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Ideology and Senate Voting On the Panama Canal Treaties

This research examines the relative utility of ideology (as compared to party affiliation, regionalism, election status, and presidential leadership) in explaining Senate voting decisions on the two Panama Canal Treaties in March and April 1978. Employing bivariate and multivariate techniques, we demonstrate that the ideological explanation of voting was more potent than the others for these two treaties. In addition, when we analyzed separately senators who decided early and senators who decided close to the vote, we again found that the ideological variable remained the crucial factor in the decision calculus of both groups. Only among "late deciders" do we begin to witness the significant effect of another factor, regionalism. We discuss the implication of the results for salient issues in American foreign policy.

Over the last decade, ideology has enjoyed considerable favor as an explanation of congressional voting behavior on foreign policy issues. In fact, according to available evidence, this dimension has come to rival more traditional explanations for congressional action on these questions. In this paper, by systematically evaluating other explanations of Senate voting on the Panama Canal Treaties in March and April 1978, we again demonstrate the utility of the ideological explanation. Furthermore, given the nature of our data, we are able to show the relative potency of ideology among those senators who decided on their position on the treaties early (within about two months of the treaty signings in September 1977) and those senators who decided at the last moment.

Ideology and Foreign Policy Voting

Several important assumptions form the basis of an ideological explanation of foreign policy voting. The most important assumption, of course, is that senators (in this case) make their policy choices on the basis of some internalized set of political values and beliefs about the world. A corollary to this assumption for the American setting is that this set of beliefs can

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best be depicted along the familiar left-right or liberal-conservative continuum. Two other assumptions are also necessary for this explanation: (1) that senators can be arrayed along this continuum from “conservative” to “liberal” and (2) that foreign policy issues have identifiable “liberal” and “conservative” positions. If these assumptions are correct, we should be able to predict accurately a senator’s position on a given issue, based upon his position on the left-right continuum. Put differently, a liberal senator would vote the “liberal” position, while a conservative senator would vote the “conservative” position.

These assumptions create several immediate problems. Most notably, we must ascertain the liberal and conservative beliefs of members of the Senate. We shall do that by quantifying their past voting behavior. A second problem is that we must determine liberal and conservative foreign policy positions on an issue. This task is more difficult, and the determination will be qualitative, based upon traditional views about the role of the United States in the world. More difficult still is a third problem that encompasses the first two. We must decide whether ideology is related to foreign policy matters, especially for the U.S. Congress, which has seemed so responsive to presidential initiatives, constituency demands, and party ties in its past voting behavior.

In connection with this last problem, some earlier research is most helpful. Moyer (1973, pp. 106-141), for example, demonstrates that defense voting in the House of Representatives formed two voting scales (a Cold War scale and a Preparedness scale) for the 90th (1967-1968) and 91st (1969-1970) Congresses; those scales correlated well with voting scales on domestic issues (e.g., civil liberties, domestic welfare, public works). Thus he is able to conclude that “basic liberal-conservative attitudes in large measure may explain congressional voting along the spectrum of issues covered in our scales” (p. 114). Moyer goes on to demonstrate that this ideological voting on defense issues was greater in the 91st Congress than in the 90th Congress. Finally, and most significantly, Moyer recasts his arguments into a testable ideological model and provides evidence that this model is a better explanation of House defense voting than four other models: two military-industrial complex models, a constituency model, and an ideosyncratic model (pp. 117-132). On balance, then, Moyer provides persuasive evidence for an ideological explanation of foreign policy voting in the House.

Russett (1970) reports a similar finding for defense and foreign policy voting in the Senate during the 90th Congress. First he notes that defense voting tends to form identifiable scales, a result that suggests some underlying dimension. More to the point, though, he reports a strong correlation between foreign and defense voting and civil rights and urban affairs voting (p. 88). Elsewhere, Russett summarizes the meaning of his results as well as Moyer’s. By the early 1970s, he argues, members of Congress were coming to view issues

in the domestic and foreign policy arenas as interrelated and were voting on that basis (Russett and Hanson, 1975, p. 135). Domestic liberals were being transformed into foreign policy liberals, while domestic conservatives were becoming foreign policy conservatives. Thus the ideological divisions which have long been prevalent in American domestic politics became apparent in foreign policy as well.

