

Chinese and World Cultural Models of Developmental Hierarchy

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Abstract:

Prior research on cultural models of developmental hierarchy finds broad agreement among publics in diverse countries about the rank ordering of countries on perceived level of development, based on an omnibus measure of development. In this research, I use a multidimensional measure of world hierarchy to explore dimensionality in models of global hierarchy. A detailed analysis of the Chinese model of hierarchy identifies content domains where country-specific models of hierarchy differ from world cultural models. Irrespective of the national attributes evaluated, Chinese respondents produced very similar hierarchies on each six different indexes. The Chinese model of hierarchy shows broad overlap with the world culture model, suggesting that an omnibus measure of developmental hierarchy is sufficient to measure global hierarchy. Notable differences between Chinese and world cultural models of hierarchy indicate that Chinese respondents hold especially negative views of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and India, and unusually favorable opinions of Russia. Analyses also show that respondents from 19 countries ranked China higher on the cultural dimension than any other dimension but ranked the Chinese government *lower* than all but one other country. Statistical analysis reveals that the data exhibit over-time stability and strong association with alternate measures of developmental hierarchy.

Introduction:

Development is, among other things, a socially constructed cultural model. The developmental cultural model is an expansive worldview that provides people with a mental framework for understanding the world, how and why it is changing, and the role and status of people and places within the larger world system. This model posits a global hierarchy, with nations ordered according to their perceived societal values, social institutions, modes of living, geography, and cultural attributes. Developed societies are defined as being democratic, capitalist, urban, technologically advanced, scientifically rational, innovative, pluralistic, and educated, among other things. Societies that deviate from the standard model of what constitutes a developed society were, in an earlier era, pejoratively labeled backward, uncivilized, or primitive but these days are assigned to categories such as less developed, developing, or third world (Swindle 2016; BBC 2016).

The writings of social scientists from the 17th century to the present have used various hierarchical schemas to describe and evaluate cultural groups, with a common theme across schemas that all societies can be placed on a ladder, or continuum of development, ranging from low to high (Spencer 1851; Tylor 1871; Smith 1937; Lerner 1958; Nisbet 1969). The nations of northwest Europe have been viewed as the apex of development for centuries, with other nations believed to be at lesser stages of development (Rostow 1960, 1971). The developmental slope that places non-Western countries, cultures, and regions at less advanced stages of development typically flows from northern countries to southern countries and from western countries to eastern

countries (Wolff 1994; Todorova 1997; Melegh 2006; Csánóová 2013; Melegh et al. 2013).

Contemporary research on developmental hierarchy suggests that the writings of social scientist and the programs and policies of the world polity have successfully disseminated hierarchical beliefs about countries and cultures throughout the world. Survey data collected in many different countries have produced a growing body of evidence in support of a common understanding of the rank ordering of countries on development (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al. 2013; Csánóová 2013). That is, when asked to rate countries by level of development, respondents from countries as different as Argentina, Bulgaria, Egypt, Nepal, Taiwan and the United States constructed very similar hierarchies that were also highly correlated with objective measures of development such as the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI). The strong association between subjective and objective measures of developmental hierarchy points to the existence of a universal and cross-nationally invariant understanding of hierarchy that appears to be strongly influenced by developmental schemas.

To date, studies of developmental hierarchy have primarily documented the cross-national uniformity of beliefs about the rank ordering of countries and their strong association with objective measures of development such as the HDI. Relatively understudied are instances in which country-specific global deviate from the common, cross-national model of hierarchy that has been documented in prior research. I give special attention to the structure of the Chinese model of hierarchy and ways that Chinese respondents differ from respondents in other countries in the how they

subjectively evaluate countries. China represents a unique and important case to further our understanding of several as-yet unexplored subjective dimensions of hierarchy. China stands out as one of the largest countries in the world in areas such as population, economy, and geographic footprint, for example. China also stands out as the largest non-democratic government in the world and one of the oldest of world cultures. Chinese culture is steeped in a legacy of empire and has exerted a strong regional influence that has often involved resistance to many elements of, and proscribed pathways to, societal development.

For example, the developmental cultural model places high value on democratically elected governments and protection of human rights and free speech. China has forged a unique developmental trajectory based on a planned market economy directed by a non-democratic government and has at times actively spread its model to neighboring countries (e.g. North Korea, Vietnam). The Chinese model of development has involved resistance to calls from world polity actors to expand freedoms of speech and press, afford greater protections for political dissident, and other democratic reforms. Such positions stand in stark contrast to the ideal-type model of development espoused by the world polity whereby socioeconomic development occurs in tandem with economic liberalization and democratic political reforms. China's distinctive and successful approach to socioeconomic development raises the possibility that Chinese citizens have a different understanding of global hierarchy, especially as related to markets, governance and culture. For this reason, I also give special attention to the ways in which world raters subjectively evaluate Chinese culture, government, economy, and people.

A close inspection of China within a developmental hierarchy framework sheds light on the criteria people use to evaluate countries and illuminates conditions in which respondents sometimes deviate from the global model of hierarchy. Deviations such as those involving subjective evaluations by Chinese respondents provide meaningful insights into the cognitive nature and organization of global hierarchy. The purpose of this research is to answer three interrelated questions:

1. What is the structure and dimensionality of the Chinese model of global hierarchy?
2. How distinct is the Chinese model of global hierarchy, relative to the world cultural model?
3. How do publics around the world evaluate China on a wide range of national attributes?

To date, however, our understanding of cultural models of global hierarchy is based on data collected from an omnibus question which asked respondents to evaluate countries on development without providing a definition of development (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al, 2013). As a result, we still know little about the dimensionality of beliefs concerning global hierarchy, despite knowing a great deal about the content of the larger developmental idealism cultural schema (see, for example Thornton, Dorius and Swindle 2015). Left unanswered is the degree to which the general structure of global hierarchies varies according to the national attributes being evaluated. Reliance on an omnibus measure of global hierarchy means that we also do not yet know how sensitive the measurement of global

hierarchy is to the survey context (e.g. question wording, rated countries, country order, attributes rated).

I leverage a unique dataset containing a large number of measurements of global hierarchy derived from surveys fielded among respondents in 20 societies, including China. Respondents in each society evaluated 50 countries on a large number of attributes. From these data, six indexes were constructed and countries were ranked ordered, by index, into global hierarchies. With six indexes, 20 surveyed countries, and two occasions of measurement, the data contain more than 200 hierarchies, each comprised of 50 countries. The large number of global hierarchies contained in these data greatly extend the number of study populations and measurements of global hierarchies over previous studies, allowing for a more rigorous test of the universalistic claims of developmental idealism concerning global hierarchies.

The structure of the paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, I review literature concerning developmental culture and models of hierarchy, including the historical and contemporary origins of the world cultural model of global hierarchy. In section three I describe the data used in this research. In section four I report results of analysis of the Chinese and world cultural models of hierarchy.

Developmental Culture

Cultural models

Cultural models, or worldviews, are mental maps that guide people in everyday life and provide instructions for how to navigate social life. Cultural models specify desirable end-states and means for achieving such ends. These cultural schemas (Collett and

Lizardo 2014; Sewell 1992; 2005; Swidler 1986; Vaisey 2009) come in all shapes and sizes, but we most commonly associate them with religious worldviews, national and sub-national cultures, and political ideologies, each of which are an expansive and constrained network of attitudes, beliefs, and values (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993). One such cultural schema, referred to as developmental idealism (Thornton 2001, 2005) relates the attitudes, values, beliefs, attributes and behaviors of individuals and societies to the concept of development.

