A frame analysis of Hungarians' intentions after 1989

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Yijiang Pan

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Carl W. Roberts, Major Professor
Fredrick O. Lorenz
Kim A. Smith

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Graduate College
Iowa State University

This is to certify that the master's thesis of

Yijiang Pan

has met the thesis requirements of Iowa State University

Signatures have been redacted for privacy

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Chapter I: Introduction and Literature Review

Introduction

This article applies frame theory to portrayals of Hungarians' intentions and their rationales for these intentions in one Hungarian newspaper's editorials from 1990 to 1997. In 1989, Hungary became an independent country and started its transition from a Soviet Union style communist country to a democratic country. Hypothetically, this social change would have a huge impact on Hungarians' way of understanding each other's intentions. In particular, this study investigates whether evidence exists for a change in these understandings from a "permission frame" that governs people's actions by permission, to a "community frame" that governs people's actions by a desire for a better community. A data set was collected from editorials in Hungary's largest newspaper, Népszabadság. The newspaper's popularity leads to my belief that the intentions and rationales portrayed in these editorials are likely to have helped shape public discussions on the issues addressed within them. The hypothesis is tested using content analysis. The results show no evidence for any permission frame, but some evidence for a shift toward a community frame during the period under study.

Historical background before 1989[1]

The recent history of Hungary since the 20th century is not a pleasant one. First, when defeated in World War I, Hungary lost almost two thirds of its territory and 70 percent of its population according to the Treaty of Trianon. Then, almost at the end of World War II,

[1] This and the following section are summarized from A Concise History of Hungary (Miklós, 2001) and 'www.multied.com/nationbynation/Hungary/History1.html.'(History Central, 2003)

as an unfaithful ally, it fell under German military occupation in 1944. However, when the war ended in 1945, with Germany defeated along with its allies, Hungary was taken over by the Soviet Union and was forced to accept this country's complete sovereignty over it.

Russians exercised their power by controlling the local government and training Hungarian politician Matyas Rakosi to be the Prime Minister of Hungary, thus establishing a communist dictatorship. In 1953 after Stalin died, Imre Nagy replaced Rakosi and made quite a few efforts to improve the economic environment of Hungary. These efforts won him popularity and an improved quality of life for Hungarians. Trying to restore Stalinism, Rakosi struggled back to power secretly in 1955. The Russian government did not welcome this action. Moscow replaced Rakosi one year later with Erno Gero, at a time when the new Russian leader, Khrushchev, began to clearly denunciate Stalin altogether.

Whatever Moscow's plan for Hungary was or whoever led the Hungarian government, the Soviet Union dominated Hungary during this period, leaving almost no autonomy for Hungary's own political, economical or even social policies. Social and economical changes were forced upon this country: all private industries were nationalized, freedom of religion and of the media was strictly censored, and hundreds of victims were sent to prison or even executed. Thus, Hungarians were not permitted to choose their way of living, which was then totally shaped by Russian's vision of a utopian society.

This high pressure led to both political and economic crisis, culminating in a Hungarian revolution that broke out at the end of 1956. The revolution was ignited when the security forces fired on Budapest students who were marching in support of Poland's confrontation of the Soviet Union. The fight quickly turned into massive popular uprising until the popular former Prime Minister Nagy once again became Prime Minister. Once in

power, Nagy quickly dissolved the state security police, abolished the one-party system and announced Hungary's neutrality and withdrew Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, promised free elections and negotiated with the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. But these decisions were quickly reversed by the Soviet Union's massive military attack.

A new puppet government was formed, this time led by Prime Minister Janos Kadar, who not only executed thousands of activists during the revolution, but also introduced relatively moderate cultural, economic, and political reforms for Hungarians. He decentralized the economy slightly, which allowed for supply and demand to play some part in the market place. The living-standard increased significantly for Hungarians under his leadership. For the following twenty years, Hungary experienced a quite peaceful and stable domestic environment, albeit in the presence of the Soviet Union's occupational military. Consequently, although the country achieved some lasting economic reforms, political reforms were very limited until the late 1980s.

Historical background after 1989

At the time of its political collapse in 1989, the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its involvement in Hungary and withdraw its troops completely. At no time during the previous 100 years had international events offered such favorable possibilities for this country's and its leadership's international position. Neither Russia nor Germany presented a danger to its independence any longer. Hungarian prospects for working out differences with neighboring countries seemed promising.

On October 18, 1989, the obsolescent Hungarian Parliament voted 333 to 5, for a series of constitutional amendments declaring Hungary an independent, democratic, and

constitutional republic, asserting the values of both bourgeois democracy and democratic socialism. This marked the nation's dramatic turn to a multiparty democracy and formally ended the communist one-party domination in Hungary. Also, it officially changed the name of the nation from "People's Republic of Hungary" to "Republic of Hungary."

In May 1990, the first free parliamentary election was held. Although the communist party re-established itself as the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), it did not win the election over populist, center-right, and liberal parties. Under Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, the Democratic Forum (MDF) formed a center-right coalition government with the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP). Peter Boross succeeded as Prime Minister when Antall passed away in December 1993. Antall together with the Boross government created and instituted many basic laws of economy and politics, which facilitated the country's transition to democracy and laid the foundation for a free-market economy. Like other transitions going on at the same time in Central-Eastern Europe, these reforms did not manage to fully privatize Hungary's economy, to reduce its growing foreign debt, to control currency inflation, to lower unemployment rate, or to increase Hungarians' living standard. The government was thus blamed for not strongly reinforcing the economy mainly because of fiscal incompetence and of some party officials' political corruption.

The ensuing recession led to the election of the Hungarian Socialist Party in May 1994. The MSZP formed a government under the leadership of Prime Minister Gyula Horn, who continued economic reforms and privatization. The Horn government also pursued a foreign policy of integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions and reconciliation with neighboring countries. Horn instituted a stabilization program that reduced social spending,

lowered the budget deficit, devalued the forint, controlled incomes, and accelerated privatization. Although these reforms were not much different than the ones launched by the Antall/Boross government, the economy finally began to improve during 1996-1997 after three years of austerity under the MSZP government.

However, the slow pace of economic recovery convinced voters to put the Alliance of Young Democrats (MPP) into power in 1998, which later formed a coalition government with FKGP and MDF. The new government led by Prime Minister Viktor Orban has continued to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration, and to promise faster economic growth. Rather than continue Horn's reforms, the Orban government's strategy was to increase social spending, a policy that risks jeopardizing gains made in Hungary's budget deficit and its reduction in foreign debt. Also, the government became very enthusiastic in advocating minority rights for ethnic Hungarians outside the country, especially in support of oppressed Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia, and the former Yugoslav Republics. In 1999 Hungary became a member of NATO. It is to become a EU member in 2003.

Below is a brief description of the major Hungarian political parties (European Forum, 1998):

- Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP): The former communist party, which changed its name from the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party to the Hungarian Socialist Party in 1989. It also changed to a new program advocating democracy and a free-market economy.
- Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF): Having a general focus against communism, it bases its program in traditional conservative and Christian democratic values.

- Independent Smallholder's Party (FKGP): It is one of the main opposition parties, appealing primarily to Hungarians' populist and nationalist values. Its supporters include mainly small property owners, peasants and the rural middle class.
- Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP): Its support consists mainly of religious peasants and some Christian intellectuals.
- Alliance of Young Democrats (MPP): It is a liberal party founded by university students and young intellectuals. After 1995, its leadership change forced it to become a mainstream conservative, right wing party, emphasizing conservative, national and Christian themes.

Literature review on Hungary's transition process

Hungary's post-1989 transition has a dual character. On the one hand, it involves a political transformation from communist authoritarianism to democratic pluralism. On the other hand, it involves an economic transformation from state-owned and government-regulated economy to capitalistic market economy. This dual character has attracted a lot of attention from academia.

Hungary's political transition began with an almost universal rejection of state socialism. This rejection is understandable, given the unbearable experience Hungarians had under the previous Russian occupation. Problems involved in dismantling the old communist system, included restitution to previous owner of nationalized properties, political rehabilitation of democratic infrastructure, and the establishment of legal principles for democratic politics (Welsh, 1996). But at the same time there was no clear idea of the form

that Hungarian political bodies should take. The country had barely any legacy of democracy itself, nor had it any successful examples from other East-European states.