A third study by Bernstein and Anthony (1974) demonstrates the applicability of this logic to a particular issue, voting on the ABM in the Senate between 1968 and 1970. As they show, ideology rather than party commitment or a state's economic benefit was primarily responsible for a senator's position on the ABM. Furthermore, Bernstein and Anthony show that the influence of ideology grew each year for those senators not wholly in line with the ideological explanation. At the same time, ideology remained firm for those senators whose initial position was motivated by this factor.

Two recently published works add more support to this ideological explanation of foreign policy voting. Schneider (1979) uses 1970 interviews and 1971-1976 roll-call data to test pluralist and ideological theories of congressional behavior. He finds strong support for the ideological theory across all areas of congressional behavior, including foreign policy voting. Moreover, ideological "constraint" existed between foreign and domestic issues for all the Congresses and sessions examined in both houses, but with a slight dropoff from its peak during the 92d Congress (p. 134).

A later study by Smith (1981) challenges the approach and the time frame used in Schneider's study, but not its conclusions. Using a different research strategy and focusing on U.S. Senate behavior from 1957 to 1976, Smith finds overall support for Schneider's conclusions for the 1970s. In general, ideological alignments are evident for all six policy areas (government management, social welfare, civil liberties, agriculture, foreign policy, and defense) in his study. However, like Schneider, Smith finds that ideological alignment for foreign policy declined slightly by the middle 1970s. Smith's conclusions and caveats are germane to our reason for undertaking this study. He contends that the degree of ideology is related to the issues, that his study cannot claim to show the effects of ideology upon individual decision makers, and that there is no assurance that these patterns will remain.

All of these studies, then, find support for the ideological dimension in congressional foreign policy voting. At the same time, most of their results may be timebound; the greatest influence of ideology has been demonstrated for a period during which the controversy over the Vietnam War was at its height, and apparently these effects declined slightly in the middle 1970s. But has this decline continued? A test of this explanation with more recent data may help us answer this question.

Ideology and the Panama Canal Treaties

Our test case for this ideological explanation is the Panama Canal Treaties voted by the U.S. Senate in early 1978. The Panama Canal Treaties were signed by President Carter and General Omar Torrijos of Panama on 7 September 1977 (Department of State Publication 8924, 1977, p. 1). While their signing ended negotiations that first began back in 1964 during the Johnson administration, that act did not end their controversy. In fact, the signing was only the beginning of a ratification process that was to be played out in the Senate over the next seven months.

The treaties themselves were two separate pacts. The Canal Treaty itself called for the complete turnover of control to Panama by the year 2000, with various stages of transference over the 22 years of the treaty. The second treaty, the Neutrality Treaty, becomes effective in the year 2000. This pact states that the canal shall be secure, permanently neutral, and open to the vessels of all nations in time of peace and war. The United States and Panama agreed to maintain and defend this neutrality.

Both treaties were subject to modification as they were debated in the Senate. Most of the amendments and reservations were to the Neutrality Treaty, but the most important of them, the DeConcini Reservation (introduced by Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona) was added to both treaties. This reservation provided that if the canal were closed for any reason, the United States or Panama could take the steps necessary—including the use of military force—to reopen it. Other reservations and amendments ensured the possibility of U.S. military bases in Panama beyond the year 2000, allowed for the “expeditious” passage of U.S. and Panamanian warships or auxiliary vessels through the canal during an emergency, and provided that the level of American assistance to Panama would not be specified as part of the treaty process (Furlong, 1981, pp. 77-81, 90-95).

In revised form, then, the Neutrality and the Canal Treaties were passed by identical votes, 68 to 32, on 16 March 1978 and 18 April 1978, respectively. Furthermore, each senator voted the same way on each treaty. Thus, in our analysis, we shall treat the votes on the two treaties as a singular exercise.

In order to test the ideological explanation for this case, we needed first to develop a measure of ideology for each senator and then to assert the ideological position of supporters and opponents of the treaties. The ideology of each senator will be operationalized by using Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores for each senator. The ADA identifies a senator’s degree of support for “liberal” positions on a range of foreign and domestic issues. Thus we assume that the higher a senator’s ADA score, the more liberal a senator’s ideology. Conversely, the lower the ADA score, the more conservative

a senator's ideology.¹ We averaged ADA scores for two years (1976 and 1977) for as many senators as possible. (For those senators newly elected in 1976, only 1977 ADA scores were available.) By this procedure, we hoped to get a better measure of a senator's ideology than the score for the immediate past year alone would have provided.