Developmental idealism (DI) is a cultural model comprised of many related attitudes, beliefs, and values about life and social change. As far as cultural models go, DI is a particularly expansive one. This developmental worldview includes beliefs about personal matters such as when and who to marry, when and how many children to have, the benefits of school attendance, and the desirability of modern lifestyles (Allendorf and Thornton 2015; Lai, Qing and Thornton 2015; Kavas 2015, Kavas and Thornton 2013; Thornton 2012). The model posits, for example that late age at marriage, low fertility, high education, and urban life are valued features of modern life and that the attainment of such attributes will produce many more desirable outcomes associated with developed societies. DI culture teaches that modern life is both good and attainable. Modern societies are understood to be organized around democratic social and political institutions and the principles of free-market capitalism. In DI culture, modern societies are identified by their built urban communities, advanced technology, and educated, healthy, and wealthy citizens. DI culture also includes a large number of causal beliefs about how to achieve the good life and how to become a developed society. These causal beliefs include positive, reciprocal relations between development

and such things as gender equality, education, freedom, democracy, and human rights, to name a few (Thornton, Dorius and Swindle 2015; Thornton et al 2016, this volume).

The values of the developmental worldview have strong overlap with many of the foundational elements of world culture. For example both DI and world culture place high value on equality, individualism, scientific-rationality, personal freedom and human rights, democratic self-government, and the desirability of societal progress and development (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997; 1999; Schofer et al. 2012; Krücken and Drori 2009). One reason for the strong coincidence between the DI worldview and world culture (Boli and Thomas 1997; 1999) is that the institutions of the world polity have been active and productive disseminators of world culture *and* developmental culture (Boli and Thomas 1999). Developmentalism and world culture are embedded in governmental and non-governmental organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank, in national constitutions, world conventions and treaties, and in the now globalized western mass education system (Baker and LeTendre 2005; Benavot et al. 1991; Benavot and Riddle 1988; Meyer et al. 1977; Meyer et al. 1992). Another area in which development culture and world culture are similar is that they are both transnational secular cultures. Developmental culture and world culture span time and space, are seen as universally relevant to, and prevalent in, nations with very different religious and cultural histories. The worldwide scope and prevalence of DI culture give it numerous opportunities to effect the direction, pace and uniformity of global social change.

Developmental Hierarchy

A central feature of the DI culture is developmental hierarchy: A commonly held set of beliefs regarding the rank ordering of countries in terms of their perceived level of development. Ranking nations is as old as the concept of the nation-state, but ranking people and cultures in terms of their level of barbarity or civility dates back even further (Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1969; Pagden 1982). Social and political writers of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries frequently rank ordered cultures into various taxonomies (Condorcet N.d./1795; Ferguson 1980/1767; Hobbes 1991/1642; Locke 1988/1690; Malthus 1986/1803; Millar 1979/1779; Smith 1937/1776). European cultures and people were typically labeled modern, civilized, developed, or enlightened in such taxonomies, while non-western cultures and people were associated with savagery, barbarism, underdevelopment, brutishness, and traditionalism.

Swindle's (2016) extensive historical analysis of such terms, which he refers to as 'developmental keywords', demonstrates that they have been pervasive in published material for the last three centuries. To be sure, some developmental terms have fallen out of fashion (e.g. uncivilized, barbaric) and been replaced by less pejorative terms, though some have had a longer shelf-life (developed, modern) than others (second world, third world, less-developed). Other investigations of developmental keyword prevalence have reached similar conclusions, finding that developmental terms have been prevalent in books, magazines and international venues such as world fairs and conventions for quite some time (Bennett 2004; Brantlinger 1985; Kuklick 1991; Lutz and Collins 1993; Nisbet 1969; Preiswerk and Perrot 1978; Qureshi 2011; 2012; Sturge 2014). Many developmental keywords, including some of the 'old terms' no longer viewed as appropriate in contemporary developmental discourse, are active and

prevalent in modern social institutions. In India, for example, social groups are classified into backward and forward castes. Backward classes are those in a low social position in the traditional cast hierarchy and forward classes are defined in terms of their relative level of social and economic advancement. Such fundamental institutionalization of developmental thinking and extensive use of developmental key words is highly suggestive of public exposure to the concept of developmental hierarchy in many locals.

The importance of keywords and categories of development/modernity for the present research is described aptly by Swindle (2016: 10), who states that “categorical labels for groups of people construct and reinforce social worlds of distinction in human imagination” (see also Bourdieu 1991). As I discuss below, developmental keywords and related concepts are ubiquitous in the survey data analyzed in the present research. The extensive use of developmental keywords in survey instruments increases the likelihood that the developmental schema and its attendant attitudes, beliefs, values, and stereotypes are activated by the survey context.

Hierarchy in World Development Culture

These days, world polity organizations such as the United Nations routinely publish data that rank order countries according to various attributes of modernity. The most well-known of such data, the Human Development Index (HDI), has been published annually since 1990 and has been widely disseminated. A person interested in downloading the latest HDI ranking data from the United Nations (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/data>) will, in a matter of moments, have no less than 17 league tables ranking countries on development, a raft of poverty indexes, demographic and health outcomes, educational achievements, and economic attributes. In addition to

providing rankings and other quantitative metrics on more than 150 nation-states, the UN organizes countries into developmental categories, including very high development, high development, medium development, and low development. The HDI is just one of dozens of global hierarchies constructed by the world polity and disseminated globally. Popular ranking systems include the Freedom House Index, the Polity IV Project, Transparency International's Global Corruption Index, Moody's Sovereign Credit Ratings, and the Henley & Partners Visa Restrictions Index. The pervasiveness of global rankings and developmental categories in popular discourse is one among many ways in which world citizens are exposed to the concept of developmental hierarchy (Thornton, Dorius, and Swindle 2015).

As noted earlier, survey research indicates that respondents from diverse countries construct strikingly similar developmental hierarchies, regardless of respondent's nationality, age, sex, or education (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al. 2013). The consistency of results across different samples, surveys, and methodologies has led some developmental scholars to assert that developmental hierarchy is a fundamental and essential element of the developmental idealism cultural model (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al. 2013; Thornton, Dorius and Swindle 2015). The present research goes a step farther to suggest that the near-saturation level visibility and dissemination of global rankings, developmental keywords, and other notions of developmental hierarchy by world society actors and institutions (e.g. education, the press, World Bank, United Nations) implicates global hierarchy as a fundamental element of world development culture.

To foreshadow the empirics that follow, I find that publics in 20 countries constructed nearly identical rankings of more than 50 countries on six different dimensions of the nation-state, including a nation's people, government, products, investment climate, tourism appeal, and culture. In combination with the hierarchies that were collected from publics in 13 countries as part of the Developmental Idealism studies, the additional measurements presented below suggest that world development culture has facilitated the dissemination and entrenchment of a common model global hierarchy that is now a fundamental feature of contemporary world culture. Such uniformity of beliefs concerning global hierarchy raise questions about when, where, and to what extent national cultures deviate from the world cultural model of hierarchy.

Development is a complex and multifaceted concept that has expanded beyond a narrow focus on economic growth to a much more exhaustive definition that includes demographic behaviors, social structure and institutions, political institutions, and culture. Developmental idealism research shows that people have internalized similarly complex understandings of development that involve preferred forms of government (democratic), standards of living (healthy and wealthy), complexity of the built environment and social life (urban cities), and the perceived modernity of a country's people (gender equality and freedom of speech and movement), to name a few. Such complex and multi-faceted understandings of development suggest that beliefs concerning developmental hierarchy may also be multi-dimensional and vary by content domain (e.g. culture, people, economy, governance).

One way to test such assertions would be to ask respondents to rate/rank countries on essential attributes of development such as political institutions, economic

systems, standards of living, and demographic regimes. To date, however, our understanding of cultural models of hierarchy is based on surveys which asked respondents to rate countries on development using an omnibus question that did not provide a definition of development (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al, 2013). This research shows that citizens in many different countries and cultural traditions share a common understanding of developmental hierarchy, but due to the question wording, it is unclear if developmental hierarchy is the only form of global hierarchy in the DI schema or if the structure of global hierarchy varies by the content domain being evaluated by survey respondents.

