produced the more extreme forms of alienation previously described. Thus, Durkheim's theory provides us with a central causal process which explains alienation, and it will be elaborated later. Still, there are certain inadequacies in Durkheim's theory which I shall address later in this chapter.

Simmel's (1950) theories relating to alienation (though like Durkheim he did not use the term) include several types: alienation of the individual from his work; alienation of the individual from culture; and alienation from others. Again, alienation from work and alienation from culture concerns me only to the extent that such forms also alienate the individ-
ual from others. Simmel's ideas are not essentially different from Marx's or Durkheim's in this regard, however. He too sees the division of labor splitting society, separating persons into socially isolated specialties within which they develop their own subcultures and life styles, therefore partaking of the larger "objective" culture only partially, and thus alienating themselves from the other subcultures. But to Simmel, the major form of alienness consists of the development of an emotional neutrality. In terms of our definition of alienness in this study, it consists of the lack of sharing any concern about the other person beyond a pecuniary relationship. Participation in society exists mostly in belonging only to a common economic market as producers and consumers, buyers and sellers. Underlying this form of alienness is the development of a money economy which replaces a barter economy. Emotional neutrality develops due to the lessening of demands that one of the parties to a social relationship can place upon the other when their exchange involves money rather than an exchange of goods or services or other exchangeables. The demands of a master upon the slave, for example, are much greater, extending as they do into the slave's very personality, than the demands of a landlord upon the tenant who gives the landlord only money. With the development of a money economy the demands and obligations of social relations become more and more neutral, thus the emotional connections between persons more
neutral. Men treat one another more as means than as ends, more as commodities themselves, as monetary exchange pervades more and more spheres of society, permeates more and more social relationships.

Emotional neutrality is thus the basic form of alienness to Simmel, resulting from the emergence of money as a medium of exchange. A monetary economy alienates people by substituting a strictly pecuniary relationship for a social one. The city, as a center for commerce and trade, and as the seat of the money economy, brings quite different people together who share very few social relationships hence share very little culture, hence their low sense of belonging and participation in a life beyond that of the marketplace.

Like Marx and Durkheim, Simmel's theory does not include an account of alienness nor of the process of alienation per se. Once again the theory is primarily structural and sociological in its analysis, and, also like these other writers, its emphasis is primarily economic.

Max Weber (1964) offers another "variable" as a cause of alienation. For Weber, capitalism and the increasing rationalization, by which he means the increasing application of quantitative calculation\(^1\) to behavior, results in competition between persons, or as he puts it, " . . . the battle of

\(^1\)Weber distinguishes this kind of rationality, which he terms "formal rationality," from "substantive rationality." The latter form does not concern us here.
man with man" (p. 93). This is the kernel of Weber's contribution to the theory of alienation, though he did not formulate it as such. The application of statistics, mathematical models, double-entry bookkeeping, etc., are examples of formal rationality by which precise calculations are made. Derivatives, however, are also the legal norms (the law) and the bureaucratic structure, which also afford calculability and precision of behavior. Thus, capitalistic, formal rationality begins to permeate the whole of society, forming the context of social relations, characterized basically by competitive struggle. Men are estranged from one another, left feeling isolated from one another, competitors rather than comrades.

Weber's analysis also includes an account of the rise of rational capitalism on the basis of the Protestant movement and ethic. In this sense, Weber's analysis is connected to the attempt by Marx to account for the rise of "egoism" and complements what Marx was attempting to do. One way in which the Protestant Ethic promoted egoism was to create a concern on the part of the individual for a sign of his predestination to heaven or hell. One such sign was success in his calling, success being equated with, among other things, material wealth. The way in which protestantism underlies the whole development of capitalism is, of course, a familiar part of the sociological literature and need not be recounted here except to point out its relationship to Marx's ideas.
Weber's theory, like Simmel's, accounts for the structural bases of alienation and alienness. It does not tell us about these latter concepts in much detail. It does not, therefore, extend, either, into the subjective state of alienness or the social-psychological process of alienation. We may say of Weber's theory of alienation that it, like the others, is primarily a structural, sociological analysis, and, again, places heavy emphasis upon economics, at least indirectly, through religion.

Weber's idea of the effects of rationality has been carried further by Karl Mannheim (1970), and Mannheim's treatment not only tries to account for the structural causes of alienation and alienness but to connect this structure to one of the major psychological characteristics of alienness as we have described it: "D-cognition" or self-preoccupation. Mannheim's work, therefore, constitutes a bridge between the classical and neoclassical writers.

Mannheim (1970:509) distinguishes between "functional rationality by which he means that " . . . a series of actions is organized in such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal, every element in this series of actions receiving a functional position and role," and "substantial" rationality by which is meant the intelligent thought of individuals.

He states further (1970:510):

Now that we have made these distinctions, we can
safely make the following statement. The more industrialized a society is and the more advanced its division of labor and organization, the greater will be the number of spheres of human activity which will be functionally rational and hence calculable in advance. Whereas the individual in earlier societies acted only occasionally and in limited spheres in a functionally rational manner, in contemporary society he is compelled to act in this way in more and more spheres of life. This leads us directly to the description of a particular type of rationalization which is more intimately connected with the functional rationalization of conduct, namely the phenomenon of self-rationalization.

By self-rationalization we understand the individual's systematic control of his impulses—a control which is always the first step to be taken, if an individual wants to plan his life so that every action is guided by principle and is directed toward the goal he has in mind.

Mannheim thus points out the way in which the highly rationalized societies set the conditions for man to begin to become highly self-conscious. Such self-consciousness constitutes, in Mead's terminology, a dominancy of the "Me" phase of the self-process whereby the individual monitors his own behavior for the purpose of fitting it to a line of action that will lead to a specific goal. Simmel, too, believed that man became much more intellectual in modern societies, using his head more than his "heart."

In the discussion of Mannheim's thesis of increasing self-rationalization, the work of Erik Erikson (1963) must be mentioned. Although he is not a sociologist, Erikson's work is so important to our topic it cannot be ignored. He
may be considered one of the giants in the development of the
identity concept and therefore, by extension, of alienness.
Erikson's intellectual background was in the psycho-analytic
school of psychology. Using an eight-stage theory of psycho-
social development of the individual, he studied the sociali-
ization of children in both preliterate and modernized so-
cieties.

Erikson also emphasizes the rationalization of society
as the basic cause of problems of identity. Contrasting the
way in which children are socialized in preliterate societies
(he was using the American Sioux as an example) with that in
modernized societies, he writes:

The developmental principle in this system
holds that a child should be permitted to
be an individualist while young. The parents
do not show any hostility toward the body
as such nor do they, especially in boys,
decry self-will. There is no condemnation
of infantile habits while the child is de-
veloping that system of communication be-
tween self and body and self and kin on
which the infantile ego is based. Only
when strong in body and sure in self is he
asked to bow to a tradition of unrelenting
shaming by public opinion which focuses on
his actual social behavior rather than on
his bodily functions or his fantasies (1963:
154).

Speaking of the modernized Western cultures, Erikson
writes further:

In contrast, . . . Western civilization
. . . [has] been guided by the conviction
that a systematic regulation of functions and
impulses in earliest childhood is the surest
safeguard for later effective functioning in
society. They implant the never-silent
metronome of routine into the impressionable baby and young child to regulate his first experiences with his body and with his immediate physical surroundings. Only after such mechanical socialization is he encouraged to proceed to develop into a rugged individualist. He pursues ambitious strivings, but compulsively remains within standardized careers which, as the economy becomes more and more complicated, tend to replace more general responsibilities. The specialization thus developed has led this Western civilization to the mastery of machinery, but also to an undercurrent of boundless discontent and of individual disorientation.

Erikson's message is thus quite similar to Mannheim's, i.e., that it is the rationalization of society which brings about problems of identity, or alienness. The differences are that Erikson places emphasis upon how this rationalization becomes imposed upon the socialization process, especially in early infancy and childhood and how such "mechanical socialization" interferes with the spontaneous, natural development of the ego (or self). These points are well taken and much of what Erikson has to say will become incorporated into this study, especially with respect to his ideas of the earliest phases of psycho-social development and the development of the rational control over impulse. This development, in my view, is basically the same phenomenon as the growth of self-consciousness.

Although the forms of self-consciousness spoken of by Mannheim and alluded to by Erikson are not quite the equivalent of my alienness per se, these men's works, in addition
to providing theoretical ideas for the structural causes of alienness, were among the first to emphasize this growth of rational and self-conscious control over behavior as a characteristic of modern personality.

It remained for other writers, however, to point out the further development of self-consciousness of this sort into self-preoccupation and eventually into the form of narcissistic self-preoccupation which I have referred to in Maslow's terms as "D-cognition."

**The neoclassical literature**

Later writers have, indeed, remarked upon this particular character trait and have made it the core of modern personality. Thus, although the particular body of literature I shall review next is not ordinarily linked to alienation studies, per se, its concern with the individual's increasing focus upon the self places it within the overall framework. This focus, furthermore, becomes more and more involved with the concern for the presentation of self in an idealized way, in this literature.

C. Wright Mills (1956), although basing his work on the Marxian model and method, extended the analysis of alienation more explicitly in the social-psychological direction to include ideal-self-preoccupation. Using Marx's idea of the "fetishism of commodities," Mills argued that in a capitalist society dominated by exchange relations, even one's per-
sonality becomes a salable item and often determines the successful sale of other items. The individual salesperson begins to treat his own personality as a merchandisable commodity in the exchange. Such a process obviously brings about a greater self-consciousness and control over one's spontaneous impulses, and a concern with presenting the self in a certain light.

Teaming up with Hans Gerth, Mills (1964) formulates a theory of motive that portrays the individual as extremely self-conscious and self-controlled. In their "vocabulary of motives," for example, the individual is portrayed as having this vocabulary readily available for the purpose of explaining his behavior to others in a socially acceptable way. This vocabulary of motive may or may not reflect his true motives. The control of impulse and its supplantation by rational, self-conscious control in an ideal way has here become highly developed.

Riesman's book (1977) also attempts to account for the increasing tendency of individuals to consciously control and monitor their own behavior and to present an ideal self. Riesman describes three stages of character development, each of which displays increasing levels of self-consciousness. Each type is related to developments of social structure. In the "tradition-directed" character type the individual acts in reference to a rather stable set of institutions, traditions and customs to which he has been rather thoroughly
socialized. When society changes, these customs no longer exist and the individual must rely on an inner set of principles (the inner directed type) that guide him through the turmoil. The last stage, that of "other direction," is a state of heightened self-consciousness, presumably connected to bureaucratization, where personality becomes, as with Mills, a product to be sold. Instead of behaving with reference to an inner set of principles and ideals or to traditional norms and institutions, the individual adapts his behavior to the cues of others around him. To rise in status within bureaucracy, the individual's own personality and his adjustment to his peers are his most valuable assets. The result is a constant self-preoccupation and a prevalent attempt to direct one's behavior in accordance with the requirement of the ideals of immediate contemporaries.

In his book, *The Organization Man*, William H. Whyte (1957) has also aptly described a dominant, emerging character type that seems to be an adaptation to the growth of such large-scale bureaucratic structures.

Whyte (1957:6) writes:

> When a young man says that to make a living these days you must do what somebody else wants you to do, he states it not only as a fact of life that must be accepted but as an inherently good proposition. If the American Dream deprecates this for him, it is the American Dream that is going to have to give, whatever its more elderly guardians may think. People grow restive with a mythology that is too distant from the way things actually are, and as more and more lives
have been encompassed by the organization way of life, the pressures for an accompanying ideological shift have been mounting. The pressures of the group, the frustrations of individual creativity, the anonymity of achievement: are these defects to struggle against—or are they virtues in disguise? The Organization Man seeks a redefinition of his place on earth—a faith that will satisfy him that what he must endure has a deeper meaning than appears on the surface. He needs, in short, something that will do for him what the Protestant Ethic did once. And slowly, almost imperceptibly, a body of thought has been coalescing that does just that.

Whyte refers to this body of thought as the "social ethic." Its function, as indicated in the previous quote, is to provide a definition of the self by which conduct may be carried out and self-fulfillment thus occur. Whyte (1957:7) writes further:

By social ethic I mean that contemporary body of thought which makes morally legitimate the pressures of society against the individual. Its major propositions are three: a belief in the group as the source of creativity; a belief in "belongingness" as the ultimate need of the individual; and a belief in the application of science to achieve this belongingness.

Whyte's "Organization Man" would appear to be equatable with Riesman's "other directed" type and Mill's type who utilizes the vocabularies of motive. It appears also as the prototype of Goffman's individuals who seem to be preoccupied with self-presentation.

It is Erving Goffman's (1959) work, indeed, that is the most detailed analysis of this constant preoccupation with
self. His work is not so much an attempt to account for the rise of such self-preoccupation, however, as to describe it in minute detail and to show its relation to social structure in face to face encounters. For Goffman, self-preoccupation is taken as a starting point of analysis, but the fact that he does so, and the extent to which his theories have become quite influential, serve to underscore the fact of the prevalence of self-conscious manipulation and control of one's behavior. Goffman's "dramaturgical" approach thus emphasizes the conscious management of impressions "given" as well as "given off" in the company of other persons and the "presentation of self" to these others. Goffman points out, furthermore, a connection, previously mentioned, between self-preoccupation and alienness. He writes (1959:237):

... to the degree that the individual maintains a show before others that he himself does not believe, he can come to experience a special kind of alienation from self and a special kind of wariness of others.

Goffman (1959:236-237) quotes a college coed who says:

I sometimes "play dumb" on dates, but it leaves a bad taste. The emotions are complicated. Part of me enjoys "putting something over" on the unsuspecting male. But this sense of superiority over him is mixed with feelings of guilt for my hypocrisy. Toward the "date" I feel some contempt because he is "taken in" by my technique, or if I like the boy, a kind of maternal condescension. At times I resent him! Why isn't he my superior in all ways in which a man should excel so that I could be my natural self? What am I doing here with him, anyhow? Slumming?
This quotation indicates the girl's self-consciousness and her ambivalence about her own motives and behavior. She is aware of role requirements (her perceptions of girls being expected to be "dumber" than boys and boys being therefore superior) but she is also aware of the stereotypic nature of these norms and that in actual interaction they break down. Her normatively imputed self (her ideal self) is not fulfilled in the actualization of it and her consciousness is focused upon her own feelings and behavior. Her self, in that moment, has become objectified, and its definition has to be renegotiated. She indicates this process by referring to her "natural self."

This alienation from oneself, as Goffman phrases it, i.e., of being an outside observer of one's own behavior, such as an actor's must be while on stage, is the especially salient aspect of the alienated state as has already been said. On the other hand, the feeling that one is merely performing, and, concomitantly that one's actions are not one's "own," is not an inevitable outcome of modal self-consciousness, though it may often accompany it. I shall have more to say about this aspect of alienness later.

Don Martindale's study (1966) of the impact of the growth of large-scale organizations on society is another outstanding attempt to deal with the modern preoccupation with self. It goes further in theoretical formulations, however, in that it relates self to society by positing specific
character types with specific community configurations. It also provides a theory of the formation of the community within which these character types emerge. Martindale (1966:543) writes: "Social Behavioristic theory assumes that personality, like human society, is a social creation. The same absence of instinctive commitments of behavior which delivered society into man's own hands simultaneously delivered his own nature to his own construction." Martindale sees community formation as a process of the gradual emergence of "instrumental" institutions as solutions to collective problems. Such institutions occur primarily in three areas of collective life: mastery of nature, social control and socialization. When the institutions in each of these areas become stable, consistent, and complete with respect to one another, a community is formed that provides a total way of life for the people. A community forms a complex set of institutions that tend to create relatively specific character types from which men draw their self-ideals.

The earliest form of community according to Martindale was the tribe,\(^1\) based on hunting and gathering. Its character type was what Martindale refers to as the "Tribesman," i.e. a relatively specific set of character traits linked to

\(^1\)Actually, the earliest form is known, more technically, as a band (see Chapter VI).
the roles available to individuals in the tribal community. Villages based on agriculture arose next, then cities based on trade. Each of these, too, produced its distinct character types. Ancient civilization arose as cities became imperial empires or states. Cities or imperial states then began to decline but cities *per se* were to reemerge somewhat during the end of the medieval period. Martindale writes that with the decline of the City-States during the medieval period "... three major types of rural subsistence communities took shape concomitantly with the disappearance of ancient society. These rural subsistence societies were: manorial communities to sustain the pursuit of religious values; peasant villages; and manorial communities consisting of one or more peasant villages reduced to a condition of serfdom for the sustenance of a conquest stratum of landlord knights." According to Martindale each of these three communities produced distinctive character types in the monk, the peasant and the knight. The autonomous city community, too, when it reemerged, formed its particular character types in what Martindale refers to as the "humanistic" and the "religious" types, i.e., the "man of taste" and the "man of conscience" respectively (Martindale, 1966:548-549).

The relevance of Martindale's formulations to the theory of alienation is that these character types become the generalized self-ideals typical of their accompanying community forms and of certain segments or classes within these
communities. As such, each type becomes a reference for each individual's self-expression or presentation, a model for the development of selfhood. Each type, furthermore, is particularly fitted to its particular social milieu, is, in fact, a product of it. Martindale casts the crisis of alienation in terms of this relationship. He writes: "One fundamental source of contemporary man's sense of lost identity has been the decay of the religious and humanistic personality types, while they have been retained as ideals of authentic selfhood" (1966:555). And, further: "Contemporary man's individuality is in crisis partly because he takes his personality ideals from traditions that no longer correspond to his life conditions, and he has not yet made a satisfactory transition to the new forms of individuality required by the large-scale organization" (1966:560).

In an insightful passage, Martindale (1966:651) points out the relationship of man's contemporary crisis of "self-estrangement" to social structure:

It is sometimes difficult to ascertain which precipitates the deeper crisis, the sudden contraction or the sudden expansion of the scope of individuality. A major expansion invariably means that collectively defined channels of behavior have disappeared. To many persons this is a chilling experience, as if they had suddenly been transported to an uncharted wilderness. They are lost, bewildered, perhaps even terrified by the experience. The sudden narrowing of the scope of individuality, on the other hand, has the properties of a virtual imprisonment.
Taking up the theme of these earlier writings, the authors of the most recent sociological analysis of the phenomenon have labeled American culture as "narcissistic," implying that self-consciousness has been carried to an extreme. In his widely acclaimed book, Christopher Lasch (1979:32) writes:

Studies of personality disorders that occupy the borderline between neurosis and psychosis, though written for clinicians and making no claims to shed light on social or cultural issues, depict a type of personality that ought to be immediately recognizable, in a more subdued form, to observers of the contemporary cultural scene: facile at managing the impressions he gives to others, ravenous for admiration but contemptuous of those he manipulates into providing it; unappeasably hungry for emotional experiences with which to fill an inner void; terrified of aging and death.

Here, again, we meet with the other-directed type of Riesman, the user of vocabularies of motive of Girth and Mills, the Organization Man of Whyte, and the self-presenter of Goffman. To Lasch he is the "narcissist," the empty man in search of something he can't define, absorbed with himself.

How does Lasch account for the rise of narcissism? According to him it ". . . derives from quite specific changes in our society and culture--from bureaucracy, the proliferation of images, therapeutic ideologies, the rationalization of the inner life, the cult of consumption, and in the last analysis from changes in family life and from changing patterns of socialization" (1979:74). But the most telling
causal variable of all, according to Lasch, is a diminished expectation that the future holds improvement. He writes: "Having no hope of improving their lives in any of the ways that matter, people have convinced themselves that what matters is psychic self-improvement: getting in touch with their feelings, eating health food, taking lessons in ballet or belly dancing, immersing themselves in the wisdom of the East, jogging, learning how to 'relate,' overcoming the fear of pleasure" (1979:29).

Lasch thus introduces a host of concepts to account for the rise of self-absorption, most of them being those already mentioned by other writers, but one of them new. Since Lasch writes discursively it is sometimes difficult to ascertain exactly what is meant by these concepts and how he sees them as related, but by a "proliferation of images" he apparently means the increased use of advertisement to portray certain ideals and to the personality-selling techniques emphasized by writers like Mills, Riesman, and Whyte. Thus, like bureaucracy, rationalization, and consumption (translated loosely as Marx's "Fetishism of Commodities"), this variable is not new. Neither are Lasch's references to changes in family and socialization new, though, like other writers, he fails to specify what specific changes he is referring to. Lasch's contribution to the attempt to account for the rise of narcissism in American society thus introduces only one new variable, that of diminishing expectations for the future.
Since the future offers no hope, there is, apparently, only the recourse of focusing upon the here and now and upon one's self.

Another sociologist, Edwin Schurr (1977) deals with the rise of self-preoccupation, but only attempts to account for it in a tangential fashion since his main concern is to warn against such self-absorption and its related therapies as a diversion from the attempt to deal with the problems of modern society realistically. Schurr seems to argue that such self-absorption is primarily a phenomenon occurring among the affluent who have time for it.

This kind of self-absorption is not, however, the kind that I am dealing with in this study, which has as its most distinguishing mark a modal self-consciousness and contradistinction of the self and the attempt to live up to and defend an idealized image. It is difficult to see how mere affluency can account for these particular features, so apparently widespread in contemporary society. It is this particular component of alienation that is caught up in all the various "dimensions" terms of empirical alienation theory such as self-estrangement, isolation, meaninglessness, normlessness, powerlessness, etc., to which we now turn.

The social psychological literature

Unlike the writers of the classical and neoclassical vein, certain contemporary sociologists have been primarily
concerned with operationalizing the alienness concept as a psychological state and making it researchable. Most of this writing stems from the work of Seeman (1959), whose work, in turn, is drawn primarily from Marx and Durkheim.

Seeman views the term "alienation" as referring to a psychological state and defines this state as an individual's subjective feeling of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation and self-estrangement. This definition of alienation as a multi-dimensional phenomenon has occupied a host of writers who have attempted to establish the relationships between these dimensions, in the process either rejecting the scientific utility of the concept (Israel, 1971: 259), or elevating certain dimensions to prominence over the others, or eliminating certain dimensions entirely, etc. These attempts involve the construction, usually, of statements on questionnaires or interviews to which individuals are asked to respond. Statistical techniques of various sorts are then used to analyze these responses and to test for common factors, scalability, etc.

When these attempts are not strictly definitional they are sometimes also connected to the more truly sociological endeavor to discover the social and cultural conditions that give rise to these subjective states. The work of Blauner (1964), Goldthorpe (1966), and Mizruchi (1961) are representative of this kind of work.

A complete review of this type of literature is not con-
sidered necessary at this point since Seeman's (1975:115) own review and summary is sufficient. Seeman concludes his review and reiterates what he believes to be the major problem remaining as follows:

There is perhaps no better way to conclude this review than by a return to the issue of the unity of the so-called dimensions of alienation, for that issue generates a continuing empirical and theoretical debate. The "empirical cluster or 'alienation syndrome'" described by Keniston (1968:327 ff) includes all the variants discussed above, while others, as we have seen, find the absence, the modesty, and the situational specificity of the interconnections of these alienations impressive. Some of this difference in viewpoint is a direct function of methodological differences, but some of it, too, is a matter of philosophy of science and of theory. Thus, the dimensions discussed above become the instigation of a steady search for a better grounded theory of alienation (e.g., Sevigny, 1969; Geyer, 1974), one that can rationalize more satisfactorily why these six categories have emerged, what ties them together, and how their sources and consequences should be conceived. Despite Marx and the modern exegesis inherited from his work, such a theory remains only a prospect for the future. (Italics mine.)

Summarization of the Literature

The overall theory of alienation as comprised of these various studies, both sociological and social-psychological, may thus be summarized very generally as follows:

Alienation occurs via a disruption and change (primarily economic in origin) in the structure of society through which people are socially, culturally and psychically bound
together. In this view, of which Marx's is exemplary, society becomes "atomized" into a "mass" of solitary, depersonalized, powerless individuals, each pursuing his or her own goals. This mass, furthermore, coheres on the basis of an "organic solidarity," while moral anomie abounds. Individuals become related to one another in vast, impersonal, rational bureaucracies, as other-directed, organizational men, and treat one another and themselves as categories, numbers and commodities in a monetarized marketplace. Work, and even leisure, become only a means to conspicuous consumption in a rat race to the illusory top, all of which is basically meaningless. History and tradition fades, becomes irrelevant, as does the future. The now generation does its own thing. A kind of rampant focusing of consciousness upon the self prevails, a cult of self-exploration and narcissism develops. Man's selfhood, said to be anchored in and nurtured by social relations, is purported to be in grave states, for society no longer sustains it as a stable configuration. Man is now said to be an actor of roles in which spontaneity is negated and replaced by self-conscious control and direction of behavior in accordance with an idealized self-conception.

In his own review, Martindale (1966:561) has written:

In their various ways, Riesman, Gerth and Mills, and Goffman have rejected both the religious and the humanistic views of man and the theories that account for them. They presuppose a world of large scale organizations concerned with the individual's external characteristic but indifferent to
his inner being. In various ways they all insist that contemporary man is a sort of hollow shell: in place of shame or guilt, the operation of diffuse anxiety (Riesman); instead of being viewed as the mainsprings of action, motives are treated as "vocabularies" operative in strategies of deceit (Girth and Mills); conscience and taste are not found in man's nature, only in appearances of morality (Goffman).

The hypothesis that the world of large-scale organization has introduced a major crisis in contemporary man's self-conception and the theories of personality seems to be overwhelmingly confirmed.

Contrasted to this view of man in the modernized, or gesellschaft, society and culture, is that of man in the traditional, folk, or gemeinschaft society and culture. Here, social relationships are primary and personal. Social cohesion is based on a "mechanical solidarity." Moral norms are intact in a stable culture and people are related socially rather than economically. The individual exists fundamentally as an integral part of a group, his own consciousness being practically coincidental with the collective consciousness. History is the extension of time and tradition backward through the individual's ancestors; and the future is the extension of time and tradition forward through his offspring. The individual is not an atom in a mass pursuing his own needs irrespective of others but is implicated firmly in a stable social structure, giving him a sense of meaning, place and direction, both in time and space. The individual and his society are essentially one, each a facet of the other.
Problems Remaining in the Field of Alienation Studies

Although the literature reviewed serves as an important fund of ideas and propositions which will be incorporated in this study, there are several major problems in this literature that remain to be worked out. I shall list these problems first as problems of theory and secondly as the problem of historical substantiation of the theory.

One major problem to emerge from the analysis of the literature within the framework is the complete lack of any description or conceptualization of the initial state of identity or of the primary identification/alienation process. As indicated, my conceptualization of identification/alienation is one of the processes by which the individual becomes bonded to or separated psychologically from others. In my view, this process begins early in life—at birth, in fact—and continues into late adolescence. This view is basically different from that presented in the majority of sociological literature. As my coadvisor, Professor Robert Richards, has stated: "... to emphasize the fragmentation of modern life which confronts adults to be the essential source of such a personality characteristic as (alienness)—as most literature does—flies in the face of all contemporary social-psychological knowledge about the importance of primary socialization in character formation. . . ."

The overriding need here as I see it is to describe the
initial state of identity and the primary identification/alienation processes as fully as possible. This description will serve to counter the emphasis on adult alienation and alienness in the literature (with the exception of some writers but Erik Erikson especially) and, in addition, will provide a characterization of the original state of the individual's consciousness out of which the self is gradually differentiated. Such a characterization will provide a basis upon which to contrast the states of secondary identity and alienness in later life. Although it is probably technically improper to speak of an original state of "identity" from which the individual is alienated--because to do so would presuppose an objective self-consciousness--it is technically necessary to presume some prior state out of which alienation or identification may proceed (Schacht, 1970:258). I have called such a state "subjective consciousness" to contrast it with the objective consciousness of the secondary phase of alienation. Such a state, as I hope to show, provides a valuable ideal-typical contrast to the states that follow it.

A second major problem addressed is the problem of description of the identification/alienation process during

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1 It is necessary to avoid confusion in terminology here, however, to point out that I do not equate primary nor secondary identification/alienation with primary and secondary socialization. I use "primary" and "secondary" to denote stages in the alienation process and not to the different loci of socialization.
childhood. Like the process of identification/alienation in infancy, there is an almost absolute absence of attention to this secondary alienation process, qua process, in the alienation literature. Certain steps in this regard have been taken by Twining (1980) though I believe he errs in several ways. Twining's efforts are helpful, however, in that they at least point out the problem and, in addition, provide an important contribution by way of centering the alienation process upon the self-society dynamic. It is in the way in which the self-other difference continues to develop after primary alienation that offers the key to the understanding of the alienation process in its overall sense. Secondary alienation is that phase of the process in which self-consciousness becomes modal and the self-concept forms in contradistinction to others. Secondary identification is the phase of the process by which the self-concept converges with others. The task of describing the identification/alienation process during childhood, of isolating the social-psychological dynamics involved, is a second major task of this study.

A third major problem is the description and conceptualization of the resulting states of alienness, as well as of identity. This problem is the one which has been most addressed by contemporary sociologists but only on the alienness side. Beginning with the seminal work of Seeman (1959), alienness as a psychological state was described as consisting
of several dimensions of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation and self-estrangement. As indicated in the review of literature, however, the problem of description remains, primarily because of the inability to theoretically or empirically tie the various dimensions together. Except as it exists implicitly the state of identity has been totally ignored.

The problem of tying the various dimensions of alienness together continues to exist, I believe, as a result of a rather fundamental confusion of these dimensions with alienness itself. In my own view these "feelings" or "expectations" (powerlessness, normlessness, etc.) are separate and distinct from the concept of alienness per se; they point to different things. However, it is my contention that these feelings can be shown to be logically and causally related to alienness as derivatives of it. Thus, while they are not alienness per se they are among the most frequent products of alienness and, even though the distinction between these and alienness must be kept intact, it is perfectly permissible to continue to refer to them as an alienness "syndrome."

The description of the way in which these feelings form a system, with an inner coherency formed around alienness, along with the description of the state of identity, will be a major effort in this study.

A fourth major problem is the isolation, in a full, clear and direct fashion, of the structural causes of alien-
ation. While the classical writers have provided us with invaluable insights into the possible ways in which a change from traditional society to modern society alienates people from one another, there is still a great need for the specification of the variables and of the explication of their causal relations.

For a quick summary of the structural causes explicated in the literature reviewed, the reader is referred to Table 1. As is shown, Marx's theory has provided the initial impetus and major framework for sociology in this respect. Yet there are several major difficulties with this framework, stemming primarily from its emphasis upon economic structure as the cause of and the arena for alienation. More specifically, these difficulties stem primarily from Marx's assumptions of the importance of the productive process to the self-expression of the individual.

Marx's claim is that man fulfills himself through "productive activity," i.e., he objectifies himself and reproduces himself in his labor and in the "reappropriation" of its product. It is upon this claim that Marx's theory is often labeled "essentialist." This essentialist idea of the nature of man, however, presents several difficulties.

The first major difficulty is that such a view seems to unnecessarily eliminate much human activity as a context for alienation. Of course, Marx's use of the concept of "productive activity" is very broad and he allows the term to
Table 1. A list of the structural causes of the rise of self-preoccupation, by author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Structural cause</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karl Marx (1963)</td>
<td>Institutionalized private property</td>
<td>Divides society into worker and capitalist and renders each individual a competitor with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Weber (1964),</td>
<td>Competitive capitalism/rationalization</td>
<td>Sets men against one another in pursuit of profit/extends to a self-rationalization imposed upon the natural developmental cycles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Mannheim (1970),</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erik Erikson (1963)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georg Simmel (1950)</td>
<td>Money economy</td>
<td>Produces emotional neutrality in social relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emile Durkheim (1964)</td>
<td>Division of labor</td>
<td>Reduces cultural sharing, promotes difference, anomie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. W. Mills (1956),</td>
<td>Salesmanship, growth of bureaucracy</td>
<td>Promotes the use of one's own personality as a selling tool, thus heightens self-consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Riesman (1977),</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Whyte (1957)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Martindale (1966)</td>
<td>Lack of correspondence between</td>
<td>Promotes self-disillusionment and a sense of crisis in self-conceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>traditional personality-ideals and the reality of Big Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Lasch (1979)</td>
<td>Loss of sense of history; diminished expectations for the future</td>
<td>Psychological focus upon the here and now and the self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin Schur (1977)</td>
<td>Material affluency</td>
<td>Allows more time to address to self</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
refer to any activity, in any context, which yields a product. Still, such activities as those occurring in play, games, sports, entertainment, religion, politics, family, etc., would apparently be ruled out.

But self-fulfillment doesn't depend on productive activity alone. The actualization of self occurs in and through any activity and thus self-fulfillment, or conversely self-disillusionment, may take place accordingly. Indeed, as I shall later show, self-fulfillment or self-disillusionment may occur not only by overt activity but by covert comparison of the individual's self with others as well.

A second difficulty arising from Marx's emphasis on productive activity is that it is allowed to explain too much. It is difficult to agree, for example, that the alienation of labor and its product can have the array of effects presented by Seeman in his alienness syndrome, i.e., normlessness, powerlessness, etc. To attribute all these effects to a loss of ownership or control of one's labor and product is to invest this activity with tremendous importance to the individual. There is no doubt that productive activity is important to the individual's self-actualization, but it just doesn't seem to be capable of producing such results from a logical point of view. Such a view would, for instance, apparently rule out the Freudian notion of "sublimation" and the notion of how the whole of society can rest upon this defense mechanism. To make this claim is once again to
appeal to an essentialist notion of man. Again, productive activity is only a part of activity in general. Man shapes himself in all activity. Productive activity's importance to him will vary with the degree to which his society utilizes such activity as a measurement of his self. It is the damage to the self incurred through its disillusionment in actualization in general that accounts for the complex psychological effects listed by Seeman.

A third major difficulty inherent in the Marxian framework, and one which follows from the above, is that it restricts alienation and alienness to the adulthood phase of human life since it is only during this phase of the life cycle, ordinarily, that productive activity occurs, at least in the sense in which Marx seemed to intend. In doing this, however, the Marxian framework must assume an "over-socialized" conception of man (homo-sociologicus) and to thus impart to him a higher degree of malleability and susceptibility to social structure than is probably warranted. Such a conception fails to take account of the fact that character structure, once formed, is a deeply imbedded system of traits and as such possesses a certain autonomy, independence, and dynamic of its own quite apart from social structure. The omission of the conceptualization of character-structure and of a theory of its development has been pointed out as one of the more serious weaknesses in the Marxian framework (Ollman, 1976). This same criticism is implied by Mills (1956) when
he points out that the alienating effect of capitalistic labor presumes an ideal of labor in the mind of the worker, one that resembles that of the artisan in the crafts and guilds of medieval society, against which he compares his actual working conditions. It is questionable whether such an ideal exists among workers who have never known it, again signifying the importance of character structure and its formation.