Political changes started from negotiations between oppositional parties and the communist party. These negotiations took on an ambiguous character through its simultaneous tendency toward renewal and restoration: a tendency to embrace a new, unknown future while at the same time a tendency to hold onto some of the security of past arrangements (Kovacs and Maggard, 1993). Contrasting the 1990 and 1994 elections provides the clearest evidence of this ambiguous political objective. In 1990 the communist party's loss showed signs of the Hungarians' tendency and determination to head toward a new future. Yet it is also true that the communist party's return to power in the 1994 election showed some hesitance among Hungarians to give up those parts of pre-1989 Hungary that afforded them feelings of security.

Another issue regarding Hungary's political transition as discussed by Lewis, Lomax and Wightman (1994) is that there were too many parties, with surprisingly few that truly represented the people's interests and values. In 1990, sixty-five parties registered for the first free election while the largest party among them only had 30,000 members. Most of the parties were made up of elite groups of intellectuals or personal friends. They did not represent social interests or constituencies, nor were they held together by any common ideas or ideologies. Few of them offered specific political and economic programs for the future. Furthermore, parliamentary debates were full of ideological discussions and personal attacks that distracted from efforts to solve Hungary's real political and economic problems.

The economic transition was even more fundamental to the transition as a whole, because the costs of economic transition may erode support for the new government (Mason,

1995). In Hungary, unlike in East-European countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, the government undertook slow and continuous change in its economy, centered by an overall restrictive monetary and fiscal policy (Adam, 1995). The first well-known step taken by the new government was the Kupa program in 1991, which was intended to balance the Hungarian budget by reducing subsidies and government investment, while increasing taxes. The program reduced demand and production within the country, increased unemployment, and is attributed to the economic recession that followed its implementation. The program, as well as similar ones in other post-communist societies, also opened up the domestic market to the influence of the world economy by liberalizing foreign trade and freeing the currency rate and market prices. However, there was no market infrastructure in the Hungarian economy, and the trading relationship with the former Soviet Union had been lost. A sudden liberalization of the economy and its adjustment to international markets was a big threat to the well-being of the Hungarian economy. Moreover, the economy quickly suffered from currency inflation and a decline in foreign trade. Despite their first freedoms to practice ownership in private businesses and to invest both at home and abroad, most Hungarians experienced a decline in living-standard during this time of economic reform. Life for Hungarians was not better but worse.

Adam (1995) attributes some of the economic austerity to the little attention that reformers paid when designing the transformation strategy to the old value system, in which all were managers and workers. He argues that although most managers and workers hated the old communist system, they still identified with some of its objectives such as full employment, equal distribution of income, and social programs. Mason's (1995) study suggests the same thing: people tended to support a strong role of government and had deep

skepticism about the distributive system based on merit not on need, which were both attitudes grounded in socialist ideology.

Thus the transition, both politically and economically, was full of problems. Pre-1989 attitudes like chauvinistic nationalism, anti-Semitism, an inability to adjust to Hungary's role as a minor power in Central-Europe, and an unwillingness to cooperate with its neighbors began to re-emerge with Hungary's economic decline (Bigler, 1992). Hungarians also experienced relative deprivation, because they were forever comparing their situations to those in Western societies. What had been considered to be impossible under communist regulation was now seen to be possible. Encouraged by their new freedom, individuals wanted more (Dodder, 1995).

More importantly, the Hungarians' attitude toward this historical transition to democracy was at stake. According to Evans and Whitefield (1995), factors that led individuals to support democratization in Hungary included not only the country's rising living-standard, which facilitated private ownership and the formation of urban middle classes, but also the abilities of electors to be heard via the party and electoral system, and to perceive responsiveness in the political system. Neither of these abilities was fully attained during the early years of the transition.

After two to three years of enthusiasm for the democratic government, many Hungarians lost interest in the political system. With so many parties to choose from, but so few that represented public opinion, Hungarians were reluctant to choose membership in any of them by 1994. Decreased participation in the second national election in 1994 was clear evidence of this withdrawal of Hungarian voters. Sztompka (1996) argues that Hungarian people showed more distrust of their new government than ever, which was attributed to

uncertainty, insecurity, ambiguity and opaqueness, apathy, and an attitude of disillusionment. They withdrew from public life and escaped into private life with family members and close friends, continuously consuming and neither saving nor investing. They did not plan or think of a long-term future.

Mishler and Rose (1997) show that skepticism was the predominant collective feeling in post-communist Hungary other than distrust. The skepticism, in their opinion, came from a trade-off feeling among public dissatisfaction with current economic performance, optimism about future economic performance, and satisfaction with the political performance of contemporary institutions in offering ever-greater individual liberties. Some of the people opposed to or skeptical about the recent reforms chose not to express their opinions through the electoral process (Mason, 1995), others became mobilized enough to shift electoral support for the Boross government to the former communist party in the 1994 election.

Hungary's new democratic government neither told individuals what to do nor took care of them any longer. Yet Hungarians were unprepared for these freedoms in that they had not yet learned how to make decisions for their own lives (Dodder, 1995). Instead, as one might expect in accordance with social disorganization theory (Elliott and Merrill, 1950), many Hungarians' selfish and hedonic orientations could no longer be managed during the unstable period of democratic transformation. Thus one important component of this transformation is the abandonment of such popular values and political beliefs inappropriate to a market economy and democratic capitalism. In Mason (1995) one finds evidence of just such a switch in popular orientation away from radical egalitarianism and hostility to private enterprise--the type of switch needed to allow for attitudes more consistent with Hungary's recent democratic transformation.

Duch (1995) provides survey data showing that the citizens in this young democracy were able to distinguish the legitimacy of institutions from the poor behavior of the incumbents who governed. Thus they would not abandon democratic capitalism just because of the economic chaos they encountered. Duch's data further suggest that it was Hungary's more sophisticated citizens (i.e., those with higher socioeconomic status, education, and more information) who were less likely to question the basic principles of democracy and capitalism.

It is also fruitful to look at other transitions to democracy. For example, West Germany after 1945 is another example of a post-authoritarian European democracy. Before 1945 Germany had been an authoritarian state in which political leaders dominated society, class, and individual interests and were vested with powers unchecked by any principles or popular sovereignty. Minkenberg (1993) emphasizes two major aspects of Germans' attitude change during the country's political transition to democracy after World War II. First there was a sense of cultural disorientation that came from the combined effects of the discrediting of the former political regime, the obsolescence of tradition supported within the Third Reich, the humiliation of the military defeat, and frequent re-orientations in the previous 100 years. This disorientation left Germans without a continuing sense of national identity. Indeed, in the early years after 1945 Germans displayed rather low levels of national pride when compared to other nationalities. Secondly, Minkenberg (1993) points to the German legacy that predisposed Germans to support the new governmental authorities. Therefore, Germany's democratic transition has the character of allowing new orientations to be learned and new political culture to be built. In contrast, Hungarians' patriotism and their suspicious of authorities were strengthened by the events of 1989. Unlike Germany, Hungary's

democracy could only grow from within rather than be imposed from outside by the allied victors of World War II.

Theoretical perspective

Frame theory originates from the book, Frame Analysis (Goffman, 1974). Goffman's definition of frame is "principles of organization which govern events and our subjective involvement in the events" (Goffman, 1974, p. 10). It is a system constituted of principles of organization, having a certain arrangement and stable relations. For example, "a checker move is informed by rules of the game, most of which will be applied in any one complete playing through the game; the physical manipulation of a checker, on the other hand, involves a framework informing small bodily movements" (Goffman, 1974, p. 24). For a checker move, the frame governing this event and the individuals' subjective involvement in the event is a system constituted of game rules and small body movements. Both the game rules and body movements have their specific arrangements and relations, and are always found together, coherent and complete.