China and Developmental Hierarchy

China is distinct among world powers in several important ways. Perhaps the most notable way China deviates from the developmental model of a 'modern' country is with respect to governance. China has navigated a unique developmental trajectory that favored communist governance over democracy, the latter of which is the preferred form of government in world development culture. By rejecting democracy and many of the very outcomes that the international development community has long argued are necessary ingredients for successful development (e.g. free speech, human rights), China embodies an alternate model of modernity. The Chinese economy, which in contemporary form practices socialist market economics featuring strong state intervention, is another area where China stands apart from most other large, industrial countries. Importantly, the Chinese economy has produced a historic, sustained GDP growth rate over many decades (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009) that poses a significant challenge to neoliberal economic assumptions of dominant international development

agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In their analysis of Hungarian media, Csánóová et al. (2016, this volume) found that China featured prominently in news coverage, sometimes positively and other times negatively. China was viewed as a powerful and economically important country with a vibrant industrial base. The Chinese government was portrayed negatively in the areas of democracy and human rights and also in areas related to the environment, such as pollution and natural disasters.

A third way in which China stands out among contemporary nation-states is its rich and well-preserved cultural history and its claim to one of the oldest of world civilizations. Its cultural heritage is a tremendous draw among world travelers, such that China ranked third in the world in international tourism receipts and fourth in the world in annual tourists arrivals (United Nations 2015).

In short, there are a number of reasons to expect that Chinese respondents hold distinctive views concerning global hierarchy, owing to China's rich cultural heritage and unique and successful developmental strategy. Indeed, China stood out among 13 countries that participated in a larger study of developmental beliefs (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al. 2013) as one of just three countries whose citizens gave their own country marks on development that exceeded its HDI rating. Chinese citizens to respondents in many other countries. Public ratings of China's level of development exceeded its HDI score in every surveyed country, which indicates that distinctive perceptions about China extend beyond Chinese citizens. Data from the DI studies also indicate that Chinese respondents view their neighbors in East Asia differently than do respondents from countries in other parts of the world: Chinese

respondents gave below average ratings to Japan and Taiwan—among the largest deviations between subjective ratings and the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) scores.

A detailed inspection of China addresses several as yet unanswered questions regarding cultural models of global hierarchy. As noted earlier, the purpose of the present research is to answer three interrelated questions. In the first, I explore the structure and dimensionality of the Chinese model of global hierarchy. I conduct formal tests of association between the rank-ordering of countries on each of the six global hierarchies constructed by Chinese respondents to assess multidimensionality in national (country-specific) models of world hierarchy. I then report stability estimates that compare the structure of global hierarchies collected from Chinese respondents in 2008 and 2009. Research on a panel of Taiwanese students (Thornton et al. 2016 in this volume) concludes that reliable measurements of developmental hierarchy can be obtained at the individual-level and at the level of public opinion, but we otherwise know little about the stability subjective measurement of hierarchy at the level of public opinion. The test-retest estimates reported below extend our understanding of the over-time stability of public measurements of world hierarchy.

In the second, I ask how the beliefs of Chinese citizens concerning global hierarchy differs from the beliefs of world citizens. To answer this question, I compare the structure of Chinese global hierarchy to the structure of global hierarchy constructed by respondents in 19 other countries. I then compare the Chinese model of global hierarchy to two external measures of developmental hierarchy, including the HDI and

subjective country ratings on development collected as part of the Developmental Idealism Studies (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al., 2013).

In the third, I ask how world publics score China on a wide range of national attributes. To answer this question, I analyze the distributions of a larger number of public measurements of hierarchy collected from a cross-nationally diverse array of countries. These data identify two national attributes in which publics scored China far from its overall position in the global hierarchy.

METHODS

Dependent Variables. Dependent variables for this research come from the 2008 and 2009 *Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brand Index* studies (Anholt-GfK 2015). The Nation Brand Index (NBI) studies administered an annual survey in 2008 and 2009 to approximately 1000 respondents in a core panel of 20 countries, amassing just over 40,000 completed questionnaires. Respondents age 18 and older with internet access were administered an ex-post standardized (Granda, Wolf, and Hadorn 2010) web survey containing identical questions and response categories. The data from study country were weighted to reflect key demographic characteristics (e.g. age, gender and education) and the indexes are thus representative of the online test-taking population in each study country. As is typical of internet populations, respondents are overly representative of rich, educated, and urban citizens. The composition of the sample is unlikely to substantially affect the results of the present study because prior research on developmental hierarchy finds little meaningful variation in subjective national rankings by respondent income or education (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013).

A common set of 47 countries were rated by respondents in 2008 and 2009 and an additional six countries were evaluated in one or the other year, but not both, for a total of 53 rated countries (see Table 1 for countries). With the exception of China, all survey participants also evaluated their own country.

Table 1. Surveyed publics and ranked countries, by world region

<i>Region</i>	<i>Surveyed publics (n=20)</i>	<i>Ranked countries (n=53)</i>
North America	Canada, United States	Canada, United States
Western Europe	France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, United Kingdom,
Central/Eastern Europe	Poland, Russia, Turkey	Russia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Turkey, Romania
Asia-Pacific	Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea	Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, New Zealand
Latin America	Argentina, Brazil, Mexico	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru
Middle East/Africa	Egypt, South Africa	Angola, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates

NOTES: The following countries were only rated in one year: Angola (2009), Columbia (2009), Iceland (2008), Kenya (2009), Nigeria (2008), and Norway (2008).

The NBI studies were modeled on a theory which posits that places (cities, regions, states, countries) have brands and that the brands associated with places are similar in form and function to brands associated with products, celebrities, and firms (Anholt 1998, 2007, 2010). Place branding theory, and its acronym, public diplomacy, suggests that the nation brand is comprised of six dimensions, including: exports (products), the immigration and investment climate, governance, the local people, tourism, and national culture and heritage.

Respondents in the NBI studies completed a questionnaire in which they evaluated each of 50 countries on a large number of attributes (see Table 2 for question wording). The majority of responses were collected using seven-point Likert scales in

which seven indicated strong agreement and one indicated strong disagreement. A small number of questions presented respondents with a list of adjectives and asked them to select the one they most strongly associated with each evaluated country. Between the Likert-scaled questions and the word association questions, more than 50 measurements were collected on each of the 50 evaluated countries by each respondent.¹ The study's authors used a subset of these questions to construct six additive indexes—one for each dimension of the nation brand. The survey questions comprising each of the six indexes are listed in Table 2 and are organized by index.

These data yielded just under 12000 country rankings, from which I constructed 240 hierarchies comprised of 50 countries (six indexes in each of 20 study countries over two years of data collection). Rankings on each index range from 1 to 50. I reversed scaled these rankings into country scores such that the highest score identifies the top ranked country and the lowest score identifies lowest ranked country.

Questions on the *Immigration & Investment* index asked respondents to evaluate each country as a place to live and work, to study, to make business investments, and in terms of the quality of life and equality of opportunity afforded in each country. Respondents were also asked to associate the words ambitious, backward, declining, developing, forward-thinking, isolated, modern, and stagnant with each rated country.

The *Products* index asked respondents to evaluate countries as producers of science and technology, as creative places with cutting edge ideas and new ways of

¹By randomly assigning respondents to evaluate 25 countries from a larger list of countries, a total of 50 nations were rated by half the panel for a total of 500 ratings per rated country on each attribute. In Egypt and Turkey, where respondents are not as familiar and experienced with online surveys, survey length was reduced, resulting in each nation getting approximately 250 and 400 ratings respectively.

thinking, and in terms of intent to purchase goods and services from each country.

Questions on the *Products* index also asked respondents to associate the words advertising, automotive, crafts, agriculture, banking, fashion, film and television, food, high technology, and oil with each rated country.