What was the preferred liberal and conservative position on the Panama Canal Treaties? We would argue that the liberal position would be to support the treaties, since they represented an effort to work with other states as equals in the international system, to reduce international tension, and to move toward peaceful change through diplomacy. The conservative position, on the other hand, would be to reject the treaties because they represented a change in the status quo, a challenge to America's position in the western hemisphere and the world at large, and a possible gain for communism in the international system.² As a consequence, if ideology is a good explanation, we would expect senators with high ADA scores to vote for the Panama Canal Treaties and senators with low ADA scores to vote against the pacts.

Alternate Explanations and the Panama Canal Treaties

As we implied at the outset, the ideological explanation for voting is not the only one possible. In order to determine the relative utility of the ideological explanation, we shall simultaneously evaluate several other explanations: party affiliation, regionalism, election status, and presidential leadership.

One obvious explanation, referred to by Clausen (1973, p. 91) as "that tiresome truism," is party affiliation. It has been described as "the single best predictor of voting in the United States Congress." More recently, Schwab (1980, p. 196) has made the same point: "party is a very significant factor in decision making. The party variable affects the outcome of votes more than region, constituency or any other possible variable." Thus we shall examine the utility of this explanation by looking at the relationship between party (Republicans, Democrats) and voting divisions (for and against the treaties).

A second possibility is that regional differences may help explain voting on the Panama Canal Treaties. Differences on foreign policy issues between coastal (East Coast/West Coast) and central (Midwest) members of Congress have often been suggested (e.g., Rieselbach, 1966, pp. 106-114). In addition, the South has also been characterized as a region more supportive of foreign and defense initiatives than any other. In fact, the regional explanation represents a "long and sturdy tradition of political analysis" which "should not be ignored even though regional differences are imprecisely defined and measured" (Clausen, 1973, p. 161).

For our purposes, we defined five geographical regions based upon the eight regions Clausen defined in his study of congressional behavior (p. 161).³ The five regions are as follows:

Northeast: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey;

Midwest: Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska;

Border: Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Maryland, West Virginia;

South: Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Arkansas;

West: Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii.

If the regional explanation is a sound one, we should find a significant relationship between these regions and support for or opposition to the treaties.

Our third alternate explanation is that constituency attitude influenced voting for or against the Panama Canal Treaties. Since we do not have a state-by-state breakdown of constituency support or opposition, we focus upon senators who were up for reelection and senators who were not up for reelection. Because there was consistent opposition to the treaties by a majority of Americans throughout the treaty process,⁴ we would expect that the votes of the 23 senators who ran for reelection would more clearly reflect public sentiment than would the votes of the rest of the Senate. (Twelve other senators who were up for reelection did not run in November 1978 for a variety of reasons. Examining their votes will also be useful for understanding the utility of this explanation.) Thus if this subset of senators up for reelection acts differently from the rest, we could say something about the impact of constituency in this context.

Our last explanation is that the treaty roll calls were affected by the president's leadership,⁵ often cited as an important explanation for voting on foreign policy matters. As Wildavsky (1966) demonstrated about two decades ago, if the president takes a stand and is determined, he can get his way on foreign and defense matters up to 70 percent of the time.⁶ More recently, Clausen (1973, pp. 222-230) has demonstrated the potency of presidential position in congressional votes on what he labels "international involvement" issues. Since we have only one issue and we know the presidential position on this issue, we cannot directly test this argument. However, we can test the potency of the presidency indirectly. We shall examine presidential support scores for 1977 to see if that is a good explanation for voting on the Panama Canal Treaties in 1978. If this explanation is supported, we should see a strong relationship between those senators who had high presidential support scores and those who voted for the treaties. Similarly, those senators who had low presidential support scores should be most likely to vote against the treaties.

Data Analysis

Our initial data analysis provides considerable support for the ideological explanation of foreign policy voting on the Panama Canal Treaties. The mean ADA score among supporters of the treaties was 59.8, while the mean ADA score among opponents was 13.9. (The range of ADA scores in our data was between 0 and 95.) Furthermore, the Pearson product moment correlation between ADA score and voting on the treaties was .70. Thus the higher the ADA score, the more likely a senator was to vote for the treaties, while the lower the ADA score, the more likely a senator was to vote against them.