For all these reasons, the structural causes of alienation as being located in economic institutions, and in the other institutional areas indicated in Table 1, has to be rejected. Alienness as a deeply imbedded psychological trait is not merely a situational response; it is a complex syndrome of traits and dimensions that starts early in character formation and is formed over a period of time. If this is true then the possible areas of structural causes of alienation and alienness must be expanded beyond the economic to include other institutional areas. Character structure is a result of the interaction process beginning as early as infancy and continuing through childhood and adolescence. It is, for the most part, formed by adulthood. Such a view places the structural causes of alienation, not in the economic institution, but primarily in that of the family. A whole new area is thus opened up in the attempt to account for the structural causes of alienation and alienness and the family takes center stage. A major question then arises as
to how the family does this and to how, or whether, alienation in the family is produced by structural factors outside it. As I have already said, this is an entirely different approach than traditionally taken in the field of sociology. If economic and other institutional factors (such as the political) do play a part in alienation, then it is through their indirect effects on the institution of the family and thus upon the individual only in an approximate way. But the description of such a causal process remains essentially to be done and this is a major problem area addressed in this study.

These four major problems pose themselves first as problems of theory and they must be clarified. The task ahead is to first describe the initial state of identity and the succeeding processes of identification and alienation beginning at birth and moving through an infancy phase within which the self becomes differentiated, and then through a childhood phase in which the self is more or less fully conceptualized, either as identical to others or contradictive to them. We must further describe the ultimate states resulting from these processes and, finally, we must theoretically specify and isolate the structural causes of alienation.

The problem of historical substantiation of the theory

Once these problems of theory are worked out, however, the problem of the substantiation of the theory arises. Thus,
another major effort in this study will be to attempt an empirical grounding of certain key propositions. The major proposition, as indicated, taken over from the classical and neoclassical literature, is that modern society and its structure, whether through economic or other social change, brings about the alienating process. Are there, in fact, different degrees or incidences of alienness in modern societies as compared to traditional societies? This is a key proposition which, if false, seriously discredits the theory. This and other key propositions, to be introduced in Part Two, must be selected and confirmed or disconfirmed.

Organization of the Study

Both of these problem areas, that of constructing a clear and detailed theory of alienation and then empirically substantiating the theory, are addressed in this study.

The present study is thus divided into two major parts addressing these problems. Part Two presents a social-psychological theory of alienation. Although the tentative descriptions given in Part One, Chapter I, serve to present this theory in outline form, it seems necessary nevertheless to present a fuller version of the total range of concepts, variables and their relations, and to seek to tie the various propositions together more extensively in order to address the problems remaining. The theory overall is presented in Chapters III through VI. Chapter III addresses the problem
of the description of the original state of subjective identity and of the primary phase of identification and alienation. Chapter IV describes the secondary phase of identification/alienation and the state of secondary identity. It also describes the alternate state of alienness. Chapter V further describes the state of alienness as a "syndrome" of traits that emanate from the feeling of self-difference and contradistinction. This chapter seeks to tie the seemingly otherwise disparate dimensions of Seeman's alienation syndrome together into a coherent and dynamic system. Chapter VI addresses the problem of the isolation of the socio-structural causes of the alienation process. Here, the social-psychological process of alienation is tied to the structure of the larger society.

Part Three of the study is a cross-cultural examination of the theory and is presented in Chapters VII through VIII. Chapter VII presents comparative data on three variables in eight societies ordered according to structural complexity. These data are presented to examine and substantiate three key hypotheses drawn from the theoretical system presented in Part Two. Chapter VIII analyzes these data.

Part Four summarizes and concludes the study.
PART TWO:

TOWARD

A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

OF ALIENATION
CHAPTER III:
IDENTIFICATION AND ALIENATION IN INFANCY:
THE PRIMARY PHASE

As indicated in Chapter I there are two main stages or phases of the identification/alienation process: the primary and secondary. The primary stage coincides with the infancy period of the life-cycle, while the secondary stage coincides with childhood and adolescence, and extends perhaps even into adulthood. The subject of this chapter is the primary stage.

The primary stage of identification/alienation consists essentially of the differentiation of subjective self-consciousness into objective self-consciousness along with the concomitant formation of certain emotional states as modalities of the personality. The emergence of the objective self inevitably separates the individual cognitively and conceptually from his environment, but if this separation is accompanied by emotional security, a feeling of alienness from others will not likely develop. If self-differentiation is accompanied by emotional insecurity, however, then the development of a feeling of alienness is likely.

Developing concomitantly with the self-as-object, these emotional modalities predispose the individual to alienness from others or identity with them. The emotion of fear of others or of anxiety in their presence, i.e., the experience of insecurity, is the forerunner of the state of alienness
for it brings on an increasing control of the subjective self by the objective self which is the basis for the contradistinction element of the self to develop later. The primary stage of the identification/alienation process is thus the foundation upon which alienness is built since it not only establishes the initial distinction between the self and others but, in addition, establishes the basis upon which the development of a contradistinction between the self and others may develop.

In this chapter, I shall describe as much as possible the initial state of consciousness of the infant; that is, I shall describe the state of subjective consciousness from which the objective self becomes differentiated. Such a description is essential as an ideal-type with which to compare the objective consciousness of alienness later in this study. Next, I will discuss the primary alienation process in which subjective self-consciousness is being transformed into objective self-consciousness accompanied by the emergence of emotional insecurity. Following this, I shall discuss the primary identification process. In both of these discussions the emphasis shall be on how negative and positive sanctions and their concomitant experiences of self-fulfillment or self-disillusionment become the basis upon which alienation may proceed further into childhood and a contradistinction of the self may develop.
The Psychic Identity of the Infant
and Others: Subjective Consciousness

"Subjective consciousness" refers to a state of consciousness wherein the self as an object to consciousness has not emerged. Indeed, it refers to a state of consciousness in which a subject-object dichotomy does not exist at all. In this state of consciousness, the individual does not make a distinction between himself and his environment in an "object" sense. Thus, he exists in a kind of psychic unity with his environment in which his consciousness simply mirrors, or maps, this environment directly.

To understand the alienation process in its most fundamental sense, i.e., as the breaking of this original psychic unity, the subjective consciousness state must be described as much as is possible. In the discussion that follows, the reader is referred to Figure 4. This figure represents the phases of consciousness characteristic of the state of subjective consciousness. I shall comment briefly upon each phase.

First, I take subjective consciousness to include as its major component the various modes of sensitivity of a living organism to the stimuli of its environment. "Environment" here refers to any surrounding context of the nervous system, including the organism's own body exclusive of the nervous system. Subjective consciousness in this usage is like the ray of a flashlight illuminating or "picking out" aspects of
the environment. In actuality, living organisms possess differential modes of sensitivity in various combinations rather than a single visual one. Hence, an organism may experience, or is conscious of, the stimuli of the external world through its various complements of visual, tactile, auditory, olefactory and gustatory sensitivities according to its level of phylogeny. Human subjective consciousness apprehends the external world in all these sensory modes.

These sensory modes are themselves only the "raw data," however, the punctate sensory "impressions" received from the external world. Subjective consciousness is also a perceptual consciousness, i.e., a consciousness of form wherein the punctate impressions are "assembled" into or registered as pattern

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**Figure 4. Phases of Subjective Consciousness**
or design or gestalt. Forms, patterns, designs or gestalts are products of both the innate sensory/perceptual apparatus of the organism (Merleau-Ponty, 1967) and of learning. Sensation and perception are thus closely related, i.e., occur more or less simultaneously, so that it is best to treat them as unitary phenomena, which I shall do in this study. Perception in this usage, then, refers to the "organization" of sensations into patterns, forms, or gestalts.

A single pattern or form perceived by the organism we shall call a "percept." Percepts are psychological "units" derived from the external flux of the environment. Percepts, in turn, comprise the larger psychological unit of "image," a term which I shall use to denote the total perceptual field of the organism at any given time, and which includes all the sensory modes. Images are neural reproductions of the sensory-perceptual field and its component percepts by the organism within its nervous system. The organism's consciousness, therefore, is a map or mirror of its environment, registered as images in the nervous system.

The mapping of the environment in the form of images is basically of two types: short-term and long-term. The retention in memory of an image for only a brief period after the stimulation is often referred to as the "after-image." However, images may be stored for somewhat longer or, indeed, much longer, periods of time in "long-term" memory, and thus become more or less permanent features of the nervous system.
These more or less permanently stored images may be "recollected" in consciousness but until then they are not considered as part of it.

When an organism recalls or recollects (brings into consciousness) stored images as means of associating a stimulus with a response, the process is referred to as "apperception" (Fancher, 1979). This process of apperception will be contrasted later with cognition. Apperception, in my view, is a phase of "mental chronometry" which precedes cognition and utilizes images only, as opposed to symbolic representations. These images, as said, consist of the percepts, which consist in turn of the sensory impressions received during any initial experience, including the emotions and behavioral responses of the organism to this experience at the time of occurrence. They are recalled to consciousness usually by the reoccurrence of the original situation in which they were initially formed, and the "successful" response emitted at that time is then repeated.

Figure 4 also shows emotion to be a component of subjective consciousness. By "emotion" I am referring to phenomena indicated by such terms as fear, anger, grief, joy, etc. These emotions enter the individual's consciousness as concomitants of his sensory-perceptual and apperceptual experiences. They also feed into the behavioral response and may act as an additional motivational force. I say "may" and "additional" because it seems to me theoretically possible
(although quite rare in human behavior) for a behavioral response to occur without emotion, i.e., purely as a sensory-motor reflex or even as a more complex cognitive motor form based solely on sensational stimuli. By emotion, too, I am referring to more primitive feeling states of the organism than is connoted by such terms as patriotism, pride, revenge, etc. To me, these latter terms refer to feelings that are only possible for man as a self-aware member of a culture bearing society. This, however, is an idea which I shall develop later.

Subjective consciousness is also a consciousness of the behavioral response, i.e., a kinesthetic sense. By behavioral response I refer to the purely motor activity of the organism: running, jumping, biting, scratching, kicking, etc. Once emitted, these too become part of subjective consciousness, fed back into subjective consciousness as sensation and perception, and the process begins again as a continuous cycle in this way.

Aside from these "contents" of subjective consciousness, we may conceive of it in other ways also. Thus, another aspect of subjective consciousness, related to this continuous cycling process, is that it is like a stream. For as the organism moves it shifts its sensory and perceptual fields. At the same time, the environment itself changes. Thus, the content of consciousness is always a flux of images and their component percepts, as well as the concomitant
emotions (if any), being quickly shunted through and away, others retained a little longer. The percepts within these images may exist only on the "periphery" of consciousness, while others are at its center. Other percepts may be vivid and clear while others are "pale" and "vague."

When a particular percept of consciousness is held for a time, is particularly vivid and is centrally "located," it is common to speak of such a percept as being in the focus of "attention" of the organism, or of the organism as being in a certain "attitude" or "orientation" toward the percept. Consciousness thus also has a selectivity aspect and the term is often used in this sense, e.g., to be conscious of something or to be unconscious of something means that we have focused our attention upon it. The selectivity dimension of consciousness provides a central function over the organism's behavioral responses. That is, operating through the attention mechanism, consciousness selects its stimuli, inhibits "inappropriate," and releases "appropriate" responses to these stimuli (Mead, 1972:173).

We may further describe subjective self-consciousness then as a form characterized by an unbroken stream of sensations, perceptions and images; "unbroken," that is, in the sense of this stream being a continuous, multiphasic, unidirectional, irreversible process, rather than a series of discrete, bidirectional experiences.

These qualities are brought out by Schutz (1967:45),
who, borrowing from Bergson, conceptualizes the dureé, which I take to be equivalent to subjective consciousness, as follows:

Let us begin by considering Bergson's distinction between living within the stream of experience and living within the world of time. Bergson contrasts the inner stream of duration, the dureé—a continuous coming-to-be and passing-away of heterogeneous qualities—with homogeneous time, which has been spatialized, quantified, and rendered discontinuous. In "pure duration" there is no "side-by-sidedness," no mutual externality of parts, and no divisibility, but only a continuous flux, a stream of conscious states.

Schutz (1967:47) states further:

. . . when I immerse myself in my stream of consciousness, in my duration, I do not find any clearly differentiated experience at all. At one moment an experience waxes, then it wanes. Meanwhile something new grows out of what was something old and then gives place to something still newer. I cannot distinguish between the now and the earlier, between the later now and the now that has just been, except that I know that what has just been is different from what now is. For I experience my duration as a unidirectional, irreversible stream and find that between a moment ago and just now I have grown older.

Describing the dureé further, Schutz (1967:51) states also that:

Within the flow of duration there is only a living from moment to moment . . . . Then, as Husserl says, I live in my acts . . . . From the point of view of being immersed in duration, the now is a phase rather than a point, and therefore the different phases melt into one another.
along a continuum. The simple experience of living in the flow of duration goes forward in a unidirectional, irreversible movement, proceeding from manifold to manifold in a constant running off process. Each phase of experience melts into the next without any sharp boundaries as it is being lived through.

In this description of the durée two characteristics, as indicated, thus stand out: (1) the indiscrete character; and (2) the unidirectional, irreversible character. These characteristics I take to be the major distinguishing characteristics of subjective consciousness and therefore require further comment.

To say that subjective consciousness has an indiscrete character is to say that it has a non-categorical quality and is thus characterized as sensory-perceptual in nature rather than conceptual, and that these sensations and perceptions are not thus homogenized into classes or typifications, lumped together, so-to-speak, but are experienced in their entire variety of sensory-perceptual characters. One gets the impression that this form of experiencing is a very "rich" form, of great detail, contrasting directly with the experiencing in the state of alienness to be described in the next chapter.

To speak of subjective consciousness as unidirectional means it is not or cannot be turned back upon itself. The organism does not, therefore, perceive itself as an object of its own consciousness. While subjective awareness does
not preclude such conscious experiences as the sensation and perception of the organism's own body, e.g., of visual or tactile sensations and perceptions of one's hands, feet, torso, face, etc., or the kinesthetic sensation and perception of one's bodily movement or functions, and the sense of these as distinct from the environment, these experiences of consciousness are not those of consciousness of the object-self. For, as yet, consciousness is only a flow of sensory-perceptual images, of the external or internal world of things, of their movements, their shapes, their colors, their smells, their textures, etc. In subjective consciousness, there is at first no categorical attitude, no concept of time, nor space, nor substance, no consciousness of the self as object, only a moment to moment existence. We quote Schutz (1967:47) in this regard: "As long as my whole consciousness remains temporally unidirectional and irreversible, I am unaware either of my own growing older or of any difference between present and past."

Thus, while it is difficult to imagine, subjective consciousness is at first a state of consciousness in which there are no objects and therefore no categories. By the same token there is no self-reflexive existence, only a unidirectional consciousness, in which man does not experience himself as an object. In subjective consciousness, there is no reflexive awareness of his own being and existence, only a being and existence. In such a state, there is no differ-
Breaking the Psychic Identity of the Infant and Others: Primary Alienation

Primary alienation is the social-psychological process through which the psychic unity of the individual and environment is broken. It proceeds by way of the interactions between the individual and others through which the individual's subjective consciousness is transformed into objective consciousness. At the same time, however, this process is accompanied by the development of a modal fear or anxiety predisposing the individual to withdraw, emotionally and inter-actionally from others, to enclose himself off from them. This modal fear and anxiety, too, is the product of the interactions between the individual and others. (It is on the basis of this emotional fear and anxiety that I use the term alienness because this term connotes more than mere objective distinction.) Although these two aspects of the alienation process occur together I shall treat them separately in this section, beginning with the transformation of subjective consciousness into objective consciousness.

The emergence of the subject-object dichotomy

The essence of the alienation concept is a separation of the individual and something else. This separation refers to more than the mere perceptual separation of the individual
and environment described in the discussion of subjective consciousness. As I use the term in its primary sense, it refers to the separation of the individual from others by the development of the objective self. To develop a self as object is to distinguish it from other objects, hence to separate it, or alienate it, from other objects. At the root of primary alienation, then, is the transformation of subjective consciousness into objective consciousness and the gradual emergence of the object-self as separate and distinct from other objects, including other persons.

The transformation of subjective consciousness into objective consciousness is accomplished through learning to communicate by use of symbols. By acquisition of symbols, the individual's consciousness is made discrete, or discontinuous. Through language, percepts are named and are thus loosed from their embeddedness in images; they are freed, not only of their image context, but from one another by being transformed into a symbol. It is in this fashion that these percepts become discrete. At the same time, symbolization of a percept objectifies it, makes it external, possible of being shared with others, which enhances its discreteness.

George Mead (1934) refers to this process of designating percepts as "indication." Human beings can indicate things in their environment (registered as percepts in their consciousness) by symbolizing them. The development of language has the consequence of allowing organisms to share their experi-
ences through the designation of such experiences by symbols. The designation of a thing in our environment by a symbol transforms the thing, registered in our consciousness as a percept, into an object, for the thing is now no longer a private affair but has become objectified. "Objects" are images or percepts that we indicate symbolically to one another and are thus socially created. We shall utilize "object" in this way, i.e., to indicate a distinction between the purely private image or percept and the image or percept that has become symbolically designated and socially shared.

"Objects" are not merely the perceptual replicates of things, however, for symbolization gives rise to another type of object whose reference may not be to any particular tangible thing but to a class of things, or, also, to what we term ideas, or concepts. E. A. Gellner (1964:120-121) has defined a concept as "... an aspect of thought... a kind of unit in terms of which one thinks: a unit smaller than a judgment, a proposition, or theory, but one which necessarily enters into these." At the same time, Gellner links conceptualization to language although there may not be a complete identity of the two: "Concepts correspond to or 'are the meaning of' all meaningful words, with certain qualifications: (a) only one concept corresponds to two or more words with the same meaning; (b) there is a tendency to speak of concepts only with regard to words which do, or at least can, refer
either to something that can exist or be imagined or to an operation that can be performed, and not in connection with words whose role is grammatical rather than designative . . . ; (c) there is a tendency to speak of concepts in connection with general rather than singular terms. . . "

For our purposes, the distinctions between language symbols per se and concepts emerging from Gellner's comparisons are that symbols may stand for images and percepts as well as concepts. However, we may subsume all these units under the term "object." An object, once again, in our meaning, is anything which the organism can designate or indicate symbolically. An additional point, however, is that the objects may be conceptual as well as perceptual and thus the world to which the human being consciously responds is much different than that of the non-symboling animal: it is categorical, discrete, temporallyized and spatialized and comes to include abstract objects as well as "concrete" objects.

One of these abstract objects to which the individual responds is his own self. Through acquiring the capacity to symbolize things in general he may symbolize himself as well. Thus, subjective consciousness becomes, as well, objective-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of itself through its objectification. In essence, the human individual, through acquiring symbols, forms a "second self" which overlays the first. I quote Bergson (1949:38-39) in this respect:

Probably animals do not picture to them-
selves, besides their sensations, as we do, an external world quite distinct from themselves, which is the common property of all [self]-conscious beings. Our tendency to form a clear picture of this externality of things and the homogeneity of their medium is the same as the impulse which leads us to live in common and to speak. But, in proportion as the conditions of social life are more completely realized, the current which carries our conscious states from within outwards is strengthened; little by little, these states are made into objects or things; they break off, not only from one another, but from ourselves. Henceforth, we no longer perceive them except in the homogeneous medium in which we have set their image, and through the word which lends them its commonplace color. Thus a second self is formed... a self whose existence is made up of distinct moments, whose states are separated from one another and easily expressed in words. (Italics mine.)

As Bergson implies, the process by which the second self arises corresponds to the process by which the individual objectifies his environment generally, namely through linguistic communication with other individuals. To speak of the self as becoming an object to itself, then, is to imply its social derivation through its representation by the individual and others in symbolic communication.

We assume here that the individual cannot indicate himself prior to being indicated by another. It is the indication of the individual by another through symbolic interaction that turns his consciousness back upon his own subjective experience. We quote Mead (1972:202) in this respect:

The individual experiences himself as such,
not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only insofar as he first becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or are in his experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved.

Mead (1972:203) continues:

The importance of what we term "communication" lies in the fact that it provides a form of behavior in which the organism or the individual may become an object to himself. It is that sort of communication which we have been discussing--not communication in the sense of the cluck of the hen to the chickens, or the bark of a wolf to the pack, or the lowing of a cow, but the communication in the sense of significant symbols, communication which is directed not only to others but also to the individual himself. So far as that type of communication is a part of behavior, it at least introduces a self.

An important point to be made about Mead's latter quotation is that symbolic communication only *introduces* a self. That is, the ability to take oneself as an object of one's own consciousness is only *initiated* by symbolic communication. Thus, primary alienation refers only to the phase of self-development in which the self becomes *differentiated* as an object to itself, in contrast to the secondary alienation phase in which the self as object becomes *contradistinctive*. 
The differentiation of the self is only the initial process of development of the self as object to itself, but is at the same time the basis upon which the later contradistinctiveness can emerge.

As indicated earlier, it is through the use of symbols that the individual also acquires the capacity of cognitive thought. Indeed, mind and self (the objectified self) develop parallel to one another. Mead (1972:159) writes:

In all conversations of gestures within the social process, whether external (between different individuals) or internal (between a given individual and himself), the individual's consciousness of the content and flow of meaning involved depends on his thus taking the attitude of the other toward his own gestures. In this way every gesture within a given social group or community comes to stand for a particular act or response, namely, the act or response which it calls forth explicitly in the individual to whom it is addressed and implicitly in the individual who makes it; and this particular act or response for which it stands is its meaning as a significant symbol. Only in terms of gestures as significant symbols is the existence of mind or intelligence possible; for only in terms of gestures which are significant symbols can thinking—which is simply an internalized or implicit conversation of the individual with himself by means of such gestures—take place.

Mead (1972:159) writes further:

The internalization in our experience of the external conversation of gestures which we carry on with other individuals in the social process is the essence of thinking; and the gestures thus internalized are significant symbols because they have the same meanings for all individual
members of the given society or social
group, that is, they respectively arouse
the same attitude in the individuals
making them that they arouse in the indi­
viduals responding to them. Otherwise
the individual could not internalize them
or be conscious of them and their meanings.

According to Mead, the self develops in two stages: the
play stage and the game stage. The primary phase of identi­
fication/alienation refers to only the play stage. The game
stage takes place in childhood and therefore in the secondary
phase of identification/alienation. Mead's two stages of
self-development are so well-known in the literature that it
is not necessary to detail them here except to show their
concordance to the concepts being presented.

The addition of the object-self and of mind alters the
phases of consciousness as previously depicted in Figure 4.
These alterations are depicted in Figure 5. As shown, the

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Figure 5. Phases of Objective Consciousness
component of cognition is the added factor. By "cognition" I simply mean thinking, and by "thinking" I mean the manipulation in consciousness of symbolic representations (objects) of the environment by the individual. Cognition involves the indication of percepts in the stimulus field symbolically to oneself and the trying out in one's imagination of various lines of behavior in response to problematical situations (Meltzer, 1978:20-22). Cognition, mind, or thinking, then, are added to consciousness in the primary stage. Concordantly this state is characterized by the categorical attitude and an attitude of the separateness of the self from the environment. The subjective self becomes an object to be contemplated and, perhaps, placed under surveillance and control. But whether such surveillance and control occur depends on the concomitant emotional development of the individual.

The emergence of emotional insecurity

To refer to the process of the emergence of the subject-object dichotomy as "alienation" would be too strong a term if it was not at the same time accompanied by the development of an emotional insecurity which predisposes the individual to fear or distrust other persons, thus to have a tendency to be wary of them, to shy away from them, and, above all, to enclose the subjective self off from them. The addition of these traits to the individual's psyche, along with the split-
ting of the self into subject and object, justifies the alienation term. These developments, moreover, are the basis upon which the alienness state comes into full existence.

The emergence of this emotional insecurity—like that of the subject-object dichotomy—is brought about through interaction with others in which the infant is attempting self-actualization. But, as indicated in the first chapter, self-actualization during infancy can only refer to the infant's attempts at satisfaction of the needs of the subjective self since the objective self has not yet fully developed. Subjective self-needs are posited here as needs in and of themselves existing in their own right alongside others. This view corresponds with that of Miller (1981:7) who echoes those of Winnicott, Mahler, and Kohut: "The child has a primary need to be regarded and respected as the person he really is at any given time, and as the center—the central actor—in his own activity. In contradistinction to drive wishes, we are speaking here of a need that is narcissistic, but nevertheless legitimate, and whose fulfillment is essential for the development of a healthy self-esteem." This narcissistic need appears to be essentially the need for a certain type of self-expression. Miller writes further: "When we speak here of 'that which it is at any given time,' we mean emotions, sensations, and their expression from the first day onward. Mahler (1968) writes: 'The infant's inner sensations form the core of the self. They appear to remain
the central, the crystallization point of the 'feeling of self' around which a 'sense of identity' will become established." These references, of course, can only be, in my terms, to the subjective self.

When the interaction of the infant with others is self-fulfilling, that is, when his actualization of his subjective self is met with "... respect, echoing, understanding, participation and mirroring..." (Miller, 1981:9), then emotional security develops. When, on the other hand, the significant others with whom the infant interacts sanction his subjective self-actualization negatively, he experiences basic anxiety and fear and, if the negative sanctioning is repeated over time as a modality, these traits are "introjected" as a generalized emotional insecurity. It is the feeling of basic anxiety and fear, the resultant of negative self sanctions, that are the mark of self-disillusionment during infancy. This self-disillusionment, in turn, produces the generalized feeling of insecurity, and this feeling is the basis on which the individual's alienness is built.

This is so because the infant begins to inhibit the actualization of self out of fear of self-disillusionment. He learns to modify his behavior to avoid the negative sanctioning of his significant others. The inhibition of his subjective life is the forerunner of the loss of spontaneity of behavior and of the growing cognitive control over it in the secondary stage. It is the harbinger of the growing
dominancy of the "Me" aspect of the self over the "I," i.e.,
the overlayering of the subjective self by the objective self.

The development of this dominancy of the Me over the I
is, as I have said, the resultant of negative interactions
between the infant and others, but particularly between the
infant and its mother or mother surrogate. Miller (1981:8),
in speaking of her narcissistic patients, has said that
"... I found that every one of them has a childhood history
..." where:

There was a mother who at the core was
emotionally insecure, and who depended
for her narcissistic equilibrium on the
child behaving, or acting, in a particu­
lar way. This mother was able to hide
her insecurity from the child and from
everyone else behind a hard, authoritarian,
and even totalitarian facade.

This child had an amazing ability to per­
ceive and respond intuitively, that is,
unconsciously, to this need of the mother,
or of both parents, for him to take on the
role that had unconsciously been assigned
to him.

This role secured "love" for the child—
that is, his parents narcissistic
cathexis.

This is, of course, to say not much more than that the
mother's narcissism brings about that of the child. The
question arises as to how the mother's narcissism was
brought about, but this is a question I shall defer until
Chapter VI when the sociological sources of alienation and
alienness are traced. The importance of Miller's statements
for our analysis is to point out the part of the parent-child
relationship to the development of emotional insecurity and thence ultimately to the loss of spontaneity of subjective self-expression and the emergence of the dominancy of the Me over the I.

Continuing the Psychic Identity of the Infant with Others: Primary Identification

Even though the infant develops the self-other distinction with the acquisition of language more or less automatically, if he does not at the same time develop emotional insecurity, then he continues in psychic unity with others. This is because, even though the Me has developed, the spontaneity of the I is left unhindered. The development of objective self-consciousness proceeds as merely alternating phases with no dominancy over the subjective self. In other words, there is no "split" between the subjective self and the objective self, one as subordinate the other as superordinate. The development of one is the development of the other.

Though he does not refer to it as such, Hewitt (1979:71) has described the individual's self-consciousness at the primary stage of the identification/alienation process as follows, providing, of course, that the individual has not developed an emotional insecurity and anxiety: "The 'I' and the 'Me' continually alternate in ongoing conduct. At one moment, the individual acts as an 'I,' responding to a par-
tic particular situation and to the object and people in it; at the next moment that response becomes a part of the past and so is part of the 'Me'--the response now can be an object of reflection."

Thus, while the self as object is known and is distinct, it is known only as an intermittent phase of the "conversation of gestures" between the subjective and objective self. The self as object enters into the stream of consciousness only as a momentary reflection, disappears as the subjective self waxes, reappears again. In addition, even though the individual now has an objective self and, in this sense, loses his complete identity with others and perceives himself as differentiated from them, still this is not felt as an alienness from them since he does not fear them, is not anxious in their presence, nor wary of their responses to him, and, indeed, cannot at this point of the identification process fully conceptualize himself as "alien." The individual's identification with others at this point is one of emotion rather than cognition.

This development allows the infant to reach out to others and to embrace them for he has no fear of them. He has no fear of them because they haven't negatively sanctioned, in a modal sort of way, his actualization of the subjective self. He has not been required to inhibit his impulses, his feelings, and has received positive sanctions to his subjective-self expressions. The relationship between the mother
and infant has been a warm and nurturant one in which fear and anxiety, the avoidance of which would have compelled the infant to inhibit his spontaneous impulses and enforce upon them a rigid control and dominance of the "Me," played no or little part. He is "full" of security.

In such a case, the I and the Me develop concordantly and interlace. The orientations and attitudes of others (the generalized other) are absorbed into the individual's own psychic structure as the "Me" and fuse with the "I" in a natural sort of way, not by virtue of the infant's desire to know these attitudes in order to avoid disillusionment but because he simply appropriates them to his growing sense of self. They become "his own," so thoroughly mapped into his nervous system that he will not even have to think about them prior to his acts. The Me, in such a case occurs only in "real" problematical situations in which goals are blocked and which require the engagement of mind and self with respect to their accomplishment, and which have no reference to the avoidance of self-disillusionment but simply to the actualization of the self.

Conclusion

With the differentiation of the self into subject and object, and with the development of emotional security or insecurity, the primary phase of the identification/alienation process is ended. Ordinarily, we can say that this
phase of the process lasts only about eighteen months to two years of the life-cycle. Nevertheless, as I hope to have shown, it is an absolutely crucial phase in determining whether the individual comes to experience a modal alienness from or identity with others in society. It sets the stage for the next phase of the process, i.e., it establishes the objective self and undergirds it with emotional security or insecurity. If in the course of the differentiation of the self the individual is encouraged, through the mechanism of the objective self, to inhibit subjective self-expression--"encouraged," that is, through negative sanction and avoidance of disillusionment--then he begins to suspect that this subjective self of which others disapprove is somehow bad. Not only has the self become differentiated from others but it has the possibility of becoming conceptualized as con-tradistinctive. Of course, the opposite occurs if others encourage subjective self-expression; the individual's conception of himself is one of identity with these others.

These further developments, however, mark the secondary phase of the identification/alienation process. The description of this phase is the subject of the next chapter.
The secondary phase of the identification/alienation process starts as soon as the individual begins to form a concept of himself. As we have seen, this event occurs when the self takes itself as an object. Once objectification of the self occurs, i.e., when the individual learns his own name and begins to use the personal pronouns to distinguish himself from others, a set of attitudes toward himself develops. These attitudes form his self-concept. If the individual forms an attitude toward himself such that he believes he is not a bona fide or authentic member of his society, then I label him alienated from others. If, on the other hand, he forms the opposite attitude, i.e., that he is a genuine, authentic member of his society, then I label him identified with that society. Either of these states emerge in, and are the culmination of, the secondary phase of the identification/alienation process.

The dynamics of the secondary phase are in some respects the same as the primary phase but there are also significant differences. These differences revolve around the formation of the objective self. For instance, the individual still attempts to actualize and fulfill the subjective self but in
childhood this attempt becomes self-conscious. Thus, in this phase, fulfillment of self is accomplished in terms of the satisfaction of cognitive motive as well as physiological or biological need. The actualization process itself is now no longer merely action and social action alone but is accompanied by symbolic communication. That is, actions, both the individual's own and other's, now take on symbolic dimensions and are interpreted in light of their meanings for the newly emerging concept of self. It is on the basis of these interpretations that the attitude toward oneself as alien or identical to others develops.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the secondary phase of the identification/alienation process, i.e., to show how, in some detail, the developments of the object-self and of emotional security or insecurity in infancy are further elaborated in childhood and lead to identity or alienness respectively.

Identification in Childhood

As indicated in Chapter III, the objectification of the subject-self occurs via symbolic interaction. As also indicated in Chapter III, symbols may stand for two classes of objects, e.g., things and concepts, or concrete objects and abstract objects, respectively. When an individual is given a name, he is thus objectified in his own consciousness, but he is at first objectified as a concrete entity. It is only
later that he comes to also objectify himself conceptually, i.e., abstractly. He forms a conception of himself, over time.

This self-concept is essentially a set of attitudes expressed toward one's own experiences, that is a set of attitudes toward the subjective self. These attitudes, moreover, when analyzed, reflect a structure. For instance, some attitudes reflect the individual's perceptions and cognitions of himself as to who he is, that is, to his identity. Such verbal statements as "I am John" or "I am a father" or "I am an accountant" identify the individual to himself and others. They distinguish him from and place him in relation to others. Other verbal statements, such as "I am fat" or "I am a glutton" describe the individual's perceived traits. These statements present an image of the individual with respect to his body, his feelings, thoughts and actions. Statements like "I am a good (or bad) father" or "I am fat and ugly" are statements which not only represent identity and image but represent a judgment or evaluation as well. They represent the individual's regard for himself, i.e., his self-esteem.

The structure of the self-concept is to a large extent a derivative of the social system and culture of the society. To say this is simply to reiterate the gist of the discussion in Chapter III on the emergence of the subject-object dichotomy in consciousness. It was said there that objectification was basically a process of the joint designation of a
percept or image by a symbol. Symbolization of the individual is thus the mechanism through which he comes to view himself as an object, but this symbolization is, in turn, simply a set of social categories to which the individual is assigned by others and by himself.

The self-concept, then, is essentially made up of the various social categories of the society and reflects the social structure. Thus, the self-identity element for the most part derives from the system of status-roles\(^1\) of the society; the self-image element derives from the descriptive traits arising as stereotypical of each of the status-roles. These descriptive traits constitute the ideal image of the person occupying them. The self-esteem element is by and large a derivative of the social esteem accorded to the various status-roles of the society together with any discrepancy between the individual's "real" self (his actualized self) and the "ideal" self (what he wishes to be).

It follows from these assertions that it is through the construction of the self-concept that the individual is psychologically integrated into (or alienated from) society from a social-psychological viewpoint. Through symbolic interaction the individual builds his self-concept. This con-

\(^1\)I have used this term very broadly to refer to not only social-statuses per se but to the whole host of categories into which persons in society classify one another. For a more detailed treatment see Rosenberg (1979:9-14).
cept, in turn, is simply reflective of the social-system and culture of the society. These systems, in turn, act as integrating mechanisms of the society. They bind people together organically and mechanically. By assuming various status-roles of the social-structure the individual thus takes his "place," whether "high" or "low," in the society and is integrated into it.

The assumption of certain specific status-roles is, of course, more or less automatic. Examples are the status-role of "human being," "male" or "female," "child" or "adult," "peasant" or "nobleman," "white" or "black," etc. These are the ascriptive statuses. Without effort on his part the individual is automatically assigned to these categories and expected to display the ideal images attached to them. Other status-roles are achieved. These must be attained through the efforts of the individual himself. They are not automatic.