Word associations on the *People* index included aggressive, fun, hard-working, honest, ignorant, lazy, rich, skillful, tolerant, and unreliable. The terms ignorant and lazy were historically common developmental keywords that have since been replaced in contemporary discourse by terms such as rich and tolerant. The remaining three questions on the *People* index are strikingly similar to the well-known Bogardus social distance scale (Bogardus 1933) in that respondents were asked to evaluate nationals as hosts, friends, and employees.

Likert-scaled questions on the *Governance* index asked respondents to evaluate each country as competent and honest, respectful of human rights and fairness, and responsible in the areas of international peace and security, environmental protections, and world poverty alleviation. The *Governance* index contained the following word associations: corrupt, dangerous, reassuring, reliable, transparent, trustworthy, unpredictable, unstable.

The final two indexes, *Tourism* and *Culture*, have a relatively small number of developmental keywords, but the attributes that respondents were asked to consider, including buildings and monuments, a vibrant city life and urban attractions, contemporary music, films, art and literature, modern design, and pop videos, opera, and films, are concepts with strong association to modern societies. Respondents were also asked to rate countries on their success in sports.

Table 2. Survey questions comprising each dimension of the *Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index*

IMMIGRATION & INVESTMENT	
a.	Willingness to live and work for a substantial period in the country (1-7)
b.	Quality of life (1-7)
c.	Good place to study for educational qualifications (1-7)
d.	[country] has businesses I'd like to invest in (1-7)
e.	Equal opportunity (1-7)
f.	WORD ASSOCIATION: Which adjective best describes the current economic and business conditions in [country]? ambitious, backward, declining, developing, forward-thinking, isolated, modern, stagnant
PRODUCTS	
a.	The country's perceived contribution to innovation in science and technology (1-7)
b.	The degree to which the country is seen as a creative place with cutting-edge ideas and new ways of thinking (1-7)
c.	The effect of a product or service's country of origin on people's attitudes towards purchasing it (1-7)
d.	WORD ASSOCIATION: Each country's level of association with the following industries: advertising, automotive, crafts, agriculture, banking, fashion, film and television, food, high technology, oil
PEOPLE	
a.	If I visited [country], the people would make me feel welcome (1-7)
b.	I would like to have a person from [country] as a close friend (1-7)
c.	A well-qualified person from [country] would be a valuable employee (1-7)
d.	WORD ASSOCIATION: Choose the adjective that best describes the people of [country] from among the following: aggressive, fun, hard-working, honest, ignorant, lazy, rich, skillful, tolerant, unreliable
GOVERNANCE	
a.	[country] is competently and honestly governed (1-7)
b.	[country] respects the rights of its citizens and treats them with fairness.
c.	[country] behaves responsibly in the areas of international peace and security (1-7)
d.	[country] behaves responsibly to protect the environment (1-7)
e.	[country] behaves responsibly to help reduce world poverty (1-7)
f.	WORD ASSOCIATION: Each country's level of association with the following adjectives: corrupt, dangerous, reassuring, reliable, transparent, trustworthy, unpredictable, unstable
TOURISM	
a.	Would you like to visit [country] if money were no object (1-7)
b.	[country] is rich in natural beauty (1-7)
c.	[country] is rich in historic buildings and monuments (1-7)
d.	[country] has a vibrant city life and urban attractions (1-7)
e.	WORD ASSOCIATION: Which adjective best describes the experience of visiting [country] from among the following: boring, depressing, educational, exciting, fascinating, relaxing, risky, romantic, stressful, spiritual
CULTURE	
a.	[country] excels at sports (1-7)
b.	[country] is an interesting and exciting place for contemporary culture such as music, films, art and literature (1-7)
c.	[country] has a rich cultural heritage (1-7)
d.	WORD ASSOCIATION: Which of the following are most expected to be produced in [country]: circus, films, modern design, museums, music, opera, pop videos, sculpture, street carnival, sports

NOTES: Respondents selected one word from each word association list that they most associated with each country. All other questions used seven point, Likert response scales. Source: Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (2008, 2009).

What stands out most among the questions listed in Table 2 is their similarity to the attributes of modern societies contained in developmental culture. The language of the word associations, which asked respondents to evaluate countries in terms of how *backward, developed, modern, forward-thinking, ignorant, lazy, rich, aggressive, and educated* they are, is the language of developmental idealism and a nearly word-for-word match of developmental key words (Swindle 2016). Likert scaled questions asked respondents to rate countries on, for example, equality (*Immigration* index, item f), science and technology (*Products* index, item b), human rights (*Governance* index, item c), and the vibrancy of their urban cities (*Tourism* index, item e). Survey research shows that people associate these concepts and many others measured by the questions listed in Table 2 with modern, developed countries (Thornton 2005, Swindle 2016).

Among the six indexes, the survey questions comprising the *Immigration & Investment* and *Products* indexes are the most replete with developmental thinking. Such strong developmentalism in these indexes leads me to hypothesize strong association between this index and independent measures of development such as the HDI. Taken together, the other four indexes are less steeped in developmental keywords, but nonetheless have sufficient overlap with developmental culture that I expect country scores on these indexes will be associated with external measures of developmental hierarchy.

In a study exploring perceptions about the relationship between development and inequality, respondents in six Chinese provinces were asked to rate countries on development and on their level of economic inequality (Xie et al, 2012). The researchers found that respondents were able to produce developmental hierarchies that were

consistent with the HDI, but were not able to accurately rate countries on their level of economic inequality. Instead, respondents rated countries similarly on development and inequality. A study involving respondents in the United States reached similar conclusions (Xie et al. 2012). The authors from these studies concluded that a) respondents in both countries lacked an understanding of inequality and b) that respondents associated high inequality with development, reasoning that in instances when respondents lack information to accurately construct global hierarchies (e.g. rating countries on level of inequality), they simply reconstruct a more familiar hierarchy: In this case, a developmental hierarchy. Based on the findings of the afore mentioned studies, I posit a high level of agreement between the rank ordering of countries on each index, similarly reasoning that even if respondents lack specific knowledge about countries on the rated attributes, they will infer ratings based upon sidewise information such as their knowledge of developmental hierarchy.

Independent variables. I compare the Chinese model of world hierarchy to two measures of developmental hierarchy. In the first, I use the Human Development Index (HDI), perhaps the most widely known measure of development. The HDI measures three dimensions of human well-being, including health, wealth, and education. Health is measured by life expectancy at birth; education is measured using mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling; wealth is measured using gross national income per capita. HDI data were available for all but two countries (Taiwan and Scotland) rated in the NBI studies. Readers who are interested in the technical details of the HDI are referred to the 2015 Human Development Report Technical notes (United Nations 2015).

My second measure of developmental hierarchy is based on subjective measurements collected as part of the Developmental Idealism (DI) studies (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al. 2013). The developmental idealism studies involve 16 independent samples obtained from 13 countries, of which five were nationally representative (Albania, Bulgaria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the United States). The other eight samples were representative of regions or sub-populations (Argentina, Egypt, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malawi, Nepal, and Taiwan). Sample sizes ranged from 484 to 1500. Respondents were asked to rate countries on development using a 1-10 scale where higher values indicated more developed and lower scores indicated less developed.² Respondents were not given a definition of development. Instead, they rated countries according to their (unreported) understanding of what constitutes development.

With the exception of the Bulgarian sample, the list of rated countries was the same for all respondents in a single sample. The lists varied somewhat between samples such that no two countries rated exactly the same set of countries. This was done to ensure that raters evaluated countries with whom they were likely to be familiar. In the Bulgarian study, respondents were randomly assigned to three groups, with each group rating 14 countries (Melegh et al. 2013). Four countries were common to all three country lists, but the remaining 10 countries were only asked to one of the three groups.

² Wording for the DI surveys varied somewhat across study populations, but in most surveys the question wording was “We would like you to think about development in different countries around the world today. We’ll be talking about countries as varied as England and Mongolia. Think of a development scale that rates countries from *zero* to *ten*. The *least* developed places in the world are rated *zero* and the *most* developed places in the world are rated *ten*. You can use both of those numbers for rating countries plus all of the numbers in between. Using this development scale, where would you put Japan?”