A visual inspection of the data provides even more support for this relationship. Among those senators supporting the treaties, only nine had ADA scores below 40: Baker of Tennessee (10.0), Bellmon of Oklahoma (15.0), Bentsen of Texas (22.5), Cannon of Nevada (35.0), Danforth of Missouri (25.0), Long of Louisiana (20.0), Nunn of Georgia (20.0), Sparkman of Alabama (35.0), and Talmadge of Georgia (20.0). Among those senators opposing the treaties, only five had ADA scores above 40: Burdick of North Dakota (57.5), Ford of Kentucky (45.0), Melcher of Montana (70.0), Randolph of West Virginia (42.5), and Schweiker of Pennsylvania (47.5). So far, ideology appears to be a good explanation for voting on the Panama Canal Treaties in the U.S. Senate.

Despite the strong support for this explanation, two of the four alternate explanations also receive support from our data analysis. Table 1 shows the tabular breakdowns of support and opposition to the treaties by party affiliation, region, and election status of the senators. For the fourth alternate explanation, presidential leadership, we calculated the Pearson product moment correlation between presidential support scores and voting for or against the treaties.

Regionalism and election status do not seem to provide very good explanations of voting on the treaties. As the results shown in Table 1 suggest, the relationship between voting on the treaties and the five regions is not statistically significant. The Northeast, the Midwest, and the Border states voted by sufficient margins to ensure the two-thirds majority required for treaty approval in the Senate; the West and the South did not. However, although senators from the South and the West gave less support to the treaties than did the rest of the country, a majority of them supported the treaties. Therefore, regional differences do not seem to have been a pivotal factor in the success of the two canal treaties.

The election status of the senators did not appear to be a very good explanation either. As Table 1 also makes clear, this variable does not discriminate between supporters and opponents of the treaties. A majority of

TABLE 1
Senate Voting on the Panama Canal Treaties
By Party Affiliation, Region, and Election Status

Variable	Percent Who		Number
	Opposed the Treaties	Supported the Treaties	
<i>Party</i>			
Democrat	16.1	83.9	62
Republican	57.9	42.1	38 ^a
<i>Region</i>			
Northeast ^b	10.0	90.0	20
Midwest	31.8	68.2	22
West	42.3	57.7	26
Border	25.0	75.0	12
South	45.0	55.0	20 ^c
<i>Election Status</i>			
Senators not up for reelection ^d	29.9	70.1	77
Senators up for reelection	39.1	60.9	23 ^e

^aFor party and vote, $\chi^2 = 17.02$ ($p < .001$); $\phi = .43$.

^bSee the text for the states in each region.

^cFor region and vote, $\chi^2 = 7.54$ ($p = .11$); Cramer's $V = .27$.

^dThis category includes 12 senators up for reelection who did not run.

^eFor election status and vote, $\chi^2 = .34$ ($p = .56$); $\phi = .08$.

the senators not up for reelection supported the treaties; so did a majority of those up for reelection, although the margin was smaller. The first analysis included in the category of those not up for reelection the 12 senators whose terms were expiring but who chose not to run in November 1978. Even if we remove those senators from the category, the results are not changed. The 12 senators in this group split evenly—six supported the treaties and six opposed them. On balance, these results imply that constituency attitude—measured indirectly by the reelection variable—was not a potent factor in the voting on the Panama Canal Treaties.

By contrast, both the party affiliation and the presidential support analysis receive substantial support. The analysis by party affiliation is significant according to the chi-square and phi statistics. (See Table 1.) Democrats tended to be highly supportive of the treaties; a majority of Republicans tended to oppose them.⁷ We also found a significant relationship between presidential support scores and voting on the treaties; the Pearson product moment correlation is .57. Thus the presidential leadership explanation also seems indirectly confirmed: the higher the presidential support score during the previous year, the more likely a senator was to vote for the Panama Canal Treaties.

What do such results imply for our ideological analysis? Do they undermine the ideological explanation? At this juncture, we cannot say for sure, but we can offer some plausible reasons for those results, consistent with an ideological explanation. Part of the results can be explained by the fact that ideology is related to party (Democrats are more liberal than Republicans). Thus the party analysis may mask an underlying ideological explanation. Similarly, the level of presidential support is a function of both party and ideology, and thus a bivariate analysis would tend to show a positive relationship between voting and presidential support scores. Our next task, therefore, is to move beyond these bivariate analyses to assess these various explanations more fully.