According to Goffman, a fundamental division exists between natural and social frames. On one hand, a natural frame is "undirected, unoriented, unanimated, unguided and purely physical" (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). Such a frame consists of physical and biological principles (often legitimated according to knowledge grounded in physical and biological sciences), that cannot be interfered or influenced by people. An illustration of a naturally framed event is the weather as given in a report. On the other hand, there is the social frame, which "incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency" (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). In contrast to the natural frame, a social frame is directed, oriented

and guided, thus involving person's motives and intentions. An illustration of a social frame is the newscaster's "reporting" of the weather.

However, these two types of frames are not completely independent of and detached from each other. On one hand, people always feel they have the "capacity to gear into the ongoing natural world," whereas "whatever an agent seeks to do will be continuously conditioned by natural constraints" (Goffman, 1974, p. 23). This simultaneity of social frame and natural frame motivates a further division within the social frame. One type of frame governs when people "manipulate the natural world in accordance with the special constraints that natural occurrings impose" (Goffman, 1974, p. 23). This is an enabling frame in the sense that in accordance with its rules the agent is enabled to act within the natural world. A second type of frame governs when people only enter the "special worlds in which they can become involved" (Goffman, 1974, p. 23). In contrast, this is an inhibiting frame in the sense that the agent is inhibited from action toward the natural world.

When individuals break the current frame and shift to another, their reasons could be diverse. Each individual is treated like a performer, who is performing according to certain rules (which make up a frame) onstage. There might be some moments when he/she does not follow the rules, but performs in another way. Why he/she does this is an empirical question. He/she may suddenly forget the rules, or he/she may suddenly feel antagonistic toward the rules and decide once not to obey them, or he/she may try to impress the audience by acting differently. But when such a frame shift becomes a collective activity, Goffman (1974) suggests that this is always in response to a structural change within society that directly or indirectly drives such changes at the individuals' level of frame. For example, if all the performers on a stage suddenly stop speaking English and begin speaking French instead,

this might be because of a new awareness that there is a French audience. Notice that the "change" in audience (as part of the performance) is analogous to structural changes in a society (made up of such performances).

To sum up, frame theory posits that frames are sets of rules people use to enable or inhibit activities and any change of frames entails social changes in perceivable reality. Given this understanding of frame theory, I develop two concepts for capturing the change in principles depicted as governing Hungarians' intentions during 1990-1997.

- Permission frame

The first concept is permission frame. Before 1989, when under Russian occupation, Hungarian people's behavior was closely regulated by Russians, who would punish acts that they believed to subvert their power. My premise is that this occupation left Hungarian people with an understanding of actions as always potentially subject to punishment. Insofar as they acted in accordance with their Russian occupiers, they likely came to understand the driving engine of individuals' activities as restricting their behaviors to only do things that are permitted. This mode of interpreting motives will be referred to in this research as a "permission frame."

There is a link here from permission frame to the division of natural frame and social frame (Goffman, 1974). To some extent, the concept of natural frame comprises a rationale for people's non-acting, whereas the concept of social frame provides rationales for people's acting. Permission frame, in my conceptualization, consists of the principles of acting with permission, and non-acting without permission. Permission therefore is the rationale for people's acting, whereas non-permission is the rationale for people's non-acting. Yet, this type of rationale is not justified in natural terms. Only people withhold permission for each

other. Thus this is a case in which not a natural frame, but a social frame serves to inhibit actions.

- Community frame

The second concept is community frame. After 1989, Hungary became an independent, self-governed country. At this point, I would argue, it no longer made sense to think of actions as constrained by their occupiers' permissions. So motives could no longer be other-referential; they necessarily shifted to self-referential ones. One type of self-referential motivations is in terms of individuals' responsibilities to prevent tragedies that might be to the detriment of the community itself. My contention is that during the Russian occupation, Hungarians gained a sense of community—a sense of themselves as a people, distinct from their occupiers. This strong sense of community likely remained intact after the Russians left, such that Hungarians' "permission frame" would have shifted to a "community frame."

Yet a fundamental change in the sense of community occurred with the Russian pullout. Before 1989 bad things could always be interpreted as imposed by "them" (i.e., the Russian outsiders) on "us" (i.e., the community of Hungarians). After 1989 the prevention and alleviation of bad things became Hungarians' own responsibility. The shift from other- to self-reference is thus likely one in which blame for one's problems shifts from outside the community to within it. Accordingly, there would be a growing in people's feeling of responsibility to their own country -- a responsibility for making sure the structure of this community lasts and nothing bad happens on the inside. So an individual acts because he/she is aware that something bad will take place if he/she does not act, and he/she feels guilty if it

happens. This mode of preventing good things from disappearing and preventing bad things from happening will be referred to as the "community frame."

Community frame has a theoretical linkage to Goffman's division of social frame (Goffman, 1974). Community frame, in my conceptualization, is constituted of the principles of preventing good things from disappearing, and preventing bad things from happening to the community. The rule to prevent good things disappearing is the basis for an inhibiting frame, in accordance with which the agent is justified in not acting toward a desirable natural world. The rule to prevent bad things from happening is the basis for an enabling frame that justifies the agent's action toward an undesirable natural world. With these conceptualizations of permission and community frame, I now proceed to a review of the literature on frame analysis.

Literature review on frame analysis

There is not much literature on frame analysis at present. Basically, the current literature on frame analysis is grounded on the presumption that "actors invoke and manipulate diverse frames of meaning by assembling cues, taken from linguistic forms laid down in the cultural background, to build their relations with others" (McLean, 1998, p. 51). Such cultural framing typically involves particular techniques that are amenable to analysis. The methodology underlining the literature is analyzing keywords, images and phrases, treating the frequency and ubiquity of particular words and phrases as measurable objects. Measuring the use of these keywords, images, and phrases across cases allows researchers to trace which cues and framing devices are most used, the purposes to which they are applied, and whether they are used in conjunction with or in contrast to other keywords, images and

phrases. For example, researchers may look for how writers try to catch readers' attention on certain events, characters, or perspectives.

One study categorizes and analyzes frames that were used when people asked for favors in Venice during the Renaissance. Analyzing letters written for favors during that time, McLean (1998) searched for common themes, keywords and structures in these letters and laid out a format for this type of favor-seeking behavior. In his conclusion, he attributes this format to a certain type of frame called civic republicanism, which was a popular value during the Renaissance. This usage of frame is a frame that works by enabling individuals to enter the society.

Another rather theoretical piece comes from Brown and Levinson (1987), who understand frame as strategies that help people maintain face. (In their study, face is defined as the public self-image to which every society member aspires.) According to the authors, these strategies are reflections of the social distance between the speaker and the audience, the power that the audience has over the speaker and most importantly, the particular culture. Analyzing different strategies then grants them insights of different cultural frames. Their usage of frame is a frame that works by enabling individual to maintain face.

Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990) study the frame-creating use of pronouns. The authors argue that different grammar presentations of pronouns like 'I' or 'me' or proper names like 'Tom' mark different languages and cultures. By analyzing uses of pronouns, different cultural frames can then be traced. For example, the Japanese language does not have any statements beginning with a person's name, say, 'Tom'. Therefore, according to their argument, this is a reflection of a typical Japanese cultural frame that individuals do not take

on responsibilities (Mühlhäusler and Harré, 1990). Their usage of frame is a frame that works by inhibiting individuals from taking any responsibilities.

Another approach defines frames as "contextualization cues that communicate the proper context for understanding a message through the text of the message itself" (Duranti and Goodwin, 1992, p. 18). These cues include social and spatial setting, nonverbal behavior and background knowledge, all of which are devices used in organizations of principles in frames. This usage of frame is a frame that works by enabling actions in accordance with proper settings.

There is not much literature on frame shifts either. Babb (1996) applied the concept of frame change to the U.S. labor movement during the mid-1800s. Babb asked what happens when a social movement's frame is contradictory to the participants' experiences. Her findings led her to conclude that an old frame tends to have a longer life than reality, because movement leaders try to extend the frame to include contradictions, or try to preserve the frame by using ambiguous language to address contradictions. However, if both frame extension and frame preservation fail to solve the problem, a new frame may eventually replace the old one. In her research Babb uses content analysis of themes in newspaper articles related to this movement. Her usage of frame is a frame that works by enabling continuous actions during U.S. labor movement.