This method allowed for a total of 34 countries to be rated without inducing excessive survey completion fatigue on the Bulgarian respondents.

The DI studies collected ratings on 56 countries. China and the United States were rated by 15 samples; India was rated by 12 samples; France and Nigeria by 11 samples; Japan by 10; and Brazil and Pakistan were rated by nine samples. 14 countries were evaluated by at least two samples. Thirty-four of 56 countries were only rated by the Bulgarian sample, due to the more expansive developmental hierarchy question module in that survey.

In the analysis that follows, I document the Chinese model of hierarchy, followed by a comparative evaluation of how 19 publics rated China relative to the other countries on each index. I then report results of two tests of the reliability of the NBI data, after which I show the level of association between global hierarchies contained in the NBI data and measures of developmental hierarchy.

Analysis and Results

Structure and Dimensionality of the Chinese Model of Hierarchy

Table 3 reports country scores of 52 countries that were evaluated by Chinese respondents. The first six columns contain index-specific country scores and the seventh column reports each country's average score across all indexes (data are sorted from high to low by average score). In unreported analysis, I estimated the over-time correlation between country scores on each index—a method for measuring the test-retest reliability of public measurements of global hierarchy in the NBI data—and results indicated that the data were highly stable from one year to the next. Correlations between 2008 and 2009 country scores collected on Chinese respondents were .97

(*Immigration & Investment, Products, Tourism, Culture*), .95 (*Governance*), and .92 (*People*). All scores are therefore report as averages of the 2008 and 2009 data collections.

The eighth column reports variation in country-specific scores, measured as the average of the differences between a country's average score (column 7) and its scores on each of the six indexes. The last two columns report each country's HDI score and DI score, respectively. DI scores were rescaled by a multiple of 10 to make them more directly comparable to the HDI.

Germany received the highest average score (46) among Chinese respondents and Indonesia received the lowest average score (2.8). Nine of the top-ten average scores went to European ancestry nations, and with few exceptions the top-ten countries scored highly on all six indexes. Chinese respondents gave low marks to all four countries located in sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa). Six of the seven Muslim majority country's evaluated by Chinese respondents received an average score that placed them in the bottom third of the distribution (Malaysia ranked 31).

Taken together, the data indicate that the Chinese public holds strongly favorable views of European ancestry countries and strongly unfavorable views of sub-Saharan African countries. In this regard, the Chinese model of global hierarchy is very similar to the world development model of hierarchy, which also places Europe and Africa at the poles of the global hierarchy. It is not clear if the religious composition of countries influenced Chinese evaluations of rated countries, but given China's thorny history with Islam in its western provinces (the government, for example, suppressed an

independence movement among the Muslim Uighur's in the vast northwest province of Xingjiang in 1949), we can at least speculate that Islam had a negative effect on Chinese respondents evaluations of Muslim majority countries.

Among high scoring countries, there were several instances in which the Chinese public gave countries below average scores on one or more dimensions. These include Switzerland, Canada and Sweden on the *Culture* index, the UK, Italy, France and the US on the *Governance* index, and France on the *People* index. The low ranking of France by Chinese respondents agrees with findings from the DI studies, which also found that Chinese respondents rated France unusually low on development (Thornton et al 2012). The NBI data suggest that it was negative views of the French government and people that lead Chinese respondents to rate France somewhat lower on development in the DI studies. The Chinese public reserved its harshest assessments, in relative terms, for the United States and Taiwan (*Governance*), Singapore and New Zealand (*Culture*), and Japan (*Governance* and *People*). The especially low marks of the Taiwanese government by Chinese respondents (8.5) stands in stark contrast to their unusually favorable opinion of the Taiwanese people (41.5).

The unusually low ranking of Japan by Chinese respondents demonstrates that regional relations and the shared histories of countries, cultures, and peoples can influence respondent's evaluations. In the case of China-Japan, the exceptionally hostile relations between the two countries, especially due to the 1895 Sino-Japanese war and WWII appears to cut both ways, because Japanese respondents were even more biased in their assessments of China on the six indexes (unreported results). Chinese respondents were equally negative in their evaluations of Japan in the DI

studies, where Chinese respondents rated Japan lower on development than respondents in other surveyed countries (Thornton et al 2012). The Chinese scores for Japan and Taiwan identify instances in which world cultural models mix with local culture to produce hybrid models of global hierarchy (Thornton, Dorius and Swindle 2015; Thornton et al. 2016).

Inspection of the variance around each country's average score, reported as differences, suggests that the Chinese public holds conflicted views about many of its regional neighbors. Japan, for example, had the largest variation across the six indexes of any rated country (11.6), followed by India (11.3), Taiwan (10.2), Singapore (9.3), and South Korea (7.3). In the case of Japan and India, the high level of disagreement across the six indexes was due to Chinese respondents giving very low marks to the people and governments of both countries. Chinese respondents also gave unusually low marks to the cultures of Singapore and Taiwan. Taiwan also received a very low score on the *Governance* index (8.5). When ordered by variation in country scores, the data shows that four of the top five countries were China's regional neighbors, and a fifth (South Korea), was ranked eighth.

In their study of Bulgarian cultural models of hierarchy, Melegh et al (2013) found a strong, positive correlation between how familiar respondents were with a country and how highly they rated the country on development. Future research will need to explore whether regional proximity affects the ratings of respondents in other countries similarly to the way it appears to have influenced Chinese respondents. At least in the case of China, respondents were far more nuanced in their views of regional neighbors,

perhaps due to greater familiar with neighboring countries, but perhaps also because their shared histories have involved competition and conflict.

Chinese and World Hierarchies

Table 3. Chinese evaluations of 52 countries across six indexes, ordered by average score