We employed a logit regression analysis to identify the relative contribution of these explanations to the Panama Canal votes. The logit technique was chosen because it allows for a dichotomous dependent variable as well as for categorical and interval independent variables.⁸ Ordinary least squares regression, on the other hand, is inappropriate because a dichotomous dependent variable violates an important assumption of that technique: the error terms are not normally distributed and they suffer from heteroskedasticity (Kmenta in Bond, 1979, p. 654). The first two columns of Table 2 show the logit analysis results for the five independent variables. Despite its differences from ordinary least squares regression, the logit coefficients from this technique can be interpreted in much the same way as unstandardized regression coefficients. The important exception is that the unit of analysis is the "log-odds" of voting for the two treaties. Moreover, this logarithmic characteristic must be taken into account in the interpretation. From our results, the only variable that reached significance is the ADAScore variable; none of the other variables has a z-ratio (coefficient/standard error) that is greater than 1.96. The interpretation for the ADAScore coefficient in this case is as follows: a unit change in the ADA score is associated with an increase by .104 in the log-odds that a senator would vote for the treaties. Simplifying somewhat, then, the higher the ADA score, the greater the probability that a senator will vote for the treaties. Despite the insignificance

TABLE 2
Logit Models for Voting on the Panama Canal Treaties

	<i>All Votes</i>		<i>Early Deciders</i>		<i>Late Deciders</i>	
	Total Model	Best Model	Total Model	Best Model	Total Model	Best Model
Constant	-4.720 (-1.712) ^a	-2.022 (-3.835)	-2.974 (- .309)	-2.703 (-3.548)	-6.374 (- .908)	-4.008 (-1.965)
ADA score	.104 (3.757)	.081 (5.193)	.095 (2.336)	.093 (4.154)	.165 (2.044)	.161 (2.431)
Party	.652 1.091		.350 (.393)		2.436 (1.486)	1.883 (1.674)
Region						
Northeast	- .975 (- .990)		5.079 (.146)		-4.771 (-1.713)	-3.323 (-1.839)
Midwest	-1.254 (-1.541)		-1.721 (- .196)		-3.038 (-1.855)	-2.936 (-1.791)
West	- .005 (- .006)		-1.221 (- .140)		1.188 (.685)	.807 (.508)
Border	.647 (.762)		-1.415 (- .161)		.219 (.155)	.682 (.575)
South	1.587 (1.799)		- .722 (- .082)		5.402 (1.878)	4.776 (2.056)
Reelect	- .494 (-1.210)		- .764 (-1.121)		.416 (.455)	
Pressupt	.026 (.550)		.016 (.210)		.041 (.341)	
Chi-square	56.232 ^b df = 86	62.545 df = 93	27.500 df = 48	29.641 df = 55	18.445 df = 29	18.845 df = 31
P-value	.995	.994	.992	.998	.935	.957

^aThe numbers in parentheses are z-ratios (logit coefficients divided by their standard errors); those greater than 1.96 are significant at the .05 level.

^bNone of the six chi-squares is large enough to allow us to reject the models by the "goodness of fit" criterion.

of all variables except the ADAScore one, this model fits the data quite well. The calculated chi-square value is relatively low (56.23), and the attained p-value is very high at .995. Thus these results suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the voting data do not fit this distribution of independent variables.⁹

Also available with this logit routine is a stepwise program which eliminates variables until it has identified the most efficient model.¹⁰ When we did that kind of analysis for these data, the only independent variable that remained in the equation was ADAScore. Table 2 also shows the results of this analysis under the heading "Best Model." In sum, then, the results of this multivariate analysis suggest the power of ideology for explaining the voting on the Panama Canal Treaties—even when we simultaneously control for other explanations.

Ideology and Early Deciders on the Panama Canal Vote

Because the debate on the Panama Canal Treaties spanned some seven months and because some senators decided and declared their positions early, we have a unique opportunity to delve more deeply into the process of deciding on these pacts. Moreover, we can attempt to determine more precisely the relative utility of the various explanations for those senators who decided early and those senators who decided relatively close to the vote.