But the individual may be ascribed to or achieve various status-roles, of course, without identifying with them. Identifying with a status-role means that the individual claims it as his own; he chooses it for himself and conceives of himself in its terms. As Johnson (1960:128) has stated: "One is said to identify with a social role if one . . . adopts it as one's own, striving to attain the necessary skills and to conform with the role norms--one is said to identify with a social group if one . . . considers oneself a member of it." (Italics are mine.)
The process by which the individual attains an identity with these status-roles I have referred to as the identification process. The secondary phase of this process is distinguished by the formation of the self-concept. It proceeds by way of the individual's assuming the various status roles and gradually coming to build up an identity in the overall, or "global," sense composed of all the status-roles he claims for his own. As he matures, the child is assigned certain status-roles and expected to act according to the normative ideals of them. He also assumes certain status-roles which are not automatically assigned. The appropriation of both sets of these status-roles as his own, both the ascribed and the achieved, constitutes his overall identity, image and esteem, i.e., his overall self-concept. (Those status-roles which he appropriates within any particular situation is said to afford the individual a "situated" identity.) It is only over a period of some duration that this overall identity is attained.

The secondary identification process per se may be said to begin when the individual, through interaction with others, starts to learn of the social structure of the society. In American society, for instance, the individual will learn that he is a human being as opposed to his companion which is a dog. He will learn that he is a male as opposed to his mother and sister who are females. He will learn that humans do not eat bones, and males do not wear lipstick. He will also learn
that humans are generally more esteemed than dogs and that males are generally held in higher esteem than females in American society. Throughout his associations with others he will constantly become aware of these various status-roles and of which apply to him and of which do not.

The mere learning of the status-roles, of the images and esteem attached to them, however, is not sufficient for identity with them. As indicated, the individual must choose these roles as his own. This choice appears to be mostly a matter of the social esteem accorded to the status-role. Through his interaction with others, the individual is guided into accepting certain status-roles and achieving others by the sanctions, both negative and positive, applied by others. In other words, significant others offer the individual social-esteem if he accepts certain status-roles which they ascribe to him (they deny it if he doesn't), and the individual seeks social esteem by the achievement of certain other status-roles which he more or less chooses as his own.

When an individual chooses a status-role as his own, appropriates it to his self-concept, he is said to have "introjected" the status-role. Webster defines this term as "the adoption of externals (persons or objects) into the self, so as to have a sense of oneness with them and to feel personally affected by what happens to them." (Quoted in Rosenberg, 1979:36-37.) Rosenberg (1979:37) has stated that "when an external object is introjected, the fate of the object and
of the self are experienced as inextricably intertwined." He states further: ". . . if anything external to the self is capable of arousing feelings of pride or shame—pride in my shiny new automobile, shame at my unfashionable clothes, pride in an honor bestowed, shame or embarrassment at the defeat of my school team—then these elements have been appropriated by the self and are contained within its boundaries" (1979:35).

Although chosen roles are introjected into the self and thus evoke certain emotions, not all of them do so equally. It is apparent that some statuses are more cherished as one's own than others. Some status-roles may be introjected only superficially while others lie at the very core of the self. The emotional experiences of gaining and losing status-roles during the acquisition of an overall or global identity thus vary accordingly. Some roles are gained and lost rather imperturbably during the process (and continue to be so throughout life) while the gain or loss of others evokes strong emotions.

Merely choosing a status-role and introjecting it (whether centrally or peripherally) is insufficient to reach a state of identity with that role. In addition the individual must confirm his claim to it in the eyes of others. He "must" do so because of the near impossibility of successfully acting it out without such confirmation. If others fail to agree with the individual that he is what he claims
to be the reciprocations necessary for most roles to be affected may simply be withdrawn. Though some roles may be carried out without others and some are less reciprocal than others, it is in the nature of the social act that it requires another for its completion. Furthermore, the self-concept is essentially a social phenomenon in that we cannot see ourselves except as others see us, except by taking the role of the other. The self as object to itself cannot even exist except as the individual takes the attitude of the other toward his self.

Confirmation of identity occurs as the individual, through actualization of the self, compares himself to the stereotyped self-ideal prescribed by the status-role, and as others, who also use the ideal as a basis for their comparisons, make affirmative judgments about these comparisons. As he makes these affirmative judgments, and as others communicate their affirmative judgments to him, the individual is confirmed in his own eyes that he is what he purports to be in that particular situation.

These comparisons made by the individual and others are the cognitive element added to the self-fulfilling experience during the secondary phase. As was shown in Chapter III, self-fulfillment is also an emotional experience, but this emotional experience is now contingent on the cognitive interpretation of the actualization of the self.

This contingency upon cognitive interpretation, however,
in no way reduces the importance of the emotional element in self-fulfillment. Indeed, we may say that it is still the ingredient which completes the experience; it gives the experience the fullness of meaning. Although in sociology this term has been used to refer primarily to action that is characterized by cognitive or symbolic terms, and this usage is correct, still this usage should not overlook the fact that subjective states of emotion are always corollaries of objective or cognitive processes.¹ The object-self, again, is merely the cognitive outgrowth and overlaying of the subjective self. It is in the subjective self that the meaning of action is substantiated.

This idea is brought out nicely by Gendlin (1964:112). He writes: "Both in social talk and in theory we so largely emphasize external events and logical meaning that it almost seems as if it were difficult to notice that, in addition to external objects and logic, we also have an inward bodily feeling or sensing (a direct referent)." He states further:

> It is less apparent, but still easily checked by anyone, that this direct referent contains meaning. At first it may seem that experiencing is simply the inward sense of our body, its tension or well being. Yet upon further reflection, we can notice that only in this direct sensing do we have the meaning of what we say or think. For, with-

¹For this reason, I use the term "feeling" as part of my definition of alienness and identity to signify its alliance with cognition.
out our "feel" of the meaning, verbal symbols are only noises . . .

Verbalization, language, are the symbolic and outward expressions of the "feeling," "experiencing" process. As Gendlin (1964:112) says: "Before symbolization the felt meanings are incomplete . . . Thus, to explicate is to carry forward a bodily felt process." Gendlin's references to an "inward bodily feeling or sensing" or a "direct referent" are, of course, the equivalent of the concepts of the "dureé" and the subjective self discussed in Chapter III. Gendlin thus recognizes the subjective and the objective states of self-experience and points out that the subjective states of experience, the "direct referent" (dureé, subjective consciousness) are in process and that the carrying forward of this process depends to a large extent on the symbolization of its varying states in interaction with other persons. The "completion" of this feeling, experiencing process involves the emotional concomitant of cognitive interpretation and always accompanies the actualization of self. It "colors" the interaction, gives it its fullness of meaning. To say this is simply to reiterate that the objective-self is an outgrowth and overlaying of the subjective self and that cognition is always connected to emotion.

It is important to point out again that self-esteem in the objective sense is merely a need in the subjective sense transformed into a motive. As indicated in Chapter III the infant has the narcissistic need of subjective self-expression.
As we have seen, the subjective self consists primarily of the internal, multiphasic flow of consciousness of the bodily and environmental states, registered as sensation and feeling (or emotion). These sensations and feelings form the core of the subjective self around which an identity, in the objective sense, is formed. The self-concept, i.e., the objective-self, is always grounded in the experiences of the subjective self and it is the subjective self that is in contact with and reacts to the environment. The objective self, in this sense, is simply the cognitive side of the subjective self, a reflection upon it.

The combined elements of a positive cognitive judgment that the individual is what he claims to be and the emotional concomitant of this judgment thus make up the experience of self-fulfillment in the secondary phase of identification. This self-fulfilling experience, repeated modally in the individual's interactions with others, is the final ingredient of the formation of identity with any particular status role. Having assumed various status-roles, both ascribed and achieved, having chosen a particular status-role as his own, and having been self-fulfilled by repeated confirmation from others, the individual's identity with the status-role is complete. The individual comes to believe that he is the kind of person the status-role implies. This belief becomes a stable part of the set of attitudes he has toward himself and is emotionally affirmed.
As the individual identifies with more and more of these status roles, he forms an identity in the overall or global sense, i.e., an identity compounded of all the status-roles he has drawn from the "generalized others" of his society and constellated in the "Me" aspect of himself. As said previously it is through the formation of the "Me," reflective of the generalized other, that the individual takes himself as an object. If, over the course of his maturation and socialization, he conceives of this object as a bona fide member of his society, integrated with it in various degrees and ways through his identifying with its various social categories, then he has reached a state of identity with the society.

The state of identity itself, then, can be characterized in two ways, the first and foremost of which is by the cognition, backed up by emotion (or feeling), that one is a member of the society (an American, a Japanese, a Wintu, Hopi, etc.), or that one is a human being (as opposed to an "animal"), a male, etc. This knowledge, rooted in emotional experience as already described, links the individual to others, not only to those who hold such identities in common but to those who hold different identities but which relate to him reciprocally in social relationships, e.g., male-female, husband-wife, doctor-client, etc. Even though these identities are different from his own they are a reciprocal and thus constitute a kind of unity.
A second way in which the identity state can be characterized, however, already alluded to in Chapter I and Chapter III, is in terms of the degree to which the object self is present in consciousness, thereby rendering the individual separate from or distinct from his environment. As I have indicated in the preliminary sketch of my theory in Chapter I, a distinguishing characteristic of the alienness state is a modal self-consciousness, i.e., an almost constant awareness of the self as object. By definition, the differentiation of the self from others is a necessary factor in the alienation of the self from these others. It is not sufficient, of course, as the contradistinction of the self is also an essential ingredient. But the term "alienation" connotes a separation, at least in the minimal sense. Conversely, the identity of the self with the world around it presumes its unity with that world. More fundamentally, it presumes the obliteration of the self-other distinction, the erasure of the subject-object boundary. A state of frequent objective-self consciousness by definition separates the individual from others, whereas a state of subjective consciousness unites him with others.

The identity state, then, is marked also by the lack of modal self-consciousness as well as by the cognition and feeling that one is a bona fide, authentic member of his society and also of whatever sub-category or sub-group he has chosen as his own. Indeed, the belief that one is a member of
his society in the authentic sense makes the lack of self-consciousness and self-preoccupation possible. I shall have more to say about this, however, in the discussion of secondary alienation in the next section of this chapter.

This unreflective state, in which individuals apparently reach partial lack of objectification of self and thus exist momentarily and to varying degrees in pure subjectivity, is probably what Abraham Maslow (1968) calls the state of being cognition. This being cognition is what I have come to think of as the essence of the state of consciousness resulting from self-fulfillment; it constitutes a very important aspect of the state of identity of the individual with society.

Maslow gives us a good picture of the conscious state of the "self-fulfilled" person, that type of person who is the opposite of the self-disillusioned person. He attempts to describe the state of being of such a person, the experiences of such a person. Maslow (1968:646-651) calls these experiences "B-cognition" for "being-cognition," the act of cognition as a state of being, i.e., "temporary, non-striving, purposeless, self-validating, end-experiences and states."

His description of such experiences includes: "In B-cognition the experience or the object tends to be seen as a whole, as a complete unit, detached from relations, from possible usefulness, from expediency, and from purpose." Also:

1. The percept is fully and exclusively attended to with all its relevant aspects.
2. It is seen exclusive of its human
relevance, attended to in and of itself. (3) B-cognizing seems to make the perception richer. The task of normal perception which is so frequently anxiety based or motivation-determined, is fulfilled in the first viewing and thereafter the object or person, now that it has been catalogued, is simply no longer perceived. (4) B-cognition includes perception that is relatively ego-transcending, self-forgetful, egoless. It is possible in the aesthetic experience or the love experience to become so absorbed and "poured into" the object that the self, in a very real sense, disappears. Some writers on aesthetics, on mysticism, on motherhood, and on love have gone so far as to say that in the peak experience we may even speak of identification of the perceiver and the perceived, a fusion of what was two into a new and larger whole, a superordinate unit.

The state of identity also seems to correspond with Rogers' (1954:109) concept of the "adjusted self": "The self becomes increasingly simply the subjective and reflexive awareness of experiencing . . . (it) exists in the experience of feelings . . . at any given moment the self is primarily a reflexive awareness of the process of experiencing. It is not a perceived object but something felt in process. It is not a structure to be defended, but a rich and changing awareness of internal experiencing."

The state of identity, then, is one in which, paradoxically, the self more or less disappears from consciousness as an object of it. The boundaries between the self and others are eliminated in the sense that these others, after an initial cataloging, are then reacted to without modal con-
sciousness of the self as an object distinct from them and different from them. The interaction proceeds simply on the basis of sensation, perception and emotion, with cognition playing a minimal role, and certainly engaged in very little with respect to the object self. This state is very much an extension of the process of the conversation of gestures between the "I" and the "Me" described in Chapter III. The difference is that identity is relatively more complete.

The identity state is, to repeat, possible only on the basis of modal self-fulfillment, not only in childhood but also on a fulfillment in infancy which has built up a reservoir of positive emotions and which therefore encourages rather than inhibits the expression of the subjective-self impulses. With these positive dispositions the infant enters childhood and assumes new roles, claiming some for his own and confirming them in the eyes of others. Out of this process his identity is assured. If, however, the infant's experiences of self-actualization are characteristically self-disillusioning, then he faces childhood with altogether different dispositions and is very likely to take, not the route of identification, but that of alienation. In this process, rather than coming to believe himself to be the kind of person called for by the status-role, he comes to believe he is not this kind of person even though he has, in fact, chosen it as his own. He comes to form a conception of himself as contradistinctive to the status-role. The process by which
he does so is the topic of the next section.

Alienation in Childhood

The secondary alienation process begins at that point where an individual has chosen or appropriated a role for himself and fails in confirming it in the eyes of others. Disconfirmation of the self, as we have shown previously, occurs via the social-psychological mechanism of self-disillusionment. Self-disillusionment is the opposite of self-fulfillment; and its ultimate consequence, alienness, is the opposite of identity. Whereas in identity, the individual believes himself to be one with his society and is modally in a state of B-cognition, the alienated individual sees himself in contradistinctive terms and experiences an almost constant state of D-cognition. D-cognition is a state of consciousness in which the self as object is held modally in the attention of the individual. D-cognition is used in the sense that the self as the object of consciousness is separated from the environment of which it was once a unity and which is now being defended.

Just like self-fulfillment, self-disillusionment is a process that is a little more subtle than we might at first assume. Basically, however, it involves a discrepancy between perceptions that have implications for the self. As Toch (1965:128), in his study of social movements, has said:

A disillusioning experience is the perception of a discrepancy between con-
ventional beliefs and psychological or physical realities. More accurately, it represents a perception of a discrepancy between two perceptions, one of which shows the consequences of belief, and the second of which reveals the import of facts or the demand of needs.

Toch's usage has the advantage of connecting disillusionment to conventional beliefs, and thus to culture (a point I have emphasized earlier), and this is another important characteristic of self-disillusionment as well, i.e., that the real self is discrepant with the ideal self as this ideal is reflected in cultural norms, values and beliefs. Indeed, it is the contradiction between the actions and feelings of others toward the real self and how they are supposed to feel and act toward the self that is a critical feature of self-disillusionment; for cultural definitions form the basis of the individual's ideal self and become the standards against which he compares himself to others and against which he measures the rightness and wrongness of acts toward him and which thus determine the discrepancy between the real-self and the ideal-self. When discrepancies between one's ideal-self and the reactions of others occur then the individual experiences disillusionment, and such disillusionment has certain implications for his self. In our culture, for example, it is normative for parents (identity) to love their children (identity), but when children perceive that they do not do so, then they may come to have an image of themselves
as unlovable. To be unlovable, furthermore, is a very bad thing, and one's self-esteem is thus lowered. Or in our culture it is normative for an older brother (identity) to be stronger (image) and dominant (image) over a younger brother (identity). To not be so lowers self-esteem. To lower self-esteem in any of these ways, in turn, is to produce the various negative emotions of sorrow, anxiety, sadness, grief, unhappiness, etc., to varying degrees, or to produce frustration. These emotions then produce various behaviors, all of which may be seen as attempts to restore self-esteem.

Thus, all facets of the self are involved in disillusioning experiences, i.e., self-identity, self-image, and self-esteem. We act out of a motive to fulfill ideal self-conceptions involving our identity, image and esteem, but we are checked by the responses of another that disconfirm such ideal conceptions, that indicate a discrepancy between the reality and the ideal. Such responses thus go directly to our self-conceptions; they question our identity or seek to redefine it; they thus impute a different image and also alter our self-esteem; and in so doing they cause us discomfort, anxiety, frustration, anger, etc.

It is perhaps appropriate at this time to describe such disillusioning experiences in order to obtain a more concrete idea of what the term encompasses. We must realize, of course, that descriptions of such experiences by way of the printed word are inadequate compared to their presentation in
actual life or by audio and video recordings. Nevertheless, a fuller understanding may be obtained by presenting ethno-
graphic data which I believe represent such experiences and which we may understand intuitively and use as a basis for further elaboration.

Jules Henry's (1973) study of five families describes an incident that happened in the Rosenberg family which illustrates disillusionment in both its affective and cognitive dimensions. Ben and Irving are two brothers. Abraham, a third brother, is autistic, and is away from the family in a center for treatment. Henry (1973:138-140) describes the particular incident as follows:

When I went outside I found Irving beating up Ben again. They wrestled. Ben, as usual, seemed to enjoy it. Mr. Rosenberg soon came out, got angry and tried to separate them, blaming Irving. Soon the father went indoors and Irving attacked Ben. Ben began to give Irving a hard time by falling on top of him. When Irving left, as if to stop fighting, Ben called him "chicken," so Irving came back and continued to fight. Once Ben got a headlock on Irving and pinned him to the ground. It was obvious that Ben was practically inexhaustible and was causing Irving more and more difficulty. I believe that when Irving wanted to quit, it was because he was tired. It was striking to see Ben constantly provoke Irving to continue to fight, even though Irving pommeled him so and dug his knuckles into him. At one point Ben came over and asked me to hold his glasses.

At last, when Irving seemed really exhausted, he went inside. I followed him into the kitchen, where he was sulking, apparently very angry. He did not respond to some-
thing I said. Then he began to scold his father for blaming him for attacking Ben. He was in his usual state of mounting rage. His mother and father continued to blame him and he kept getting angrier and angrier.

I went outside to play with Ben, but I could see what was going on in the kitchen and I heard Irving screaming. Then he seemed to attack one of his parents physically—it seemed to me it was his father. Later his father said it was the mother, but she said it was the father. Then I heard Irving go into the bathroom, slamming the door behind him, and I went inside. Irving was in the bathroom, sobbing and coughing, and his parents were very tense.

Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg mixed efforts at appeasement with (hostile comments) on Irving's behavior. We had originally decided to go to the park this evening, and Mrs. Rosenberg said, "We're going now, and you'll be left behind." Irving shouted tearfully, "Go ahead!" His mother kept telling him to come out. I cannot remember much of what was said, as the parents stood outside the lavatory door, but it was mostly inadequate to the situation and only enraged Irving, even after his sobbing had quieted down. His tearful voice could be heard through the door. One of the things he kept saying was, "You cause me so much heartache in this house. You blame everything on me. You are doing to me what you did to Abe."

Part of the time I sat in the kitchen with Mrs. Rosenberg, who pretended to be reading a magazine. I asked her, "Do you know what you're reading?" and she answered no. She told me that Irving used to have bad respiratory trouble but that the condition had been quiet for about three years. "He's having the beginning of an attack now," I told her, and she looked at me incredulously.

Mr. Rosenberg approached the lavatory door angrily and threatened to unscrew the lock. Then, in spite of the fact that I had told
the parents I would not go to the park if Irving didn't come along, Mr. Rosenberg said, "Dr. Henry says he wants to go."
He then added, in a voice that was, for him, gentle, "Don't come out for my sake, come out for Dr. Henry's sake."

Somewhere in here one of the parents asked Irving, "Why do you stay in the bathroom?"
And he replied, "Because this is the only place where there is solitude."

After sitting for some time in the living room, Mr. Rosenberg joined his wife and me in the kitchen. He said, "We must get them a bicycle," and the parents talked about that for a while. Their idea was that there should be one bike for the two boys, and Mrs. Rosenberg remarked that the boys had a bicycle once but had never used it.

Both parents were very anxious as they talked about the boys' being bored and not associating with other children. They said the trouble is that Ben seems too young for Irving, that Irving hangs around the house with nothing to do. Mrs. Rosenberg feels that everything that happened tonight was due to boredom.

Mrs. Rosenberg promised Irving he could stay up as long as he wanted and watch his favorite TV show. She said, "Come on out, Irving, you'll miss your favorite TV show," but Irving clamored back, "You never do anything for me." She protested how much she had done, resentfully denying his accusations. The father's statements were mostly hostile rebuttals of what Irving had said. Every time his mother reminded him of what she had done for him, Irving became sarcastic and told her how great she was. Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg spoke of their love for him, and Irving ridiculed them. Mr. Rosenberg accused Irving of wanting to cause the family pain and Irving told them they caused him a great deal of pain.

An effort to appease Irving was to offer him chocolate cake, but he said that the cake in the refrigerator was only fit for pigs, and
that at that time of night no bakery was open.

In talking to me in the kitchen Mrs. Rosenberg said that what made Irving mad was being confronted with the fact that he must have been the aggressor, since he was on top of Ben. (Note the misperception.) Ben said that the whole thing started because he got very tired and didn't want to play ball any more and because he had made two wild pitches, which annoyed Irving very much.

Irving, looking very tired, his eyes red from crying, has come out of the lavatory and joined the family in the living room.

With his back to everybody, Irving began to play with the Venetian-blind cord. This so angered his father that he got up, went over to Irving and told him to stop it, but when Irving did not obey, the father seemed to think better of it and went back and sat down on the sofa. He said nothing to Irving for the rest of the evening. Mrs. Rosenberg told Irving he might break the blind, and if he did, there would be no money for a bicycle. Irving scoffed at the idea of getting a bicycle, saying she would never give it to him, and she replied, "Well, you'll see. Did I ever go back on anything I said to you?" Irving said nothing.

After Irving stopped playing with the cord he slumped down on the floor between a chair and the window, with his back to the TV set, and remained there until his parents went to bed. Through all this Ben sat watching TV next to his father.

When Mr. Rosenberg was getting sleepy, he put his arm around Ben and nuzzled him. He rubbed his head against Ben's and put a hand under Ben's buttocks. Ben did not counter-snuggle, and after a while, with both his hands, withdrew his father's hand from under his buttocks. (At dinner this evening, when Irving was out of the room, Mr. Rosenberg patted Ben on the thigh and
said, with a warm expression, "Bennie.")

Talking roughly to his parents in the living room, Irving said that his mother can't stop talking, even in her sleep, to which she replied, "How can you tell, you're asleep!" Irving said that neither his mother nor his father loves him. Her listing all the things she has done for him, like taking him to the doctor when he was sick, drew his scorn and contempt. She said, "Doesn't my taking you to the doctor when you are sick prove I love you?"

At one point Irving went into the kitchen and his mother set a dish of ice cream before him twice, but he pushed it away both times, with a disgusted expression.

Protesting mildly, Ben was shoved off to bed by his father and urged up the steps by his mother. She later told me that Ben had said he'd get Irving a new Mad magazine tomorrow. She related this with satisfaction, indicating to me what a nice boy Ben is. (I have no record of Ben's having actually done this.)

At last Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg went up to bed and Irving went into the kitchen, picked up the little radio and turned to the ball game. He got himself half an apple too. He and I were alone now, Irving in the dining room and I in the living room. He said nothing. I don't remember whether I spoke to him, but if I did there was no reply. After a while I got up to go upstairs. I said good night, but there was no response.

The next day Mrs. Rosenberg told me that she had gone down to him—he doesn't like to be alone—and asked him if he wanted to go to bed. He said, "Just a minute, until I'm finished," listened to the radio a little while longer and stopped. She went up to bed with him and kissed him good night and he kissed her good night.

That night, for the first time, I saw Irving asleep in Ben's bed. They were lying in dorsoventral position, Ben's back against Irving, and Irving's arm around Ben.
The italics in the above quotation are mine and are intended to demark certain appropriate evidences of disillusionment. First, we note that the interactions center upon Irving as their object, and this, of course, is what makes such interactions self-disillusional. Thus, Mr. Rosenberg blamed Irving for the fighting, as did Irving's mother. Secondly, we note also the basic discrepancy that pervades the whole episode, i.e., the discrepancy between the parents' feelings and actions toward Irving which, in turn, is a discrepancy between how they are supposed to feel and how they really feel. Having perceived the discrepancies between how his parents feel and act toward him in many instances of interaction before, Irving perceives the blame as a confirmation of their real feelings toward him, and since they shouldn't feel this way such feelings are a discrepancy in this way also, i.e., a discrepancy between his parents' conception of him and the ideal self-conception.

Another discrepancy occurs in interactions between Irving and his brother Ben. During the fighting, Ben seems to get the best of Irving and calls him "chicken." As older brother, Irving is supposed to hold his own (his ideal self). Since he apparently has some difficulty at this, this too is self-disillusioning. He grows tired, he sulks and gets angry and attacks his parents, whereupon they continue to blame him. In this and several other ways too, Irving perceives his younger brother as his parents' favorite, receiving love and
affection and attention over him, again a discrepancy between his ideal self-conceptions and his real self. Note that Mr. Rosenberg did not speak to Irving for the rest of the evening but instead attended to Ben in an affectionate fashion. This, too, is a disillusionment of the utmost consequences to the self, involving a discrepancy between an ideal self and a real self.

A third, and perhaps most important, characteristic of this episode that we note is its more direct implications for Irving's self-conceptions and their emotional consequences. The discrepancies between how his parents should feel and act toward him and how they actually feel and act have come to define Irving to himself as unwanted, unlovable, rejected, inferior to Ben, preferred (if at all) second to Ben. Irving says that neither his mother nor his father loves him. These are implications, furthermore, that have dire emotional consequences. The great pain and sorrow emanating from this definition and image of himself pervades the narrative. Irving, indeed, articulates his pain. He states: "You cause me so much heartache in this house. I have nothing but heartache in this house."

We have said earlier, of course, that certain status-roles could be gained and lost without much emotional effect upon the individual. Conversely, we said that there are others which have greater emotional implications, that lie closer to the center of the self. Those roles which have the
greatest emotional implications for our selves, generally speaking, are those which admit us to the widest, most inclusive social categories. This is due to the fact that membership in these is often a prerequisite for entry into others which are less inclusive and subcategorical. For example, a most inclusive category, sociologically speaking, is that of "human being." To not be included in this category is to place the individual outside the boundary of the most comprehensive category and to thereby deny him the most fundamental expression of self. It is interesting to note that many societies have a name which means, in the native dialect, "the people" and which implies that other human beings fall outside this category, i.e., as "aliens." The treatment of such aliens, when captured, often speaks to the profound distinction between such persons and themselves in the minds of their captors.

It appears at first somewhat incredible that any individual born into a society could come to a state in his self-conceptions as to believe himself not even to belong to the category of human being. Yet at the same time, I have become convinced that something like this belief lies at the heart of the state of alienness. The alienated individual, though he may not be able to articulate it, feels himself to be different from others to the point where I have called it a feeling of contradistinctiveness. As shown in the ethnographic narrative of the Rosenberg family above, this contradistinctiveness
is expressed and revealed in behavior a number of ways and constitutes as profound a differentiation as that made between many primitive peoples and those of other societies.

It is this contradistinction, the product of modal self-disillusionment, that seems clearly to lie at the heart of the state of alienness. Katz (quoted in Hewitt, 1979:226) in his studies of deviance has called this contradistinction the "negative essence." He writes:

... the sociological existence of deviant phenomena is constituted by the imputation of deviant ontological status to human beings. The ontological status imputed to deviants is a negative essence, which is analytically the mirror-image of imputing to human beings a positive essence, or charisma. The one is an imputation of sub-human nature, the other of superhuman nature.

And Hewitt (1979:226), in a further comment upon the "negative essence" writes:

Such a conception carries us to the heart of the phenomenon of deviance: not merely a category of behavior defined as a breach of social order (though that is an essential part of it), deviance also is a category of persons, viewed as somehow less than fully human, less than normal, not up to normal human capabilities or dispositions. (Italics mine.)

Like the deviant, only perhaps more so, the alienated individual views himself as less than fully human. In this way, he is perhaps the greatest "deviant" of all. Schachtel (1975:75) states that alienated people often express "... a feeling that compared with others one is not fully a person."
This is alienness of the most fundamental nature and the emotional consequences of this alienness range from deep and agonizing sorrows and depressions to intense hostility and rage.

This particular consequence of the cognition of being an alien points out what makes this experience truly disillusioning as contrasted to a "mere" failure to fulfill self in actualization—an occurrence that happens rather routinely in complex, modernized societies. While such routine experiences may attack the self, the individual does not suffer from them as he does in the true self-disillusionment, for they do not have the same meaning. The individual can usually shrug them off as insignificant or dismiss them entirely. They simply do not carry the emotional freight of the true self-disillusionment because they do not carry the same implications for self. As shown in the narrative, the meaning of a self-disillusioning experiencing is that one is somehow a non-person, possessing a negative essence. It comes to define the individual to himself in this way, i.e., as a negative person, unlovable, unwanted, a non-person. Once this definition is established, every time an experience of self-disillusionment occurs it thus reenforces this conception of

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Feuer (1969) has criticized the theory of alienation for equating it with mere self-frustration. I mean to show that self-disillusionment is an altogether different phenomenon than that to which Feuer seems to refer.
self, and bears with it the emotional consequences of grief, anxiety, and sorrow.

In its most basic form, then, secondary alienation refers to the process through which the individual fails to identify himself as a "full-blown" person, to use Schachtel's phrase. He fails to achieve the most basic identity of all, the identity of "person," or of "human being." The alienated individual comes to possess a "negative essence" that contradistinguishes him or her from normality, and serves, thereby, to disidentify him or her with his own kind. While cognitively he can realize that he is, of course, a human being, there is the failure of emotional confirmation of such knowledge, echoing Gendlin's view that the meaning of our's and other's actions has an emotional base or "direct referent" that "fills out" or "colors" our interactive life. (As we have seen, this emotional base is established in infancy.) In the state of secondary alienness, the person's cognitive component can at once comprehend the absurdity of the thought or statement that one is not a person yet at the same time he fails to substantiate it emotionally and experientially. To reiterate, these two components of action are thus clearly linked; cognition does not rule our behavior apart from emotion. It is the latter, indeed, that is truly motivational and makes our use of the term self-disillusionment, as well as fulfillment, appropriate, for it signifies the emotional basis of alienness as well as the cognitive basis.
We may summarize up to this point as follows: Self-disillusionment is defined as a social act in which there is a perceived discrepancy between the ideal and the real self, and which comes to cognitively define the individual to himself in a negative way. The disillusioning experience thus simultaneously negates the ideal self-concept and constructs in its stead a negative kind of self-concept, a contradistinction between oneself and others, from which emanates the negative emotions. These negative emotions, in turn, motivate the individual to attempts at restoring his ideal self-concept. The individual, during such attempts, now becomes acutely aware of himself and is, in this even more essential sense, alienated, since the self is no longer a unity with its environment. It is, instead, an object of his consciousness, becoming so as a result of its disillusionment in interaction with others.

Thus, from modal self-disillusionment alienness occurs. Its major characteristics are the modal objectification of the self in consciousness, and the contradistinction, in addition to the differentiation of the self from others and the centralization of it in the attention of the individual. The centralization of the self in consciousness results from being almost constantly in defense of the self-concept, a defense against its disillusionment. The avoidance of self-disillusionment, and the anxiety that it brings, requires constant monitoring and control of one's impulses and emotions.
Stated in our terminology, the "Me" aspect of the self becomes focused upon two other aspects of the self, i.e., it becomes focused upon the self-concept, and, also, becomes a rather constant monitor of the "I." The "I," in fact, now comes under strong censorship and is placed in service to the self-conception. Weinstein and Weinstein (1977:107) have put it this way:

There are two possible relations of self to self-concept. First, the self-concept may be objectified and fixed so that it represents the self and can be used as an instrument by it to achieve certain rewards and to avoid certain punishments. Second, the self-concept may be made subjective and relative to the processes of choosing and creating, and therefore provisional, revocable, mutable, and representative of only phases of conscious processes.

The second relationship obviously represents the being-cognition state. Referring to the first relation of the self to self-concept, however, these writers call it an "instrumental" relationship. In this meaning, the "Me" apparently makes an instrument of the I and uses it, instrumentally, "to effect the idealized self-concept." These authors state: "At the limit of instrumentalism the self-concept becomes a means to its own presentation and validation. In this case the individual is fully absorbed in the self-concept, making all actions subordinate to its establishment and maintenance in awareness" (p. 108). This relationship represents the D-cognition state.

Self-absorption, modal self-consciousness, self-preoccu-
pation; these are the mark of alienness, the result of self-disillusionment. They refer to the constant monitoring and control, even suppression, of the impulsive self. Such characteristics echo Lasch's "narcissist," Riesman's "other-directed" type, White's "organization man," and Mill's "happy robot."

In our terminology, then, we are secondarily alienated when we fail to fulfill an ideal self-concept. The alienation of the self occurs here in the sense that one's behavior, feelings, beliefs, etc. are now brought into the awareness of the actor. The self is objectified, carved out of the flux of consciousness, made the focus of our attention. Such objectification is the separation, in our perceptions, of ourselves from our environment. We and our environment are no longer one. The self is foreground, the environment background. The failure to fulfill self-conceptions, to translate the ideal self-concept into action as confirmed by others, brings the self into central consciousness. Behavior now is controlled, non-spontaneous. Before action occurs it is subjected to our attention in relation to the self-concept. Alienness occurs here in the sense that, otherwise, the self would be, relatively speaking, a non-entity, a stream of consciousness in which the object self arises, if at all, only fleetingly. The individual would no longer be modally self-conscious. He would exist in a state of "being cognition," and unity with society, though not like that in the state of
duration. When, on the other hand, he becomes conscious of himself, the self is separated from the social environment. The individual is no longer in psychic unity with his society. He not only views himself as an object, but invests this object with a negative essence. Disillusionment comes to identify the individual negatively to himself. He comes to define himself as an alien among his own people.

Conclusion

With all that has been presented in Chapter III and in this chapter it is probably worthwhile to present a brief recapitulation at this point before going on to a more detailed description of the alienated state.

As seen in Chapter III, the individual is born with no objective self-awareness. In this state, i.e., the state of subjective awareness only, he experiences no distinction between himself and others other than a perceptual differentiation. Born into a symbolically communicating society, however, he acquires language and, concomitantly acquires objective self-consciousness. Underlying this acquisition is a certain emotional mode of experience. Depending on whether the mode is positive or negative, the individual will eventually become identified with certain status-roles of the society or alienated from them. Since it is through identification with these status roles that he is integrated into society, if he becomes alienated from them he also becomes
alienated from society, i.e., the other persons with whom he is associated.