Whereas, Babb (1996) focuses on strategies used in retaining an old frame, Snow et al (1986) address strategies used in promoting a new frame. Their research problem is how participants' support for a social movement organization (SMO) is secured. Their solution to this problem is explained using a concept called 'frame alignment', by which they mean "the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual

interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 464). In a qualitative analysis of letters and speeches by several SMO leaders, four frame alignment processes are identified. First, there is 'frame bridging' which is the alignment of "linking two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 467). Secondly, there is 'frame amplification' which is the alignment of "clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469). Thirdly, there is 'frame extension', which is defined and used the same way in Babb's (1996) study as extending the original frame to include contradictions. Finally, there is 'frame transformation', which they define as the cases that "new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or mis-framings re-framed" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 473). This frame transformation, in other words, frame change involves "redefining activities, events, and biographies that are already meaningful from the standpoint of the original frame, in terms of a new frame" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 474). Their usage of frame is a frame that works by enabling continuous actions during social movements.

The literature offers me the insight of linguistically analyze frames. Most of the articles in the literature use languages as an approach to frames and use definition of enabling frames more than inhibiting frames. Since I give equal weights to both enabling frame and inhibiting frame in my study, I believe the combination will contribute to relevant studies. Furthermore, the literature informs me that although both Babb (1996) and Snow et al. (1986) talk about frame change, neither of them succeeds in detecting any frame change at all. This lack of evidence of frame-changing is an opportunity for me to contribute to the current literature.

Hypothesis

Nothing in the literature reviewed in the preceding section would motivate a change in my underlying hypothesis. The emphasis in the studies has been on enabling frames. In contrast, my emphasis is on both enabling frames and inhibiting frames. Before preceding with the empirical component of this research, my research hypothesis can be restated as follows: <u>between 1990-1997 there was a gradual frame shift in Hungarians' descriptions of each other's intentions from a "permission frame" to a "community frame."</u>

Chapter II: Data

Sample

Hungary is of interest in this research because it is one of those East European countries that had dramatic changes of its political and economic social structures since 1989, and thus offers a chance to test a change of frames in accordance with this change. In addition, Goffman (1974) argues frame is analogous to the syntactical structures of language. In all possible forms of language, media content is one important source of public ideas and common frameworks. Therefore, newspaper content is likely to provide information of the frame underneath.

The data set is comprised of sentences in editorials collected from the Hungarian newspaper, Népszabadság, from 1990-1997. Népszabadság, the largest newspaper in Hungary, used to be the communist party paper before 1989. It was, and continues to be, one of the most influential newspapers in the country. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that some structural changes of the media also occurred during the social and economic transition in Central-Eastern Europe (Splichal, 1992). Before 1989, media out through Central-Eastern Europe were severely censored and controlled by central governments and communist parties. After 1989, liberalization and privatization started influencing the press. Local broadcasting went through complete privatization and commercialization. However, nation-wide broadcasting was still largely controlled by central governments. "A national, politicized and quasi-commercial public broadcasting" (Splichal, 1992, p. 8) was established.

However, in Hungary, privatization and commercialization took place in both national and local media. Népszabadság, as well as the other newspapers, became privately owned by western investors. This happened because there was not enough Hungarian capital

or interest in acquiring them during privatization, and the Hungarian government did not propose restrictions on foreign ownership in the press (European Media Landscape, 2003). The new Népszabadság has kept the largest share of the national newspaper market, but has taken up new content more consistent with the values of democracy and the market economy.

Sampling of newspaper items

This data set is homogeneous as well as heterogeneous in some ways. It is homogeneous in the sense that it comes from one newspaper, and thus serves as its own baseline against which frame changes can be evaluated. It is heterogeneous because it is a systematic area sample, and thus contains texts on a wide variety of topics.

The sampling procedure is as follows:

1. From August 1990 to June 1997, one day between Monday and Friday was randomly sampled for every second week.
2. In each of these randomly selected newspapers, the number of pages of the first section only was determined. The newspaper's sections were distinguished according to the newspaper's categories of sports, local news, national news, and so on. Only the first section was chosen as the sample target because most editorials were there.
3. A page from the first section was randomly sampled.
4. A point on this page was randomly sampled.

Sampling of editorials

After getting a randomly sampled point from the newspaper, a decision was then made as to whether or not the newspaper item containing this point was an editorial or not. If

it was, it was included in the final sample; if not, then an alternative newspaper item was randomly sampled in the same issue of the same newspaper.

The following is a description of what criteria must be met for an item to be considered an editorial:

1. An editorial is defined as a newspaper item in which a non-foreign writer's primary intention is to convey an imputative assertion about a non-foreign agent.
2. Editorials are not descriptive. The primary intention of an editorial must be to convey an imputative assertion. An imputative assertion may depict a Hungarian individual(s), group(s), or organization(s) as objects toward whom another individual(s), group(s), or organization(s) . . .

wants to act	hopes to act	would act if some condition were met
ought to act	is permitted to act	should act if some condition were met
can act	must act	could act if some condition were met
attempts to act	refuses to act	might act if some condition were met

   There are altogether 12 modal auxiliary verbs used in this study: want to, ought to, be able to/can, refuse to, hope to, be permitted to, must, attempt to, would, should, could and might.
3. A newspaper item is not an editorial if no imputative assertion is given in the item's first three or last three paragraphs.

Sampling of imputative assertions and rationale clauses

After sampling an editorial, its last imputative assertion is located. More specifically, starting from the very last sentence of a translated piece and going backwards, the first

appearing modal auxiliary verb is located and the sentence containing that modal auxiliary verb is examined to determine whether or not it is an imputative assertion. Since there is one imputative assertion located for each editorial, the texts being analyzed contain 171 sentences coming out of 171 editorials.

Sometimes phrases that imply imputative assertions do not explicitly contain a modal auxiliary verb (want, can, ought, etc.). To avoid errors of omission in such cases, a specific transformation to a modal form must be found. Some examples follow:

- X "looks like a cabaret" --> X ought not to be done.
- X "only makes sense if" Y --> Given Y, X ought to happen.
- X "is afraid that" Y --> X does not want Y.
- "What" X "needs is" Y --> X ought to have Y.
- X's "plans to do" Y "are unrealistic" --> X cannot do Y.

Moreover, there are two potential errors of commission that could be made in judging whether or not a sentence containing a modal auxiliary verb comprises an imputative assertion.

1. A modal auxiliary verb refers to a non-Hungarian person's intention. For example, the word, 'must', in the sentence "Slovakians must go..." is oriented to the intention of Slovakians, not Hungarians. Therefore this sentence should not be considered an imputative assertion and should not be analyzed in the study.
2. A modal auxiliary verb is used descriptively. For example, the word 'can' in the sentence "refrigerator can cool food..." is a descriptive verb without implication of any intentionality. Therefore this sentence should not be considered an imputative assertion and should not be analyzed in the study.

Figure 1 provides a complete illustration of the procedure for sampling an imputative assertion.

After locating the imputative assertion, a rationale clause for this imputative assertion is also located in the nearby context. This means finding the reason why the author believes a Hungarian has this specific intention (i.e., the intention indicated within the imputative assertion). For example, consider the following closing sentences of an editorial: "There is a forgery of history in world-language as well. This is exactly why we Hungarian historians should tell the truth about the last era of Hungarian-Slovakian coexistence here, in Hungary!" This editorial's last imputative assertion is identified by locating the modal auxiliary verb, 'should'. This imputative assertion is thus, "We Hungarian historians should tell the truth about the last era of Hungarian-Slovakian coexistence." Next, the reason for the imputative assertion ("we...should tell...") is found, namely "there is a forgery of history." If the author's reason, or rationale, for the selected modal auxiliary verb cannot be found in the text, another modal auxiliary verb with an explicit reason was located going backwards further into the editorial. (See appendix 1 for a supplemental list of newspaper items that are not editorials.)



Figure 1: Flow chart for deciding if a sentence contains an imputative assertion

Translation

After the final sampling of imputative assertions and rationale clauses, professional translators translated parts of every sampled editorial into English. Under the assumption that almost every editorialist tries to express his/her opinions in the beginning or the end of his/her writing, only the first and last three paragraphs of each editorial were translated (a paragraph must contain at least 3 sentences). More was not translated due to a limited budget.