For analytic purposes, we identified the "early deciders" as those senators who had stated their support or opposition or who were judged to be for or against the treaties by two independent assessments—one a *Christian Science Monitor* survey reported on 7 November 1977 (Dillin, 1977), the other a United Press International poll reported on 21 November 1977 (United Press International, 1977).¹¹ To a remarkable extent, both surveys agreed on the classification of senators opposing or supporting the pacts. For those senators who were uncommitted at the time of these surveys, we classified them as the "undecideds" or the "late deciders." Sixty-two senators constituted our group of "early deciders," and 38 senators were classified as "late deciders."

Our expectation is that the ideological explanation would be even more strongly supported among the "early deciders" than in the Senate as a whole. The assumption is that these early deciders are the most ideological members and thus would not likely wait to be swayed by other considerations in their decision calculus. In the main this expectation is supported. For supporters of the treaties who decided early, the mean ADA score was 67.5, higher than the mean score for all supporters. For opponents of the treaties who decided early, the mean ADA score was 11.7, lower than the mean score for all opponents. Similarly, the correlation coefficient between ADA scores

and voting on the treaties is higher for early deciders than for the entire Senate ($r = .80$).

Even with these improved results for the ideological explanation, three of the four other explanations gain strong support as well. As Table 3 makes clear, the party affiliation and regionalism both do well in accounting for voting on the Panama Canal Treaties, while election status does not. The presidential leadership explanation also receives increased support. The correlation coefficient for this explanation is .62 for the "early deciders." Thus, we are back to the position that we found with the whole data set—equally plausible bivariate explanations.

When we apply our logit analysis to the "early deciders," we are able once again to demonstrate the explanatory power of the ideological argument. Again the only variable that is statistically significant in the total logit model for the early deciders is the ADAScore variable. (See the middle columns of Table 2.) Moreover, the magnitude of the ideological variable is about the same as for the whole data set that we examined earlier. Similarly, as we would expect, the "best" logit model for the early deciders also includes only the ADAScore variable. Overall, then, despite some bivariate support for the other explanations, our multivariate analyses still point to ideology as the most important factor in the voting decision of "early deciders" on the Panama Canal Treaties.

Ideology and Late Deciders on the Panama Canal Vote

For the "late deciders," ideology also proves to be a better explanation than the other ones that we have proposed. First of all, although the mean ADA scores for late supporters (53.5) and late opponents (24.7) fall between the two earlier results, they are still quite a distance apart. Similarly, while the simple correlation between ADA and vote was lower than the earlier two analyses ($r = .46$), it is still larger than the correlation between presidential support scores and vote ($r = .35$). Furthermore, as Table 4 shows, a bivariate evaluation of the party affiliation, regionalism, and election status explanations do not do very well; none reaches statistical significance. For instance, in contrast to the earlier analyses where there were some divisions along party lines, now both Democrats and Republicans support the treaties, the Democrats somewhat more. Similarly, regional variations are at a minimum: only the Midwest showed less than a two-thirds majority among the late deciders supporting the treaties; and those up for reelection and those not up for reelection supported the treaties at almost exactly the same level (78 and 79 percent, respectively).

Ideology demonstrates its real potency in the results presented in the last two columns of Table 2. In the total model, the ADAScore variable is

TABLE 3
 Early Deciders' Voting on the Panama Canal Treaties
 By Party Affiliation, Region, and Election Status

Variable	Percent Who		Number
	Opposed the Treaties	Supported the Treaties	
<i>Party</i>			
Democrat	16.7	83.3	36
Republican	69.2	30.8	26 ^a
<i>Region</i>			
Northeast ^b	0.0	100.0	12
Midwest	28.6	71.4	14
West	47.6	52.4	21
Border	50.0	50.0	4
South	72.7	27.3	11 ^c
<i>Election Status</i>			
Senators not up for reelection ^d	35.4	64.6	48
Senators up for reelection	50.0	50.0	14 ^e

^aFor party and vote, $\chi^2 = 10.44$, $p < .001$.

^bSee the text for the states in each region.

^cFor region and vote, $\chi^2 = 14.49$ ($p = .006$); Cramer's $V = .48$.

^dThis category includes 10 senators up for reelection who did not run.

^eFor election status and vote, $\chi^2 = .45$ ($p = .50$); $\phi = .13$.

the only one which reaches significance, and its magnitude is greater than in any of the models previously examined. An increase in ADA score by one unit increases the log-odds of voting for the treaties by .165 for a senator. At this final decision stage, ideology remains very critical for the undecided senators.