It is the negative mode of emotion which leads to alienation. Subjected to a modal self-disillusionment in infancy the individual experiences emotional insecurity. Lacking in basic emotional security, the infant's development of the positive self-concept later is jeopardized, for, if those significant others around him, having failed to love him in infancy, continue their lack of love in childhood, the child begins to conceive of himself in this way, i.e., as unlovable. This is the beginning of the negative essence or contradistinctive characteristic, the perception of being unloved, the conception of being unlovable. Angyal (1951:52) writes:

In the neurotic development there are always a number of unfortunate circumstances that instill in the child a self-derogatory feeling. This involves on the one hand a feeling of weakness which discourages him from the free expression of his wish for mastery, and on the other a feeling that there is something wrong with him and that, therefore, he cannot be loved. The whole complicated structure of neurosis appears to be founded on this secret feeling of worthlessness, that is, on the belief that one is inadequate to master the situations that confront him and that he is undeserving of love.

And Schachtel (1975:78) states that the dynamics of this feeling of basic anxiety and self-derogation often "... crystallize around repeated parental remarks which, rather than referring to a particular act of the child, say or imply
that the child is or lacks, by its very nature, such and such; that Tom is a lazy-good-for-nothing or that he is 'just like Uncle Harry,' who happens to be the black sheep in the family." (Italics mine.)

While these significant others then continue their psychic assault upon the child and therefore merely continue what they have always done, we must remember that the intra-psychic developments are interrelated so that the basic anxiety the child has developed during infancy also has its effects, quite independently of the effects of the continued self-disillusionment by significant others. That is, the lack of an inner emotional strength predisposes the individual to certain behavior tendencies and comparisons which play back upon the self-concept. Such tendencies toward timidity, shyness, withdrawal, etc., definitely tell the individual something about himself. Of course, when these effects are coupled with the continuing self-disillusioning responses in childhood, then the full development of negative essence and thence of alienness is even more probable.

The development of negative-essence through self-disillusionment is thus the basis of alienness for it consists essentially of the formation of a conception of oneself as abnormal, subhuman, unlovable, unwanted, etc. Alienation thus is a long-term process in which significant other persons' interactions are of a self-disillusioning consequence and in defense from which the individual becomes self-preoccupied.
In coming to be constantly self-preoccupied the individual loses his unity with his environment since the acting, spontaneous, impulsive, subjective self has now become separated and contradistinctive within his consciousness as an object, and is measured and controlled constantly by the "Me." He exists now in a defensive state as opposed to a state of being. He has, indeed, become fully alienated.

We turn now to a fuller characterization of the alienated person.
CHAPTER V:
A PORTRAIT OF THE ALIENATED INDIVIDUAL

Alienness as a psychological state is expressed well in the following poem gleaned from a student newspaper in a community college:

I've carefully travelled the corridors of my mind
Opened every door and seen only blackness.
I've looked into my soul
And seen only ugliness.
I've considered the space I fill
And decided it would be better empty
Why do others trouble with me
When I am so devoid of worth?
Why must I continue to waver
On the outside edge of life?
Where is my peace?
Is it hiding
In the ugly, empty darkness within me?
I don't know.
I don't know.

K.J.

In this poem, we see the negative essence of the self, we see the preoccupation with the self, we see the feeling of not being a part of humanity, and we see the emotional concomitants of these attitudes. While these are the essential characteristics of the alienated state per se, there are additional traits that are said to constitute it. Seeman (1959), of course, has been primarily responsible for drawing attention to this "alienation syndrome," i.e., the feelings of meaninglessness, powerlessness, self-estrangement, anomia, and isolation. It is obvious that our discussions thus far have
overlapped, at least implicitly, most of these, but some, e.g., powerlessness and meaninglessness especially, require further elaboration.

As indicated in Chapter I, the full description of the alienated state is a major problem remaining. This includes not only a listing of the major traits which comprise it but also their dynamic interrelationships. Although we have offered some preliminary conceptualizations in this regard, we need now to accomplish closure by adding to the description the traits which we have omitted and prescribing their interrelations and dynamics in greater detail.

Self-Images
of the Alienated Person

In Chapter IV I said that modal self-disillusionment produced a negative essence or contradistinctive conception of the self. This negative self-concept, in turn, produces an almost constant preoccupation with the self-concept, a preoccupation with denying it or suppressing it in consciousness and with fabricating, enhancing and protecting an ideal self concept.

The dynamics of this process have been felicitously described by Weiss (1975:466) as follows: "The alienated patient is not born alienated nor does he choose alienation. Lacking genuine acceptance, love and concern for his individuality in . . . [infancy], he experiences basic anxiety."
Weiss continues:

Early he begins to move away from his self, which seems not good enough to be loved. He moves away from what he is, what he feels, what he wants. If one is not loved for what one is, one can at least be safe--safe perhaps by being very good and perfect and being loved for it, or by being very strong and being admired or feared for it, or by learning not to feel, not to want, not to care. Therefore, one has to free oneself from any need for others, which means first their love and affection, and, later on, in many instances, sex. Why feel if there is no response? So the person puts all his efforts into becoming what he should be. (Italics mine. p. 466.)

The construction of an ideal self-concept and the attempts to be that concept is basically an attempt to alleviate the self-hate that disillusionment has engendered. In perceiving himself as unloved, unwanted, a non-person, the individual comes to think of himself in derogatory terms. He is unlovable, worthless, unwanted, sub-human. This is his real self-image, what he "knows" himself to actually be. However, the knowledge of this real self is so painful that the individual must constantly attempt to change it and to bring it into concordance with the idealized image. This ideal image comes to guide his behavior and to dominate his consciousness. The individual thus literally tries to become, to actualize and fulfill, these idealized self-images.

As implied in Weiss's quotation above, there are three kinds of such ideal self-conceptions in a global sense that
the individual may construct, and each in its own way represents a primary solution to the basic anxiety and negative feelings that the individual has with regard to his real self concept.

The first of these is what we may call the "Conqueror." Horney (1950:214-215) has described the "Conqueror" (though she does not use this particular term) as follows:

He glorifies and cultivates in himself everything that means mastery. Mastery with regard to others entails the need to excel and to be superior in some way. He tends to manipulate or dominate others and to make them dependent upon him. This trend is also reflected in what he expects their attitude toward him to be. Whether he is out for adoration, respect, or recognition, he is concerned with their subordinating themselves to him and looking up to him. He abhors the idea of his being compliant, appeasing or dependent.

Furthermore, he is proud of his ability to cope with any contingency and is convinced that he can do so. There is, or should be, nothing that he cannot accomplish. Somehow he must be—and feels that he is—the master of his fate. Helplessness may make him feel panicky and he hates any trace of it in himself.

The Conqueror overcomes the derogatory feelings in himself by suppressing them and by becoming a superior person, to be looked up to and admired. He thus experiences pleasant emotions from this image of himself. Also, he succeeds in vindicating the hostility and rage that he feels (unconsciously perhaps), for others, resulting from his shabby treatment in infancy.
When the Conqueror fails to fulfill this ideal self-conception he resorts to various means to deny these failures to himself. As Horney (1950:192-193) writes:

By dint of imagination, high-lighting "good" qualities, blotting out others, behavioristic perfection, externalizations, he must try to maintain in his mind a picture of himself of which he can be proud. He must, as it were, put up an unconscious bluff and live with the pretense of being all knowing, all generous, all fair, etc. He must never, under any conditions, be aware that by comparison with his glorified self he has feet of clay. In relation to others one of two feelings may prevail. He may be extremely proud, consciously or unconsciously, of his faculty of fooling everybody—and in his arrogance and contempt for others believes that he actually succeeds in this. Conversely, he is most afraid of being fooled himself and may feel it as a profound humiliation if he is. Or he may have a constant lurking fear of being just a bluff, more intensely so than other neurotic types.

A second major idealized self-concept is what may be called the "Saint." Again, Horney (1950:222-223) describes this kind of self-concept, primarily in imagery, as follows:

His idealized image of himself primarily is a composite of "lovable" qualities, such as unselfishness, goodness, generosity, humility, saintliness, nobility, sympathy. Helplessness, suffering, and martyrdom are also secondarily glorified... a premium is also placed on feelings—feelings of joy or suffering, feelings not only for individual people but for humanity, art, nature, values of all sorts. To have deep feelings is part of his image.

In becoming a Saint the individual once again overcomes
derogatory feelings about himself, but in an opposite way than the Conqueror. Hence, opposite kinds of behavior ensue but the effect is the same, an experience of greater self-esteem and therefore of pleasure and the relief of basic anxiety. Of course, just like the Conqueror, the Saint's real self-image intrudes and he must resort to various defense mechanisms to avoid the negative effect of such intrusions. He, too, engages in imaginary fantasies, suppressions, externalization, etc., to maintain the idealized self-image and avoid self-disillusionment.

A curious attribute of the Saint in this respect, which makes him quite different from the Conqueror, is his inability to feel pride consciously in his idealized attribute, that is to consciously experience his own self-esteem. He cannot do so because his very self-image of saintliness, which includes humility, requires him not to do so. Thus, in his behavior he may never express his self-esteem openly, and even in his feelings and thoughts he suppresses this esteem, whereas the Conqueror's primary characteristic seems to be his obvious (but only apparent) love of and pride in himself. The Conqueror's superior image allows him to do so whereas the Saint's does not.

A third idealized self-concept that emerges is what we may call the "Stoic." Horney (1950:277) describes this type's image as "... a composite of self-contained serenity, freedom from desires and passions, stoicism, and fairness."
The Stoic has simply resigned from the battle of trying to get love and affection from others. He has withdrawn into stoicism, beyond or above it all, detached from emotional involvement. Self-disillusionment can now no longer touch him. And like the Conqueror and the Saint, the Stoic must resort to the use of the various defense mechanisms to maintain the idealized image in the face of disillusionment, but he particularly relies on imagination and fantasy. Having withdrawn from active involvement, yet still not relinquishing all of life's goals, he resorts to imagining himself as accomplishing these goals.

Unless one of these self-conceptions wins out and becomes the central tendency in the individual's personality, the alienated person actually shows combinations of these images, and his or her activities, feelings and thoughts will be products of all of them at various times and places. A tendency toward any one of these conceptions probably constitutes a neurotic state whereas most alienated persons probably experience the whole configuration only to varying degrees that may never reach full neurosis.

The constant attempt at living up to these ideals, however, produces a set of characteristics that are more or less typical of all alienated individuals.
Major Characteristics of the Alienated Person

The first and most basic characteristic of the alienated individual, of course, is his sense of isolation from others. In failing to obtain an identity as a human being the individual automatically becomes isolated from other people in his own perceptions and conceptions of himself. This perception and conception is, indeed, alienness per se. He feels and sees himself apart, not just from specific other people or groups but from humanity in general, and he feels unlike them, different. First of all, he probably feels inferior to them. He knows this, secretly, though when he adopts the idealized image he tries to hide this even from himself. This inferiority is a negative essence that makes him somehow sub-human, abnormal.

Furthermore, he has the impression that he simply does not experience the world as others do. These two distinctions are not independent, for being inferior, unloved, unwanted, makes him experience life differently, e.g., promotes a greater sensitivity to actions of others, and forms a different perspective that "cuts through" the morality of the culture and the ethnomethodology of most people. Thus, he often becomes unconventional in his thoughts and may glorify such unconventionality, relegating himself to the outskirts of society even more. In addition, the alienated person may perceive himself to be different physically, from others,
usually a difference that, once again, reenforces his feelings of inferiority and unloveliness. He may see himself as unhandsome, ugly, as having too many freckles, too large ears or nose, of being too short or tall, too awkward, etc. He may fasten upon such differences and blow them all out of proportion. In sum, these images of himself serve to make the individual feel different, and therefore alien, to others, and he develops a deep sense of isolation from these others.

A second major characteristic of the alienated person is his feeling of being a constant spectator of himself. This feeling is engendered by his feeling of difference from others in a negative way and a desire to be like them. This feeling infuses the individual's consciousness, constituting an underlying factor in the whole dynamic of his personality system and motivates him to almost constantly seek a redefinition and confirmation of himself. This modal objectification and preoccupation with the self in the individual's consciousness is thus a major factor in the alienness syndrome. It constitutes a very essential element of the alienated state.

This self-preoccupation is more true, perhaps, of the Stoic than of the Saint or the Conqueror, but each type has this feeling. And, of course, such a feeling emerges because it is true; he is a constant spectator in the sense that he must constantly monitor his own behavior and feelings and compare them with his ideal self-image. He must never admit the real self-image to others or even to himself. He must
never admit his inferiority, his ugliness, his unworthiness of love and affection, his sense of difference and isolation. Thus he must be always ready to censor the "I" if it does not fit the ideal self-image. He must always be looking at himself from an "outside" perspective.

It is this characteristic more than any other which is implied in Riesman's other-directed type, and in Goffman's characters, who are so concerned with presentation of the self, and in Lasch's "narcissist." Since the self is a social product, alienated people must confirm their self-conceptions in the eyes of others like everyone else, the difference being that the self-concept has become rigid and fixed and dominating. It is this absolute necessity to maintain this concept that may account for other-directedness, and perhaps not, as Riesman's theory indicates, the concern for getting ahead and the recognition that to do so depends on other people in the bureaucracy. The other-directedness may come from the need to maintain an idealized self-concept as confirmed in the eyes of significant and reference others. The alienated modern man is probably not a "hollow shell" with no self-concept. Modern man, like historical man, has a self-concept, too, but one which, if he is alienated, he must defend with his every action. Otherwise he is his real self, unworthy, unlovable, sub-human, inferior.

A third basic characteristic of the alienated person is a sense of indefiniteness, or a vague, diffuse dissatisfaction
with life, or, according to Lasch (1979:81) "pervasive feelings of emptiness and depression." Such feelings are often expressed as like being in a "void" or as a feeling of great "emptiness."

This sense of vagueness, of diffuse anxiety, of a void, or emptiness, is what I believe the term "meaninglessness," as used in alienation studies, should connote. Thus, contrary to much usage, it is not that the individual perceives the external world itself as meaningless but that the individual cannot make meaning out of his own life. For the individual, it is a failure to be able to find meaning in his own existence. His life lacks meaning, is empty, is like a void, is vaguely apprehended, indefinite (undefined).

"Meaning," in this sense, is used as it is in Schutz's social-phenomenology to refer to the implication of an action within the overall "Act." Thus, as Schutz (1967:61) says, "The meaning of any action is its corresponding projected Act," where by "Act" he means a completed (or consummated, in Mead's sense) action. The individual's life may thus be conceived as an action. What, then, we may ask, is its meaning? To do so is to ask what goal it strives for, what ultimate value it seeks to attain. If one has his goal in mind, then the actions one engages in as one's life unfolds have meaning in terms of their "fit" or "place" within the life-act as it is previsioned.

But we must reiterate here the importance of the emotion-
al basis of meaning, or what Gendlin (1964) has referred to as the "direct referent." As we have said previously, without the "feel" of the events and structures within which we are implicated these events and structures are only external objects, not a part of us, and we may react to them at the cognitive but not the emotional level. I am suggesting that through lack of identity with a social group the individual fails to introject the emotional concomitants of its norms, values and beliefs and thus fails to obtain their full meaning. Extreme examples of this, of course, are the sociopathic states. Thus, the alienated person, in failing to obtain identification with his society or social group, has failed to imbue his own actions with the emotional grounding that completes their meaning. Without this emotional grounding, the meaning of the action is not felt but only known. The individual's sense of vagueness, of emptiness, of diffuse anxiety, is thus, essentially, a sense of meaninglessness wherein he cannot connect his emotions to his actions. To him, his actions thus may be without meaning, hence his sense of indefiniteness and vagueness and the anxiety that accompanies these.

This sense of meaninglessness is also connected to the usage in alienation literature of the term anomia or personal "normlessness." Norms are guides to conduct. They are based on values, which are ends, or goals. These values and norms must be internalized which means they must not only be
known but felt. In suffering from anomia the individual is deprived of the emotional basis for the conduct of his life. In being so deprived he suffers meaninglessness. He experiences his own life as a void, bereft of purpose and meaning. These terms thus imply a lack of sense of direction, no reference points, an amorphous landscape from the individual's point of view. As Kenneth Keniston's (1965) character Inburn (who is a composite of Keniston's alienated subjects) puts it, the world may appear to such individuals as an "endless and featureless countryside." But anomia is accounted for, of course, not by the fact that society is endless, featureless, meaningless, etc., but by the failure to achieve an identity from which flows the sense of belonging, meaning, purpose, and normativeness, since to identify as human, and hence as female or male, or as a certain race or ethnic group, or as a member of a certain religion, class, or occupation, etc., is to locate oneself within a social structure and a social process and hence to provide direction (to varying degrees, of course). Without this source of identity, one feels "lost on an uncharted sea."

To say this is simply once again to promote the idea of the psycho-social essence of the self, especially in the sense of the identity concept. As we have said, the term "identity" is a psycho-social term indicating a sense of sameness and belonging with others of one's group, class, or ethnic category, etc., and it gives a sense of place and location of the
individual within his society. Moreover, it is emotionally based as well as cognitively. Without this identification within his group, the individual feels lost, alone, without direction, without meaning.

A fourth major characteristic of the alienated person is his sense of not being "himself" but of presenting an artificial facade. Henry (1973:49) refers to this as "sham," that is "... a concealment of how we really feel and pretense of feeling something different." Schachtel (1975:75) writes that alienated people "... tend to feel that they travel with a forged passport, under an assumed identity." And Horney (1950) makes this characteristic the equivalent of alienness itself, for she refers to it as "self-alienation." By this, she means the individual's lack of spontaneity, the lack of the expression of the impulsive "I" and its subordination by the "Me" to the ideal self-conception. All of these usages I believe are equal to the more sociological familiar term of "self-estrangement." In the process of "self-alienation," or self-estrangement, the individual puts a greater and greater distance between his spontaneous impulses and his actual behavior. Horney believes that in this process the individual's "own" emotions and wishes are so overridden that he may become unconscious of them after a time. While it seems inconceivable that an individual can actually lose consciousness of one's emotion, values, beliefs, etc., one can, apparently, constantly monitor and assess these for
their fit with ideal self-conceptions or role requirements and suppress them if they do not do so. The suppression can, then, in extreme cases, "deaden" the individual's awareness of his own beliefs, values and emotions, or diffuse them to the point where he or she appears to have none of his own or to be immune or inured to the normal emotional consequences of events. This is closer to what Horney means when she speaks of the "loss" or "alienation" of the self, for by "self," here, she is referring to the impulsive, spontaneous "I."

It is interesting to note the difference between the concept of sham, of concealment of one's true "feelings," and to what existentialist philosophers refer to as "inauthenticity." According to Sartre, to live authentically is to live up to the social ideals of oneself, for instance, the Christian ideal or the middle class ideal, or the Jewish ideal, if one is Christian, middle class, or Jewish. He states: "... authenticity for . . . [the Jew] is to live to the full his condition as Jew; inauthenticity is to deny it or attempt to escape from it" (1967:216). Note that Sartre is not speaking here of the subjective, spontaneous "I," and the failure to live up to it but to the denial of one's social self-ideal, and to act as though one were not even aware of what situated others impute one to be in the effort to be another type of ideal-self, one that will please the other interactants. For Sartre, the Jew should accept the fact that one is a Jew and
is so defined by others, and one must deal with that definition of oneself as a fact of his situation.

He writes (1967:216):

What characterizes the inauthentic Jews is that they deal with their situation by running away from it; they have chosen to deny it, or to deny their responsibilities, or to deny their isolation, which appears intolerable to them. That does not necessarily mean that they wish to destroy the concept of the Jew or that they explicitly deny the existence of a Jewish reality. But their gestures, sentiments and acts aim secretly at destroying this reality.

In a word, the inauthentic Jews are men whom other men take for Jews and who have decided to run away from this insupportable situation. The result is that they display various types of behavior not all of which are present at the same time in the same person but each of which may be characterized as an avenue of flight.

Sartre, furthermore, recognizes the self-conscious aspects of these attempts by certain Jewish people to escape their situated identity. He states: "For my part, I recognize that the effort to escape produces in some Jews . . . an almost continuously reflective attitude" (p. 217). And, "with . . . (the Jew), anxiety often takes a special form; it becomes a fear of acting or feeling like a Jew" (p. 217).

It is in the loss of the spontaneity of one's actions and in the engagement of sham, as well as inauthenticity, that the fifth major characteristic of the alienated person emerges. This is a feeling of not being the source of his own actions, a loss of autonomy, a feeling of _powerlessness_. Horney (1950:
writes that the compulsive character of self-idealization "... inevitably deprives the person of his full autonomy and spontaneity. As soon as, for instance, his need to be liked by everybody [the Saint] becomes compulsive, the genuineness of his feelings diminishes; so does his power to discriminate. As soon as he is driven to do a piece of work for the sake of glory [the Conqueror], his spontaneous interest in the work itself decreases." Horney writes further:

... the neurotic does not own his energies (feel his energies as his own). He has the feeling of not being a moving force in his own life... when a person for instance, feels that he must do everything that is expected of him, he is actually set in motion by the pushes and pulls of others, or what he interprets as such--and he may stand still like a car with a run-down battery when left to his own resources (p. 166).

Again, powerlessness, like meaninglessness, is not used in the sense that the individual assesses the objective conditions of his society and his ability to influence its political processes and arrives at the conclusion he cannot do so. Instead, powerlessness is a subjective state in which spontaneity is overridden in the service of living up to an ideal self-image. Energy derived from impulse is used in the service of being the idealized-self which the individual knows to be a sham or inauthentic.

These characteristics, i.e., constant spectatorship of the self, of sham, inauthenticity, and lack of spontaneous action, also bring on a desperate fatigue at constantly being
something one is not, of being "on stage." This is a sixth major characteristic of alienness. The alienated person, being obsessed with the fear of being "unmasked," and his contrivance exposed, must work continuously at his defenses. As Lasch (1979:169-170) has written: "Imprisoned in his self-awareness, modern man longs for the lost innocence of spontaneous feeling." Schachtel (1975:75) says that the fear of exposure is present in those individuals who feel they are playing at a role, who present an artificial facade to the world. He writes: "They tend to feel that they travel with a forged passport, under an assumed identity." Constant preoccupation with the ideal self and the fear of the exposure of the real self require so much energy that the alienated person thus often feels a sense of weariness and fatigue that borders, at times, on exhaustion. Often it may turn into downright hopelessness. The urge to "give up," to say "to hell with it" and to go on spending binges or leave work undone for long periods may also be results. The whole effort may come to be "just not worth it." In this sense, the feelings of meaninglessness and powerlessness may be enhanced. This feeling of great fatigue, of weary dejection, is, indeed, an important correlate of these two characteristics.

These, then, are the major characteristics of the alienated person: (1) he has an extreme sense of difference and therefore of isolation from others. Also he (2) constantly monitors his own behavior and emotions and overrides his spon-
taneous impulses. In addition, he (3) has a sense of meaninglessness or emptiness to his life and often engages in (4) sham and inauthentic behavior, basically for the purpose of living up to an ideal self-image that will bring him social approval or admiration, or raise him above such base needs. He then (5) loses a sense of being the source of his own activities and feels powerless. The whole charade, furthermore, involves such constant effort that it brings on (6) tautness of muscles and body-posture, nervous tension and perhaps frequent headaches. He suffers from fatigue and weariness.

We turn now to the socio-historical and socio-cultural contexts producing these characteristics.
CHAPTER VI:
THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF IDENTIFICATION AND ALIENATION

As indicated in Chapter I, the interactional process occurs in a specific situation comprising a certain time and place. Individuals interact with "objects" in this immediate situation, including themselves, as well as other concrete objects like furniture, tools, etc., and abstract objects like norms, social categories or groups (etc.). In this immediate situation, individuals actualize and present themselves to others and are either fulfilled or disillusioned, the repeated experiences of which lead to identity or alienness, respectively.

But interactional situations occur in a larger socio-cultural context also. That is, social situations are always imbedded in a wider network of social organization and social structure and in the cultural system of norms, values and beliefs which underlie them. Furthermore, beyond the socio-cultural context lies a "socio-historical context," that is, a phase or stage in the structural development of a society. Thus, the "situation" at any given moment may be conceived as the result of the larger socio-cultural context, and the socio-cultural context in turn may be seen as the result of what has gone before it in a sequence of historical events. A full accounting of the alienation process and of the alien-
ness state requires that we extend our analysis into the wider contexts beyond the situation to seek the sociological and historical conditions under which they arise.

It is not, of course, as though we had to begin anew, for as indicated in our review of the literature, a host of writers have sought to account for alienation in a sociological and historical way. As also indicated, however, there are some problems with these theories that, in my view, render them inadequate. These problems have to do primarily with the way in which sociological factors become mediated through the social process to the individual, there to be reflected in his or her character. As we have seen, the basic proposition of alienation theory is that changes in the structure and culture of traditional society have brought on the alienation of the members of this society from one another. From the point of view of this study, this means that such changes produce the alienation process which produces the feeling of alienness. The basic question is: How do they do this? And the answers given in classical theory appear to be unsatisfactory for several reasons.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to try to trace out the sociological causes of alienation, conceived as a product of a specific type of socio-cultural context in a specific phase of socio-historical development. Its necessity stems from what I believe to be certain limitations in the classical, neo-classical and contemporary empirical
theories. I shall first clarify the concepts of "socio-historical" and "socio-cultural" context and then will address the problems of theory and seek their remedies in accord with my own theory as set forth previously.

The Socio-Historical Contexts
of Identification and Alienation

While many social scientists have attempted to do so (Sahlins and Service, 1960; Parsons, 1966), it is extremely difficult to ascertain on an empirical basis any overall pattern of historical development of societies. Although clearly some patterns exist, each society has its own unique history and therefore develops in its own unique way. Whether this development occurs via the dynamics of a materialist class-conflict, a struggle between a "center" and a "periphery," successful adaptation to a challenge, or via diffusion or innovation, etc., the pattern of change is probably not universal.

In this study, therefore, I am not advancing any universal theory of change to account for alienation and alienness. What I am attempting is to isolate a certain process of social change at the socio-historical level that can adequately account for the occurrence of alienation at the social-psychological level. This process, again, is not posited as a universal, evolutionary scheme.

As I have intimated earlier, the central proposition in alienation theory is that a change in a society from a tradi-
tional type to a modern type is the primary source of alienation. As I have also intimated, however, the specific causal sequences of this process remain rather vague and obscure. The proposition itself is so abstract that it does not tell us how this transition brings alienation about. The dichotomy of tradition vs. modern encompasses such a host of changes that the isolation and identification of such a process becomes extremely difficult.

It is possible, however, to discern one trend implied in this dichotomy which represents a particularly good candidate as an explanation of the emergence of an alienation process in the modern societies. At the same time, this trend is fairly well accepted throughout the literature (Smith, 1976:53) and is therefore somewhat relieved of the problems of cultural evolutionary theory. I speak of the trend, manifested in a great number of societies, and certainly one implied in the tradition to modern dichotomy, of structural differentiation, specifically from simple to complex.

By structural complexity, I am referring primarily to the number of "parts," i.e., social-statuses, social-relationships, social-groups, social-categories, etc. which emerge primarily on the basis of a division of labor. By division of labor, I am referring, as in Durkheim's (1964) usage, to the differentiation of functions, and thus of status-roles, in the society. Greater structural complexity will refer to an increase in the number of such units within any particular
On the basis of this concept, i.e., of structural-complexity, it is possible to arrange societies on a continuum from least complex to most complex. From the viewpoint of contemporary knowledge of social change, specifically from the viewpoint that no universal patterns of change can be empirically substantiated, it seems to me that this trend is the most that can be "rescued" or salvaged from classical alienation literature with regard to its central proposition, i.e., that the change from a traditional type to a modern type of society brings about alienation. To do otherwise risks bringing up all the value-problems contained in terms like "modernization," "cultural-evolution," etc., which I wish to avoid.

The division of labor, and its consequent, structural complexity, therefore, assumes a central role in the attempt to construct a theoretical account of the socio-historical context of alienation and alienness. In what follows I shall attempt to trace out what I believe to be types of societies based on different levels of structural complexity. I shall also attempt to delineate what I believe are the factors and their dynamics involved in the transformation of a society from a low level of structural complexity to a higher one.

To paraphrase primarily from Durkheim (1964), the division of labor seems to occur most directly as a result of increased population in a society, which produces greater
intra-societal competition between persons and groups. Persons and groups specialize as a result and a greater division of labor ensues. Population increases, in turn, depend upon a variety of factors but first and foremost upon food supply. This, in turn, seems to depend mostly upon technological innovation with respect to securing food and commodity products from the natural resources of the societal territory. When food supply increases, population increases, and it is population increase which I shall single out as the primary factor leading to the formation of new levels of structural complexity as a result of the competition for scarce resources it engenders.

The least complex societies, which I shall call level 1, consist of a quite small population. The social organization of such societies consists primarily of family groups linked together by intermarriage and kinship. The family performs most social functions. A family's mode of food production in such societies consists of hunting or fishing (or both) and gathering. Its technology is based around these modes. The communities tend to be encampments, or winter and summer villages of temporary residence.

If the society's environment can provide enough food,

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1 I use the term primary here as I have used it previously to refer to a first or initial phenomenon.

2 This level is similar to what in anthropology is referred to as "bands," consisting of hunters and gatherers.
then its population may increase, depending on its technology. From such increases in population, the structure of the society changes into a new type of greater complexity which I shall designate as level 2. These more complex structured societies are composed of a number of sub-societies that are socially integrated through the formation of new structures which I shall call "associations." Presumably with the increase in population of the original society, the surplus people break off to form their own social units, but maintain social ties with the original group, not only by kinship but by the formation of new social units other than the family. The formation of such units is what distinguishes these societies as of greater structural complexity. While each sub-society thus forms a separate community, each is tied with others socially, culturally and geographically by the formation of "associations." In Durkheim's terms, the society has become "segmented," but the associations help to keep it integrated structurally. The family, however, is still the most important unit.

As food gathering or production technology continues to develop, population continues to increase. The territory of the society begins to fill up. Families claim most of the livable land. Unless the surplus people wish to invade another society's territory, the people are faced with food shortages. Under this condition, there is a pressure for the social units of the society to begin greater interchanges of
food, goods, and services to offset shortages in one area with surpluses in another. The structure that does this is the status-role of chieftain, and it is this social development that demarks a new level of structural complexity. This level I shall designate as level 3.

The chief's major function appears to be to redistribute surplus goods and services. These surplus goods and services result from the greater division of labor that in turn has resulted from the greater intensity of competition among the social units to secure subsistence, which in turn has resulted from their increased numbers. Thus, these societies, unlike the others, are not merely "segmented," in Durkheim's terminology, but are truly differentiated by a division of labor. This division of labor, furthermore, is not merely a symbiotic development but an act of conscious specialization.

The more numerous specialized units and the emergence of the chieftain's role for their coordination is the primary characteristic that sets this society off from less structurally differentiated societies. But there may also be a measure of prestige and power which devolves to the chief and carries over to his relatives. Certain norms of deference and sumptuary rites may emerge around this role, and it tends to become hereditary, with the chief's relatives taking the position upon his death or ascension. Thus, while true stratification in the political and economic sense does not
occur in these societies, certain social divisions may occur, demarked by norms of deference and consumption. This characteristic also distinguishes this society structurally from others and places it higher on the continuum.

In such societies, too, there are the first beginnings of the fully developed status-roles of priest, though these are still relatively diffuse. Food surpluses help support such a truly specialized class, which also develops its own norms, rituals and ceremonies.

This more complex structure, i.e., level 3, shows a new form of social integration, which Durkheim called "organic." Units become economically interdependent. Socio-political integration, though still weak, is stronger at this level. Cultural, or "mechanical," integration is weakened in this society because of the division of labor, but because it is still territorially and numerically small enough for interaction among the units to occur frequently, common values, beliefs and norms remain fairly intact.

In a historical context, it may be argued that, as population continues to grow, people are forced to settle in areas less capable of providing enough food and substance. These new settlements find it necessary to provide for themselves by providing special services to others. Such services could include specialization in handicrafts and trade goods, or in defense, or in religion. These goods and services are then traded, or bartered, for food, or for
other goods and services. It is probably on the basis of trade, along with the continuing increase in population, that a new community form, the city, was to emerge and which was to become the characteristic community form of a more structurally complex society than those discussed. This level will be designated as level 4.

This structural level of society is demarcated from the other types by institutionalized force. A group arises which claims for itself the right of ultimate sanction of other groups by coercive power. Its authority is legally estab­lished. Norms are increasingly transformed from folkways and mores to laws. This development is a direct outgrowth of increasing population pressure and urbanization. We may presume that such pressures on societies emanated not only from within but without. Other societies, too, were coping with population growth. These other societies represented constant threat. Furthermore, there is little doubt that scarce resources and increased competition for them, especially as enhanced by urban concentration, lead persons to utilize differentials in power to further their own interests, or even to seek out such differentials for their use. If a certain group came to specialize legitimately in the defense of an urban community or society, such legitimacy only further supported the development of institutionalized force by providing the "golden opportunity."

The ultimate structural result, therefore, may have been
the formation of the "state," that is, a system of status-roles whose manifest function is to defend against other societies and to control, regulate and coordinate—from a more or less central point—the activities of intra-societal members. The development of a political state thus demarks this a 4 level of structural complexity. It was probably based primarily in some urban community from which it extended its power throughout the territory and over all of the rest of the society. It built walls and fortifications around its city into which the farmers and villagers in the surrounding hinterlands could withdraw from attack.

Some of these societies extended their territories through conquest, becoming truly large and complex social systems, such as the Chinese, Indian and Mesopotamian. From these original, pristine civilizations emerged the civilizations of Egypt, Greece, Rome, Crete, etc. The development of such societies constitutes a fifth level of structural complexity. Their formation probably presented rather formidable problems of integration and presuppose concomitant developments in written law, in communication, trade and commerce, etc. It is these patterns of structure which place them at higher levels on the structural continuum.

At this level of complexity, and perhaps at the previous level as well, technological innovation in food and commodity production and population growth are still important factors in the dynamics of these societies, but more
and more relevance has to be attributed to externally intrusive factors as well as to the factors of intra-societal conflict between members and groups at the "center" and on the "periphery" of the society.

The historical fates of these ancient civilizations are now a part of our history books and are fairly well-known. They were eventually broken up or reduced territorially and replaced by the contemporary nation-states, some with attendant increases in structural complexity based on an almost explosive division of labor. These latter nation-states are marked off from the others by the existence of an industrialized economy and by corporate and bureaucratic forms of organizations, all of which are based on rational-istic and scientific principles applied to production and human relations. They represent the highest and sixth level of structural complexity, not only in terms of a profusion of occupational status-roles, groups, organizations, and differentiated institutions, but in terms of the heterogeneity of religious, ethnic and other social divisions of the population.

The Socio-Cultural Contexts of Identification and Alienation:  **Gemeinschaft**

and **Gesellschaft**

Societies may be classified within a socio-historical category according to the structural scheme just presented.
The idea is that each of these levels of structural complexity represents a specific configuration of organizational and structural characteristics resulting from the confluence of various factors over time. Each of these levels, therefore, represents a historically developed socio-structural context within which alienating processes may be located.