Nonetheless, the marginal increase of benefit to translate the whole editorial would likely have been trivial.

Translations from the original Hungarian into English were done as literally as possible. Three key instructions to translators were as follows:

1. In translating the editorials there must be a one-to-one correspondence between each of the following in both original text and translation: paragraphs, sentences, and clauses.
2. The following need not be preserved in translations: punctuation other than the sentence terminators, and word order. The general idea is that the order of clauses may be rearranged in the translation, but the subject-verb-object relations within clauses must be preserved.
3. Idioms should be replaced with English phrases that come as close to possible to the idioms' meanings. Hence, literal translations of these idioms should be provided. (See appendix 2 for complete instructions to translators).

Content analysis: Program for Linguistic Content Analysis

Both the imputative assertion and its rationale clause were encoded, using the semantic text analysis program, PLCA: Program for Linguistic Content Analysis (Roberts, 1989). Each imputative assertion was encoded according to its author's position regarding his/her fellow Hungarians' intentions (namely, regarding what they want, hope, must, attempt, refuse, ought, would, should, could, might, or are able, permitted to do). The semantic grammar is comprised of four major syntactic components:

Subject: the initiator of an activity.

Modal: the editorialist's imputed intention regarding the initiator's motives.

Action: the activity under consideration.

Object: the target of this activity.

For example, an editorial in which the general message is, "Politicians ought not argue too much with each other," would be encoded as, "politicians (subject) ought (position) not argue (action) with politicians (object)."

Each rationale clause is encoded as linked by a conjunction to the imputative assertion. The semantic grammar for the rationale clauses is comprised of three major syntactic components: subject, action and object with the same definition and use as encoding the imputative assertion. For example, "Politicians ought not argue too much with each other, it distracts them from taking actual actions to help the economy," would be encoded as, "politicians (subject) ought (position) not argue (action) with politicians (object), because arguing (subject) is not going to help (action) the economy (object). Complementary syntactic components include subject's genitive, object's genitive, clause valence, audience, speaker and so on. All encoding was performed separately by two coders, and verified by a native Hungarian when these coders were unable to reach consensus.

Measures

1. Time

The date when an editorial was published is a measure of changing Hungarian milieu from a soviet style communist society to a democratic society during 1990-1997. Economically, it measures a process of Hungary's giving up the state-owned economy while

embracing a market-oriented economy. Politically, it measures a process of changing from soviet style communism to Western European style democracy.

The variable, 'year', is one of two measures derived from editorials' publication dates. To ensure approximately equal numbers of editorials among years, editorials from 8/1990 to 6/1991 are treated as year 1991, editorials from 7/1991 to 6/1992 are treated as year 1992, and so on through 7/1996 to 06/1997 being treated as year 1997. Accordingly, there are 7 levels of the variable, 'year', ranging from 1991 to 1997. The early years are assumed to be more communistic; the later years are assumed to be relatively more democratic.

The variable, 'time', is a dichotomous variable, also a measure of change in the Hungarian milieu. Editorials from 08/1990 to 12/1993 are included in time period 1, and ones from 01/1994 to 06/1997 are included in time period 2. Both periods have similar sample sizes of around 85. Time period 1 is considered more communistic than time period 2. Time period 2 is considered more democratic than time period 1.

2. Modal

An imputative assertion's modal auxiliary verb affords a measure of permission frame and community frame.

Of the twelve modal auxiliary verbs used in PLCA, the modals indicative of these frames are 'permitted', 'ought' and 'must'. It is not difficult to argue that the modal 'permitted' is a measure of permission frame. Moreover, it is reasonable to say that the modal 'must' is a measure of community frame in the sense that modals were only classified as instances of 'must' when the subject's intention was to 'keep something bad from disappearing' in the first place. For example, the sentence "Journalists should join the

boycott of this politician, because supporting him is not justified by their responsibility" is coded as a modal 'must', meaning 'be compelled to' in the sense that boycotting this politician is preventing something bad from happening. (In this case, it would be bad doing something one is not responsible for doing.)

The modal 'ought' is a measure of community frame as well because it indicates an imputative assertion in which the subject's purpose is to 'prevent something good from disappearing'. For example, the sentence, "The official should retain the list of works, because it will preserve our many alternatives," is coded as a modal 'ought', meaning 'be obliged to' in the sense that preserving our many alternatives is kept from disappearing by retaining the list of works.

As already discussed, evidence of community frame is found in references to people taking things as their own responsibility, preventing good things from disappearing their community, and preventing bad things from happening. In contrast, evidence of permission frame is found in references to things only happening because they are allowed to happen. Thus use of the modal 'permit' is an appropriate measure for permission frame.

3. Rationale

The rationale associated with each imputative assertion is used to measure the presence of permission frame versus community frame as well. Notice that rationale is not a measure of each editorial's topic or theme. Instead, it is a measure of the reason, or justification, for each imputative assertion as stated in its rationale clause. When people appeal to a permission frame, their rationale behind such an intention would likely reference an authority's decision, a policy or rule, what had been done before (i.e., a tradition), or even pressure from other countries. When people are thinking in terms of a community frame,

however, their rationale of intention would more often reference the community, the country's well-being, individual responsibilities and human rights.

Six categories of rationale were developed intuitively during the encoding process: economy, democracy, welfare, security, group's interest and culture. The balance of this paragraph provides descriptions and illustrations of each.

- Economy: When there were words in an imputative assertion's rationale clause indicating economy, this rationale was coded as economy. Many times, such words were used as 'economy', 'market', 'price', 'agriculture', 'industry' and so on.

For example, in one of the editorials, the Minister of Agriculture hopes the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture will help him in identifying Hungary's agricultural problems. His rationale is that this help is necessary because these efforts can be integrated into the growth of the national economy. The rationale for this editorial is therefore categorized as economy.

- Democracy: When a rationale clause had words associated with democracy, the rationale for this editorial was coded as democracy. Associated words include 'politician', 'parliament', 'democracy', 'political party' and etc.

One example is an editorial calling for cooperation among the government and oppositional political parties in order to achieve consensus on Hungary's foreign policies. The rationale clause says that this cooperation is needed because it is helpful for both parties to understand the situation better, and to play their part more successfully in the political process. The rationale therefore is categorized as democracy.

- Welfare: When a rationale clause contained words like 'medical system', 'social security system', 'handicapped people', and 'poor people', this rationale was coded as welfare.

An illustration of this is with an article that refers to the government's changing of offices, which is expensive and not necessary. Instead of spending money on moving government offices, the article argues, poor people are in a greater need of the money. The rationale for this editorial is that the poor people need money to increase their living-standard, thus prompting its categorization as welfare.

- Security: When a rationale clause contained words like 'public order', 'national security', 'military', 'safety', this rationale was coded as security.

For instance, an editorial about NATO's potential influence on Hungarian military reasons that the government should not obey some of NATO's policies, because it is going to weaken Hungary's military force. The rationale is for a stronger national military, and therefore is coded as security.

- Group's interest: When a rationale clause had words referring to community groups or social groups that do not represent Hungarians' overall interests -- groups such as 'entrepreneurs', 'local community', 'trade unions' -- this rationale is coded as group's interest.

One illustrative editorial says that the people should not search for a corrupted local officer, because his running-away saved the local people from media and public ridicule. The reason for the action lies in the interests and rights of local residents, and therefore is coded as group's interest.

- Culture: This is a category that includes articles dealing with cultural, historical and idiomatic reasoning. Key words indicating this category include a broad range of key words like 'nation's glory', 'language', 'historical event', 'truth', 'morality' and so on.

For example, the author of an editorial is not very satisfied with the national reading list for primary and secondary schools. He thinks it should be revised because it should provide more possible alternatives. The rationale here is for a better quality of education, and therefore is categorized as culture.