Country	NBI indexes						Average Score	Average Deviation	External Measures	
	Immig Invest	Products	People	Govern	Tourism	Culture			HDI Score	DI Score
Germany	46.5	49.0	47.0	46.0	42.0	45.5	46.0	1.5	85.5	84.8
United Kingdom	47.0	48.0	45.0	38.0	45.5	47.5	45.2	2.4	86.5	81.5
Switzerland	47.5	45.0	46.5	49.0	47.5	32.0	44.6	4.2	88.8	88.7
Australia	46.0	41.0	45.5	45.5	48.0	40.5	44.4	2.4	89.8	.
Canada	47.0	40.5	47.0	47.0	42.5	34.0	43.0	4.0	86.7	.
Sweden	42.0	40.5	46.0	47.5	42.5	38.0	42.8	2.7	89.7	79.1
Italy	39.0	41.5	40.5	37.5	48.0	45.5	42.0	3.2	82.9	75.8
France	44.5	46.5	31.0	32.0	47.5	47.5	41.5	6.7	84.8	79.7
United States	47.0	50.0	40.0	17.5	42.5	49.5	41.1	8.2	88.3	90.2
Singapore	46.5	42.5	49.0	50.0	37.0	15.0	40.0	9.3	81.9	.
Denmark	39.0	34.5	41.5	44.0	38.0	35.5	38.8	2.8	86.2	77.1
Russia	30.0	45.5	34.0	35.5	37.0	49.5	38.6	5.9	71.7	64.3
Netherlands	39.0	36.5	36.5	43.0	38.5	36.5	38.3	1.8	87.7	66.4
Spain	34.5	33.0	39.0	33.5	36.0	44.0	36.7	3.2	82.7	73.9
Austria	37.5	31.0	35.5	38.5	37.5	39.5	36.6	2.2	83.6	80.2
New Zealand	40.0	31.5	39.0	42.0	36.0	17.5	34.3	6.6	87.4	.
Finland	36.5	34.0	36.5	41.0	30.5	25.0	33.9	4.1	85.7	.
Scotland	33.5	29.0	32.0	34.5	32.0	32.5	32.3	1.3	.	.
Egypt	19.0	24.0	29.5	27.5	48.0	42.0	31.7	8.9	62.2	62.6
Norway	35.0	31.0	32.0	40.0	32.0	20.0	31.7	4.1	91.7	77.4
Brazil	26.5	27.0	32.0	29.5	28.0	43.0	31.0	4.3	68.3	62.2
Belgium	32.0	29.5	30.0	37.0	27.5	24.0	30.0	3.0	87.4	.
Ireland	32.0	27.0	30.0	33.0	26.5	29.0	29.6	2.1	86.1	.
Taiwan	30.0	36.5	41.5	8.5	33.0	16.0	27.6	10.2	.	70.0
Argentina	23.5	21.0	25.5	26.5	23.0	38.0	26.3	4.0	76.2	57.9
Hungary	26.5	20.5	26.0	26.5	22.5	26.5	24.8	2.2	76.9	60.0
South Korea	26.0	38.0	10.0	21.5	19.0	30.5	24.2	7.3	82.1	.
Poland	25.0	24.5	19.5	26.5	20.0	22.5	23.0	2.3	78.6	59.9
Iceland	28.0	17.0	26.0	32.0	24.0	6.0	22.2	7.1	85.9	.
Mexico	20.0	17.5	23.0	17.0	25.0	27.5	21.7	3.5	69.9	.
Malaysia	23.5	22.5	21.0	25.5	22.0	8.0	20.4	4.1	72.3	.
Chile	22.0	21.0	19.5	24.0	20.0	12.0	19.8	2.7	75.2	.
Romania	18.0	18.5	19.5	21.5	16.5	23.0	19.5	1.8	70.6	.
Thailand	10.0	11.5	23.0	10.5	30.0	26.0	18.5	7.8	64.8	.
Japan	21.0	44.0	2.5	3.0	13.5	23.5	17.9	11.6	85.7	83.0
Cuba	8.5	12.5	21.0	13.5	13.5	29.5	16.4	5.9	68.5	.
India	5.0	22.0	5.5	3.0	21.5	38.0	15.8	11.3	49.6	48.8
Czech Republic	17.0	17.0	14.5	22.0	11.0	10.5	15.3	3.3	82.1	58.4
Peru	14.5	8.5	17.0	19.0	17.5	15.0	15.3	2.6	67.7	.
Turkey	11.0	10.0	12.5	13.5	14.5	21.0	13.8	2.7	65.3	57.9
United Arab Emir	17.0	12.0	13.5	21.0	9.0	5.5	13.0	4.2	79.7	78.3
Lithuania	12.5	7.5	11.5	16.5	8.5	12.0	11.4	2.3	75.4	.
South Africa	6.0	10.5	10.0	12.0	10.0	18.0	11.1	2.6	63.2	65.0
Colombia	12.0	13.0	13.0	9.0	10.0	8.0	10.8	1.8	65.4	.
Saudi Arabia	14.0	10.5	12.0	13.5	6.5	8.0	10.8	2.4	74.4	63.2
Estonia	13.5	8.5	11.5	16.0	8.0	5.0	10.4	3.3	78.0	.
Nigeria	7.0	3.0	17.0	10.0	12.0	12.0	10.2	3.5	.	40.4
Kenya	6.0	3.0	12.0	7.0	6.0	10.0	7.3	2.4	44.7	.
Iran	3.0	11.0	6.5	5.5	3.5	13.5	7.2	3.4	66.5	65.4
Ecuador	6.0	3.0	5.5	8.5	4.5	3.5	5.2	1.5	67.4	.
Angola	5.0	2.0	4.0	6.0	3.0	2.0	3.7	1.3	39.0	.
Indonesia	2.0	4.5	2.5	3.0	2.0	3.0	2.8	0.7	60.6	.

NOTE: Scores are averages of 2008 and 2009 rankings. See Table 2 for 30 measures comprising each index. DI scores are the country ratings collected by the Developmental Idealism Studies. HDI refers to the Human Development Index (2000). DI scores were adjusted by a multiple of 10 to make them more directly comparable to the HDI. Deviation scores are averages of absolute deviations of each index from a country's mean score.

Beyond the noted country-specific deviations, the key finding in the Chinese model of hierarchy is consistency. With few exceptions, countries that scored high on one index also scored high on the other five indexes. Likewise, countries to which Chinese respondents gave low marks on one index received low marks on all indexes. The correlations between the six indexes, which are reported in Table 4, ranged from a low of 0.51 (*Governance* and *Culture*) to a high of 0.90 (*People* and *Immigration-Investment*, *People* and *Products*). The majority of correlations were above 0.70. Unreported factor analysis indicates that the Chinese hierarchies reported in Table 3 form a univocal scale, with all factor loadings in excess of 0.76, and five of six loadings exceeded 0.85. The factor accounted for 93 percent of the variation among the six indexes and Cronbach's alpha was 0.95 (results available upon request). At a practical level, this means that, by and large, the Chinese public reproduced the same global hierarchy, irrespective of the question wording or index content.

The two areas where Chinese respondents held somewhat more nuanced views about the structure of global hierarchy involved governance and culture. Recall that the *Governance* index is comprised of evaluations of citizen rights, government efforts to protect the environment, alleviate poverty, and maintain world peace and security, and the honesty and competency of government. The *Culture* index is comprised of evaluations of national success in sports competition, a country's cultural heritage, and the desirability of the country for contemporary culture, defined as music, film, art and literature. Especially low scores for the United States, India, Japan, and Singapore on the *Governance* index by Chinese respondents accounted for nearly all of the lower factor loading on the *Governance* index. Six countries had substantially different scores

on the *Culture* index than they received on the other five indexes (Singapore, New Zealand, Norway, Taiwan, Iceland, and Chile), though the only detectable pattern in such deviations were that many of the countries ranked low on culture were relatively small and many were island nations. Additional research is needed to further explore such deviations.

Table 4. Dimensionality of the Chinese model of global hierarchy: Correlation between country scores on six indexes

	Immig & Invest	Products	Government	People	Tourism	Culture
Immig & Invest	1.00					
Products	0.86	1.00				
Government	0.57	0.81	1.00			
People	0.72	0.90	0.90	1.00		
Tourism	0.80	0.85	0.76	0.88	1.00	
Culture	0.76	0.67	0.51	0.71	0.85	1.00

NOTES: The above correlations are based on (N = 52) countries rated by Chinese respondents, averaged over 2008 and 2009 data.

Similarity and Difference between the Chinese and World Cultural Models of Hierarchy

I next compare the Chinese model of hierarchy to the average scores obtained from the 19 other publics surveyed in the NBI studies, followed by a comparison of the Chinese model of global hierarchy to the HDI and DI scores. Table 5 reports deviation scores that measure the difference between each country’s score by Chinese respondents and its average score from the other 19 publics. Countries are sorted from high to low by the absolute size of the difference between Chinese and world rater scores. Negative values identify instances in which Chinese respondents scored a country lower than the world average score for that country. Positive values indicate that Chinese respondents scored a country higher than did respondents from other

countries. Positive scores are shaded yellow and negative scores are shaded maroon to facilitate detection of patterns in the data.

As can be seen in Table 5, the Chinese model of hierarchy most sharply differs from other publics concerning Japan, where Chinese respondents scored Japan an average of 22 points lower than did respondents from the other 19 publics. Japan received substantially lower scores from Chinese respondents on every index but *Immigration & Investment* (+5). Chinese respondents scored a number of their other regional neighbors quite differently than did world raters. In fact, the five countries with the largest differences between Chinese and world raters were all regional proximate countries, including Singapore (+16.3), Russia (+10.9), Taiwan (+9.3), and Indonesia (-9.0). Three other countries from South East Asia, including India (-6.3), South Korea (+4.8), and Malaysia (+4.2), also had above average deviation scores.