These contexts, in turn, may be seen as associated with particular socio-cultural contexts, that is a particular set of values, beliefs and norms characterized by a particular weltanschauung or geist. Traditionally, sociologists have recognized two major types of such contexts: the gemeinschaft and the gesellschaft. These terms, of course, stem from the work of Tönnies (1963) though they were recognized before him. Since Tönnies's work, other similar classifications have emerged.¹

While gemeinschaft has been translated in sociology as "community," and its opposite, gesellschaft, as "society," such usage fails to capture the essential meaning of the term, and especially that which is relevant to the concept of identity/alienness. But in his review of the concept of gemeinschaft, Cohen (1978:2) brings out this meaning. He writes:

English speaking peoples have translated

¹See the review of types used by Sorokin, Redfield, Parsons and Becker in the introduction to Community and Society by Charles Loomis and John McKinney.
gemeinschaft to mean "community." Occasionally we come closer to the essence of Tönnies's meaning when we say communal spirit or communal relationship. Gesellschaft is translated to mean "society," "association," or "large society." In fact, the title of Tönnies's book is stated as Community and Society in the English translation. Such a conception is more sterile and simple than Tönnies himself obviously intended. This intent is visible, for example, when he refers to the gemeinschaft of mother and child, gemeinschaft of mind, gemeinschaft of friendship and the like . . . This is a far cry from the translation and idea of gemeinschaft which sees it as community, unless when one uses the word "community" what is meant is the inner essence of this, in the form of communing, wherever it is found, whether between mother and child or in place of residence and elsewhere.

Cohen states further that gemeinschaft is "... a form of relating to group and world, and a view of the world, actually a weltanschauung . . . a mode of perception and a mode of relating." In a clear reference to gemeinschaft in this way, Cohen (1978:3) states:

A gemeinschaft may refer to a special kind of social group, a type of relationship, and a way of thinking. It is a group or relationship that comes into being because sympathy among the members arises and makes them feel that the relationship is a value in and of itself (Timasheff, 1957, p. 98; Loomis and McKinney in Tönnies, 1963, p. 5). Gemeinschaft may be seen not only as a group of a certain kind, but as a thread of thought, a perception, of feeling, of relationship as well, where all of this in effect is the purpose of the relationship. It is not a matter of what one can get out of the relationship. The relationship is not perceived as a means, but as an end, having value of its own accord. The gemeinschaft
exists because the relatedness to whatever is perceived in essence and understood is a pleasure in and of itself.

In the gesellschaft context, on the other hand, social relations are not perceived as ends in and of themselves but as means to an end. This end is usually considered to be purely economic, as in the attainment of greater efficiency for the pursuit of profit. Reason dominates over tradition or over morality in the gesellschaft context. In his discussion of the concept, Loomis (1964:286-287) states that:

In gesellschaft, beliefs must submit to such critical, objective, and universalistic standards as employed in logic, mathematics and science in general. The norms for the expressing of sentiments follow the model of the "calculating scheming person" (F. Tönnies, Community and Society, p. 130), e.g., "honesty is the best policy" under the gesellschaft only if it pays dividends in terms of the goal (or ends) to be honest, not because of any intrinsic morality in honesty. Behavior in the marketplace is taken as the model . . . . Obligations in relationships are functionally specific (ibid., pp. 177, 194, 278 and 279, fn. 22) and affectively neutral (ibid., pp. 75, 90, 129, 141, 156, and 157).

In our usage, then, the terms gemeinschaft and gesellschaft shall refer to a cultural context that accompanies certain structural configurations of a society as it develops historically. In this sense, these terms will refer more to the value-orientations that characterize the societal participants and to the system of norms that reflect these orientations. After Parsons and Shils (1951), we shall reserve the
gemeinschaft term to refer to that value pattern of affectivity, particularism, ascription, diffuseness, and collective-orientation. Conversely, we shall reserve the gesellschaft term to refer to that value pattern of affective-neutrality, universalism, achievement, specificity, and self-orientation.

In our theorizing in this study, the gemeinschaft context is seen to be associated with the first three levels of social structure. The gesellschaft context emerges most clearly at the fourth level of social structure. The socio-historical development of a society from communal to associational through these levels, and their associated cultural development, is shown in Figure 6. It is convenient, and quite in accord with sociological custom to classify the first three types of societies as sub-types within a larger type of "communal," "folk" or "traditional" society, and to.

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**Figure 6. Levels of Structural and Cultural Development**
classify the latter four as sub-types of "associational," "urban," or "modern" societies. It should be understood that the gesellschaft culture develops gradually in each successive socio-historical category of society until it comes to its fullest expression in the industrialized nation-states.

It should be pointed out here again that I am not expressing an evolutionary or even neo-evolutionary theory of social change that is universal to all societies. As I have said previously, I wish merely to extrapolate a structural trend which can be observed to have occurred in a great number of societies and which I believe represents a plausible causal sequence producing alienation. My view is that, as the factors enumerated interact in the way I have described over time, greater structural complexity of the society is produced. It is this structural complexity, in turn, which produces alienating processes. Societies do not, of course, have to follow this route to modernity. Indeed, today, through the export of industrialism, commercialism and Western rational, scientific and technological procedures, these causal processes often do not apply. Still, in whatever way the movement from traditional to associational types occurs, it is in this transition that I locate the causal process producing alienation and alienness.
Identification and Alienation of Self and Others in the Two Contexts

It is in the context of associational societies and gesellschaft culture that sociologists, from the classical to the neoclassical to the contemporary, locate the alienated individual. Conversely, in the communal societies with their gemeinschaft culture there is said to be an almost complete fusion of the individual with society.

In his analysis of Durkheim's work, Tiryakian (1962:53) makes this point:

Durkheim posits in The Division of Labor, that the earliest form of society is characterized by mechanical solidarity, analogous to the solidarity of elements and molecules in physical bodies; further, the bond relating people to society is analogous to that which relates things to the person. Mechanical solidarity is more or less spontaneous, and personal volition counts for little, since it has not yet developed. In such a society, still approximated in existent primitive groupings, individuals resemble one another so much in their perception of the world that the collective consciousness is practically coincident with the individual consciousness; there is really no individual consciousness as such. The individual consciousness is a "simple dependency of the collective type and follows all its movements, just as the object which is owned follows those of its owner."

Tiryakian states further that Durkheim certainly was aware that individual differences in personalities existed among these early societies and that it was recognized and taken into account. But as the quotation above indicates,
the degree of similarity in belief and practice was so great that "... the collective consciousness is practically coincident with the individual consciousness ...." Such a state represents, indeed, an ultimate identity of the individual with society.

In the associational society, however, a disunity between the individual and society exists. Marx (1963) describes the individual in this state as:

... separated from community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice. The only bond between egoistic men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic persons (p. 26).

And Tönnies (1963:65) remarks that:

The theory of the gesellschaft deals with the artificial construction of an aggregate of human beings which superficially resembles the gemeinschaft insofar as the individuals live and dwell together peacefully. However, in the gemeinschaft they remain essentially united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in the gesellschaft they are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors.

And in one of the more modern versions (Lasch, 1979) the individual is described as avoiding "close involvements," cultivating "a protective shallowness," entertaining "fantasies of omnipotence and a strong belief in [the] right to exploit others and be gratified." Lasch calls this individual "... the narcissist, who sees the world as a mirror of himself and has no interest in external events except as they
throw back a reflection of his own image"; and added to these traits is the individual's feeling "of vague, diffuse satisfaction with life," and the feeling that "his amorphous existence" is "futile and purposeless," "empty" and "inauthentic."

These two extremes of socio-cultural contexts, then, produce two extremes of individual consciousness, one of identity with, the other of alienness from, society. The question we take up next is just how the associational type of context does this.

**Associational Society and the Alienation Process**

Just how does associational society constitute the conditions which produce alienation? As we have seen in the review of literature in Chapter I, many writers have addressed this problem, but as also indicated in that chapter, several problems emerge with these theories which render them unsatisfactory in accounting for alienation and alienness as we have conceived them. In our view, the alienation process consists of a long term series of disillusioning experiences in which the individual comes to define him or herself in a negative way and hence fails to identify him or herself as a normal human being. The alienness of which we are writing in this study is basically the feeling of not belonging to, or lack of identity with, humanity. A complex set of traits and attitudes
stems from this feeling. This feeling, and its accompanying set of traits, can probably only be gotten in the very early stages of personality development, for later, in adulthood, the individual may refract, refute or simply ignore the implications of another person's action for his self. From this perspective, it is obvious that the alienation process must be located in those situations which themselves are parts of primary group contexts. To not do so requires an "oversocialized" conception of man's nature in that to be influenced by secondary group contexts the individual's personality must be conceived as quite plastic, even in adulthood, for it is only during this phase of the life cycle that such groups can have their effects. In addition, to locate the alienation process solely in secondary groups gives these groups properties of self-fulfillment or disillusionment they probably don't fully possess.

The alienation process as lying within secondary groups, therefore, must be ruled out, and the theories of alienation which hypothesize the source of alienation to be in economic or political sectors of society can at best be justified only as dealing with another definition of alienness, one which I believe to be inadequate in accounting for the truly complex phenomenon that has come to occupy hundreds of writers in a variety of different fields. Even such secondary groups as the schools and the churches must also be ruled out as being places of alienation because they do not have access to the
individual early enough. Thus, as the conceptual work in the preceding chapters has strongly implied, the alienation/identification process per se is most likely to occur in the family.

But, of course, simply because we learn that the alienation process must be confined to the primary family group does not mean that its causes are also located solely here. It is an overwhelmingly supported conclusion that the family is shaped largely by factors outside it in the larger society.

As Yinger (1969:271) has stated:

The central proposition of contemporary family theory is scarcely new or startling. It is that the family cannot be understood as an isolated phenomenon. It must be seen in the context of the economic and political institutions, the religious influences, the population facts of the society of which it is a part. It is not by chance that a static agricultural society will emphasize the extended family, will often permit or encourage plural marriage, and will give to parents the power to make choices of partners for their children. Such elements as these fit into a stable social structure, just as emphasis on the conjugal family, romantic love, and separate households is likely to characterize urban, mobile societies. Powerful forces create the kind of family system to be found in a particular setting.

The theory of alienation presented in this study, therefore, does not depart radically from those traditional alienation theories which seek its causes in the structure of the society except to emphasize the family group as the institutional area in which the alienation process occurs. This
emphasis stems naturally from our definition of alienation, just as Marx's emphasis upon economic institutions stemmed naturally from his definition of alienation. In defining alienation differently than I have in this study, however, the traditional theories of sociology give us very little insight as to just how other structural factors impinge on the family to produce the alienating process within it. With only a few exceptions (Keniston, 1965; Riesman, 1977), neither have modern writers dealt with this problem. The question, then, arises: just how is the family implicated in the structure and organization of the society so as to establish the alienation process within it?

**Associational society and the family**

The precise nature of the relationship between the family and the modernization of society is still largely unknown. Industrialization and urbanization, for instance, have been posited as influencing the family in various ways. But in a review of some studies examining the impact of these variables upon the family, John Edwards (1969:17) comments: "The(se) articles . . . strongly indicate a need for revision in our theories pertaining to the relationship between industrialization, urbanization, and the family." And in a further comment he says: "What appears certain is that industrialization and urbanization are sometimes sufficient conditions for altering family structure, but they are not necessary ones, and the
precise nature of their relationship remains obscure and of greater complexity than most studies of familial change indicate" (p. 17).

Two outcomes of industrialization and urbanization which so far remain relatively unquestioned, however, are those of emphasis on romantic love and changes from patriarchal-authoritarianism to democratic-equalitarianism. The two seem to go together and are at least partially accounted for by the industrialization and urbanization of society.

From patriarchal-authoritarianism to democratic-equalitarianism

Burgess, Locke and Thomes (1971:8) argue that the American family is changing from a "traditional" type to a "companionship" type. They distinguish the two as follows:

The family as a traditional system and as a companionship represent two polar conceptions. The most extreme conceptual formulation of the traditional family system would be one in which its unity would be determined entirely by the traditional rules and regulations, specified duties and obligations, and other social pressures impinging on family members. The family as a companionship system focuses on the unity which develops out of mutual affection, intimate communication, and mutual acceptance of a given division of labor and given procedures of decision making by a husband, wife, and children.

Probably the foremost factor bearing on family unity in the companionship type, as these writers suggest, is mutual affection between husband and wife. Whereas in the traditional family love and affection between spouses played a less
extensive role, in the companionship family they came to have paramount importance. Lantz and Snyder (1969:98-99) make reference to this change:

As indicated earlier, the American family has not always considered love to be the basis for its existence. Especially marked changes in the role of love in marriage have occurred within the last fifty years, as manifest not only in the changing basis for family life, but in writings that reflect the spirit of the period.

Miller and Swanson (1969:228) also make this point while beginning to trace the connection of the phenomenon to larger changes in society, such as urbanization and industrialization:

It was into this urban-industrialized family that there came romantic love in the modern sense. If husband and wife, parent and child were not bound together as tightly as before with the old ties of kin supports and the heavy dependence of woman on man, a new basis for their relation had to develop. It was, as Burgess and Locke suggest, shared affection. In this remaining bond, the relation had to be more intense and sure than before. Romantic love became the test. It was a passion for another person so great that one was singled out from all others as the only fully satisfying object in the world; so intense that at the slightest chance of its failure, appetite fled, words were inadequate, and the world barren until it was resumed. And with romance went the criteria of common interests and compatibility. In the relations of equals, interests had to be common and compatible or the marriage failed.

Other writers, too, trace the emergence of love and af-
fection as the unifying force in the contemporary American family and begin to link up structural factors to it in an empirical fashion. Thus, a study by Levinger (1964) showed great similarities in the reported goals and criteria for satisfaction among men and women. Both husbands and wives were equally apt to rank companionship and affection as the most important goals for a good marriage. Although a study by Farber (1957) showed dissimilarities among husbands and wives of a lower socio-economic class concerning marital goals, wives in this group still ranked affection and companionship significantly high. Gurin and others (1960) reported that husbands and wives were equally likely to mention some aspect of their interpersonal relationship, as opposed to their external environment, in evaluating their marriages. This in turn was related to socio-economic status with those higher in status linking affection and companionship more often to marital adjustment. Komarovsky (1964) also indicated the same linkages in her study of blue collar marriage.

There is cross cultural confirmation of this phenomenon also. In Oscar Lewis's book (1959:ix) it is stated: "Demonstrative affection or, except during a relatively brief courting and initial mating period, what we usually mean by 'love,' are rare among the poorer, simpler peoples of the world. Above all, where hunger and discomfort rule, there is little spare energy for the gentler, warmer, less utilitarian emotions and little chance for active happiness."
These studies suggest two things important to our study: (1) husbands and wives, at least among the higher socioeconomic categories in contemporary associational societies, put great emphasis on affection and companionship as goals of marriage; (2) such an emphasis may be a result of modernization and the transfer of functions from the family accompanied by a rising economic well-being which releases people's energies and time to the affectional function. This latter point is made by Lantz and Snyder (1969:46-57):

In industrial society, the family no longer had to depend on its own resources for survival. The fulfillment of such basic needs as those for food, clothing, shelter, medicine, recreation, education and protection was largely taken over by specialized agencies outside the home. And many of the duties that were still performed in the home such as cooking and cleaning were greatly simplified through technology and mechanization. Having been freed from performing many chores that previously were necessary for its survival, the family could now apply the extra time and energy to other areas of family living.

Family instability and changing family functions

It appears, then, that the bonds of love and affection have become the major integrating factors of families in contemporary associational societies. However, the cohesiveness of the family appears to decline concomitantly, as measured by divorce. Reiss (1971:284) indicates that "divorce is associated with economic conditions in part; and during good times the overall divorce rate increases, as can be
seen ... by comparing the 1930s (the depression years) with the 1940s." Thus, when things are economically good the affectional factors play a greater role. But these, in turn, are most likely to lead to divorce. Reiss (1971:286) indicates why:

Love is a quality that can be lost in a relationship more easily than can a sense of duty to be married and raise a family. This being the case, the basis of marriage can be more easily lost when that basis is love. In such a case the individuals involved will seek a divorce because marriage has been defined by them as involving a love relationship.

The importance of the affectional component of the modern marriage and its relationship to the instability of the family is also indicated by Lantz and Snyder (1969:4):

... much marital incompatibility is based on the interpersonal relationship between husband and wife. The variety of ways in which husbands and wives treat each other, both interpersonally and sexually, are expressions of all that is felt between the marital partners. Thus the basic attitudes of husband and wife toward each other find expression in all phases of marital life. It follows, then, that a breakdown in the interpersonal relationship between husband and wife sets the stage for subsequent marital difficulties.

But while the ultimate measure of instability in the family, of course, is divorce rate, this is an after-the-fact statistic. Marriages are obviously unstable before their ultimate break-up, and it is this aspect of instability that seems to bear the most weight in contributing to alienness.
It does so through its effect on the socialization process.

Family instability and socialization

The weight of the husband-wife relationship upon the psychic development of the child is testified to by Burgess, et al. (1971:515):

The relationship between the parents in a home, whether it be a straining one or supporting one, looms much larger in its bearing upon the children's behavior than do such things as education or the economic advantages or handicaps which the parents have had. In fact, the marital relationship appears to be more important than any other factor in the homes thus far studied... In our study we found that if too many areas of adjustive difficulties exist between parents, it brings them insecurity which communicates itself to the child, who then uses devices we call aggression, withdrawal, or problem behavior in his efforts to recapture equilibrium.

Various studies seem to corroborate this finding. A study by Renne (1970) reports that parents who reported problems with their children were more likely to be dissatisfied with their marriages. Westman and Cline (1971) report that "... there is a period of disillusionment that precedes thought and discussion of divorce. During this period, the marriage relationship is strained and the children receive the backwash, even when open conflict has not occurred. At the very least, the rift between the parents creates an atmosphere in which the children lack an image of emotional honesty."

Despert (1953) refers to the situation of estrangement be-
between husband and wife that often precedes divorce as "emotional divorce." She claims this to be a worse condition than actual divorce: "While the physical separation of parents brings many urgent problems in its wake, it is not the severest blow to children. The emotional separation of parents from each other, and of parents from children, works its destruction on children in homes where the word divorce may never have been breathed."

Lantz and Snyder (1969:380) report the following case:

There is the case of a 28-year-old woman who was married to a successful professional man. The marriage was poor from the outset. The woman's solution to the marital difficulties was to become pregnant in the hope that her husband would not then wish to abandon her. Although there was every indication that the relationship with her husband was deteriorating, the woman continued in her belief that children would preserve her marriage. By the age of thirty-three, this woman had three children, all conceived with the same motive. The parents were in continual conflict, and the children experienced considerable neglect. Shortly after the third child was born, the husband became involved with another woman and left his wife.

As this case illustrates, one consequence of marital instability, whether in the form of an outright rift ending in divorce or of an emotional estrangement, is the neglect of the child. In the study cited earlier by Westman and Cline (1971) they include the following effects on children:

From the point of view of the affected children, divorce requires a number of adjustments: (1) to the anxiety, confusion and strife of the conflict-ridden marriage; (2) to the absence of an image of adults
with mutual affection and respect; (3) to the compromise of routine childrearing responsibilities accompanying the disintegrating marriage; (4) to the prospect of change in parent relationships; and (5) to the parents preoccupation with rearranging their own emotions and lives, leading to a reduction in attention to the children, or, in some cases, to an overreliance on the children for support. (Italics mine.)

Thus, there appears to be some evidence and substantial agreement among researchers and analysts that family instability has various deleterious effects upon the children. These effects are usually analyzed as emotional in nature even though their specific form or nature is rarely indicated and the social-psychological processes are not clear. Burgess, et al. (1971) alludes to the child seeking to "recapture equilibrium"; Westman and Cline (1971) refer to the lack of an "image of emotional honesty," etc.

The effects of marital instability appear to depend to a large degree upon the phase of the personality formation process that the child is in, for socialization has different consequences at different times in the life cycle. The earlier phases of the socialization of the child appear to be crucial.

If divorces occur in the seventh and eighth years of marriage, it follows that children are relatively young, i.e., in the infant stage or childhood stage of the development of personality. It is obvious that family instability can thus have important consequences for the development of emotional
security and self-conceptions, two of the most important outcomes of personality formation. At the same time, each phase of personality development is locked into and predicated upon the other. The interruption or malfunction of a previous phase will thus have its important effects upon the following phase, probably rendering it inoperative or causing it to develop in undesirable, negative kinds of ways.

Summary and Conclusion

Our theory of the structural causes of alienation consists basically of the proposition that (1) the growth of population (based on improved technology) increases the structural complexity of society; (2) in becoming more structurally complex, the form of integration of the family is altered, becoming based almost entirely on love and affection between the spouses; (3) being a weaker form of integration, the stability of the family is decreased, as indicated by high divorce rates. These rates indicate the number of marriages in which role-reciprocity and complementarity have broken down and from which emerges a great deal of anxiety, anger, frustration, jealousy, lack of trust, quarreling, fighting, cutting remarks, etc.; (4) the primary result of this instability between husband and wife is to direct and concentrate most of their energies on themselves and their problems. Children, while they may not be neglected deliberately are inevitably neglected: the routines of childrearing
are interrupted; there is a reduction of attention; and even when these tasks are performed they may be done in a highly anxious state or perhaps even resentfully; (5) the further effect of these factors is to create an insecurity in the infant and a negative essence in the child. With these developments comes self-preoccupation and the control of the "Me over the I" in service to some ideal self-conception. Over time the factors solidify into true feelings of alienness with all of the attendant characteristics described in Chapter V.

With these formulations behind us the theory of alienation as I have propounded it is essentially complete. We turn now to an attempt at empirically substantiating certain key propositions selected from the theory in its overall sense.
PART THREE:

A CROSS-CULTURAL TEST OF

THE THEORY
CHAPTER VII:
ALIENATION IN EIGHT SOCIETIES

The theory, having been put forward in Part One, now requires an empirical substantiation. As far as I know, no attempt has ever been made to empirically verify the general proposition of alienation theory: that it is the modernization of society that brings about alienation and alienness to a wide degree. It is obvious, of course, that such a verification poses almost insurmountable methodological difficulties and this may be the reason why no effort has been made.

Despite the knowledge that many difficulties would in fact exist and that the findings and conclusions of the attempt to substantiate this proposition would be hindered by methodological fault, such an attempt was undertaken. This part of the study is a report on the effort to verify the central assumption in alienation theory, and certain corrolaries as they have been developed in the theory just presented.

Methodological Procedure

Only certain key propositions have been selected for the empirical substantiation of the theory. These propositions are key in Zetterberg's (1965:161-166) sense, i.e., they occupy strategic points in the overall system of propositions such that the disconfirmation of any single one could seriously discredit the whole theory.

The propositions are as follows:
$H_1$: Socio-structural complexity will be associated negatively with family stability; the greater the structural complexity of a society the less stable the family.

$H_2$: Family stability will be positively associated with socialization; the greater the family stability the more nurturant the form of socialization.

$H_3$: A nurturant form of socialization will be positively associated with alienness-identity; the more nurturant is the socialization process, the greater will be the individual's identity with the society.

The causal model for these propositions is given in Figure 7. I have included the variable numbers and their sym-
sols (x and y) so that the reader may refer to them if need be.

The design of the study called for by the propositions is obviously cross-cultural and the method used was what Smelser (1976) has called "systematic comparative illustration," or what has been traditionally called the comparative method. Since all scientific methods, including the statistical and experimental, utilize comparison, Smelser opted for the former term.

Systematic comparative illustration is a method which consists of a selection of a limited number of cases or units—in this instance total societies—upon which measurement of a set of independent and dependent variables is undertaken and whose relations are then analyzed. It is a method used when the cases are not drawn on a random basis and their number is too small for probability inferences beyond the sample.

The sample of societies in this study was not drawn randomly and is very small thus requiring the use of systematic comparative illustration. The reason for drawing a limited number of cases non-randomly is simply the almost non-existence of indicators of the alienness variable with an acceptable degree of face validity. Alienness per se is not ordinarily measured or reported upon in the ethnographic and historical literature which was used as the data source for this study. Only eight cases, indeed, could be found which yielded valid indicators of the dependent variable. To find
these indicators, a rather thorough immersion in the cultures of these societies was required in order to derive some estimate, sometimes rather rough, of the levels or incidence of this variable. Inferences had to be made from ethnographic observations of a variety of areas of the social life of the societies studied.

The paucity of data, while suspected, was not known at the beginning of the study. Thus, at first, a statistical method was attempted consisting of the assignment of numbers to all societies listed in the HRAF (Human Relations Area Files) and of drawing a random sample of fifty units. Prior to this, each of the major independent variables of structural-complexity, family-stability and socialization, and the dependent variable of alienness, had been operationalized (see Appendix I). Using the operationalization of structural-complexity, each society was then classified into its appropriate level. With the realization that alienness would perhaps be the most difficult variable to measure, an attempt to obtain a measure of this variable was made first. It soon became evident that there would be very little indication of this variable per se in the ethnographic literature. Some categories of the structural classification were ultimately emptied for lack of data.

The procedure thus reverted simply to the attempt to locate ethnographic reports which contained observations that offered valid indication of the level of alienness. This entailed a case by case search through the HRAF files. As it
turned out, very few societies in the HRAF had ethnographic reports containing valid data on the alienness variable. A search was then begun on ethnographic and historical reports outside the HRAF which might do so. With such cases located, efforts were then attempted to secure valid indicators of family stability and socialization also. Such an attempt proved far less difficult though, again, some cases were eliminated for lack of valid indicators. The end result of this attempt was the sample of eight societies shown in Appendix II. No valid data whatsoever could be found for the level 4 and 5 societies and so these categories have been eliminated.

The ethnographic and historical sources from which the data were drawn are given in the context of the study where they are cited along with the page numbers where the data were found. The observations cited do not represent the complete data sources, however, but are selected as the most representative. A complete data file has been compiled separately from this study. All sources are cited in Appendix II.

Once these data were located and extracted they were coded for the purpose of quantitative analysis. Coding procedures are given in Table 2 of Chapter VIII (see p. 242). Such quantification was primarily for the purpose of clarifying more precisely the relationships and indicating, however roughly, their strength. The heart of the analysis, however, remains in the systematic comparative analyses given at various
points throughout Chapter VIII.

I turn now to the presentation of the most pertinent data, though certainly not all, on each of the variables in each society within each of the structural categories. Further comments on methodological problems and procedures will be made in Chapter VIII.

Family Stability, Socialization and Alienness in Level 1 Societies

The Wintu

The Wintu Indians lived in the Sacramento valley of the state of California. Their population in 1910, the period in which the primary ethnographer, Cora Dubois (1935), was studying them, was 395 individuals. Their traditional lifestyle had remained relatively intact though they had of course come into contact with whites fairly extensively at that time. According to Dubois (1935:28) and Newcomb (1974:198) they resided in relatively permanent villages consisting of a loosely scattered collection of bark houses numbering from four to five up to several dozen. The primary social unit was the restricted family of parents and children and perhaps a close kinsman or two. They had no hereditary leader, village council or other governmental structure. "They recognized that there were other communities like themselves in language and life-style, but even though their children found spouses in other villages, neither economic nor other neces-
sity drew them together" (Newcomb, 1974:198). The Wintu then, because of their lack of structural bonds between the village communities, may be considered a level 1 type society (see Appendix I).

With respect to Wintu family stability, the marriage form of the Wintu has been described by Dubois (1935:55) as "brittle monogamy," although polygamy was apparently accepted. "Divorce was easy and frequent since the grounds were simply incompatibility or adultery" (Dubois, 1935:56). Divorce was effected by either the woman or the man withdrawing from the joint residence and establishing a new residence with another. The ideal form of marriage was apparently a union of a "pair of siblings to a pair of siblings" (Dubois, 1935:59). "Yet the more or less brittle monogamy and the free play of individual taste in contracting marriage . . . must have obstructed the smooth functioning of the ideal system" (Dubois, 1935:59). The relationship between the spouses was one of "respect," indicating some formality. Such a relationship is in contrast to a "joking relationship" that existed between cousins, and between brothers and sisters.

Dubois (1935:56) reports that: "despite the fragility of the marriage bond there was a distinct sense of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of offspring. A child which was deserted by its father before or shortly after birth was called patdoksila (lost flint child), which was a term of approbrium. An offspring born to a woman who had been promiscuous was
called *seila* (everyone's child) or *boxaila* (brush child)."

Adoption of children by near relatives was frequent among the Wintu and a generally accepted pattern:

If a child were adopted he was given the same status as a man's own offspring. There was none of the semi-slavery of northwestern California; nor was there any of the feeling associated with foster parents which is found in our own society. Thus, Sadie Marsh was brought up by a paternal aunt. The love she has had for this woman did not impair the affection she felt for her true mother, who lived scarcely a mile away. At the same time Sadie felt free to make her elder brother's dwelling her home. In this instance, which was in no manner atypical, the child had three easily accessible homes and sets of family ties (Dubois, 1935:47-48).

Socialization of the children among the Wintu is accomplished primarily by the mother or adoptive relatives during the infancy and early childhood stages for both sexes. The father assumes more and more responsibility for the male child as he grows older.

Dubois (1935:46) reports that newly born children were "...bathed three or four times a day until the cord dropped off. Some informants were of the opinion that only then might the child be placed in its cradle." She also reports that "children were nursed from two to four years" and that a mother "rubbed, kneaded and stretched a child's body" during infancy to make it shapely, struck the toes gently with a fire poker to make the feet short, and rubbed the cheekbones upward
to make them high (Dubois, 1935:47). Newcomb (1974:199) reports that "throughout California the rearing of children was casual and informal, with little emphasis placed on naming ceremonies or on the formal instruction of children." Socialization of the children among the Wintu, all in all, appears to be relatively nurturant.

The Wintu individual's identity with his society appears to be nearly complete submersion, approaching the degree which Durkheim described as the classical case. Dorothy Lee's (1959) analysis of Wintu language is the most affirmative of this observation. Lee (1959:131-132) states that:

The Wintu Indians of Northern California have a conception of the self which is markedly different from our own ... The definition of the self in our own culture rests on our law of contradiction. The self cannot be both self and not self, both self and other; the self excludes the other. Wintu philosophy in general has no law of contradiction. Where we have mutually exclusive dualistic categories, the Wintu have categories which are inclusive, but not mutually so; that is, object A will be included in object B, but not vice versa. Out of this context, B can be distinguished or emphasized through various linguistic devices. For example, in Wintu thought, man is included in nature; natural law, timeless order, is basic and true, irrespective of man. However, independent judgment, private experience and free will are not thereby excluded, but function transiently within the framework of natural law; man actualizes and gives temporality and concreteness to the natural order upon which he impinges through act of will and personal intent.

Speaking to the relation of the self and society more
directly, Lee continues:

The concept of the self forms one of these non-exclusive categories. When speaking about Wintu culture, we cannot speak of the self and society, but rather of the self in society. As a member of my society, writing for readers of this cultural background, I am presenting my study from the point of view of the self and its gradually decreasing participation in society; however, I believe that this is only due to my cultural bias, and that a Wintu would have started from what for us is the opposite direction, the gradual distinguishing of the self from society.

Lee states further:

In our own culture, we are clear as to the boundaries of the self. In our commonly held unreflective view, the self is a distinct unit, something we can name and define. We know what is the self and what is not the self; and the distinction between the two is always the same. With the Wintu the self has no strict bounds, is not named and is not, I believe, recognized as a specific entity.

Wintu orientation does not, then, include the object self in a modally scrutinizing, evaluating way. Introspection is not a characteristic of the Wintu, is in fact uncharacteristic. Their orientations are outward to the world around them and it is the environment which captures their attention and to which they are primarily related in a way which constitutes an obliteration of the self.
The Ojibwa

The Ojibwa, or Chippewa, Indians reported upon in this study lived in Canada along the Berens River on the east side of Lake Winnipeg. The specific societal unit studied was known as the Saulteaux. The larger Ojibwa cultural entity was not politically integrated in any way so that the Saulteaux can only be considered a level 1 type society.

As Landes (1969:1) reports:

The Ojibwa lived in clusters, or villages... of from three to fifteen families. The village was the largest social unit. It existed in spring and summer when the various small families came in from the scattered hunting grounds. It was held together by little more than the consciousness of neighborhood, for no official activities characterized its existence.

Around any one large body of water, such as Rainy Lake in Ontario, the Rainy River, and the numerous lakes in Minnesota, were a number of these villages. Each village was independent, but shared with its neighbors designations and sentiments which distinguished it (or them) from other water groups or villages.

Ojibwa culture at the time of the ethnographers' visits to them was relatively pristine. Hallowell (1974:119) reports that due to migration into the remoter regions in the pursuit of furs the original culture was better preserved than other Indians whose contact with whites was more extensive. Also, the fur trade itself "supported and encouraged the perpetuation of their aboriginal ecological adaptation--hunting. In consequence, not only was their subsistence economy retained,
but the seasonal movements, institutions, attitudes and beliefs that were closely integrated with it."

Ojibwa family life can only be described as turbulent. The form of marriage most practiced was monogamy although polygamy was acceptable. Landes (1971:85) reports that "divorce is nearly as common as marriage" and that "some people are divorced not once only, or, even twice, but seven or eight times." Remarriage inevitably follows and "women remarry . . . as often as eight times" (Landes, 1971:82-83). Divorce is not institutionalized in Ojibwa society, however, and amounts to desertion. It occurs on "any conceivable pretext or on none at all" (Landes, 1971:91). Like modern European marriages "divorce implies that common interests are at an end" and the basis for the marriage has disappeared.

Family life in Ojibwa society according to Landes (1971:18) "... was often broken or violently upset because of the easy separations of husband and wife in consequence of jealousies arising from love affairs . . . ." This turbulence follows from the fact that, again like European marriages, each spouse ". . . pins his or her self-esteem upon the other's reaction" (Landes, 1971:66-67).

Needless to say, perhaps, this state of the family has direct consequences for children. Landes reports that "when the parents change mates, their offspring may go with either parent." Consequently, "the woman of many marriages may keep under one roof her children by previous marriages or some of
the children of her present husband, who may also have with him offspring from several marriages. Although children are sometimes raised by members of their bilateral kindred in the case of broken families, they usually reside with and are raised by one of the biological parents.

Socialization of children among the Ojibwa was carried out primarily by the mother, during infancy, for both sexes. Male socialization became more the responsibility of the father during childhood. Densmore (1970:48) reports that an Ojibwa mother "... had her infant constantly with her, and the daily relation between mother and child was closer than in the white race." Densmore states further:

It was the desire of the Chippewa that their children should be straight and vigorous, and to that end the mother began a child's training in early infancy. Two means were employed for this training as well as for convenience in taking care of the child. These were (1) the cradle board and (2) a custom which arose after the Chippewa obtained cotton cloth and which may be designated as "pinning up the baby." With these forms of restraint they alternated periods of freedom when the child was "let out for exercise."