On one hand, some of the six rationales have an association with community frame in that welfare certainly connects more to community frame, which is about the native people's well-being. Culture, too, has a connection to community frame because it is a concern with the country's well-being in the sense of preserving its core values. Given that Hungary is Hungarians' community, both rationales reflect Hungarians' intentions to make contributions to their country. The frame that governs this kind of action consists of principles of Hungarians' desires for a better country, and thus is to be considered indicative of Hungarians' community frame.

On the other hand, none of the six rationales indicates permission frame. The "group's interest" rationale is commonly one that would enable actions counter to Hungarians' welfare or culture. Thus in this sense this type of rationale is not indicative of a community frame. Yet the group's interest rationale is certainly not indicative of a permission frame either. Likewise, none of economy, democracy or security is clearly indicative of either of the two frames. In accordance with a permission frame, principles of permission or non-permission guide people's action. None of democracy, economy, group's

interest or security indicates any choices of action versus non-action based respectively on permission versus non-permission. Thus none may be used to measure permission frame. A rationale like "government's command" might have been linked to permission frame. But no such rationale was detected in these editorials. Since it is not included in the data set, the variable, 'rationale', cannot be used to measure permission frame.

Chapter III: Results

Modals across time

An examination of changes in modal usage across time provides some evidence regarding permission frame and community frame. Table 1 lists annual percentage among the twelve types of modals. In this table, the modal 'must' has the highest frequency with 43 out of 171 in total, followed by the modal 'ought' with a frequency of 31. Both modals 'could' and 'want' have frequencies of 21 each. The modals 'can' and 'hope' have frequencies of 19 and 15 respectively. The other modals have frequencies ranging from only 1 to 6.

The modal 'ought' seems to have some changes over time with its highest percentage in 1994 and with a slightly higher percentage during later than during earlier years. The modal 'must' has the highest percentage in 1996 and the second highest percentage in 1993. The modal 'can' has a decreasing trend, while the modal 'could' has a modest increasing trend. Since the modals 'can' and 'could' have similar semantic meanings of 'be able to', they can be combined together as one modal. The consequence of this combining is that the two modals offset each other's tendency. The combined modal thus looks stable over time. The other modals do not have any obvious pattern.

As already discussed in the data chapter, both modals 'must' and 'ought' represent community frame, and the modal 'permitted' represents permission frame. Neither of the frames has any clear pattern linking temporal changes in instances of the three modals and the hypothesized shift between the two frames. There are only seven cases as evidence of permission frame, leaving me insufficient data to draw inferences about change from a permission frame among Hungarians.

Table 1: Annual percentages among community frame, permission frame and other modals

Modal	Year 91	92	93	94	95	96	97	Total
Community frame								
Must	26.1	20.8	33.3	22.2	16.0	38.5	20.8	25.4
	(6)	(5)	(8)	(5.5)	(4)	(9.5)	(5)	(43)
Ought	13.0	20.8	8.3	29.6	12.0	23.1	20.8	18.5
	(3)	(5)	(2)	(7.5)	(3)	(5.5)	(5)	(31)
Permission frame								
Permitted	8.7	0.0	8.3	0.0	8.0	0.0	4.2	4.0
	(2)	(0)	(2)	(0)	(2)	(0)	(1)	(7)
Other modals								
Want	0.0	20.8	8.3	14.8	24.0	3.8	12.5	12.1
	(0)	(5)	(2)	(4)	(6)	(1)	(3)	(21)
Could	4.3	12.5	8.3	11.1	24.0	11.5	12.5	12.1
	(1)	(3)	(2)	(3)	(6)	(3)	(3)	(21)
Can	21.7	0.0	16.7	11.1	8.0	11.5	8.3	11.0
	(5)	(0)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(3)	(2)	(19)
Hope	17.4	4.2	12.5	11.1	8.0	3.8	4.2	8.7
	(4)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(15)
Should	4.3	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7	8.3	3.5
	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(2)	(6)
Would	0.0	12.5	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.2	2.9
	(0)	(3)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(5)
Refuse	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.6
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)
Attempt	0.0	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
	(0)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)
Might	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)

Numbers are percentages, sum to 100% in each column.
Numbers in brackets are frequencies.
Community frame includes modal ‘must’ and ‘ought’.
Permission frame includes modal ‘permitted’.
Fractions in frequencies reflect weights assigned to clauses in which more than one modal auxiliary verb appeared.

When it comes to community frame (i.e., combined data on both 'must' and 'ought'), 1996 is the highest one with a frequency of 15, followed by 1994 with frequency 13. However, it's hard to see any pattern across time because the lowest frequency occurs in 1995, and the first three years have low frequencies as well. These differences appear scattered across time, thus failing to provide clear evidence regarding my hypothesis.

A further analysis takes only two time periods into consideration: time period 1 is from 1990 to the end of 1993 and time period 2 is from 1994 to 1997. From period 1 to period 2, frequency of permission frame decreases from 4 to 3 while the frequency of community frame remains stable at 37. In sum, no evidence in support of my hypothesis is afforded through an examination of temporal changes in modal usage.

Rationales across time

The results of coding rationales into 6 categories give some insights into temporal changes in permission frame and community frame, however. Table 2 lists annual percentages among the six types of rationales. In the table, rationales of democracy, economy and culture appear to be the top three rationales among all six, with frequencies of 44, 37and 36 respectively out of 171 cases. The other rationales have 23, 16 and 15 frequencies, which are generally only half the size of the major ones. Examining rationales' patterns across years, rationales including economy, democracy and group's interest start strong during the early years but shrink later, especially the one related to group's interest.

Economy has almost the same frequencies for most of the years except 1994, when it drops precipitously at the time of the national election. However, it was mentioned more

frequently in 1991 and 1993 (with proportions of around 30 percent) than 1995, 1996, and 1997 (with proportions around 20 percent).

Table 2: Annual percentages among community frame and other rationales

	Year							
Rationale	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	Total
Community frame								
Culture	13.0	25.0	25.0	11.5	16.0	32.0	25.0	21.1
	(3)	(6)	(6)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(6)	(36)
Welfare	8.7	4.2	12.5	19.2	16.0	8.0	25.0	13.5
	(2)	(1)	(3)	(5)	(4)	(2)	(6)	(23)
Other rationales								
Democracy	21.7	37.5	25.0	42.3	28.0	16.0	8.3	25.7
	(5)	(9)	(6)	(11)	(7)	(4)	(2)	(44)
Economy	30.4	16.7	29.2	11.5	24.0	16.0	25.0	21.6
	(7)	(4)	(7)	(3)	(6)	(4)	(6)	(37)
Group's interest	21.7	12.5	0.0	3.8	8.0	12.0	8.3	9.4
	(5)	(3)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(2)	(16)
Security	4.3	4.2	8.3	11.5	8.0	16.0	8.3	8.8
	(1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(2)	(4)	(2)	(15)

Numbers are percentages, sum to 100% in each column.
Numbers in brackets are frequencies.
Community frame includes rationale 'culture' and 'welfare.'

Democracy has the highest occurrence during the election year of 1994, offsetting the relatively few references to economy. A similar offsetting occurs in 1992. Yet democracy has some low frequencies in 1991 and 1997 when economy shows up stronger as a rationale. This tradeoff in frequencies between democracy and economy proceeds from 1991 to 1995, with democracy remaining one of the major rationales of Hungarians' intentions. Only during the last years of 1996 and 1997 does one find a sharp decline in democracy as a rationale for Hungarians' intentions.

Group's interest is one of the most interesting rationales when referring to permission frame and community frame. As previously discussed, this category is not related to community frame. Instead, it refers to some specific groups other than a group representing all Hungarian society as a community. It indicates something more individualistic, more selfish, but not nation-wide. It is also interesting because it shows a clear pattern of change during the years. While reaching its highest positions in 1991 with 21.7 percent and 1992 with 12.5 percent, which are magnitudes compatible to those of major rationales like economy and democracy, it quickly weakens to one of the least frequently mentioned rationales with barely any mentions during the years from 1993 through 1997.

Also seen from the pattern across years, rationales including security, culture and welfare have tendencies to increase, especially when they are related to welfare and culture. They all start almost unnoticeable in the first year or two, but end up relatively frequent as one of the major rationales in the last year or two. Generally speaking, security is not a big concern in that it has the lowest proportion among all rationales. But it shows a somewhat increased pattern that has its peak in 1996 with 16 percent, has its lows in the first two years, and has most of its occurrences in the years after 1993.