There is one exception to this conclusion, and that exception is illustrated by the results for the "best" logit model, the last column in Table 2. At this juncture, and for the first time, another variable obtains statistical significance in the equation. The regional variable, South, shows up to be highly potent here, having a coefficient of 4.78. The size of this coefficient

TABLE 4
Late Deciders' Voting on the Panama Canal Treaties
By Party Affiliation, Region, and Election Status

Variable	Percent Who		Number
	Opposed the Treaties	Supported the Treaties	
<i>Party</i>			
Democrat	15.4	84.6	26
Republican	33.3	66.7	12 ^a
<i>Region</i>			
Northeast ^b	25.0	75.0	8
Midwest	37.5	62.5	8
West	20.0	80.0	5
Border	12.5	87.5	8
South	11.1	88.9	9 ^c
<i>Election Status</i>			
Senators not up for reelection ^d	20.7	79.3	29
Senators up for reelection	22.2	77.8	9 ^e

^aFor party and vote, $\chi^2 = .69$ ($p = .40$); $\phi = .20$.

^bSee the text for the states in each region.

^cFor region and vote, $\chi^2 = 2.27$ ($p = .69$); Cramer's $V = .24$.

^dThis category includes two senators up for reelection who did not run.

^eFor election status and vote, $\chi^2 = .00$ ($p = 1.00$); $\phi = .02$.

means that the log-odds of undecided senators from the South voting for the treaties (compared with undecided senators from the Northeast, Midwest, West, or Border states) were increased by a magnitude of almost five. Note, though, that the Northwest and the Midwest regional variables also come close to significance and also remain in the equation. In this sense, regionalism is beginning to emerge as important in accounting for the voting patterns among the undecideds. In sum, while ideology remains important, by adding regionalism (and more precisely, the South), we can provide the best explanation for the voting decisions among the late deciders on the Panama Canal Treaties.

These results imply that the decision calculus among the late deciders, while still strongly influenced by ideology, is more complex than for the early deciders. Particularly interesting is the fact that southern senators were instrumental in the success of the treaties. While we cannot determine exactly what it is about "Southness" which would make these senators support the treaties, we suspect that President Carter's roots in that region and his lobbying of that group were critical factors in this voting outcome. Even though the southern senators had not been President Carter's leading supporters in the past (as measured by presidential support scores), they apparently decided to support him in this instance. Thus factors beyond ideology made a difference for late deciders.

Some Conclusions and Caveats

These results demonstrate the explanatory power of ideology in the U.S. Senate votes on the Panama Canal Treaties of March and April 1978. For the Senate as a whole, the ideological explanation proved more potent than either a party affiliation, a regionalism, an election status, or a presidential leadership explanation. Furthermore, ideology was useful as an explanation of a senator's voting choice, even when early and late decisions were examined separately. In fact, for the late deciders, the impact of ideology was almost twice as great as for the early deciders. (Compare the magnitudes of the coefficients for the ideological variable for both groups.) At the same time, though, only among the late deciders do we witness any significant effect of the other factors. Among these senators, regionalism also has some importance as an explanatory factor.

While our findings agree with other studies which have examined ideology and senatorial voting, some important questions need to be addressed. First, to what extent can the data actually establish the impact of ideology? We have assumed (as have others) that personal ideology can be measured by ADA scores. In fact, what we have shown is that individual senators' votes on the treaties were generally consistent with their voting on issues identified as important by Americans for Democratic Action. While consistency may be a necessary condition for establishing ideological voting, it is not a sufficient one. Moreover, we cannot fully determine the reason for this consistency. Is it the result of personal beliefs of a senator, or is it the result of certain stable environmental influences (party, constituency, region, etc.) which affect a senator's behavior over time? At this juncture, we have no way of choosing between these possibilities.

The possibility of interpreting the data with an alternate assumption thus limits our certainty that ideology explains the vote on the Panama Canal Treaties. At the same time, though, the ideological explanation remains quite

plausible for several reasons. Recall that the alternate (environmental) factors did not prove to be good explanations for voting on the treaties. Furthermore, when we introduced interaction variables—party and ideology, party and region—into our logit analyses,¹² we again found no support for any explanation other than the ideological one. In effect, then, we have reduced the uncertainty over what is the source of voting on the Canal treaties.