Densmore reports frequent bathing with a warm water and herbs mixture. The cradle board was filled with a moss that had been dried over the fire and rubbed and pulled apart until it was soft and light. The baby was usually naked, or wore only very little clothing, and was surrounded by this moss inside the cradle board. "In cold weather a baby's feet were
wrapped in rabbit skin with the hair inside, or the soft down of cattails was placed around them" (Densmore, 1970:48-49).

Landes (1969:13) observes that:

The married couple loves the thought of producing offspring and of caring for them. Great indulgence is shown young children, from giving them the breast at each cry to not interfering with their bloody battles.

She reports too, however, that "during infancy, parents regard their offspring much as wild pets are regarded; sometimes they are neglected, but often they are joked about and gloried in."

In later childhood, the parents make a practice of teasing the child by bragging about his cousins. This is apparently an initiation into adult life. The cousins' parents, in turn, brag on their nephews or nieces in the presence of their own children. The cousins themselves apparently join in this teasing and jesting custom and tease and jest with one another. This is perhaps the basis of the "joking relationship" that characterizes cousin relationships among the Ojibwa.

Punishment of children is the responsibility and right of the father only, but in actuality the mother takes whatever liberties in this regard she wishes. Punishment on her part consists of scolding and withholding food.

In comparison to the Wintu, Ojibwa socialization—because reports of it contain some reference to neglect, to teasing and jesting as normative aspects—would appear to be somewhat
Measurement of Ojibwa alienness-identity reveals a surprise. Identity appears to be quite low among the Ojibwa, or conversely, alienness appears to be quite high. This conclusion is supported by the following ethnographic observations which indicate a high degree of self-consciousness on the part of Ojibwa individuals and psychological distance between them. Hallowell (1974:172) reports that:

Although there is no single term in Ojibwa speech that can be satisfactorily rendered into English as "self," nevertheless, by means of personal and possessive pronouns, the use of kinship and so on, the Ojibwa Indian constantly identifies himself as a person. Every individual knows who he is, where he is, and what kind of being he is: he entertains definite beliefs and concepts that relate to his own nature. Besides this, his language enables him to express such concepts as self-defense, self-glorification, self-deceit, self-command.

The Ojibwa, then, appear to be quite self-aware, and this is one of the essential dimensions of alienness or psychological distance from others in society. Other dimensions are noted, however, by ethnographers. Landes (1971:178-179) reports that an Ojibwa man "... is constantly alive to the need of guarding himself, to the need of keeping his pride intact, and as a consequence vague, persecutory trends are manifest in everyone's reactions." He reports further that "... there are always latent suspicions between Indians of different communities" and that a "cautious and restrained
manner of approach is adopted." This behavior occurs with respect to the individual's own community members and even to his own kin, though not as much so. Hallowell (1974:145) writes: "so far as interpersonal relations go, there is a great deal of restraint among the Saulteaux upon the expression of all categories of emotion—joy, irritation, anger, etc. The most outstanding exception is laughter." He also reports an "emphasis on strong restraint and control" and behind this "severe control is wariness and caution" (1974: 149). Both Landes and Hallowell report a high degree of "individualism." The latter researcher uses characterizations such as "amiable front," the "suppression of one's own feelings and opinions," "anxiety" and "latent mistrust."

The Ojibwa thus appear to be a "deviant case" insofar as the relationship between structural complexity and identity is concerned. As such, they will require further comment in our analysis and conclusions in a later part of this study.

Family Stability, Socialization and Alienness in Level 2 Societies

The Cheyenne

The Cheyenne lived primarily on the plains of what is now the state of Wyoming in the United States. Their social organization fits the classification of level 2 societies almost perfectly. Service (1971) indicates that the tribe was "... divided into ten loosely organized bands, each one
with its own special taboos, ceremonies, and medicines."
The whole tribe assembled once a year to perform the great communal hunt of the buffalo. During this time, the people gathered within certain areas specially designated for each of the bands. Within each of these bands, each individual further belonged to a "kindred" and then further to a family. Service reports that the tribe was crosscut by a series of "societies" which had military, social, and ceremonial functions at the time the bands were united during the great hunt.

When the communal hunt was over, the people split up into their separate families and dispersed to various parts of the territory where adequate forage for their horses was available and where hunters could cover a wider range. At this time, they usually resided for a period in "band camps" (Hoebel, 1960:31) consisting of one or more families. These camp locations are apparently well-known and are given names. Families move in and out of them as their needs warrant.

The Cheyenne family is a matrilocally extended form consisting of a man and wife and their married daughters and their husbands (from different families), their daughters' children and any unmarried sons. According to Service (1971:125) "a single tipi shelters only a husband and wife and small children, and the extended family's camp consists therefore of a cluster of several tipis."

Cheyenne family stability, in terms of both divorce and the internal relations between the spouses, seems to be high.
Divorces are rare, and with respect to the husband-wife relationship, Hoebel (1960:24) reports that:

Husbands and wives, although they are diffident in their attitudes toward each other in the early stages of their marriage, usually become most fond of each other. They form a close working team with a strong sense of family responsibility. Michelson's old woman informant related, "We had our first child after we had been married a year. It was at that time that I began really to love my husband. He always treated me with respect and kindness" (Michelson, 1932:8). And when her husband died, "His death made me very lonely, and it was the most terrible event in my life." Such was the ideal life between husbands and wives, although, of course, it did not always work out thus. Some wives were shrewish. Some men were jealous or mean tempered.

Cheyenne socialization of children appears to be particularly nurturant and self-fulfilling. Hoebel (1960) reports that children are highly valued by parents and by Cheyenne society in general. "Newborn babies are gently greased, powdered, and wrapped in soft robes. If the weather is cold they are carried in their mother's arms for warmth and comfort" (Hoebel, 1960:92). The baby is carried much on the cradle board. "When not on the cradle board it is rocked in the arms of the mother or grandmother and soothed with lullabies. It is nursed whenever it shows a desire." The baby is cuddled and constantly loved in an atmosphere of interest.

Hoebel (1960:92) reports that the Cheyenne will not tolerate a crying child and will remove it from the camp
"into the brush where [it is] . . . hung on a bush" until it stops crying.

As the infant gets a little older, it is more often carried about on its mother's back in a blanket sling rather than on the cradle board. Its head projects about her shoulders; it hears and sees all she does; it shares the warmth of her body and feels the movements of her muscles; it receives food passed over the mother's shoulder; it even sleeps on her back as she goes about her household tasks. It is enveloped in warmth, movement, and affectionate attention. Its body is gently soothed with medicated ointments and soft vegetable ointments. Its early years are full of adult-given gratification. Its frustrations must, however, be quickly internalized, for the alternative is isolation in the brush. This is the first lesson learned, and it must be remembered at all times; it pervades Cheyenne life. "Children are to be quiet and respectful in the presence of elders" (Hoebel, 1960:92).

The typical Cheyenne person does not appear to suffer feelings of alienness. Indeed, the evidence supports the opposite contention. Hoebel (1960:90) describes Cheyenne personality characteristics as follows:

Reserved and dignified, the adult Cheyenne male moves with a quiet sense of self-assurance. He speaks fluently, but never carelessly. He is careful of the sensibilities of others and is kindly and generous. He is slow to anger and strives to suppress his feelings, if
aggravated. Vigorous on the hunt and in war, he prizes the active life. Towards enemies he feels no merciful compunctions, and the more aggressive he is, the better. He is well versed in ritual knowledge. He is neither flighty nor dour. Usually quiet, he has a lightly displayed sense of humor. He is sexually repressed and masochistic, but that masochism is expressed in culturally approved rites. He does not show much creative imagination in artistic expression, but he has a firm grip on reality. He deals with the problems of life in set ways while at the same time showing a notable capacity to readjust to new circumstances. His thinking is rationalistic to a high degree and yet colored with mysticism. His ego is strong and not easily threatened. His super ego, as manifest in his strong social conscience and mastery of his basic impulses, is powerful and dominating. He is "mature"—serene and composed, secure in his social position, capable of warm social relations. He has powerful anxieties, but these are channeled into institutionalized modes of collective expression with satisfactory results. He exhibits few neurotic tendencies.

The typical grown-up Cheyenne woman exhibits much the same constellation of traits. Not having the direct outlet for aggressive impulses that men find in war, she is touchier in domestic relations and apt to be a bit willful within her family. Grinnell calls her "masterful." She is more artistically creative than the male, but still within prescribed limits. She is equally repressed sexually but manifests less compensatory behavior in masochism and aggression against enemies—although both these traits are discernable in her.
The Hopi

The Hopi tribe lives in the southwestern part of the United States. Their settlements were built on the tops of the mesas that are characteristic of the topography of the area. Three of these mesas were the primary sites of the Hopi villages. Their villages consisted of the now well-known pueblo dwellings, consisting of terraced adobe apartments. The dwellings are arranged in streets and plazas.

Two Hopi villages, Sichomovi and Walpi, were located on "first mesa." "On second mesa are Mishongnovi, Shipaulovi, and Shangopovi. Bakavi, Hatevilla, and Oraibi . . . are located on third mesa. In addition, New Oraibi and Moenkopi which are new villages, formed by dissidents from Old Oraibi, are also associated with third mesa" (Eggan, 1950:8).

According to Eggan (1950:8) "in spite of the region's aridity the Hopi were primarily maize agriculturalists. They also raised beans, squashes, pumpkins, sunflowers, and cotton . . . . Sheepherding was also a major subsistence activity. Hunting was primarily a ceremonial activity . . . ."

Although each village was politically independent, and there was no overall chief or council, the Hopi tribe as a whole is associated by various matrilineal clans which were joined together by twelve unnamed exogamous phratries. This feature places Hopi society within the second level of structural complexity.

The form of the Hopi family is extended with residence
of the newly married couple being matrilocal. The members of the family occupied the same apartment in the pueblo. Marriage is strictly monogamous.

Family stability, because of matrilineality and matrilocality and its extended form, is quite high in Hopi society. This is so despite a relatively high divorce rate for married couples, especially early in the marriage. Titiev (1971:30) reports a rate of 34%. However, also according to Titiev (1971:17) the effects of divorce are "... minimized through the mechanism of the household which is so ordered that it takes up the shocks that occur from breakdown of individual families. So secure and firmly embedded is the position of a woman in her household group, that a change of husband has little or no effect on the larger unit."

This is true, also, for children. Titiev (1971:17) indicates that "thanks to the joint principles of matrilineal descent and matrilocal residence, all children are automatically as firmly ensconced in their natal household groups as are their mothers."

When divorce occurs (for a variety of reasons), material goods are simply divided along the original lines of ownership established and the husband returns to his own mother's household. Children "invariably remain with the mother" although older children may follow either parent (Titiev, 1971:17).

Titiev (1971:43) reports that:

As long as there is constant operation
of the household system it makes comparatively little difference in Hopi society whether marriages endure or not. The strength and durability of the household unit is scarcely affected by the collapse of limited families, and it is for this reason that the social structure of the Hopi has been unshaken by the widespread prevalence of such disturbing factors as adultery and divorce.

These observations seem to warrant the conclusion that Hopi family stability is high though, of course, such stability is muted by the fact that divorce occurs frequently. However, it should be remembered that even at 34% this leaves 66% of the marriages remaining intact. As Titiev (1971:43) has remarked:

It would be misleading if nothing were said of marriages which are characterized by affection and permanency. Where a man's marital experience is happy, he tends more and more to identify himself with his wife's group; and not infrequently a married man remains devoted to his wife's household even at the expense of allegiance to his own clan.

Hopi socialization of infants and children appears to be something less than a nurturant form. According to Aberle (1951:121) it is characterized by parents' "fobbing off of responsibility for severe punishment on to other relatives and on to Soyoho" and "the use of Katcina figures for rewards and withholding of rewards." Also, children are often exposed to relatives who claim to be affectionate but whose joking implies some cruelty. They are also exposed to parents' concealment of aggressive impulses toward others in their pres-
ence, and are subjected to the initiation ceremonies into the Katcina which involve a whipping.

Aberle notes that these early experiences combine to "create in the child's mind a grave difficulty in interpreting the true intentions of others." He notes that this difficulty leads to mistrust in the child and that later experiences as an adult tend to reenforce this mistrust. This re-enforcement is due to the fact that Hopi culture contains beliefs of the existence of evil intentioned witches, or persons of "two-hearts," even among one's own kin, and thus one must conceal one's aggressive impulses from another in case he or she might be a witch. Thus, witchcraft, the witness of and practice of concealment of one's true feelings, the experiences of joking relatives, punishment by the Katcina and the initiation ceremony—all these may combine to produce rather pervasive feelings of distrust in individuals. And other observers seem to confirm this. Titiev (1971:57) writes that "fear and suspicion still seem to be dominant factors in Hopi life."

This basic mistrust of others, in turn, leads to what Aberle calls "a real psycho-social isolation among the Hopi." Confirming this are reports of the extreme Hopi individuality, of their "freedom of thought and action," extending even to their children and pets. An informant of Titiev's (1972:28) reported that "every Hopi . . . must look out for himself and can expect little help from non-relatives." Titiev reports
that "the spirit of individuality is so strong that no overall unity can be achieved."

Other reported characteristics of the Hopi personality are in harmony with these observations. Their "poise," their sense of courtesy to others, their peculiar trait of not inquiring after the health of distant relatives, their unwillingness to intervene in the affairs of others, all point to a relatively low degree of identification with others.

Family Stability, Socialization and Alienness in Level 3 Societies

The Nootka

The Nootka's territory was located on the northwest coast of North America in what is now British Columbia, Canada. Their communities were of two major types, the more permanent winter villages, located in the sheltered coves of the upper reaches of the various inlets along the coastal region, and their summer villages, located on the lower reaches of the inlets where fishing and sea mammal hunting could take place. The summer villages contained the migrated populations of a number of winter villages and were thus larger.

Although Nootkan population, according to Service (1971: 209), consisted of some 6,000 individuals, the population as a whole was never united socially. The social organization of the Nootka at its highest level is thus comprised of the
"confederacies" that came about as a result of the summer gatherings upon the beaches of commonly inhabited inlets. Within these confederacies, there is a smaller "association" of individuals because of their inhabitation of a common winter village. Within this "association," individuals are united by lineages who constitute a "household" occupying a common dwelling. The different confederacies, even though their members speak the same language, are effectively socially isolated from one another by the relatively high peaks and rugged terrain between the inlets.

In addition to these units, Nootkan society also is divided into various clans and associations. But Nootkan social organization more importantly is also marked by a system of chieftainships, each with a higher or lesser rank relative to one another. Each rank is inherited and has commensurate with it certain privileges, rights and duties. As Service (1971:216) indicates, "the most usual symbolic expression of differences in inherited rank are sumptuary customs in dress, the use of special names, economic privileges, potlatch rights, and various ceremonial privileges." This chieftainship system places every individual in a position of rank relative to one another and is thus not a true stratification system since each person if it were so construed, would have to be in a stratum by himself.

It is this system of chieftainships that marks a fundamental departure from the structure of the societies, both
bands and tribes, that have been discussed previously. For it is this structure that functions to integrate the confed­ eracy in ways beyond the associations in tribes. The nature of this integrative mechanism is brought out by Service (1971: 217) as follows:

The various grades of chiefs have various amounts of territory over which they act as executives for their lesser kinsmen. Those who use the resources formally ac­ knowledge the positions by paying sorts of tributes, such as first fruits of the salmon catch or berry-picking, certain choice parts of sea mammals killed, blank­ kets, furs, and so on. Many economic pro­ ducts are acquired by the chief according to strict and complicated custom, but quan­ tities of goods are also given to the chief more freely, when there is a surplus beyond the donors subsistence needs. The chief has no means to enforce these divisions of the products, of course, and thus, in a strict sense, the process should not be con­ sidered a tax or tribute. Furthermore, and importantly, these gifts do not function particularly to increase personal wealth which the chief might consume, for it is understood that he will later give away a comparable amount of goods in a great feast or potlatch. The chief’s function is to redistribute goods, a not unusual feature in the primitive world.

The economic function is clear: different individuals, families, and groups have vary­ ing degrees of luck at hunting or fishing at any given time, and may also be engaged in quite different pursuits. One way to get rid of a surplus of salmon and acquire some needed oil, for example, would be to trade for it, as in a market. This method of dis­ tribution would be familiar to members of European society, but many primitives dis­ tribute goods in quite a different way. The surpluses are given to the chief, who may distribute them to the members of his group at an occasion (typically made festive) or
may exchange with another group by giving the products to them at a feast in their honor, later to receive some of their surpluses at a reciprocating feast.

The Nootkan family, as indicated, is extended and patri-local, the bride, from a different village, coming to reside with the groom's family in his village. Because it is extended the family unit as a whole remains relatively intact but there is considerable degree of instability in the nuclear units within the extended family. Gunther (1962:544) reports that "there are relatively few adults in the present population that have had only one marriage." Service (1971:221) reports that "divorce is quite common."

This high rate of divorce is apparently the result of a good deal of marital discord between the spouses. Swan (1870:53) reported an incident of backstabbing between an ex-husband and the husband of a woman. He writes also that "the husband claims the privilege of correcting the wife, and some of them receive very severe beatings" (1869:11). Drucker (1951:276) writes of "a young chief who 'didn't get along well' with his wife. She was always nagging and complaining. His parents tolerated her because she had borne him a child."

Childlessness was the most common reason for marital discord (Service, 1971:221). Adultery was another frequent cause (Drucker, 1951:287; Swan, 1869:13). Simple incompatibility appears to be another. Drucker (1951:303) writes that "the system of parental arrangement of marriage was at the root of
a great deal of marital discord. Young people who were perfect strangers were united without being given a chance to make any adjustments and then expected to get along together."

Unlike the Hopi extended families which experienced a high divorce rate also, but which were capable of absorbing the shocks, the Nootkan family appears to have suffered from these internal discords between nuclear units. Drucker (1951: 302) indicates that "if a couple had children, their friends and relatives did everything in their power to prevent a separation, for it was considered a disgrace for a child to have parents living and be brought up by a stepfather or stepmother." He reports also that in case of divorce "the allocation of children presented quite a problem. Both families wanted them, recognizing that in later life they would align themselves more definitely with the people who brought them up" (1951:303).

Another effect of divorce upon the Nootkan family was in terms of the dowry and the bride's endowment, consisting of the rights and privileges exchanged at marriage. In the case of one divorce, Drucker reports that "all the elaborate and costly performances went for naught. She took a dislike to her husband, rejected his advances, and returned to her parents' home a few weeks later. The privileges, both those of the dowry, and those of the 'bride endowment,' since they had been given for the children of the couple, automatically reverted to the original owners" (1951:299).
Nootkan socialization appears to be highly nurturant, despite the almost certainly deleterious effects of a fairly unstable situation upon the parents. Some of the shocks of the unstable husband-wife relationship are cushioned by the presence of the other members of the household. Service (1971:219) reports that "instruction of the young . . . is not the duty of the mother and father alone; aunts and uncles, older siblings, and especially grandparents are all active in the training of the child."

Service (1971:219) reports also that "by modern American standards, the Nootka are affectionate and indulgent toward children. Toilet training does not begin until late, and physical punishment is not used—nor are children ever slapped or spanked for any other reason. The only means of correction, even for older children, is talking to them, attempting to shame them. This does not mean that the parents are careless, however, for they give great attention to the proper care and education of children. Instruction in etiquette and morality begins early in life, and the children are patiently corrected over and over again."

The Nootkan's identity with, or self-absorption in, his society is not complete although there are manifestations that it is relatively high. He seems not to be as completely absorbed as the Wintu or the Cheyenne, but neither is he as "individuated" as the Ojibwa or the Hopi. The relation between the typical Nootkan and his society is probably charac-
terized by that between Sapir's and Swadesh's (1955:356) informant, Tom, and his society:

. . . Tom has always been rather sober, not a skeptic by any means, but not an emotional enthusiast. His knowledge of religious ceremonies is vast, but the spirit that animates this knowledge is rather one of order, of legal particularity, not of spiritual ecstasy. The practical economical world, the pursuit of gain, has always been more congenial to Tom's temperament. This does not mean that Tom is a rationalist in matters relating to the unseen world. Only the educated or half-educated half-breeds are rationalists, and more than one of them has angered Tom by his ill-advised attempts to disturb him with skeptical arguments. However, there has been no change in Tom. He knows, as firmly as he knows his own name, that when the rumble of thunder is heard from the mountain, it is because the thunderbird is leaving his house on the peak, flapping his wings heavily, as he makes off for the sea to prey upon the whales.

This relative balance between the Nootkan and his society is further evidenced by the fact that Tom, while being capable of distinguishing himself from a number of societal categories, still feels himself to be a part of his society and "at home" in it.

. . . Tom early learned his exact relationship to all his kinsmen. He soon learned also the degree of his relationship to the neighboring house groups. He applied the terms "brother" and "sister" not only to his immediate brothers and sisters, but to his cousins, near and remote, of the same generation . . . . As tom grew older, he became cognizant of an astonishing number of uncles, aunts, grandfathers and grandmothers, of endless brothers-in-law--far and near. He was very much at home in the world. Wherever he turned he could say, "Younger brother, come here!" or "Grand-
father, let me have this .... "Along with his feeling of personal relationship to individuals there grew up in Tom a consciousness of the existence of tribal subdivisions in the village .... Each of the tribal subdivisions or "septs" had its own stock of legends, its distinctive privileges, its own houses in the village .... (Sapir and Swadash, 1955:242).

The fact that the Nootkan is often conscious of himself in contrast to others of his society, however, is indicated by the following observation of Sapir and Swadash (1955:350) who write: "Aside from the elementary problem of making a living, a Nootka Indian's main concern is to earn the esteem of his fellow tribesmen ...." Conscious concern with the self is also indicated by this passage: "The Indians believe that they do not like big foreheads and slim legs, nor do they approve of wide eyebrows, which are narrowed, if necessary, by plucking out some of the hairs. Later on in life Tom was less particular about his natural appearance, having been well 'fixed' by his mother in infancy" (Sapir and Swadash, 1955:236). (Italics mine.)

But this form of self-consciousness, of course, is what I have earlier termed mere self-differentiation and is to be contrasted to the contradistinction of the self, i.e., a negative essence experience. For the general observations of ethnographers do not point to a narcissistic self-preoccupation which marks true alienness. Service (1971:226) writes that ". . . the Nootka are a strikingly lighthearted people
with a highly developed sense of humor. Horseplay, buffoonery, and ribald anecdotes are very common, and satirical clowning is often a motif in otherwise serious ceremonies . . . . All in all the typical personality of the Nootka Indians stands in striking contrast to the gloomy sullenness which has been attributed to other peoples of the northwest coast." And Drucker (1951:279) indicates that "with whatever group a man happened to be living, he identified himself completely. For the time being, he centered all his interests and loyalties in that group, and participated in all its festivities."

The Trobriand Islanders

The Trobriand Islands are a part of a larger system of islands called Melanesia. These coral islands lie just off the southeastern extremity of New Guinea. "The bulk of the Trobriand population lives on one large island, Kiriwina (or Boyowa), which is 30 miles long and quite narrow" (Service, 1971:231). The total population is approximately 8,500 (Austen, 1936:17).

The people live in a number of village communities scattered about the island. Some are located on the coast, others are located inland. "The larger inland villages are typically built on level ground in a geometrical plan. In the center, or plaza, is the level, well trodden ceremonial court and dance ground, the whole area surrounded by a concentric ring of yam storehouses" (Service, 1971:231). Behind these yam houses is
a ring of small domestic dwellings. Located next to these
dwellings is the family's garden plot in which the staple
crop of yams is grown.

The Trobriand population as a whole is divided into four
great clans. Each of these is subdivided into sub-clans or
lineages. The primary social unit is the patrilocal but
restricted nuclear family of husband and wife, and children,
if any. In addition to these social divisions, Trobriand
society is characterized by a stratificational system which
ranks the clans with respect to one another. Each individual
is ranked also, then, according to his clan membership. Ac­
cording to Service (1971:238): "The rank of individuals is
manifested by titles, the right to wear certain ornaments,
and, most important of all, by forms of etiquette."

Villages, too, are ranked with respect to one another
since they contain differentially prestigious persons in
various proportions. Every village has a headman, or chief,
who is the eldest male of the most prestigious clan in the
village. The village in which the eldest male of the most
prestigious clan resides is therefore the highest ranking
village. The village chief receives from each household a
certain quantity of the yams produced but he then later
distributes it through ceremonial functions. In addition,
each lesser ranked village pays "tribute" to the leading
village. "This payment of tribute, however, appears to be
less a payment under duress through force or conquest and more
a payment of kinship obligations" (Service, 1971:239).

From each village subject to him, the headman of the ranking village takes a wife. This wife is always the sister or daughter of the chief of the subject village. Inasmuch as a wife's family has to supply the son-in-law with a large proportion of their produce at harvest time, the ranking chief thereby receives a considerable amount of food. And because the wife is from the ranking family of the subject village, nearly the whole community is involved in this production.

In this way, a chief's prestige may be appraised in terms of wealth—the amount of produce deposited in his storehouse. But this is not his personal wealth, for he redistributes this store to pay for the many services he receives; he has to furnish food for the big feasts and ceremonies to which his far-flung in-laws must be invited.

In this system of redistribution through a chieftain role within the Trobriand society, we once again observe the distinctive trait of these types of societies which serves to characterize them as level 3 types.

Within this overall societal structure, the family exists as a restricted family unit with the wife, a member of another clan, coming to live in the husband's house. This nuclear family unit appears to enjoy a high degree of stability. For the most part, such stability is supported by the fact that the wife's family contributes almost the whole of economic goods and services to her household, including a large amount of yams. Under these circumstances, it is the husband's greatest loss when a separation occurs and he exerts
a good deal of effort usually to reunite with his wife.

But in addition to this structural basis of family stability, there appears to be a rather genuine affection prevailing among husbands and wives. As Malinowski (1935:32) has stated: "The woman, who has no economic inducement to marry, and who gains less in comfort and social status than the man, is mainly influenced by personal affection and the desire to have children." And he states further that "... the husband lives with his wife because he is attached to her and is fond of her, because he was at one time in love with her and married her very largely for that reason" (1935:201). He states, too, that "... young people want to marry, even when they already possess each other sexually, and ... the state of marriage has real charm for them" (1935:80).

Bolstered by social structure, by the positive attitude toward marriage, and by mutual affection between the spouses, "the majority of ... marriages appear to be successful" (Malinowski, 1926:151). Malinowski says: "I seldom witnessed quarrels or heard bad language among married people ..." (1929:133) and "Husband and wife in the Trobriands lead their common life in close companionship, working side by side, sharing certain of the household duties, and spending a good deal of their leisure with each other, for the most part in excellent harmony and mutual appreciation" (1929:109).

But Malinowski reports also that "... naturally there are also less happy unions" (1926:142) and that "Divorce is
not infrequent ..." (1929:142). Despite these reports, however, on the whole Trobriand marriages appear to be quite stable relative to the other societies we have reported upon.

Trobriand socialization of children can only be described as very nurturant, for both the mother and the father share in the children's care and they do so with love, affection and tenderness. Malinowski (1929:523) reports that "The mother stands in a close bodily relation to her child in its earliest years, and from this position she recedes, though only gradually, as he grows up . . . weaning takes place late, and children . . . are allowed to cuddle in their mother's arms and to embrace her whenever they want to." With respect to the father, the relationship with his children appears to be uniquely affectionate. Malinowski (1922:71) states that "The father's relation to his children is remarkable . . . the father is by far the nearest and most affectionate friend of his children." He further reports that "... the father is a close companion to his children; he takes an active part in the cares which are lavished upon them, invariably feels and shows a deep affection for them, and later has a share in their education" (1929:6).

Although the data are insufficient to be highly confident as to the inferences drawn from them, it seems to be of high probability that the typical Trobriand Islander is highly identified with his or her society and does not see himself
as an alien to it and is rarely self-consciously preoccupied with self-conceptions and self-presentation. This is affirmed by the following observations by Malinowski (1929: 391): "The garden magician, the head fisherman, the leader of an expedition, identifies himself to a great extent in ambition, in hope, and in effort, with the communal interest. He is extremely keen that all should go well, that his village should surpass all others, that his ambition and pride should be justified and win the day." Furthermore:

They have no knowledge of the total outline of any of their social structure. They know their own motives, know the purpose of individual actions and the rules which apply to them, but how, out of these, the whole collective institution shapes, this is beyond their mental range. Not even the most intelligent native has any clear idea of the Kula as a big, organized social construction, still less of its sociological function and implications. If you were to ask him what the Kula is, he would answer by giving a few details, most likely by giving his personal experiences and subjective views on the Kula, but nothing approaching the definition just given here. Not even a partial coherent account could be obtained. For the integral picture does not exist in his mind; he is in it, and cannot see the whole from the outside (Malinowski, 1922:83). (Italics mine.)

Family Stability, Socialization
and Alienness in the Level 6 Societies

The Japanese

There can be little doubt that Japanese society is a thoroughly modern, industrialized nation-state and has been
for a considerable amount of time. Major changes in its social structure, however, did not occur until after World War Two, when extensive changes in its legal norms were introduced. We are, of course, primarily concerned with the effects of these changes upon the family.

In this regard, Langer (1966:172) reports that "After the War, constitutional reforms and Japanese civil law broke up the old family system, and replaced it with a more democratic and less authoritarian framework of human and legal relationships." This occurrence follows the trend depicted in previous sections of this study.

But the Japanese family authority pattern is not entirely of a democratic-equalitarian type. Even though its household form has become primarily restricted, it retains some of the features of the extended household. Reischauer (1977:130) reports that: "the nuclear family in contemporary Japan is somewhat less eroded than its American counterpart. Parental authority is stronger, and family ties on the whole are closer." He also reports that "... some three quarters of retired persons still live with their children."

On the other hand, as we would expect from our theory in the previous section, love and affection have come to play a major part in the husband-wife relationship. Langer (1966:177) reports the following:

Most marriages in postwar Japan are neither pure love matches nor the traditional arranged marriages of prewar
Japan, but rather a blend of the two. Sometimes an arranged meeting is the starting point and love follows. In other cases, two young people meet by chance, fall in love, and then arrange to marry each other through the traditional go between. The go between is brought in to assure both families that the prospective partners are compatible with regard to character, personality, education, and family background.

The changing basis of marriage, from a structurally sanctioned union to one of love, affection and companionship, would lead us to expect low family stability in Japan. However, this appears not to be the case. The divorce rate is reported to be only about "a third of that in the U.S." (Langer, 1966:177), which translates to about 17%. This figure is reportedly lower than that at the turn of the century. Even when we consider the fact that the Japanese family structure appears not to have reached a fully companionship-type, this figure is still much lower than our theory might lead us to predict, and we would have to rate Japanese family stability as high. In this respect, then, Japan is definitely a "deviant" case.

Socialization within the Japanese family appears to be highly nurturant at least with respect to infancy. Ishida (1971:51-52) reports the following:

When a couple has children, their interest, particularly that of the mother, tends to be concentrated on the children. The mother generally devotes herself to their upbringing. Even in the case of a family of the new middle class, which represents in many ways the most radical departure from
tradition, it is reported that the mother provides her children with continuous attention. For instance, she usually sleeps with the child, and she carries it on her back when she goes out shopping. This intimate relationship and close physical contact between mother and child is one of the special characteristics of the Japanese family. The intimate relationship continues to exist until the children reach late adolescence, although occasionally they revolt because they feel the close tie with their parents to be a burden.

Although once we learn family stability is high in Japan we would then predict highly nurturant socialization, the fact that we find it in a society as structurally complex as Japan is also a departure from what would have been predicted by our theory. This nurturant form of socialization appears to be continuous with what it was in World War Two or perhaps even traditional Japan (Benedict, 1946:258), and has not changed appreciably. The conditions of modernization, coupled with the fact that the Japanese housewife does not typically work outside the home, have, indeed, seemed to enhance this nurturance characteristic. Quoting from Ishida's observations once again, we learn that "The decrease in the amount of time spent on housekeeping, the result of the introduction of such durable consumer goods as washing machines, has made the housewife's loneliness even more intense. Left alone for long periods, she often tries to alleviate her discontent by lavishing attention on her children. 'Education Fever' and the overprotection of children are the results" (1971:52-53).
In later childhood, the Japanese socialization techniques contain elements that indicate some possibilities of self-disillusionment. Although the period upon which her observations were made are not with respect to modern day Japan, Benedict's (1946:260-264) statements are probably still accurate:

Children are usually weaned after they can understand what is said to them. They have sat in their mother's lap at the family table during meals and been fed bits of the food; now they eat more of it. Some children are feeding problems at this time, and this is easy to understand when they are weaned because of the birth of a new baby. Mothers often offer them sweets to buy them off from begging to nurse. Sometimes a mother will put pepper on her nipples. But all mothers tease them by telling them they are proving that they are mere babies if they want to nurse. "Look at your little cousin. He's a man. He's little like you and he doesn't ask to nurse." "That little boy is laughing at you because you're a boy and you still want to nurse." Two-, three-, and four-year-old children who are still demanding their mother's breast will often drop it and feign indifference when an older child is heard approaching.

This teasing, this urging a child toward adulthood, is not confined to weaning. From the time the child can understand what is said to it, these techniques are common in any situation. A mother will say to her boy baby when he cries, "you're not a girl," or "You're a man." Or she will say, "Look at that baby. He doesn't cry." When another baby is brought to visit, she will fondle the visitor in her own child's presence and say, "I'm going to adopt this baby. I want such a nice, good child. You don't act your age." Her own child throws itself upon her, often pommeling her with its fists, and cries, "No, no, we don't
want any other baby. I'll do what you say." When the child of one or two has been noisy or has failed to be prompt about something, the mother will say to a man visitor, "Will you take this child away? We don't want it." The visitor acts out his role. He starts to take the child out of the house. The baby screams and calls upon its mother to rescue it. He has a full-sized tantrum. When she thinks the teasing has worked, she relents and takes back the child, exacting its frenzied promise to be good. The little play is acted out sometimes with children who are as old as five and six.

Teasing takes another form too. The mother will turn to her husband and say to the child, "I like your father better than you. He is a nice man." The child gives full expression to his jealousy and tries to break in between his father and mother. His mother says, "Your father doesn't shout around the house and run around the rooms." "No, no," the child protests, "I won't either. I am good. Now do you love me?" When the play has gone on long enough, the father and mother look at one another and smile. They may tease a young daughter in this way as well as a young son.

Such experiences are rich soil for the fear of ridicule and of ostracism which is so marked in the Japanese grown-up. It is impossible to say how soon little children understand that they are being made game of by this teasing, but understand it they do sooner or later, and when they do, the sense of being laughed at fuses with the panic of the child threatened with loss of all that is safe and familiar. When he is a grown man, being laughed at retains this childhood aura.

These observations, then, indicate something less than a fully or very-highly nurturant socialization process. Still, comparatively, this process is marked for the most part by a highly nurturant attitude and practice, though it is confined
to the infant years.