The last column of Table 5 reports the difference score between each country's average score by Chinese and world raters. Despite differences in country scores on each of the six indexes, Chinese respondents constructed a model of world hierarchy that was nevertheless quite similar to the world cultural model of hierarchy, as measured by the average country scores from respondents in the other 19 countries. Only 11 countries deviated by more than five points on their average score, with more than half of the 52 ranked countries differing by less than three points in their average scores. These data show that when respondents are asked to rate countries on specific attributes, rather than on a generalized notion of development, they produce more distinctive global hierarchies, but on average, Chinese and world cultural models of global hierarchy are quite similar, irrespective of the exact question wording.

Chinese and World Hierarchies

Table 5. Difference between Chinese and world cultural models of global hierarchy, reported as deviation scores

Country	Immig Invest	Products	People	Govern	Tourism	Culture	Difference in Average Scores
China	not rated	not rated	not rated	not rated	not rated	not rated	not rated
Japan	5.0	-14.4	-27.9	-22.7	-36.6	-40.0	-22.8
Singapore	15.0	-10.1	16.8	10.1	28.0	37.9	16.3
Russia	21.5	28.5	-3.5	21.3	6.4	-8.9	10.9
Taiwan	16.0	-3.1	0.6	14.5	-4.5	32.1	9.3
Indonesia	-5.2	-10.6	-10.0	-9.4	-12.0	-6.8	-9.0
Egypt	8.9	22.6	4.2	30.6	-12.6	-3.0	8.5
Nigeria	0.7	7.8	5.3	8.7	7.3	12.1	7.0
Czech Republic	-6.5	-10.6	-3.9	-14.4	4.6	-8.1	-6.5
India	8.9	15.4	-21.1	10.1	-25.0	-25.6	-6.3
South Africa	-4.2	-0.4	-9.5	-1.7	-5.1	-12.1	-5.5
Cuba	5.7	15.2	-0.2	8.4	-0.5	3.1	5.3
Iran	9.7	11.7	-0.6	1.9	4.0	3.0	5.0
South Korea	17.6	16.2	-4.9	1.0	10.0	-11.2	4.8
Denmark	-2.6	0.2	4.1	-3.2	15.7	13.7	4.7
Chile	3.8	-4.3	-9.2	13.2	-6.6	-23.1	-4.3
Turkey	-5.3	5.2	-4.0	-3.4	-7.9	-9.9	-4.2
Malaysia	5.3	-9.6	5.9	3.2	8.4	11.8	4.2
Romania	3.4	8.9	6.6	-3.3	9.0	-0.6	4.0
Ecuador	-4.8	-8.2	0.3	-7.3	-1.9	-1.9	-3.9
Colombia	7.3	-0.2	5.6	4.3	0.1	5.3	3.7
Norway	-6.0	-16.3	-0.2	-10.5	9.0	4.0	-3.3
Spain	-4.5	2.9	-0.2	-0.3	-10.9	-5.0	-3.0
Scotland	-6.3	-3.6	2.5	-5.4	-3.0	-1.7	-2.9
France	1.2	9.4	-0.1	6.2	-15.4	-17.0	-2.6
Australia	-2.2	-3.6	6.5	4.6	3.1	7.5	2.6
Switzerland	-1.4	-10.5	3.5	-0.2	8.9	14.3	2.5
Iceland	-10.0	-20.5	4.5	-9.2	11.2	11.6	-2.0
Hungary	-5.1	3.0	6.0	-5.0	7.7	4.8	2.0
Ireland	-5.2	-4.7	2.8	-6.6	1.1	1.5	-1.8
Germany	3.5	4.4	-1.3	-3.0	5.7	1.3	1.8
Sweden	-2.4	-4.6	0.1	-3.8	11.2	10.2	1.8
Finland	-0.7	-9.1	2.4	-9.2	14.7	13.0	1.8
Mexico	-1.1	1.5	2.8	7.6	-14.8	-6.2	-1.7
Estonia	-7.0	-7.5	3.7	-12.0	9.1	3.7	-1.7
United Kingdom	2.4	6.9	1.9	3.9	-5.1	-0.9	1.5
Saudi Arabia	-3.6	1.5	1.2	-4.7	7.4	5.4	1.3
Austria	-5.6	5.1	3.8	-0.9	3.0	0.9	1.1
Argentina	-3.3	11.4	3.5	0.4	0.7	-6.3	1.1
Canada	-6.9	-12.8	3.3	-5.0	5.7	9.7	-1.0
Italy	0.0	3.1	-2.0	11.9	-11.0	-7.1	-0.9
United States	3.8	11.3	-1.6	12.8	-25.0	-6.9	-0.9
Lithuania	-7.8	0.0	2.1	-11.7	9.6	2.8	-0.8
Netherlands	-1.8	-2.1	2.2	-3.3	9.2	1.0	0.8
Angola	-0.7	-2.4	3.0	-1.4	3.7	1.6	0.7
Belgium	-4.1	-7.4	0.1	-9.3	12.6	4.4	-0.6
Peru	-1.4	-2.6	6.9	2.5	-3.4	0.9	0.5
New Zealand	-5.7	-21.0	7.9	-3.3	7.7	13.1	-0.3
Kenya	-0.5	-1.1	3.0	0.0	-0.4	-2.6	-0.3
Thailand	-3.4	3.6	-6.5	15.5	-16.6	6.3	-0.2
United Arab Emir	-8.9	-4.3	-1.2	-7.4	12.8	7.6	-0.2
Poland	-0.4	-1.2	3.1	-7.4	8.7	-3.2	-0.1
Brazil	0.3	9.9	1.1	2.8	-6.4	-7.5	0.0

NOTES: Data are sorted from high to low by the absolute average difference between Chinese and world raters (column 7). Negative values indicate that country scores from Chinese respondents were lower than the world average score for that country. Positive values indicate that Chinese respondents scored a country higher than did respondents from other countries.


I next consider the level of association between the Chinese model of global hierarchy and two measures of developmental hierarchy. If the developmental cultural model was active in the minds of respondents at the time of evaluation and ratings were informed by a common, world cultural model of hierarchy, there should be strong agreement between the global hierarchies constructed by Chinese respondents and independent measures of developmental hierarchy. The left panel of Figure 1 reports the correlation between the China's conception of global hierarchy (column 7, Table 3) and the 2000 Human Development Index (column 9, Table 3), including a visualization of the linear fit between the two measures. The right panel reports the correlation between the China's global hierarchy and a subject measurement of developmental hierarchy obtained from the DI studies (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al. 2013; Csánóová 2013). The developmental idealism hierarchy (DI) is based on the average ratings on development that respondents in one or more of 13 publics gave to rated countries. Twenty-nine common countries were measured in both the NBI and DI studies (column 10, Table 3).

The correlations between the Chinese model of hierarchy and those contained in the HDI and DI data were very similar, at .71 and .65, respectively. These correlations are substantively indistinguishable from the correlation between the HDI and individual-level evaluations of national development reported elsewhere (see Melegh et al. 2013: pp 607; Csánóová et al., this issue). Because Pearsonian correlation coefficients are sensitive to outliers, I replicated the results reported in Figure 1 after removing a small number of outlier countries. Removing five countries that received especially high scores by Chinese respondents relative to their HDI score (Egypt, Russia, Brazil,

Kenya, Angola) increased the level of association between the Chinese model of hierarchy and the HDI to .83. Removing three countries that received especially low scores by Chinese respondents (Japan, United Arab Emirates, and Iran) yielded a correlation between the Chinese country scores and the DI scores to .80.

I also measured the correlation between the DI scores and each of the six indexes comprising the Chinese model of hierarchy (results available upon request). The *Immigration & Investment* (.74) and *Products* (.71) indexes had the strongest association with the DI scores, followed by *People* (.58), *Tourism* (.52), *Government* (.46), and *Culture* (.29). By conventional definitions, most of these correlations are considered moderate to strong. The clear exception was culture, where Chinese respondents scored countries quite differently than did respondents in the DI studies.