Finally, what do these results suggest about ideology as a general explanation of foreign policy voting in the Senate? While we have examined only a single case, which may not be wholly representative of all foreign policy votes in the Senate, we would emphasize that this case involved a highly salient issue. Thus whatever the impact of ideology on all foreign policy votes in the Senate, this factor may well prove to be the critical one on highly salient questions. And salient issues are ultimately the important ones for American foreign policy.

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NOTES

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1. The ADA scores were taken from *Americans for Democratic Action Legislative Newsletter* (1978) and from Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews (1979).

Senators McClellan of Arkansas, Metcalf of Montana, and Humphrey of Minnesota died during the winter of 1977-1978. Because there was no measure of the ideology of their successors by the ADA criterion, the scores of only 97 senators were used in this part of the analysis.

2. For an enlightening discussion of the liberal and conservative positions in foreign policy matters, see Crabb (1976, pp. 214-298). The descriptions here are based upon his presentation.

3. Clausen's "Northeast" and "Middle Atlantic" regions were collapsed into the Northeast, "East North Central" and "West North Central" into the Midwest, and "Mountain" and "Pacific" into the West.

4. A New York Times/CBS Poll in April 1978 indicated that respondents nationwide opposed the treaties five to three and that those figures had been constant over the previous six months ("Americans' Support for Israel Declines, a Poll Finds," 1978, pp. 1A and 10A).

5. An economic explanation is often suggested for congressional voting. We considered such an explanation for the Panama Canal Treaties, but there was no concise means of differentiating states from one another on this dimension.

6. Two recent studies (LeLoup and Shull, 1979; Sigelman, 1979) suggest that some revision of the "Two Presidencies" thesis may be necessary.

7. For purposes of this analysis, Senator Harry Byrd, an Independent of Virginia, was classified as a Democrat.

8. For a discussion of logit, see Feinberg (1980) and Haberman (1978).

The highest intercorrelations among the various sets of independent variables were between ADA scores and presidential support scores (.70), ADA scores and party (-.50), and presidential support scores and party (-.64). All of these correlations are below the usual point of concern (.80). In this sense, multicollinearity is not a problem. A more exacting test for multicollinearity is to regress each independent variable on the other independent variables and to determine if any R^2 s are close to 1.00. Strictly speaking, since we have some dichotomous independent variables, such a procedure is not available to us. For informational purposes, however, we decided to test for multicollinearity with this method. The highest R^2 s were calculated when the ADA score (.70), the South (.68), and the presidential support score (.63) were the dependent variables. All other results were below these figures. Thus we concluded that multicollinearity is not a problem. For a discussion of this multicollinearity check, see Lewis-Beck (1980, pp. 60-61).

Anticipating our analysis a bit, we also did similar multicollinearity checks for the early and late deciders data. The intercorrelations were in the same range; the highest was .75 between ADA scores and presidential support scores. The regression results were about the same as above. Two R^2 s were larger, when ADA score and South were the dependent variables in the early decider analysis, the coefficients of multiple determination were .80 and .72, respectively. Overall, though, these results are within the accepted limits of collinearity.

Furthermore, we should emphasize that the stepwise logit routine starts out with all of the variables in the equation and then deletes those variables that are not very good predictors until the most efficient model is achieved. Moreover, in all except the late decider analysis, the only variable that remains is ADAScore as our discussion will report below.

9. With the logit routine, the desired outcome is to have a small chi-square (because the data are then fairly evenly proportioned across the data) and to have a large p value (because this indicates that this distribution is likely to occur in the population). In this connection, the model seems to do quite well. Nevertheless, we should note that we are dealing with population data and that these statistics primarily give us some guidance on the utility of the model.

10. The routine that we employed was based on BMDPLR, Stepwise Logistic Regression (1981).

11. The *Christian Science Monitor* survey had two assessments—one based upon public statements of senators, the other based upon the *Monitor's* "judgment calls." In the main, we relied upon the former for our categorization of early and late deciders. Because the two surveys differed slightly, judgments were necessary in a few instances. Only three senators who had indicated their initial position had switched by the time of the final vote. All voted for the treaties.

12. Interaction variables for party and ideology and for party and region were created. Logit equations were then run similar to those in Table 2. In no instance did the addition of these variables change the overall results.

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