The idea that the Japanese person's identification with his or her group is extreme has been widely reported and accepted in the west. When the word is used more or less as the equivalent of "group loyalty" or "altruism," this is probably true, at least much more so than in the U.S. However, our usage of the identification or identity term refers more to the absence of the self-conscious differentiation from and contradistinction of the individual and the group or social category. When we attempt to measure the typical Japanese person's identity with his or her group or social category in this way, we can only come to a somewhat tentative conclusion. The self-consciousness of the individual Japanese, for instance, is very high. It is so high and so frequent that the Japanese consider it a tremendous burden lifted from them when they are able to escape it. These conclusions are supported by the following observations by Benedict (1946: 248-251).

Suzuki, the great authority on Zen Buddhism, describes muga as "ecstasy with no sense of I am doing it," "effortlessness." The "observing self" is eliminated; a man "loses himself," that is, he ceases to be a spectator of his acts. Suzuki says: "With the awakening of consciousness, the will is split into two: ... actor and observer. Conflict is inevitable, for the actor-self wants to be free from the limitations of the observer self. Therefore in enlightenment the disciple discovers that there is no observer-self, "no soul entity as an unknown or unknowable quantity." Nothing remains but the goal and the act that accom-
plishes it. The student of human behavior could rephrase this statement to refer more particularly to Japanese culture. As a child a person is drastically trained to observe his own acts and to judge them in the light of what people will say; his observer-self is terribly vulnerable. To deliver himself up to the ecstasy of his soul, he eliminates this vulnerable self. He ceases to feel that "he is doing it." He then feels himself trained in his soul in the same way that the novice in fencing feels himself trained to stand without fear of falling on the four-foot pillar.

Benedict continues:

Such concepts are eloquent testimony to the heavy burden the Japanese make out of self-watchfulness and self-surveillance. They are free and efficient, they say, when these restraints are gone. Whereas Americans identify their observer-selves with the rational principle within them and pride themselves in crises on "keeping their wits about them" the Japanese feel that a millstone has fallen from around their necks when they deliver themselves up to the ecstasy of their souls and forget the restraints self-watchfulness imposes. As we have seen, their culture dins the need for circumspection into their souls, and the Japanese have countered by declaring that there is a more efficient plane of human consciousness where this burden falls away (1946: 248-249).

Benedict contrasts the Japanese viewpoint of this self-consciousness with that in American culture. She writes:

In Western phraseology, the Japanese in the practice of muga and of "living as one already dead" eliminate the conscience. What they call "the observing self," "the interfering self," is a censor judging one's acts. "It points up vividly the difference between Western and Eastern psychology that when we speak of a conscienceless American we
mean a man who no longer feels the sense of sin which should accompany wrongdoing, but that when a Japanese uses the equivalent phrase he means a man who is no longer tense and hindered. The American means a bad man; the Japanese means a good man, a trained man, a man able to use his abilities to the utmost. He means a man who can perform the most difficult and devoted deeds of unselfishness. The great American sanction for good behavior is guilt; a man who because of a calloused conscience can no longer feel this has become anti-social. The Japanese diagram the problem differently. According to their philosophy man in his inmost soul is good. If his impulse can be directly embodied in his deed, he acts virtuously and easily. Therefore he undergoes, in "expertness," self-training to eliminate the self-censorship of shame (haji). Only then is his sixth sense free of hindrance. It is his supreme release from self-consciousness and conflict (1946:250-251).

The question arises, however, as to whether this extreme self-consciousness of the Japanese reflects true alienness. As we have seen in previous chapters, alienness per se is the feeling of not being a member of the human category stemming from a "negative essence" component of the self-concept. Modal self-consciousness results from this feeling of alienness and is part of the alienness syndrome but is not necessarily to be equated with it. Does the typical Japanese person feel that he or she does not belong, and, if so, is this feeling based on a negative essence?

Our answer must be yes, based on the assumptions of our theory, previously given (see Chapter I). Our position is that self-consciousness is a product primarily of the failure
to actualize self-conceptions, i.e., to affirm our ideal identity and image of ourselves. The attempt at achievement of muga so prevalent among the Japanese—in the theoretical framework of this study—is an attempt to achieve a state of being-cognition wherein the self as object disappears and a unity of self and environment prevails. The degree to which the Japanese strive for this state is, in fact, an evidence of the degree to which they are lacking in it and, concordantly, of the degree to which they lack a sense of identity with others.

In our theoretical framework, then, the Japanese may be characterized as a very highly alienated populace, their self-consciousness representing as it must a differentiation and contradistinction of the self and others. They seek above all to submerge themselves in the group, to attain muga, to attain a spontaneity and spiritual plane of existence that will release them from their almost constant self-surveillance, that will allow them to merge the I with the roles of the society so that they forget the possibility of shame and act habitually.

As we have seen, and as we shall see further in the next section, the Japanese person's search for identity characterizes the American person's plight also. However, they differ in the way in which they attempt to achieve this goal, the Japanese seeking to do so within the group, while the American seeks spontaneity and authenticity outside it.
The United States

Like Japan, there can be little doubt that the United States is a thoroughly industrialized nation-state and has been for even longer. The industrialization of the United States has been accompanied by all of those characteristics representing the modernization process and the implementation of the gesellschaft socio-cultural context: extreme division of labor, rationalization, secularization, bureaucratization, urbanization, etc.

Within this context the American family system may be characterized as neolocal, restricted, and as a democratic-equalitarian structure of authority. It had never been entirely confined to an extended type even during the early history of the society but existed as a variety of types. The extended form was modal, however, until industrialization and urbanization began to predominate in the twentieth century. The nuclear unit then became emphasized and the restricted form came to prevail, based upon love and affection between the spouses rather than upon family alliances.

As has already been implied in the theoretical portion of this study, the American family's stability, as measured by the divorce rate, has declined accordingly. Compared to 1937, when it was 17 percent, in 1957 it rose to 25 percent, in 1977 to 50 percent, and in 1980 it stood at 53 percent. These figures bespeak of a great deal of incompatibility in American marriages and it is the compatibility of the spouses above all
that is the basis for remaining married in this society. Marital compatibility, in turn, seems to be based, not only on the sheer diversity of the populace itself, but upon the changing structure of the family. According to analysts, the institution of marriage in America is in transition (Blackman, 1976:9) and "anything in transition creates instability." Furthermore, "the effect on marriages may be one of confusion and discontent, often resulting in divorce."

Socialization in the American family is carried out primarily by the mother, with the father often acting only as the primary disciplinarian (Fischer and Fischer, 1966:100). In a comparison of American childrearing practices to other cultures, Whiting and Child (1953:305-324) found these practices to be "... extremely low in average indulgence." They state that "the average degree of initial indulgence is found to vary from an average rating of 10 for the Tonala and Doboans to an average rating of 17 for the Siriono. The median is at 13. Our American middle class group has an average rating of 10 ... ."

The studies done by Fischer and Fischer (1966) seem to confirm this observation. They report what appears to be considerably less nurturant practices of childrearing when compared to others in the sample of societies in this study. For instance: "Infants may be fed initially by bottle or breast. Ten out of our 24 sample children were nursed for a time by their mothers. The length of nursing ranged from a few days
to five months, at which time bottle feeding was substituted (1966:67). Furthermore, "Some mothers said they simply could not nurse their babies, while others expressed varying degrees of distaste or revulsion toward nursing" (1966:67).

Less nurturant practices are also revealed in feeding. American children appear to be fed, for the most part, on demand. However, "Although mothers feel that feeding should be enjoyable and weaning an easy and enjoyable experience—they have read this and hear it many times—it is nevertheless true that anxiety is noticeable in both of these activities" (Fischer and Fischer, 1966:71).

American infants tend to sleep in a crib for a year or more and in a separate room. They also tend to spend a good deal of time in a playpen or in a fenced-in yard. The Fischers state that "children learn early in Orchard Town that interaction with others is spaced, separated by periods of withdrawal" (1966:75). More to the point of our analysis, these observers report the following:

In addition to tiring the baby, it is believed that too much social attention can "spoil" him. Certain types of unpleasant behavior, interpreted by adults to mean that the infant wants social attention, are deliberately ignored. Crying is often one of these. The value here is inculcated that people are ready to share time with a pleasant person and are unwilling to spend time with an unpleasant one. Unpleasantness must be hidden from others by means of a social mask or, alternatively, one can withdraw from others.

Such contacts as the baby has with other human
beings are not marked by close bodily contacts as in many societies. There are two opposing needs considered here—one the early need for warmth supplied by close bodily contact, and the other the pleasure in the free movement of limbs. In this society the second is highly satisfied at the expense of the first. Ample clothing also intervenes between mother and child. There are freedom and a certain privacy in this. These things continue to be valued in adult social life. At the same time there are often feelings that something desirable is missing from social relations. Perhaps what is missing is the satisfaction of the need for close contact with another human being.

Non-nurturant, or self-disillusioning, practices are also manifest in childhood:

... children are highly aware that they have graduated from the rank of "baby" and are likely to exhibit considerable scorn of babies, whether a neighbor's child or a younger sibling. This feeling of superiority is the residue of the parents' praise for advanced behavior and their inciting the child by remarks like "Only babies do that. You're not a baby." The frequency of these remarks at this age, however, suggests that in adult minds, at least, there is concern lest the children lapse into babyish ways.

Proper discipline is felt to be especially important for a preschool child, and physical punishment is used more often in this period than at any other time. Initially children respond to the stronger discipline by temper tantrums. With these there is a shift in the parents' feelings toward the child from indulgence to some hostility toward his anti-social acts. Negatives become more common in the parents' speech with the child: "No! No!" (Fischer and Fischer, 1966:77).

These observations, as well as others cited in Appendix
III, lead to the conclusion that, in comparison to the other sample societies, American socialization of children appears to be low in nurturance and self-fulfillment.

With respect to the degree to which alienness exists in American society, documentation of the high incidence of this phenomenon would hardly appear necessary. Indictments of American society on this score abound in its literature, plays, movies and other art forms. The observations of social scientists also confirm it. As Eric and Mary Josephson (1975:9) have put it: "Ours is a self-conscious age. Perhaps never before in history has man been so much a problem to himself." And Lasch (1979:22) states that "Economic man has given way to the psychological man of our times--the final product of bourgeois individualism." He calls this man the "new narcissist" and describes him as "... haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. He seeks not to inflict his own certainties on others but to find meaning to his life. Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of his own existence. Superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds little use for dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the security of group loyalties and regards everyone as a rival for the favors conferred by a paternalistic state." And Schur (1977:1) writes that "Self-awareness is the new panacea. Across the country Americans are frantically trying to 'get in touch' with themselves, to learn how to 'relate' better, and to stave off
outer turmoil by achieving inner peace."

The extent to which this search for inner peace pervades American society is reflected more factually, perhaps, in the burgeoning "consciousness movement" reported by Woodward et al. in Newsweek (Sept. 6, 1976:56-62): "According to one popular handbook on the consciousness movement," say the authors, "there are more than 8,000 ways to 'awaken in North America.' Although techniques vary widely (page 60), all are directed in some way toward releasing the self from the domination of the ego." The goal of the movement, says Newsweek, is "to put seekers progressively in touch with themselves, with others, with nature and--at its most ambitious--with the fundamental forces of the cosmos." Newsweek reports that a "widespread loss of faith in family, church and government" also lies behind the consciousness movement, whose members now number in the "millions," and which represents a "mass movement."

All of these observations add up to a widespread alienness and its associated characteristics in American society: of a high degree of self-consciousness, vague and diffuse anxiety, basic insecurity, meaninglessness and powerlessness, of sham and inauthenticity. Such alienness, however, is not, apparently, as deeply felt as it is among the Japanese for, unlike they, who have sought an institutionalized solution through Zen Buddhism, it is now expressed only as a movement in America. Nevertheless, it is probably true that a high
incidence of the alienness phenomenon prevails.

Conclusion

The data presented here, it must be said, are not the best that would be desired. A question of validity, as well as reliability, of course, arises. Nevertheless, these data provide some evidence of the incidence of each of the variables which they indicate in each of the societies measured. As indicated previously, my intent is to merely obtain some "feel" for the empirical basis of the theory.

We turn, now, to a more systematic analysis of these data in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII:
A COMPARISON OF THE SOCIETIES

Eight societies, ordered by structural complexity, have been described with respect to three variables: family stability, socialization, and alienness. We may now attempt an analysis of the data in a more systematic way to bring them to bear on the hypotheses.

Analysis and Findings

Using the operational definitions in Appendix I and the codes in Table 2, numbers were assigned to each variable in each society based on the author's judgments on the data, some of which was presented in Chapter VII. (The complete data sources are given in Appendix II.) It should be emphasized that these codes represent only an ordinal scale for each variable and only serve to place the society in a higher or lower position relative to the other societies with respect to that particular variable. If the Wintu have a score of 2 on family stability, and the Ojibwa have a score of 1, it does not mean that the Wintu family is two times more stable, only that it is more stable than the Ojibwa in the judgment of the author. The scores assigned by the author to each variable within each society are shown in Table 3.

Somer's $d_{yx}$ was chosen as the appropriate ordinal level, asymmetrical measure of association to test the key hypotheti-
Table 2. Variable Codes

I. Structural Complexity:

1 = very low  
2 = low  
3 = low-moderate  
4 = moderate  
5 = high  
6 = very high

II. Family Stability:

1 = very low stability  
2 = low stability  
3 = moderate stability  
4 = high stability  
5 = very high stability

III. Socialization (non-nurturant vs. nurturant)

1 = very low nurturance  
2 = low nurturance  
3 = moderate nurturance  
4 = high nurturance  
5 = very high nurturance

IV. Alienness-Identity:

1 = very low identity (very high alienness)  
2 = low identity (high alienness)  
3 = moderate identity (moderate alienness)  
4 = high identity (low alienness)  
5 = very high identity (very low alienness)
The matrix of association for each variable relationship is shown in Table 4.

Hypothesis one, stated previously, predicts a negative association between structural complexity and family stability. Scrutiny of the ratings of family stability with respect to

Table 3. Variables and Their Ratings in Each Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society type and name</th>
<th>Var. #2 Structural Complexity ($x_1$)</th>
<th>Var. #3 Family Stability ($x_2$)</th>
<th>Var. #4 Socialization ($x_3$)</th>
<th>Var. #1 Alienness/Identity (y)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Wintu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ojibwa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level 2:</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Cheyenne</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>4. Hopi</td>
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<td>Level 3:</td>
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<td>6. Trobriands</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Level 6:</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Japan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. United States</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1A description of the calculation and use of this measure is given in Loether and McTavish (1974:223-226).
structural complexity in Table 3 shows quite plainly, however, that the prediction does not hold. Calculation of the asymmetrical measure of Somer's $d_{yx}$ in Table 4 confirms this conclusion in a more precise way. This measure is, in fact, .04 for this relation.

This statistic implies very little if any relationship between structural complexity and family stability. A graph of the relationship shows this lack of association more vividly in Table 5.

These findings raise serious questions about our theory of the effect of structural complexity on the family. It would appear from our data that instead of leading to instability, structural complexity of society has little effect on the stability of the family. Yet such a finding flies in the face of much sociological research denoting the trend of instability in the family within the more modernized societies.

Table 4. Matrix of Association ($d_{yx}$) for Variables One Through Four

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Identity (#1)</th>
<th>Complexity (#2)</th>
<th>Family Stability (#3)</th>
<th>Socialization (#4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity (#1)</td>
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<td>.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complexity (#2)</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Stability (#3)</td>
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<td>.76</td>
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<td>Socialization (#4)</td>
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The problem is a problem of theory. When this finding came to light I was forced to return to the sociological literature on the family and found there that, while indeed the more structurally complex societies showed lower family stability, this lower family stability was also to be found in the least complex societies. Family stability was highest in those societies of the middle ranges of complexity. Thus, a curvilinear relationship exists between these two variables rather than a linear one. My knowledge of family theory had simply been mistaken at this point.

This curvilinear relationship is verified by the researches of Nimkoff and Middleton (1971:131-134) and Winch, Grier and Blumberg (1971:134-137). Although these studies were not measuring family stability as I have defined it in

Table 5. Graph of the Relationship Between Structural Complexity and Family Stability
this study, they were measuring family form, which I have in-
cluded as a major part of the definition of family stability.
The nuclear, or restricted, family form was found to be prev-
alent among the less structurally complex societies while the
extended family form was found to be most prevalent among
those more structurally complex.

The extended family form, as Winch, Grier and Blumberg's
(1971) study has shown, is a function of other variables,
such as low migration, property in the form of land, and the
family as a unit of labor. All of these factors, moreover,
are associated with agricultural modes of economy, and the
agricultural mode is itself related to the middle levels of
societal complexity. Hunting-gathering and industrialism
are modes related to levels 1 and 6 respectively. It would
appear that it is the form of economy that primarily affects
family form, and hence family stability, rather than societal
complexity.

If a measure of curvilinearity such as Eta ($E_{yx}$) is ap-
plied to the data of Table 3, a .83 is obtained, showing a
substantial curvilinear relationship ($E_{yx}^2 = .69$).\footnote{Interval level assumptions, of course, are not met for
this measure. Its use here, as with the various statistical
devices generally, is merely for aid in the comparative analy-
sis and in the style generally familiar to most researchers.} Thus,
the data of this table are more in concordance with the socio-
logical literature than with our theory, and the first, linear,
hypothesis will have to be modified in favor of the second, curvilinear, one.

With the modification of the hypothesis in this way we may note from Table 3 and Table 5 two cases which deviate from what this hypothesis would predict. These deviant cases are the Cheyenne and the Japanese. For the Cheyenne, a prediction of moderate family stability would have been in order but, as shown, a very high level of family stability is manifested. For the Japanese, a low level of family stability would have been predicted but they showed a high level instead. These cases, therefore, require some comment.

The Cheyenne, as indicated earlier, have a hunting-gathering economy, but it is not, like the Ojibwa and the Wintu, based on trapping or forest-hunting. The Cheyenne, at the time of the ethnography, hunted the buffalo, and their culture and social structure evolved around this mode of hunting. Such an economic mode requires coordination and cohesion in the society, including the family, even when the whole society was mobile as it followed the herd and even when it had no concept of real property. Thus, the expectation that the Cheyenne would have low family-stability, as predicted by the curvilinear relationship, is not borne out, due, possibly, to the fact that these other factors come into play. The Cheyenne economy, therefore, is quite similar to agricultural economies in that it possesses properties molding the family into a more cohesive and stable unit.
Japanese family stability as a deviant case is perhaps more easily explained. The high stability of the Japanese family may be a result of the society's short history with industrialization. The forces of industrialization perhaps have not had time to have their full effect. There are indications that the Japanese family is becoming less stable as industrialization proceeds. Eventually, Japan, too, will probably fall more nearly upon the regression line.

Turning to hypothesis two, the prediction is made that family-stability will be positively associated with the mode of socialization. Calculation of Somer's $d_{yx}$ shown in Table 4 yields a value of .76 for this relationship, confirming the hypothesis. Considerable predictive power is gained for socialization mode by knowledge of this variable for these eight cases. The relationship is graphed in Table 6.

There are three cases which depart relatively radically from what would be predicted by the theory. The Wintu would have been predicted as manifesting very low to moderate nurturance in socialization yet show a highly nurturant mode. The Hopi would be expected to show moderate to very high nurturance but show a low nurturance instead. The Japanese would have been expected to show very low to low nurturance but a high nurturance was indicated. All other cases fall directly where they would be predicted (the U.S., the Cheyenne) or fall within one level, plus or minus, of what would be ordinarily expected.
Explanations for these deviant cases are required of only the Wintu and the Hopi since the highly nurturant socialization process among the Japanese can be accounted for by their high family stability. The Wintu and the Hopi, however, represent exact opposite cases, with moderate family stability apparently leading on the one hand to a high-nurturant socialization and, on the other, to a low-nurturant socialization. It is this opposition which needs to be accounted for.

A major difference between these two societies that may account for the differences in their socialization modes is the presence of witchcraft among the Hopi. In the data presented in Chapter VII, it was noted that Aberle (1951) had observed the belief in witches, or persons of "two hearts,"

Table 6. Graph of the Relationship Between Family Stability and Socialization
among the Hopi and that such witches could even be suspected among those of one's own family. As for the effects of this belief on the socialization process in Hopi society, it is, of course, passed on to the children as part of the belief system of the culture. Aberle (1951) observed a "grave difficulty" of Hopi children in interpreting the intentions of others leading to their mistrust of others. And, according to Titiev (1971:57) fear and mistrust permeate Hopi life. It is this factor, therefore, not found among the Wintu, that might account for the low-nurturance mode of socialization among the Hopi.

The witchcraft factor is absent, on the other hand, from the Wintu. Thus, it cannot enter into their socialization of children and the childrearing practices of these people are left to be shaped by other factors, including family stability which, although only moderate, is enough, apparently, to promote a highly-nurturant form. It should be noted that the Nootka Indians represent a similar case and offer corroborating evidence.

It should be observed at this point that the witchcraft factor offers itself as another possible explanation of the low-nurturant mode of socialization among the Ojibwa also. Although the Ojibwa possess low family stability, they also possess witchcraft. Whether or not this factor does so have this effect must also be taken into consideration.

Hypothesis three states a positive relationship between
socialization mode and alienness-identity. The $d_{yx}$ computed in Table 4 on this relationship is .64, again yielding considerable gain in predictive power and confirming the hypothesis. The relationship is shown in graph form in Table 7.

The deviant cases for this hypothesis are: the Wintu, who would not be expected to rank this high on identity, but whose high ranking can be explained as a result of the high-nurturant mode of socialization; the Hopi, who would not be expected to rank this low on identity but whose ranking can be explained also by their socialization mode, this time by its low-nurturance; and the Japanese, who, while they would be expected to rank as they do on the basis of their ordinal level of structural complexity, would not be expected to on the basis of their socialization mode.

Table 7. Graph of the Relationship Between Socialization and Identity/Alienness
The only deviant case in this relationship which needs explanation, therefore, is the Japanese. This society, with a highly nurturant socialization process, would have been expected to show high identity. There has to be some intervening variable or variables to produce the different effects that would be expected.

Although it is problematical, conceptually, to see exactly how it could do so, the most likely causal suspect appears to be structural complexity itself. As indicated by Table 4, there is a fairly substantial negative relationship ($d_{yx} = -.36$) between structural complexity and identity, suggesting the possibility of a direct effect on identity by this variable independently of family stability and socialization. The negative relationship indicates that low structural complexity will produce high identity, and high complexity will produce low identity, irrespective of family stability or socialization mode. Again, as to just how it could do this from a causal point of view is quite vague at this point. Nevertheless, the relationship points to some kind of causal relation, or the possibility of it, and it becomes necessary to check it out.

To help determine if the structural complexity variable had an effect, the assumptions of interval level measurement were relaxed and the data were subjected to partial correlation analysis. The correlation matrix is given in Table 8. Again, the relationship between structural complexity and
alienness appears to be fairly substantial at -.514. If variables three (family stability) and four (socialization) are controlled by partialling out their effects on the relation of variables one (alienness) and two (structural complexity), however, the variance of variable one explained by variable two is reduced from .26 to .05. This statistic indicates that structural complexity by itself has little direct effect, if any, on the alienness-identity variable for this set of cases, thus apparently ruling it out as a direct cause of alienness among the Japanese.

In point of fact, this finding supports one of the major propositions of the theory—that the family is the mediating agency of the effects of social structure. The forces operating on personality are, of course, diverse. Still, these forces, if our theory is correct, must have their impact through the family if they are to mold the character structure.

Table 8. Correlation Matrix

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<th>Identity (#1)</th>
<th>Complexity (#2)</th>
<th>Family Stability (#3)</th>
<th>Socialization (#4)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Socialization (#4)</td>
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</table>
of the individual.

While our theory postulates that the effects of structural complexity are mediated through the family by altering its form of integration, reducing its stability, and initiating a non-nurturant form of socialization, the Japanese case would seem to refute this. On the other hand, our findings support the contention of the mediatory function of the family with respect to alienness. We are once again left with the question: How does Japanese society, with high family stability and high nurturance, produce high incidences of alienness? Other factors must be sought as explanans of Japanese alienness, yet it is clear that these must operate through the family group's members in interaction with one another.

Turning to the data presented in Chapter VI, we find that "The Japanese are much more likely to operate in groups or at least to see themselves as operating in this way . . ." (Reischauer, 1977:127-129), and that the Japanese are "... taught to think of [themselves] primarily as a member of a group--family, business firm, professional, and so forth. . . ." (Langer, 1966:28). We also learn that "... there are prescribed and 'correct' norms of behavior in all matters" and that "group interest[s] override that of individuals" (Langer, 1966:29); that, furthermore, the Japanese "culture dins the need for circumspection into their souls" (Benedict, 1946: 248-249), and that "as a child a person is drastically trained to observe his own acts and to judge them in the light
of what people will say" (Benedict, 1946:248).

In Japanese society, then, alienness, as measured by the high degree of self-consciousness, appears to be transmitted to the child by the family simply as it mirrors the larger culture. The constant monitoring and comparing of the self to an ideal among the Japanese is not, then, the result of the early disillusionment of self during infancy but of socialization during childhood as it mirrors the culture of the society itself, of a culture which imposes this self-scrutiny upon the individual as part of its system of values and beliefs. The family is the mediator of this wider cultural characteristic even while, at the same time, it is very stable and its socialization techniques are quite nurturant.

The analysis of the data up to this point has involved the assessment of the relations of the variables horizontally. Where a case appeared to deviate from the causal model presented in Figure 5, I have tried to offer alternative explanations. However, although I have not offered any formal hypotheses in this respect, it is perhaps more germane to the central issue of the study to do some comparative analysis of these societies also on a vertical basis. The central issue I refer to, of course, is the assumption in the sociological literature that it is within the modernized (industrialized, urbanized, rationalized, etc.) societies that alienness will be found.

Scrutiny of Table 3 reveals clearly that this assumption
is not borne out. Two cases stand out as deviant from this expectation. Despite their being communal types of society, both the Ojibwa and the Hopi reveal an apparently high frequency of alienness. Both cases, however, indicate that they do so because of low to moderate family stability, and low to moderately nurturant socialization. The causal process conforms to the hypothesized expectations even though the cases themselves represent unexpected results from the standpoint of classical theory. The implication of these findings for classical theory's central proposition is that it is not necessarily true. The mere fact that a society has not been modernized does not mean persons in that society will not become alienated. Under the condition of lack of a nurturant socialization mode, alienness may result, however this non-nurturant socialization is produced. In both associational and communal societies non-nurturant socialization appears likely to be produced by a high family instability. High family instability, in turn, appears to be produced by the form of economy, being associated with hunting-gathering modes as well as industrialized modes. Low family instability appears to be associated with the agricultural mode.

There is, however, another alternative explanation, already noted, that should be considered again here. It is possible that the source of alienness in these two societies is not in the effects of family instability upon the socialization process but in the effects of witchcraft upon this
process instead. As previously indicated, both societies, the Ojibwa and the Hopi, have the belief in witchcraft in common. It is, then, possible that this factor is the crucial one in bringing about the alienness that has been observed in these societies.

By the same token, just as there is an alternative explanation of alienness in the Ojibwa and Hopi societies, it must also be noted that there is an alternative explanation for the alienness observed in the U.S. As has already been noted in the review of literature in Chapter II, Erik Erikson argues that it is the introduction of rational procedures into the socialization process, interfering with the oral, anal and phallic stages of development of children, which produces problems of identity. Thus, although our data support the hypothesis of family instability bringing this about, Erikson's argument must nevertheless be considered also.

Conclusion

These findings seem to support the theory in general with the following major qualifications:

First, a linear relationship between socio-structural complexity and family stability has to be rejected and a curvilinear relationship substituted in its place. This finding is in accordance with other studies and is thereby more strongly confirmed. The relationship between the family and the larger social structure is obviously more complicated
than I had at first assumed.

Secondly, we must recognize that there are variables other than family stability which affect socialization. The cases of the Wintu, Ojibwa, and the Nootka show that a relatively nurturant form of socialization exists despite the relative instability of the family group, and the case of the Hopi shows that a non-nurturant form of socialization exists within a relatively stable family context.

Thirdly, we must recognize that there are other variables besides that of a non-nurturant form of socialization which can bring about alienness, if not in the fullest sense with which it has been described here, at least with respect to a very basically associated trait, i.e., that of self-conscious control and monitoring of behavior. The Japanese, the Ojibwa and Hopi cases illustrate that this trait can be transmitted to the child through socialization as a result of a particular normative or belief aspect of the culture. This finding would seem to have important implications for our theory, which has argued for the place of the family in the production of the alienness syndrome, but which has deemphasized the possibility that it does so by simply mirroring the culture. For the most part, the causal process has been borne out; nevertheless, these cases show how culture can contain within it various factors giving rise to those traits comprising the alienness syndrome and that this process is not the only way in which alienness arises.
A fourth qualification bears upon the central proposition of alienation theory, namely that the greater complexity of modern society causes alienness. Alienness appears to exist in folk or communal societies and gemeinschaft cultures as well as in the associational societies and gesellschaft cultures. We must recognize that high structural-complexity per se is not necessary to the occurrence of alienness. The causes of this phenomenon are perhaps as likely to lie in the cultural beliefs and norms of the society as these affect the socialization process in the family.
PART FOUR:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

TO THE STUDY
CHAPTER IX:  
A SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

From Chapter I through Chapter VIII, I have presented a theory of alienation and have offered comparative data for the purpose of exploring the empirical basis of certain key propositions in the theory. As has become quite clear, contained within the single term "alienation" is a set of very complex issues. My arguments have often been long and somewhat convoluted. Before attempting to draw some overall conclusions from the study, therefore, it is perhaps a good idea to present a summary of the study at this time. With the outline and main ideas of the study in mind once again, we may then be in a better position to see just what has been accomplished.

In this chapter, I shall present a summary of the major ideas comprising the theoretical portions of this study and will also summarize the findings in the empirical portions.

The Theory

The effort to build a theory of alienation involved first and foremost a clarification of the central term "alienation" itself. As Seeman's (1959) paper had shown, such disparate phenomena as powerlessness, normlessness, meaninglessness, self-estrangement and isolation had all been subsumed under the alienation term by various writers. In addition, there was confusion as to whether the term referred to psychological or sociological phenomena and, within these, whether it was a
state or process. Moreover, there was confusion as to what was alienated from what: man from man, man from "society," man from himself, man from labor, etc.

Because of the normal usage and meaning of the suffix "ion," "alienation" has been construed in this study to refer to the social-psychological process by which an individual becomes alienated from some object of consciousness. Concordantly, the individual's psychic state resulting from this process was referred to as a feeling of "alienness" from this object. The object from which the individual is alienated could be of any kind, but our interests, being sociological, construed the object to be some social category (race, religion, ethnicity, class, etc.) or social group (family, congregation, corporation, etc.). The alienness state then, more specifically, was conceived to be a feeling of not belonging to, not being a part of, some social category or group, i.e., of self-exclusion from one (or more) of these. The opposite of this feeling was one of belonging to, or being a part of, one of these, i.e., self-inclusion within these. This latter feeling was designated by the term "identity," and, concordantly, the process by which the individual reached this state was called "identification."

While it is possible and quite valid for sociological inquiry to be concerned with the alienation of the individual from any social group or category, it seemed obvious that the group or category from which the individual's alienation
could produce such a voluminous literature covering such a variety of phenomena could only be one of absolutely decisive importance to his or her psychological well being. Most of the clinical literature indicated that this object had to be humanity itself. Alienness thus came to be the term designating the feeling of not being fully human, of self-exclusion from and lack of fellow-feeling with others. Alienation, in turn, became the process by which the individual came to feel his or her ahumanness, the process by which he was psychically transformed from an infantile identity with others in society to a feeling of alienness from them. It is this kind of alienness which seemed to be so lamented in the literature and which seemed to be capable of producing the variety of states that have been connected to the alienation term.

From these definitions, it is obvious that self-processes, i.e., the processes whereby the individual attains self-consciousness and the processes whereby the individual constructs his self-conceptions and thereby appropriates objects of the external world into himself, lie at the heart of the alienation process. Since, logically, the individual must exist in a state of identity prior to any alienation process, and since alienation involves the formation of self and self-conceptions, it is thus obvious also that the alienation process is one which must stretch over a considerable portion of the individual's lifetime and begins very early. The in-
individual was conceived to be in a stage of "primary identity" with others during his infancy, from which he was then "alienated" when he became aware of himself as an object during childhood accompanied by an emotional insecurity.

This first phase of the overall alienation process was called the "primary" phase. It consisted of the emergence of the subject-object dichotomy by the acquisition of language, together with an emotional insecurity as a result of modal self-disillusionment. This primary phase of the alienation process could simply continue into childhood as a "secondary" phase whereby the individual could not only distinguish himself from others as an object of his consciousness but could perceive himself as contradistinctive to them. Again, this event transpired as a result of continued modal self-disillusionment by others.

If, on the other hand, the individual's infancy was marked by modal self-fulfillment, then despite the fact that through acquisition of language he became self-conscious, he was not alienated from others but continued his identity with them. This was due to the development of an underlying emotional security rather than an emotional insecurity. It was theorized that these emotional developments were the key to whether an individual took the route of alienation or identification. Repeated self-disillusionment established avoidance behavior, eventually culminating in modal self-consciousness wherein the individual constantly controlled the subjective
self in service to an idealized self-concept. Repeated self-fulfillment established "approach" behavior wherein the individual's self-consciousness operated as an ebb and flow, not overriding and controlling the spontaneous self but acting as partner to it in preserving and pursuing the life process.

With these formulations accomplished it was possible to work out in more detail descriptions of each of the alternative phases and stages as they occurred, i.e., of the original state of primary identity, of the primary alienation and identification process, of the secondary alienation/identification process, and of the states of secondary alienness and identity respectively.

The state of primary identity was conceived to be a state of consciousness in which the individual made no distinction between himself and others, or of the environment in general. In other words, he or she had no self-awareness. Consciousness at this stage was a continuous, multi-phasic stream of percepts imbedded in images. The term "self" during this stage of consciousness can only refer to the "pure self" or the acting subject, the spontaneous, impulsive "I" of George Mead. The individual's consciousness is unidirectional, irreversible, directed outward or, if upon its own internal states, only as a subject, not as an "object."

The identification/alienation process is the process through which the individual finally achieves an identity with his fellows in society, or conversely, fails to do so. It
occurs social-psychologically in interaction wherein he attempts to actualize the self and is reacted to by significant others positively or negatively. If these others act positively, i.e., if they confirm the actualized self, we speak of self-fulfillment. If the reactions of others are negative, or disconfirming, we speak of self-disillusionment. Self-fulfillment leads to identity, self-disillusionment leads to alienness.

As indicated the alienation/identification process may be broken into two major stages: the primary and the secondary.