Figure 1. Correlation between Chinese model of hierarchy and two measures of development



NOTES: Reported correlations are based on data contained in the last three columns of Table 3. Listwise complete sample sizes are $n=28$ (a) and $n=49$ (b).

Cross-national Evaluations of China

I conclude by considering how respondents from around the world evaluated China on each of the six indexes. Figure 2 contains density distributions that display the 2008 and 2009 scores of China by respondents in 19 countries on each of the six indexes. The shape of the distributions provides insights into the level of cross-national agreement about China, with narrow distributions identifying indexes on which surveyed publics gave China very similar scores and wide distributions indicating low agreement between measured publics. China’s average score for each index is reported in parenthesis next to the respective index name in Figure 2.


When asked to rate China on development, respondents in the DI studies ranked China 13th out of 56 countries, placing it in the top quartile of rated countries in the DI studies. China was much closer to the middle of the distribution of evaluated countries in the NBI studies. According to its average score across the six indexes and 19 surveyed publics, China's score placed in 24th out of 53 countries, far below its position in the DI studies. Inspection of the index specific distributions identifies the causes of China's middling ranking in the global hierarchy. The international view of Chinese culture was unequivocally and nearly universally positive such that China's highest score was on the *Culture* index (43). International opinion of Chinese governance was unequivocally negative with an average score of seven on the *Governance* index. China's scores on the other four indexes were more dispersed, with below average scores on *Immigration & Investment* (17) and *People* (16.3) and above average scores on *Products* (31.2) and *Tourism* (31).

In support of prior research, which indicates that publics associate freedom, democracy, and human rights with developed countries (Thornton et al. 2016), respondents appear to have used similar criteria in their evaluation of the Chinese government, which they rated below every government but Iran's. China's ranking on *Governance* would have been even lower but for its unusually high ratings by Indian, Russian, and Egyptian publics.

A very different story emerges when we consider evaluations of culture, where world publics ranked Chinese culture 8th out of 53 rated countries. Such a score placed Chinese culture in the top quartile of evaluated countries, which is well above its mean score of 24 across all six indexes. Among the 53 countries that were evaluated in the

NBI studies, China’s scores on the six indexes were among the most heterogeneous of any evaluated country. In other words, if we were to reproduce Figure 2 for each of the 53 rated countries, few would show such divergent distributions across the six indexes. This suggests that China does not as clearly fit into the developmental hierarchy culture model as most countries, and, based on the data analyzed here, this seems to be due in large part to China deviating from the democratic model of governance espoused by world development culture and to its unique and highly regard cultural heritage.

Figure 2. Variation in perceptions of China, reported as density distributions for each of six indexes



NOTES: Each distribution is comprised of 38 scores for China (19 publics measured in 2008 and again in 2009). A wide distribution indicates low agreement between measured publics. Narrow distributions identify indexes on which surveyed publics gave China very similar scores. Scores averaged across 19 publics reported in parenthesis.

Conclusions

This research gave special attention to the Chinese model of global hierarchy and how it compares to developmental hierarchies and world cultural models of

hierarchy. Analysis showed that Chinese public opinion regarding global hierarchy exhibits high temporal stability, regardless of the country attributes being evaluated. The results are in strong agreement with other recent stability assessments of developmental hierarchy (Thornton et al. 2012; Binstock et al. 2013; Melegh et al. 2013; Csánóová 2013; Thornton and Li-shou Yang, *this issue*). Not only is the Chinese model of hierarchy stable, but it is also remarkably robust to variation in evaluated attributes.

Chinese respondents produced nearly the same global hierarchy on each of the six indexes. Question wording and rated attributes did not affect a large difference in the rank ordering of countries and exploratory factor analysis confirmed that the six indexes form a unidimensional scale. The uniformity with which Chinese respondents evaluated countries on six different indexes points to a relatively monolithic conception of global hierarchy in China. Strong association between the Chinese model of global hierarchy and two measures of developmental hierarchy suggest that Chinese respondents were influenced by transnational values and beliefs of world development culture, rather than distinctive Chinese schemas. If Chinese respondent's evaluations of countries were largely informed by Chinese cultural schemas, we would not expect to find such high agreement between the hierarchies constructed by Chinese respondents and independent measures of developmental hierarchy.

The findings presented here show that despite its unique history, culture, and position in the world system, the Chinese public appears to have a well-informed knowledge of the world development hierarchy that strongly agrees with the views of publics in many different countries. The strong coincidence between the Chinese conceptualization of global hierarchy, the conceptualization of global hierarchy shared

among 19 other publics, and independent measures of world development hierarchy suggest that world development culture has successfully disseminated a relatively uniform belief about global hierarchy. World development culture idealizes modern, developed societies, which it defines as rich, technologically advanced, egalitarian, educated, healthy, urban, and democratic. Because these and related attributes are most commonly present in advanced industrial societies of European ancestry, Chinese respondents overwhelmingly evaluated such countries positively. World development culture appears to have penetrated Chinese culture and become deeply ingrained in the minds of Chinese citizens.

Much has been written about an east/west slope in Europe. Countries of north and west Europe are perceived to be more developed than countries from south and east Europe (Wolff 1994; Todorova 1997; Melegh 2006; Csánóová 2013; Melegh et al. 2013). Although this slope is identifiable in the developmental ratings collected on populations on every continent, the east/west slope is most pronounced among European respondents. This suggests that conceptualizations of hierarchy involving nation-states exist on at least two levels, one global and another regional. Chinese respondents were found to hold distinctive views of geographically *proximate* nations such as Japan, South Korea, Russia, and India. Chinese respondents gave its regional neighbors markedly different scores than did respondents in 19 other surveyed countries. However, the Chinese model of global hierarchy and the world cultural model of global hierarchy, inferred from the country scores obtained from 19 cross-nationally diverse countries, were nearly identical for countries *outside* of Asia. These data are suggestive of a distinctive regional hierarchy in Asia, though a more thorough analysis

of global hierarchies constructed by other populations in Asia are need to confirm or reject such assertions.

One goal of this research was to understand how the world perceives China relative to other countries. Earlier, I posited that China's distinctive developmental trajectory may cause world citizens to evaluate China somewhat differently than other countries. The data largely confirmed this assertion. Publics in 19 countries placed China near the middle of the global hierarchy but scored Chinese culture more favorably than nearly every other culture and scored the government of China less favorably than any other evaluated government. Another way that China stood out among the 53 countries evaluated in the NBI studies was that country scores for China were among the most heterogeneous of any evaluated country. That China has charted a non-traditional path to modernity that produced many of the outcomes of world development (e.g. demographic transition, economic development, built urban environment, rising human capital) in the absence of features defined as essential to national development (e.g. democracy, free-market capitalism, strong human rights protections) may explain the limited consensus concerning China among world publics.

Further research is need to explore the other country specific models of world hierarchy contained in the NBI data to determine if similar conclusions can be drawn from analysis of other countries. Even though the NBI data were collected for purposes unrelated to the present research and used a very different measurement strategy than was used in the DI studies, the overall structure of world hierarchy did not significantly deviate between the two methods. This suggests that survey researchers can measure

world development hierarchy using an omnibus, subjective measure of development as effectively as was done using a large number of questions in the NBI studies.

When we consider the volume of data that has been amassed to date—country-specific hierarchies have now been collected in approximately 30 countries and more than 80 countries have been evaluated by at least one other country—and the uniformity of rankings across diverse publics using different measurement strategies, an increasingly clear picture emerges. It appears that world development culture has facilitated the dissemination and entrenchment of a durable and taken-for-granted global hierarchy. The world cultural model of hierarchy that emerges in similar form in very different kinds of studies shows that perceptions of countries are strongly influenced by developmental thinking. Hierarchy is a fundamental feature of world development culture and future research would do well to evaluate the effects of a relatively universal understanding of global hierarchy on world-level inequalities in life chances and living standards.

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