Culture is another major rationale together with economy and democracy. In 1991 it only occupies 13 percent of that year, but it gets somewhat stronger over time with proportions over 20 percent, and ends up with 25 percent in 1997. This provides some indication of a shift toward a frame that deals more with Hungary's cultural heritage, historical background, well-functioning society, proper moral and behavior principles for the native people, and therefore the image of a prosperous, caring and healthy community.

Welfare has a pattern like that of culture. With barely any mentions in 1991 and 1992, it ends up with 25 percent in 1997.

There is thus some evidence that the rationales have shifted through time. Peoples' rationales for their intentions seem to have become increasingly more about the welfare system and the culture of their country, which suggests that rationales are changing to be more community-like. This is consistent with one part of the hypothesis, namely that community frame appears more frequently in the later years than in the earlier years of this study.

Table 3: Slopes from logistic regressions of year on 6 types of rationales

	Logistic Regression	
Rationale	B	P-value
Community frame		
Welfare vs. non-welfare	0.188	0.112
Culture vs. non-culture	0.088	0.357
Other rationales		
Democracy vs. non-democracy	-0.155	0.086
Security vs. non-security	0.162	0.251
Group's vs. non-group's interest	-1.135	0.318
Economy vs. non-economy	-0.047	0.612

B is the estimated logit coefficient.

After encoding each rationale as a dummy variable, I ran six logistic regressions with continuous variable year as the independent variable. Table 3 shows the slopes from these logistic regressions of year on each type of rationale. None of the slopes in these models is significant at the 0.05 level, although democracy vs. non-democracy is borderline significant

with a p-value of 0.086. The negative sign of this coefficient is consistent with the previous observation that the democracy rationale decreased over time.

A further analysis restricts time to only two time periods. Table 4 shows frequencies and expected frequencies of six types of rationales in the two time periods. The rationales that have big changes between the two periods are democracy (from 25 to 19 in a decreasing trend compared to its expected frequencies), economy (from 21 to 16 in a decreasing trend compared to its expected frequencies), welfare (from 7 to 16 in an increasing trend compared to its expected frequencies) and culture (from 15 to 21 in an increasing trend compared to its expected frequencies). This analysis is consistent with the conclusions from the previous analysis. In short, there is some evidence for the hypothesis of a shift toward community frame.

Table 4: Frequencies of 6 types of rationales in 2 time periods

	Rationale					
Time	Democracy	Economy	Group's	Security	Culture	Welfare
Period 1	25	21	9	7	15	7
	(21.6)	(18.2)	(7.9)	(7.4)	(17.7)	(11.3)
Period 2	19	16	7	8	21	16
	(22.4)	(18.8)	(8.1)	(7.6)	(18.3)	(11.7)
Δ	-3.4	-2.8	-1.1	0.4	2.7	4.3

Numbers are frequencies.
Numbers in brackets are expected frequencies.
Δ is the difference between frequency and expected frequency in period 2.

Table 5 lists the values from Pearson chi-square tests for each of the six types of rationales across the two time periods. None of the tests appears to be significant at the 0.05 level. Only the test of welfare vs. non-welfare appears to be borderline significant with a p-value of 0.054.

Table 5: Chi-square tests of six types of rationale by time period

Rationale	Pearson Chi-Square	
	Value	P-value
Community frame		
Welfare vs. non-welfare	3.713	0.054
Culture vs. non-culture	1.014	0.314
Other rationales		
Democracy vs. non-democracy	1.404	0.236
Economy vs. non-economy	1.101	0.294
Group's interest vs. non-group's interest	0.359	0.549
Security vs. non-security	0.040	0.842

Table 6: Frequencies of community frame vs. non-community frame in 2 time periods

Time	Frame	
	Non-community	Community
Period 1	62	22
	(55)	(29)
Period 2	50	37
	(57)	(30)
Δ	-7	7

Numbers are frequencies.
Numbers in brackets are expected frequencies.
Δ is the difference between frequency and expected frequency in period 2.
Pearson chi-square of this test gives a p-value of 0.0125.

Again, because both rationales of welfare and culture are measures of community frame, I combine them in a further analysis to represent community frame, while leaving other rationales to represent non-community frame. Table 6 gives the frequencies and expected frequencies of community frame and non-community frame in the two time periods. This test has a one-tailed p-value of 0.0125, which is a significant finding at even a 0.02 level. Upon examining the table's expected and observed counts, one finds more observed (37) than expected (30) mentions of rationales indicative of community frame during the later of the two periods. Thus one can conclude that there is evidence for the

hypothesis that there is a shift from less community frame to more community frame in mentions of Hungarians' rationales for their intentions.

Chapter IV: Discussion

When Hungary and many other countries started the process of democratization, researchers were puzzled by how associated social changes would affect people's minds. Frame theory provides a theoretical base for investigating people's minds in a measurable way, enabling me to investigate this puzzle in analyses of Hungarians' language and intentions. In particular, I have examined Hungarians' frame in conjunction with their references to each other's intentions. Under the presumption that when under occupation Hungarians had a dominant frame of permission that forced them to get permissions before acting, I hypothesized that after independence, Hungarians' rationales for their intentions would shift from this permission frame to a community frame, according to which they justified their acts in accordance with their desire to contribute to their country and people.

After analyzing the data in a variety of ways, I find no evidence for a permission frame among Hungarians. The analysis of modals locates only a few imputations indicative of a permission frame. The rationale measure does not afford data on permission frame. That is, none of the six categories of rationales that appear in the data affords a measurement of permission frame. Since there is no evidence for the existence of a permission frame, it is meaningless to talk about its change through time. The first part of the hypothesis "there is a frame shift from permission frame" is therefore not supported by this study.

What is supported in this study is the second part of the hypothesis, namely, "there is a frame shift to community frame." The measuring of modals does provide some evidence for the existence of a community frame. However, the analysis of these data does not detect any statistically significant change in the frames. The analysis of rationale does offer some evidence for this shift. The chi-square test of community frame versus non-community frame

during two time periods is statistically significant, which is evidence for an increase of intentions justified in terms of community frame relative to non-community frame over the period of the study. Notice that among all the tests I ran only the single chi-square test of community frame versus non-community frame during two time periods yielded significant results. Carrying out several statistic tests at a 0.05 significance level increases the possibility that any significant result is simply due to sampling error. This fact should not be ignored.

Assuming that this sole significance finding was not in error, it indicates an increase in community-related justification for Hungarians' intentions during the transformation -- a change possibly indicative of their social reality, their country's growth, and their democratization process. I believe that this increase in community-related justifications comprises a methodological contribution to attitude studies of relevant transitions and social changes.

However, the concept of permission frame, although not detected or supported by this study, also gives insights into society, social science, and research methodology. The fact that it is not detectable might be due to some important, but neglected, reasons. One possible explanation is that permission frame had already been declining prior to 1989, so that it no longer served to justify people's intentions at the beginning of my study period (i.e., 1990). Another explanation might be that rationales in accordance with a permission frame suddenly disappeared the moment when Russians left Hungary, which happened earlier than the date of my earliest editorial, thus making evidence of such rationales impossible to be detected using this data set. A third explanation deals with my measure of modal. It needs to be acknowledged that people sometimes use modal auxiliary verbs interchangeably without assigning certain imputative assertions to them. For example, a person might say, "I am not

able to go," but mean that he/she is not permitted to go (i.e., that it is not his/her own inability but others' actions that would put an end to their attempt at leaving). This uncertainty might therefore explain why I could not locate evidence for permission frame by modals.

In future research, all these limitations and possibilities should be taken into consideration. I would suggest, first of all, incorporating data prior to 1990 into the study. This extension of the timeline would help test if a decline or a sudden disappearance of permission frame had taken place before 1990. Secondly, another suggestion for future research would be a reconsideration of modals used in imputative assertions. Whether a modal auxiliary verb conveys a specific imputative assertion is itself an interesting research question, the answer to which might improve our intercultural understanding.