The primary alienation process was said to consist of the process of the transformation of consciousness into a reflective, bidirectional, self-consciousness. This is the familiar process described by Mead. The individual acquires language, is designated by name by others and uses personal pronouns. His consciousness is now reversible. By use of symbols he carries the environment in his head and can manipulate the environment symbolically in thought or mental processes. He can take himself as an object from the standpoint of the other; he develops a "me" and can inhibit the "I," controlling and channeling the impulses leading to behavior. He becomes an object to his own consciousness and differentiates himself from the environment.

This development constitutes an alienation process, however, only if it is accompanied by the development of an emo-
tional insecurity. On the basis of this insecurity, the newly acquired consciousness of self may inhibit impulse and force it into the service of the externally enforced requirements of significant other persons. This is the beginning of true alienness, for, through their sanctioning of subjective self-actualization, others can force the individual to impose upon himself a control over the subjective-self by the objective-self in order to avoid self-disillusionment. Sanctioning patterns within the socialization process thus determine how the newly emerged consciousness of self may function. If these patterns are nurturant then emotional security is more likely and the individual tends toward identification with others. If they are non-nurturant, then alienation from others is more likely.

The emergence of self-consciousness marks the beginning of the secondary stage of the identification/alienation process. With further development into childhood, the individual begins to construct self-conceptions. Not only can he take himself as an object but he can endow the object with certain attributes (construct an image) and can consciously identify himself as a certain kind of person, i.e., a father, a brother, a teacher, a farmer, a warrior, a hunter, etc., (identity). He also carries the cultural ideals connected to these identities and measures his real self against this ideal self the differences from which he derives his level of self-esteem. Self-fulfillment and self-disillusionment are now
contingent on the "presentation" of self, i.e., the individual's actualization of the stereotypical or idealized self with respect to the status-role system of the society, and the sanctioning patterns of others ensuing such presentation. Again, if these patterns are nurturant, then the outcome of the secondary process is a state of identity while a non-nurturant pattern produces alienness.

Secondary identity, as a psychological state, was characterized as the feeling of belonging to, a fellow feeling with, others of one's society. This feeling leads to a form of consciousness called "being cognition," after Maslow, typified mostly by its lack of modal self-consciousness. Secondary alienness referred to the individual's feeling of not belonging to or not being a part of his society and leads to a state of consciousness called "D-cognition" (again after Maslow), typified by a modal consciousness of and defense of the self-concept.

At the heart of secondary alienness is the development of a contradistinction between self and others, i.e., a feeling of "negative essence," or of being subhuman or abnormal. It is this feeling which promotes modal preoccupation with the self-concept. Conceiving of himself as abnormal, unlovable, the individual cannot accept his "real" self but must strive to reach an ideal, be something else, admired, or feared, or loved, or attempt to rise above it in a form of stoicism. He is preoccupied with being something other than
what he sees himself to really be.

From this basic trait, others, comprising an "alienation syndrome," emerge. These are the traits which occur over and over in the alienation literature: meaninglessness, powerlessness, self-estrangement, sham inauthenticity, narcissism, being "on stage," "other direction," etc. They all stem from the basic feeling of negative essence and alienness and are connected in this way though they are not alienness per se.

The detailed descriptions of these phases and stages of the identification/alienation process and their attendant psychological states laid the groundwork for the further development of the theory through an attempt at accounting for the socio-structural causes of alienation. The identification/alienation process was considered to be a social-psychological process occurring within a socio-cultural context. The problem was to identify the context within which the alienation process arose and to describe the conditions giving rise to it.

Borrowing from the already existing literature, the two socio-cultural contexts of communal society (gemeinschaft) and associational society (gesellschaft) were utilized. The alienation process was said to arise under associational society's conditions. This was in accord with the overwhelming majority of classical, neoclassical and contemporary sociological theorists. However, in light of the prior theoretical work, modifications of the overall theory had to
be introduced.

The first modification was with respect to the immediate locus of the alienation process. For the most part, sociological theories of alienation, stemming from Marx, had located this process in the economic institutions of the society. To do so, however, one must presume that such institutions can have the rather drastic and far-reaching psychic effects described in the alienness syndrome, or else one must be dealing with a different kind of alienness. With respect to the state of alienness described in this study, it seemed highly unlikely that changes in economic institutions under associational society could produce such effects except only indirectly. Only a long term process of self-disillusionment, starting in infancy, can produce the basic feeling of negative essence and alienness from others. As an adult—the only period in which economic institutions can have a direct effect—the individual can select, ignore or refract the self-implications of the interactions of others. The only institution which has direct access to the individual during infancy and which can therefore have the drastic effects which the term alienness reflects, is the family. It was in the family that the alienation process was located. More specifically, alienation had to be a part of the socialization process within the family, for it is this process that accounts for character formation in the individual. Somehow, the socialization practice of the family had to have had
incorporated in it a pattern of disillusionment.

Assuming that the family had not possessed this feature originally, and rejecting the possibility that disillusionment would be a deliberate act on the part of parents, it was reasoned that the sources of disillusionment in the socialization process had to lie in the wider socio-cultural context beyond the family, specifically in the changing functional relations between the family and other institutions. These changing relations, it was reasoned, impacted on the family in such a way as to introduce modal self-disillusionment in the socialization of the offspring.

To understand these changes and their impact on the family, a theory of socio-historical change was presented. This theory postulates six structural levels of society, each level more complex than the others. Although there is not an exact correspondence, the gesellschaft form of cultural values was theorized to emerge roughly parallel to the emergence of level 4 in complexity. The full development of this system of values occurs in the modern nation-state.

It was theorized, again borrowing heavily from already existing theory, that with the rise of the nation-state and the gesellschaft culture the family was transformed from a patriarchal-authoritarian and extended type to a democratic-equalitarian and restricted type. The latter was presented as less stable in the sense that its divorce rates would be higher, and that the husband-wife relationship would be
based almost solely on emotional attachments and therefore more volatile, than in prior states of societal development. This instability, in turn, was the key factor in bringing disillusionment into the socialization process. It disrupted it, bringing about neglect. It presented the children with perceptions of unloving parents, a breach of the cultural ideal. It produced anxiety and insecurity from the confusion and strife of conflict and the possibility of a change in parent relationships. All of these were postulated as fertile ground for self-disillusionment, from which arose the feeling of negative essence and alienness.

The Cross-cultural Comparison

A comparative analysis of the theory was devised by selecting a sample of eight societies which were classified into the structural categories. Societies representing level 4 and level 5 which yielded data of face validity on the variables could not be found. Utilizing ethnographic and historical sources, the variables of family stability, socialization, and alienness were measured. Three major hypotheses, the disconfirmation of which would seriously discredit the theory, were examined.

$H_1$: The greater the structural complexity of a society the lesser will be the stability of the family.

$H_2$: The lesser the stability of the family the lesser the nurturance of the socialization process within it.
H₃: The less nurturant is the socialization process, the greater the individual's feeling of alienness from others.

The findings suggested that the first hypothesis had to be modified. Instead of a linear relationship between societal complexity and family stability, a curvilinear relationship was found. Family stability was found to be associated more with the type of economy than with structural complexity. Agricultural economy accounted for family stability more than any other variable.

The second hypothesis was confirmed. Only two cases out of eight, the Wintu and the Hopi, were deviant. An explanation as to why these cases deviated from expectations was said to involve cultural variables rather than purely structural ones, witchcraft being the variable speculated upon, and said to produce the low-nurturance among the Hopi.

Hypothesis three was also confirmed with only one deviant case. The Japanese were found to be very alienated from one another but were found to have a moderately nurturant form of socialization and a highly stable family. The alienness of the Japanese was also partially explainable as an effect of their culture. It was said that Japanese culture prescribes almost constant circumspection and self-surveillance, and is transmitted through the family and its socialization process without the necessity of family instability or low nurturance being present.

It was concluded that these findings supported the theory
generally with certain qualification. First, a linear relationship between structural complexity and family stability was replaced by a curvilinear hypothesis. Second, both socialization and identity/alienness were seen to be brought about by other variables than those hypothesized. These variables were, namely, cultural variables, but they were not entirely specified in any great detail. Thirdly, the major proposition of alienation theory was shown not to hold. Alienness did occur in two communal type societies. In both of these cases, either family instability or witchcraft could be posited as the causal variables.

In addition to these hypotheses an analysis of the data with respect to the central proposition of alienation theory was undertaken. This proposition was that the structure and culture of associational society was the primary cause of alienation and alienness. While the hypotheses previously examined revealed the causal process by which this was to occur, and while they were in the main verified, the question remained as to whether this central proposition was true. The test of this proposition was in whether alienness could be found in other than associational societies.

Two communal societies did show such alienness. Both, however, conformed to the causal process hypothesized. The conclusion was that associational society in and of itself is not necessary nor sufficient to produce alienness. Where there is non-nurturant socialization, individuals may become
alienated from others.

This low nurturance was traced to the practice of witchcraft among the Hopi. By the same token, since witchcraft was also practiced among the Ojibwa, this factor could have caused the low nurturance in socialization among them also and hence alienness. Witchcraft at least becomes a rival factor with family instability for the explanation of the degree of nurturance in these societies and therefore of alienness.

These findings point to another possible alternative explanation of the cause of alienness to the one presented here. Where the present theory postulates structural complexity as the major cause of alienness through its effects on the family and socialization, an alternative explanation may be that it is the cultural values, beliefs and norms affecting socialization directly that accounts for alienness. Among the Ojibwa and the Hopi, it may be witchcraft. Among the Japanese it may be the emphasis upon the group over the individual. Among the Americans, to use Erik Erikson's (1963) thesis, it may be the emphasis on rational and routinized child-care norms.

With this brief summary in mind, we may now attempt to bring the study to a conclusion by assessing the degree to which its major purposes have been served. These assessments will be made in the next chapter.
The first purpose of this study has been to present a theory of alienation capable of bringing coherency and order to the field of alienation studies, a theory free of the criticisms leveled by Feuer (1969) and others that the concept is so ambiguous and vague that it is scientifically worthless. As a major substantive area in sociology, such criticism of the alienation concept, if true, renders a great proportion of work in sociology as invalid.

A second purpose of this study has been to present some comparative data on the major proposition of alienation theory, namely that it is the transformation of traditional, folk-type societies into modern, "associational" societies that brings alienation about. It has been Kaufman (1970) who has criticized alienation theory in this way, i.e., as being "historically blind."

It is time now to bring the study to a close by making some assessments as to whether or how well these purposes have been accomplished. In this concluding chapter, I shall once again divide my comments into those concerning the theoretical portions and those concerning the empirical portion.
Conclusions to the Theoretical Portion of the Study

Theoretical ambiguity and vagueness can be taken care of easily enough by defining one's terms carefully to refer to one specific phenomenon or thing. This has been done with regard to the term "alienation" in this study. But the criticisms of Feuer and others imply problems in the alienation field requiring more complex solutions than a straightforward nominal—or even operational—definition could effect. These criticisms imply a field in utter chaos, so amorphous and in shambles as to deserve the scrap heap. My purpose in this study therefore was more extensive than to simply define a term in a non-ambiguous and non-vague way for my personal use. It was also to derive a definition in such a way as to show how it would fit or be compatible with other definitions in the field and bring them within a common orbit. My purpose was to get at the essence of the alienation phenomenon, to reduce the concept to its bare bones, but at the same time retain the richness with which it has been used.

The attempt to do this was based on the belief that most of the problems in the alienation field continue to exist as the result of artificial semantical barriers and that there is in fact a single thread running through most alienation studies despite the way in which the term "alienation" has been defined or conceived. The isolation and tracing out of this thread is what I had in mind in the theoretical work.
In doing so, I hoped not only to solve the problems of ambiguity and vagueness per se but to reach solutions to those problems which were themselves products of this ambiguity and vagueness and which continue to fragment the field and to elicit the almost derisive criticism of various writers.

There were thus two sets of problems in this study with which the attempt to build a respectable theory of alienation contended. The first set had to do with certain semantical difficulties which plague the term. The second set had to do with certain substantive issues in the construction of the theory itself once these semantical problems were overcome. I shall try to draw some conclusions as to the success or failure, the strengths and weaknesses, etc., in the solutions put forward in this study to these problems, beginning with the semantical ones.

As I have indicated, there are four such semantical problems: (1) the problem of whether the term refers to subjective or objective phenomena; (2) the problem of whether the term refers to a state or a process; (3) the problem of whether the term refers to a single, unidimensional or multidimensional phenomenon; and (4) the problem of whether the term refers to the relation between the individual and a particular object or a diversity of objects. The solution of these problems was seen as an absolute must, a first prerequisite, in bringing some coherency to the alienation field and thereby directing efforts toward more substantive theoretical issues.
as well as toward empirical research and substantiation.

The first solution put forward in the theory dealt with the subjective versus objective controversy. This issue appeared to be the most volatile and therefore the most important. According to the theoretical solution presented, alienation phenomena are primarily social-psychological but these phenomena are products of objective social conditions and processes. Each area constitutes different levels of analysis. Thus, the Marxist oriented writers and the so-called empiricist writers, if they adhere to this line of thought, can each take their respective places in the scientific study of alienation. The Marxists will continue to work at a macro-level (and therefore a more abstract level) seeking the sociological conditions producing alienation. The empiricists, on the other hand, will continue to work at the micro-levels, analyzing in a social-psychological tradition. Each, however, both the Marxists and the empiricists, must keep an interested eye on the other, recognizing the complementarity of their approaches and continually striving for connectedness.

The problem of the reference of the alienation term to either structural or processual phenomena, a problem not so widely recognized as the others, was next addressed in the

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1If they at the same time engage in social criticism and activism so be it. The brilliant social-scientific contributions of Marx could probably not have occurred had he not been animated by passions of a critical and bitter sort.
theory. This problem has lesser consequences than others, perhaps, because the usage to which the term is put is usually relatively clear in context. Still, it is inconvenient as well as sometimes confusing to have the term function both ways. The use of "alienation" to refer to the process, and the use of "alienness" to refer to the state, I believe, eliminates this problem.

Another semantical problem is that of whether the term is unidimensional or multidimensional. Seeman's categories of powerlessness, normlessness, isolation, meaninglessness and self-estrangement have all been posited as dimensions or related aspects of alienness. This problem, too, is resolved by the theory, which shows how these various attributes, while not being alienness *per se*, are products of it and cohere around it. If researchers recognize these attributes as *products* of alienness, rather than alienness itself, much confusion and futile work will be eliminated. At the same time, there is no reason to ignore studies involving these characteristics done in the past, for their connectedness to the alienation phenomenon is assured. The effort to trace out just how these attributes are connected must continue.

The problem, too, of the object from which the individual is alienated has, I believe, been adequately addressed. As shown in the theoretical work, the self extends to all objects in the environment which the individual appropriates as his own. No matter what object, i.e., whether labor, the
product of labor, other persons, etc., the same self-processes are involved as sub-processes within their alienation. This idea is crucial and central to the idea of alienation. In this study, I have selected other persons as the object of alienation, but all that I have said about alienation from persons may be said about alienation from other objects. The object selected is simply a matter of interest to the researcher and the details of its identification with or alienation from the self have to be worked out.

The solutions to these semantical problems which I have advanced here, I believe, are capable of comprehending and unifying the diverse efforts of researchers in the alienation field, whether they are Marxist or empiricist oriented, whether they focus on statics or dynamics, whether they research alienness per se or some derivative thereof, or whether they focus on persons as the objects of the alienation process, or on labor, the product of labor, or culture, etc. Each particular study can take its place with respect to whatever particular facet of the alienation scheme it pertains to.

The second set of problems with which this study contends was of a substantive nature and was, in fact, shaped by the solutions to the semantical problems. It was only after these semantical problems were solved that the substantive issues themselves were more clearly revealed. If we define alienation as a process, for example, and alienness as the state following this process, it would seem logical that
there must exist an initial state of identity between the subject and the object from which he is being alienated. By the same token, the process of this alienation must be delineated into its phases and the dynamics and interrelations of these phases described. The end result of this process, the alienated state, must also be described. Finally, if we posit a socio-cultural and socio-historical context within which the alienation process occurs, this too must be described and the connections between these contexts and the alienation process must be specified. It is obvious, too, that the opposite side of the alienation process, i.e., that of identification, must be worked out in each of its corresponding aspects.

Four major substantive categories have thus been created as a result of our previous semantical work: the category of primary identity; the category of the identification/alienation process itself; the category of secondary identity and alienness; and the category of the socio-historical context of alienation. A review of the literature revealed problems in each of these areas. Nowhere in the literature, for example, was there any description of the primary or initial state of identity or even, for that matter, any conceptualization of it. Although there had been some attempt at description and treatment of the identification/alienation process, it was too amorphous and not directly connected to alienation studies. The description of the state of alienness had been dealt with rather extensively in the literature but was mired in the uni-
dimensional-multidimensional controversy. There was extensive
treatment of the socio-historical context and causes of alien-
atation and alienness also, but these efforts were extremely
abstract and diverse.

What I have attempted to do in this study is fill these
voids. Taking each problem sequentially, I tried to work
them out, preliminarily in Chapters I and II, and more ex-
tensively in Chapters III through VI. From this perspective,
a brief review is again in order.

First, I have attempted to describe the original or
primary state of identity of the subject and object. Because
the individual is not objectively self-conscious at this stage
of development a state of identity obtains. Secondly, I have
tried to describe the identification/alienation process. Pri-
mary alienation occurs through acquisition of language by
which the subject object dichotomy arises. The self is now
seen by itself as separate and differentiated in an object-
sense from other objects. But the self can now reappropriate
these objects into itself and they can become once again
identified.

In this study, I have designated the object as the status-
role. Reappropriation of the status-role integrates the indi-
vidual into society, uniting him with other persons either as
a member of the same status-role or as a member of a recipro-
cal social-relationship. The reappropriation of the status-
role occurs via the self-actualization process in which the
individual is self-fulfilled, i.e., confirmed by others that he is this kind of person. Conversely, he is kept from re-appropriating these status-roles (is further alienated) by self-disillusionment, i.e., a disconfirmation of his attempt to be this kind of person.

Thirdly, I have tried to describe the alienated and identified states. Continued self-disillusionment results in a contradistinctive self-conception, the core of which is a feeling of negative essence, i.e., the feeling of abnormality, of defective humanness. This feeling engenders a constant self-preoccupation and an attempt at overcoming it. It also engenders feelings of isolation, powerlessness, meaninglessness and self-estrangement. The core of the feeling of identity, on the other hand, is that of positive essence. It promotes the opposite kind of traits than those of alienness.

The fourth substantive problem I have tried to solve is that of the causal connection between the wider socio-historical context and the alienation process. I have tried to preserve the major proposition of alienation theory by tracing this cause to the structural transformations of society, but I have tried also to make the causal connections clear. Thus, the theory postulates that as societies become more complex the family becomes less stable, socialization becomes less nurturant, and alienness more frequent. This causal process was seen to remedy certain defects in alienation theory stemming primarily from Marx's emphasis on productive activity as
essential to self-actualization and fulfillment.¹ This emphasis rather severely limited the self-actualization and fulfillment spheres and attributed to productive activity far more importance than seemed warranted. It also limited the effects of social structure to the late adolescent and adult years since this is primarily the time in the life cycle when the economic institutions can have their effect. Although these institutions must certainly be given their due, to invest them with this much psychological import is to fall into the over-socialized-conception-of-man error and fail to acknowledge the importance of the family, the church, the school, etc., in character formation. Economic, political, and other institutions were seen as having their effects indirectly, through the family.

I believe the solutions put forward in the four substantive areas of alienation theory have the potential, at least, of rescuing alienation theory from the criticisms of vagueness and ambiguity, of being unscientific, normative and merely social criticism. I believe, moreover, that if these ideas and conceptualizations are adhered to, they will serve as the framework within or around which the vast diversity of the literature on alienation may be organized and related. They are not the final answers but they can perhaps serve as a

¹This is one of Marx's major criticisms, i.e., that he posits a certain essential need for work in man's nature.
start toward a fully developed social-psychological, and sociological, theory of alienation.

I shall now make some final comments upon the empirical portion of this study.

Conclusions to the Empirical Portion of the Study

The purpose of the empirical portion of this study at its beginning was to "test" the major proposition that the transformation of communal (or traditional or folk) society into associational society brought about alienation and alienness. The causal process postulated in the theory was that, through increasing structural complexity in which functions originally performed by the family were transferred to other groups, the family was transformed into a companionship type, its stability depending primarily upon the love and affection felt between the spouses rather than upon functional necessity. This social-bond, being weaker, reduced the stability of the family. This instability led to a non-nurturant form of socialization which led to alienness.

Because only eight cases could be found which provided measures of alienness with some face-validity, a comparative method was used. Control of extraneous influences, therefore, was quite limited. This portion of the study, in other words, suffered from all the shortcomings of comparative methodology and thus a true test, in the scientific sense, could not be
accomplished.

For this reason, this portion of the study should be viewed primarily as exploratory and illustrative. My intent was to obtain some "feel" or "notion" of the empirical basis of the theory and not necessarily to verify it strictly according to the canons of science. As soon as I began perusing the ethnographic and historical accounts of these societies I knew this was going to be impossible.

I believe that some feel for the empirical basis of the theory has been established. The criticism of the lack of historical perspective put forward by Kaufman has been addressed. It may be said that, from our sample, it appears more likely that alienness will be found in associational type societies than in communal type ones with notable exceptions. The causal process by which this occurs has been, also with notable exceptions as well as with at least two alternatives, illustrated and, within the sample, supported. It remains, of course, to support these hypotheses in a more scientifically rigorous way, and, as for myself, my intention is to do so. I would hope that this study might be a stimulant to such efforts on the part of others as well.
APPENDIX I:
DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALIZATION
OF CONCEPTS

There have been many concepts used in this study and each has been to a greater or lesser extent defined in the body of the study where they were used. For purposes of replication of the empirical research portion of the study, however, the following definitions and operationalization of the four major concepts and variables measured are offered.

Concept Number One:
Structural Complexity

This concept is defined as the degree of specialization and differentiation in, for example, the economy, the polity, the religion, art, etc. Service (1971:490-491) states that by "structural complexity" he means "simply . . . more parts to the whole, more differentiation or specialization of these parts within the whole." In this study I have used Service's system of classifying societies into structural categories, though I have not used Service's labels for these societies and have substituted elements of my own. To some degree, the categories have been defined already in the text (see Chapter VI) but for purposes of replication the following, more precise definitions are given.
Level 1:

Societies classified into the first level of structural complexity in this study are distinguished from other levels by the absence or very insignificant incidence of any form of structurally integrating mechanism other than kinship. This form of structural integration is shared by all societies but it is the major one at this level. As Service (1971:492) has said: "... the integration is primarily personal and largely familial. ..." He states further (1971:493):

A residential group of cooperating families can establish ties, by means of intermarriage, with other residential groups so that amiable relations, consistent forms of etiquette, and perhaps cooperation in economic endeavors and warfare is engendered. Thus kinship ties structured by various marriage rules are the integrating mechanism . . . . The social bodies, the parts of the society, the differentiation of persons into statuses, and so on are all familial. There arise, of course, certain persons like curing shamans, "mighty hunters," and "dangerous men," but each one of these statuses is personal and idiosyncratic, disappearing when the person disappears. Social differentiation makes parts and statuses in the society that exist irrespective of the particular personnel who fill them. In [level 1] . . . society these are familistic differentiations; every person is one or another kind of consanguinal or affinal relative.

Level 2:

Societies classified as level 2 have larger populations, more subdivisions and additional forms of structural integra-
tion. Whereas the structure of level 1 societies consists of a simple, physically aggregated, or residential, familial unit, at level 2 there are multiples of these units, composing "segments" of the total society. These segments are united, not only by a common culture, but also by new social categories which serve to commonly identify members of the society located in different geographical areas. We may refer to these specifically as "clans," "age grades," "kin-dreds," "secret societies" or "... clubs for such single special purposes as the curing of illness or the performing of particular ceremonies. These all serve to unite persons who are members of different residential units" (Service, 1971: 494-495).

According to Service (1971:495), the rules of exogamy and marital residence operative in level 1 societies cannot serve to hold the population together as the residential units are increased. At the same time, there is no domination of one unit over another; therefore, the new social units are the only mechanism by which the residential units remain tied together in a socio-structural sense.

According to Service (1971:495), even though societies classified as level 2 in this study are more structurally complex, they remain "... egalitarian in that no one of the families or residential groups is politically superior or more powerful in hereditary rank than any other." Furthermore, the differentiation of structure "... has not been
carried to the point where there are separate bodies of political control, full economic specialization (other than that based on the universal age-sex differentiation), or even true religious professionals like members of a priesthood as distinguished from shamans." Service (1971:495-496) states that these societies consist of segmented, corporate residential units "... which are alike, largely economically self-sufficient, generally equivalent in size and organization, and autonomous in large measure." While these societies are more structurally complex than level 1 societies in terms of the multiplication of their parts, "... they are not strikingly advanced in specialization of parts."

**Level 3:**

The classification of a society into this structural level depends on its possessing a truly specialized division of labor such that the new units formed are not merely segmented but differentiated. This development constitutes the major integrating device in these societies. Service (1971:496) states: "Differentiation and specialization, creations of functionally discrete rather than identical parts, have an enormously integrating effect because the various parts become interdependent."

But this development, i.e., specialization and differentiation is not the only characteristic demarcating this structural level from others. There is also the existence of
a different social-status, i.e., that of the chief. It is through this status-role that the products of the specialized division of labor are distributed throughout the society, and it is through this status-role that additional integration is achieved.

Service (1971:496) makes the point that exchange of goods at levels 1 and 2 complexity is "... typically reciprocal; gifts are given from person to person and group to group with the expectation of return gifts sooner or later. An important feature of this latter kind of exchange is its directness; there is no intermediary." But at level 3 there "... is a kind of delayed, indirect movement of goods from producer to the redistributional center and later to the consumer" (Service, 1971:496-497).

This redistribution function of the chief's role devolves upon him a certain amount of power, though still minimal when compared to a state's power (which marks the next level of structural complexity). This differentiation of power demarks another important characteristic of these societies. As Service (1971:496) has put it:

The rise of centralized leadership involves a rise in the prestige of the person holding the office of chief. This prestige attaches to relatives of the chief, depending on genealogical nearness; and as time goes on, the status becomes hereditary. Thus, we find that not only unlike parts have arisen in the society but also unlike persons. This is to say that chiefdoms are typically nonegalitarian; they are
characterized by differences in the hereditary rank, permanent higher and lower status of persons and their families, in addition to the universally human age-sex status differentiation.

Level 4:

The distinguishing characteristic of the next level of structural complexity is the existence of a state structure, i.e., an institutionalized system of status-roles and groups which monopolizes coercive power. Service (1971:498-499) states that this level of structural complexity is distinguished from the other levels "... by the constant threat of force from an institutionalized body of persons who wield it. A state constitutes itself legally: it makes explicit the manner and circumstances of its use of force, and it outlaws any other use of force as it intervenes in the disputes between individuals and groups."

Another distinguishing structural characteristic is the formation of politico-economic classes within the society. Service (1971:498-499) states that at lower structural levels there are differences in rank and that the society may be "... conceptually divided into two or three broad social ranks..., but these are merely social." These social distinctions among such less structurally complex societies are "... fostered by sumptuary rules, certain items of dress and ornamentation; and perhaps certain kinds of food are reserved for one... [social rank] and tabooed in another"
(Service, 1971:499). But at level 4, rank "... become(s) an aspect of political and economic differentiation as well as social. Thus the aristocracy are the state bureaucrats, the military leaders, and the upper priesthood. Other people are the producers." Full-time professionalization in arts and crafts also develops, and the artisans can be regarded as still another socioeconomic group" (Service, 1971:499).

**Level 5:**

Level 5 is the civilizational level and is distinguished, among other things, by the presence of writing and mathematical notation. This category is reserved for such ancient social entities, therefore, as China, India and Mesopotamia, and, for those entities following after these, historically, such as Egypt, Crete, Greece, and Rome. Such social entities are more complex than those of level 4 in terms of size, territory and the sheer heterogeneity of the population. Also, new status-roles are added, such as scribes, which have to do with the advent of writing and other developments in jurisprudence, theology, military science, etc. Perhaps one of the more important distinctions at this level is the presence of truly urban areas, though they are still preindustrial. Nevertheless, at this level the society manifests a true distinction between an urban and a peasant culture. Agriculture, however, is the prevailing mode of economy.
Level 6:

This level is marked off from the others by the existence of a much larger population, though the territory may be smaller. Also, at this level there is the existence of an industrialized economy which is the primary cause of an extreme division of labor. Bureaucratic structure is the reigning form of organization and the society is controlled and integrated by a highly institutionalized political state. The concept of "nation" is used and applied by the members of the society and it is thought of as a "sovereign" state. Generally speaking, at this level, the population is mostly urban and a large class of blue-collar and white-collar laborers make up the bulk of the work force.

Concept Number Two:

Family Stability

To be considered as most important in the assessment of family stability is whether the family household is of an extended or restricted type, i.e., whether three or more generations make up the household or whether it is comprised of only two generations and whether these generations are geographically proximal to one another or distant. The reasoning here is that an extended household is more stable because the family's functions are more easily retained the larger is the number of persons in the household or at least the greater is the physical proximity to one another so that
the labor comprising these functions can be shared.

Of importance also is the divorce rate as well as the degree of conflict in the husband-wife relationship. Thus, statements as to the quality of the spouses' relationship, i.e., as to their love and respect for one another, their loyalty to one another, their acts of kindness or of cruelty toward one another, are to be assessed and given their due in the rating of this variable.

Also to be considered as part of this concept, especially as it is related to the divorce rate and the quality of the husband-wife relationship, is the degree to which family roles are well defined and unchanging, or, as Burgess and others (1971:8) have said, the degree to which the family roles remain clearly perceived and cognized as determined by the existence of traditional norms, specified duties and obligations and existence of strong social pressures. The existence of a clear set of norms comprising the roles of the husband and wife are thus important indicators of family stability and statements of the observers to this effect are to be considered in the assessment.

Concept Number Three:

Socialization

Socialization in this study is conceived to vary as to the degree to which it is self-fulfilling or self-disillusioning, i.e., the degree to which it provides the individual off-
spring with experiences which confirm or deny his or her actualization of self. We restrict our measurement in this study to the observations made during infancy (about the first two years to three years) and during childhood (from about two years to twelve years), based on our theory that these are the crucial years for personality development.

"Self-actualization" is used in two senses here: Since we theorize that the infant, prior to his or her acquisition of language, has no objective self-awareness, the actualization of self during this phase of the life-cycle can only refer to the attempts to gratify the needs of the organism through the impulsive "I" component of the self. During the childhood phase of the life-cycle, of course, we can refer to the attempts to fulfill the self-motives proper, i.e., to the attempt to establish and confirm an identity and image and a certain level of esteem by way of the "me" component of the self.

Because it is somewhat traditionally improper to speak of self-fulfillment in the first sense, I have substituted the terms "nurturant" and "non-nurturant" to refer to socialization of a self-fulfilling type in both senses, and to socialization of a self-disillusioning type, respectively. In point of fact, however, the terms are equivalent.

The measurement of socialization is based on statements by the original observers as to the degree of warmth and affection generally provided by socializing agents to the infant/child. Of great importance for infancy are statements about
tactility, weaning and feeding, cleaning, disciplining, and of the acceptance of or hostility toward offspring. Statements about the "tenor" of the parental relationship with their offspring during childhood are important to this assessment. Also, any statement indicating the attitude of parents toward their children as well as any actions toward them which imply to the child in a very explicit way something about him or herself.

A nurturant form of socialization is indicated when:
(1) there is a significant amount of tactility during socialization; or (2) when weaning is not imposed early but allowed to cease at the will of the infant/child; (3) when feeding is by breast rather than by other means; and (4) when food is given on demand rather than on schedule or arbitrarily at the whim or caprice of the socializing agent; (5) when a high degree of concern for the child's physical welfare is indicated by attending to its physical cleanliness and warmth; (6) when the child is not subjected to ridicule or duped, or is not frightened; and (7) when discipline is not overly harsh and is lacking in hostility toward the child but is intended to correct "bad" behavior.

This list of indicators is not presented as an exhaustive set but as merely suggestive of the kinds of observations to look for in the historical and ethnographic materials.
Concept Number Four:
Alienness/Identity

Alienness is an individual's feeling of not being a bonafide member of some social category or group based on a perception of himself as being unlike the members of this category or group in some way. In this study, alienness is conceived to be a person's feeling of not being a full member of humanity based on his or her perception of himself or herself as being different in some way so as to disqualify him or her from full status as a human being. I call this perception a "negative-essence."

While they are to be distinguished from alienness per se, several attributes appear to be highly coordinate with this feeling: (1) self-preoccupation, i.e., a constant consciousness of self and how one is presenting oneself, a high degree of affectation, a high degree of contrived, non-spontaneous behavior, engagement in sham and "inauthentic" behavior; (2) a feeling of powerlessness, i.e., a feeling of not being the source of one's own actions, of having these actions determined by others. This is a feeling, essentially, of a lack of autonomy, of being pushed or pulled by others' expectations or by the need to please others such that one does or says things for their benefit rather than for the intrinsic pleasure of the behavior or for one's own benefit; (3) a sense of meaninglessness, i.e., a diffuse anxiety, or vague dissatisfaction with life without being able to pinpoint the source,
a feeling of "emptiness," or of a sense of life as a void, a sense of depression the reason for which the individual cannot state.

Identity, as the polar opposite, is the individual's feeling of being a member of humanity based on a perception of oneself as being like others in the requisite ways. It leads to a lack of self-consciousness or self-preoccupation, to authentic, spontaneous, non-affectatious, non-contrived behavior. It is coordinate with a sense of purpose and meaning to one's life. It manifests a lack of anxiety based behavior, a lack of vagueness and of emptiness. Moreover, the individual indicates a feeling of autonomy and power over his actions, a sense of control over his or her own destiny.

Indicators of alienness *per se* are not a usual part of the ethnographer's reports and so a great deal of reliance upon indicators of these other collateral traits, i.e., modal self-consciousness, powerlessness, meaninglessness, etc., is necessary as a part of the measurement of this concept. The basic thrust remains, however, to assess the degree to which individuals in a particular society are "extricated" from their society in their own consciousness. Dorothy Lee's (1959:131-132) statement that "when speaking about Wintu culture, we cannot speak of the self and society, but rather of the self in society" is extraordinary in its clarity, whereas Malinowski's statement that the average Trobriander has "... no knowledge of the total outline of any of their
social structure" and that ". . . he is in it, and cannot see the whole from the outside" is probably adequate but certainly provides less confidence in the validity of its use in reaching a conclusion of the state of identity for these people.
APPENDIX II:
THE SAMPLE, ETHNOGRAPHIC SOURCES AND PAGE NUMBERS

Below are listed each society comprising the sample, the ethnographic or historical source from which the data were extracted, and, for each variable, the page number where the original citation(s) may be found. Persons desiring to replicate this study may use these data sources, or the sources are available from the author in collected form. Each source is quoted here only sufficiently enough to allow the reader to obtain the full information from the bibliography.

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<th>Var. No. 4 Socialization ((x_3))</th>
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