Appendix 1: Miscellaneous Newspaper Items that are not Editorials

1. Government proclamations
2. Cultural or sports news of a descriptive nature
3. Advertisements or other solicitations
4. Articles on consumer, investment, or personal information
5. Entertainment information (e.g., cartoons, television schedules, etc.)
6. Humorous articles in which no clear imputative assertion by its nonforeign writer about nonforeigners is given
7. Economic news (unless its primary emphasis is to convey its nonforeign writer's imputative assertion about nonforeigners)
8. Personal interest stories about individuals (unless their primary emphasis is to convey its nonforeign writer's imputative assertion about nonforeigners)
9. As mentioned above, unsigned news stories (e.g., news briefs and nearly all articles from news agencies such as TASS or API)
10. As mentioned above, foreign news (unless its primary emphasis is to convey its nonforeign writer's imputative assertion about nonforeigners).
11. As mentioned above, items (e.g., in direct quotations) that mention a nonforeigner's (but not the writer's) imputative assertion about nonforeigners (unless the item's primary emphasis is to convey its nonforeign writer's imputative assertion about nonforeigners).

Appendix 2: Rules for Translating Editorials

A. In translating the editorials there must be a one-to-one correspondence between each of the following in both original text and translation:

1. Paragraphs
2. Sentences (terminating with one of the three punctuation marks: ".", "?", and ":" when it separates distinct clauses)
3. Clauses (i.e., subject-verb-object relations)

B. The following need not be preserved in translations:

1. Punctuation other than the sentence terminators (.:?)
   a. To preserve breaks between sentences, you may need to insert semicolons (;) to separate long sentences into intelligible parts in English.
   b. In some languages direct quotations are not given between quotation marks. If a sentence contains the exact words that someone has stated, place them between quotation marks and make sure it is clear whose words they are either by noting that the words' originator is made explicit in the text or by inserting this as insider information in parentheses.
   c. When a colon (:) does not immediately precede a clause, but precedes a list of nouns, it need not be preserved in translation (because it does not separate distinct clauses).
      1) If a colon is followed immediately by a clause, the first word in this clause should be capitalized in the translation. (The minister's position is unjust: The judge had ruled appropriately.)
      2) If a colon immediately precedes a list of nouns, the first word in this list should not be capitalized. (He forgot three things: the integrity, tenacity, and persistence of the electorate.)
2. Word order
   a. To make sentences read like English you will need to rearrange parts of sentences.
   b. Idiomatic phrases' word order also cannot be preserved, of course.

C. The general idea is that the order of clauses may be rearranged in the translation, but the subject-verb-object relations within clauses must be preserved.

D. Idioms

1. Idioms should be replaced with English phrases that come as close to possible to the idioms' meanings.

2. These English phrases should then be followed by parentheses that begin with "lit.:" (for literally) followed by a literal translation of the idiom.

3. For example, ". . . he commented, "It was obvious (lit.: not necessary to shoot from a short-gun) to learn that there are people who do not belong there."

E. Information that an outsider might not understand

1. Anything that a foreign reader of the editorial might not understand should be clarified in parentheses that begin with the lower-case initial of your first name (plus a colon; e.g., "c:") followed by an explanation of what the translator understands as an insider.

2. Illustrations of insider's information: "The players came from Vltava (r: Vltava is river in Prague, Czech Republic)."

3. This form (i.e., initial plus colon) should also be used to make phrases explicit that are implied but not written in the text.

4. An illustration of implied information: "In a more than one hour marathon (r: his speech) devoted mainly to his self-pride, Mr. Sládek gave their (r: journalists') due also to journalists because 'They all serve only to one master.' In the end -- as (r: is) typical for him . . ."

F. Fonts

1. All text (with two exceptions) should appear in the default, or regular font.

2. The exceptions:

a. The abstract is always in bold.

b. Any part of the original text that appears in bold should be in bold.

c. Parts of the text that appear in italics should be underlined.

G. Translations should be of the first and last three paragraphs of each editorial sampled, plus its abstract and photo-captions (if any).

1. For the purposes of counting paragraphs, a paragraph must contain at least 3 sentences.

2. If, counting from the beginning, the first paragraph contains less than three sentences, its number of sentences is added to the number of sentences in the second paragraph. If this sum is less than 3, the sum is added to the number of sentences in the third paragraph. Once a sum of 3 or more is reached, the paragraph count is set to one, and you should begin counting sentences at the beginning of the next paragraph. When a sum of 3 or more sentences is reached again, the paragraph count is incremented by one and you should begin counting sentences again at the beginning of the next paragraph.

3. Once the paragraph count reaches 3, you have identified the editorial's first three paragraphs.

4. To find the editorial's last three paragraphs, repeat this procedure from the editorial's last paragraph toward its first.

5. In addition to the editorial's first and last three paragraphs, its abstract (an initial summary sentence or two in bold letters sometimes at the beginning of the editorial) must also be translated. Note that if an editorial contains an abstract, the abstract does NOT count as one of the editorial's first three paragraphs.

6. If an editorial is longer than three "counted paragraphs" (as just defined), an ellipsis (. . .) should be placed on a separate line between paragraphs in the English translation.

7. If an editorial is continued from one newspaper page to another, the phrase, "Continued on page ___" (with the appropriate page number placed in the blank), should be placed on a separate line at the point at which the text jumps between pages in the original.

8. Finally, captions of any photographs that accompany an editorial should also be translated. These should be placed at the end of the translation after the word, "Caption: ". If there are more than one caption, the phrases "Caption 1: ", "Caption 2: ", etc. should be used.

H. Translations should use the following format:

1. Name of newspaper
2. Summary sentence (approved by Carl Roberts)
3. Date, Number, Page number/Length of the newspaper's first section
4. Title
5. Author and position (in parentheses if a position [e.g., Prime Minister] follows the author's name in the original text)
6. Abstract (if any; in bold letters)
7. Single-spaced indented paragraphs (Note: Each new paragraph should begin with a single tab character.)
8. An ellipsis (in editorials that are longer than three counted paragraphs) and/or a "Continued on page ___" (in editorials that continue from one newspaper page to another) on a separate line at the appropriate points in the translation
9. Captions

I. An illustration of the format

<u>Rudé Právo</u>

Summary: Leader of the (r: right-wing) Republican party, Mr. M. Sládek, wants to change everything (decrease politicians' salaries, cancel Parliament's holidays, remove people from the Department of Internal Affairs) and everybody (President Havel, Prime Minister Klaus, journalists).

Issue: Sep. 6, 1991, 208, 3/16

Title: According to Sládek everything is upside down

Author: Kamila Jašková

Leader of the (r: right-wing) Republican party, Mr. M. Sládek, promised to deliver to his supporters 343 meetings by election during the press conference on Thursday in Prague. And in case of his winning the election he will decrease salaries of the Members of Parliament by 60% and cancel Parliament holidays. He added that "Parliament has nothing to be proud of because it passed only about one third of the bills and the majority of them had to be reworked."

According to him, "Mr. Klaus organized voucher privatization only to increase the popularity of his party and himself before elections." (r: Regarding the) Situation in the Department of Internal Affairs he commented, "It was obvious (lit.: not necessary to shoot from a short-gun) to learn that there are people who do not belong there. The Republicans already wanted to remove Mr. Langoš from his office on Easter Monday." Besides using not very precise citations from the Bible to criticize Mr. President (r: Havel), Mr. Sládek added a question: "Does Mr. President have any responsibility in this state? The (r: Mr. President) pretends: not me, the bystander (literally: not me, I only musician)."

In a more than one hour marathon (r: his speech) devoted mainly to his self-pride, Mr. Sládek gave their (r: journalists') due also to journalists because "They all serve only to one master." In the end -- as (r: is) typical for him -- this leader of the Republican party (r: Sládek) expressed his conviction that "in this state everything is upside down."

J. Typed texts should be in WordPerfect 5.1 format, and saved in files with year_month_day formatted names. For example, an editorial published in Rudé Právo on September 6, 1991, would be saved in a file named 91_09_06.RP. (Suffixes for the other newspapers are "IZ" for Izvestiia, "TR" for Trybuna, and "NE" for Népszabadság.)

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