

**Toward a definition of moral decorum: Understanding the *Pennsylvania Hall Address* as an ethical response to the constraints of public expectations through Angelina Grimke's use of sacred kairos and Biblical allusion**

by

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The student author, whose presentation of the scholarship herein was approved by the program of study committee, is solely responsible for the content of this thesis. The Graduate College will ensure this thesis is globally accessible and will not permit alterations after a degree is conferred.

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**ABSTRACT**

On the 17<sup>th</sup> of May, 1838, Angelina Grimke addressed a promiscuous audience in the newly-built Pennsylvania Hall. By speaking publicly on abolition and women's rights, Grimke responded to the exigencies of her space, her audience's (dis)interest, and the violent protestations of the mob which interrupted her remarks, but broke with the societal decorum. Decorum has been central to rhetorical theory since the classical period, functioning as an element of audience analysis. Although decorum has been traditionally considered as saying what is "right" given societal expectations, sometimes it is impossible for the rhetor to follow decorum when reacting to moral exigencies (such as the horrors of slavery).

Some scholars have analyzed why defying the restraints of decorum is sometimes necessary to effect a rhetorical change. For example, Schilb explored "rhetorical refusals" (3) as deliberate violations of conventions. A theory of non-traditional decorum based on higher ideals has been well established by scholars, and I propose to build on these theories by offering a concept of moral decorum as a lens through which to view subversive rhetorics that find justification through the moral exigencies to which they respond. This thesis explicates a theory of moral decorum and uses two of its related components – sensitivity to *sacred kairos* and the reliance on an ethical framework – to perform a concept-oriented criticism of Angelina Grimke's 1838 *Pennsylvania Hall Address* as an example of the theory at work. Through this effort, I hope to expand the understanding of the negotiation between decorum and the rhetor's ethics, to offer new insights into Grimke's *Pennsylvania Hall Address*, and to introduce a new theoretical lens for analyzing the indecorous discourse of protest and change.

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND ARTIFACT CONTEXT: THE SPECTACLE OF A WOMAN ORATOR

On the evening of the 16<sup>th</sup> of May, 1838, Angelina Grimke stood to address the crowd who had gathered in Pennsylvania Hall to hear what would be her last public speech. She was newly married to Theodore Weld, who was in attendance to hear her address. Prior to the event, Weld had sought to dissuade her from speaking on women's issues, a request she would choose to ignore (Foletta 205). All day, along with hecklers within the Hall, a mob had been gathering outside, at intervals interrupting the meetings and speeches by making a great noise and throwing stones at the windows. William Lloyd Garrison, one of the most famous and incendiary abolitionists, preceded Grimke; when he finished speaking, rioters inside the building "made great efforts to create confusion and break up the meeting" (Pennsylvania Hall Association 123). At that point, Maria W. Chapman rose from her seat to plead with the protestors to attend to Grimke's speech, hoping that "An earnest desire that the Spirit of divine truth might so far penetrate the hearts of all present, that they would be prepared to listen to the wail now coming up to them from the burning fields of the South" (123). The address then delivered by Grimke was met with multiple interruptions from the mob which she wove into the content of her remarks. Her speech, as recounted by the Pennsylvania Hall Association, was eloquent and filled with "chaste, yet forcible language" (Association 123).

Not only is the content of the speech vivid in its eloquence, but the rhetorical context of the Hall's existence is also uniquely powerful. Built as a space for the proclamation of abolition and other civil liberties, the Hall's very presence became a rhetorical statement which was opposed by proslavery factions within the city who interrupted orations and meetings with raucous protests and physical violence. This explosive collection of moments

created a transcendent kairotic situation that Angelina Grimke entered into and embodied through her rhetorical flexibility in responding to the exigencies of the Hall, Northern apathy, and the mob. Grimke's actions as a rhetor were not merely impactful for the value of what she could say to the evils of slavery; rather, she was also being judged as a woman transgressing the boundaries of the domestic sphere to speak in a public space, and the way in which she acquitted herself would have societal consequences (Henry 334). Through her address, Grimke disobeyed the societal constraints of decorum which denied women the right to speak publicly in order to respond to the moral imperative of the situation. In this thesis, I will explore Grimke's denial of the societal expectations that constrained her through the lens of a concept of *moral decorum*.

### **Toward a definition of moral decorum**

Theories of non-traditional decorum have been well established by scholars (such as Schilb, Roberts-Miller, and Rosteck and Leff), and I propose to build on their previous work through my concept of moral decorum which combines classical and modern theory to provide a moral justification for *how* and *why* indecorous acts may sometimes be legitimate rhetorical strategies. I define moral decorum as enacted by the rhetor through three primary steps. First, the rhetor must appeal to a higher moral authority to respond to a moral crisis in society. For example, Grimke used the Bible as justification when responding to the 19<sup>th</sup> century debate over the morality of slavery. Next, the rhetor must also be sensitive to the timing of the situation (the *kairos*), recognizing that there is a right time for upsetting audience's expectations, and a right time for acting. Finally, as the rhetor decides the time is right to speak out against what they perceive as injustice, their ethical framework will inform the rhetorical choices they make as they construct the appeals and reasoning in their speech. This ethical framework relies on appeals to a higher authority (such as the Bible, the

Constitution, etc.) that the rhetor's audience will also recognize. The related concepts of kairos as sacred time and the rhetor's ethical framework are concentrated on in this thesis as the guiding lenses for a concept-oriented rhetorical analysis of Grimke's speech.

This research develops three key concepts from rhetorical theory and criticism: decorum, kairos, and chronos. These terms have been extensively researched but have not been applied frequently in analysis; therefore, this work is a further exploration of how they can be advanced and practically applied by other rhetorical critics through the case study of Angelina Grimke's speech. Traditionally, the concept of decorum has been thought of as the social rules for meeting expectations, while acts of *indecorum* transgress those expectations. Indecorum happens when rhetors are out of place (transgressing their space by being where they should not – like Grimke, a woman speaking in public), or are speaking out of turn (transgressing the expectations dictating what kinds of speech are inappropriate for a situation). Moral decorum offers a counterpoint and complement to this definition of decorum. To use moral decorum is to break audience expectations in a moment that requires not the following of common expectation, but a response to a sense of moral peril or crisis. As a very purposeful form of indecorum, moral decorum is acting resolutely to call attention to difficult issues. Moral decorum often results in audience discomfort, but this discomfort is *not* for the purpose of drawing attention to the rhetor; rather, it is for highlighting the larger social problem in question. In this way, moral decorum addresses the metaphoric elephant in the room by conspicuously pointing to issues that make audiences uneasy.

The concept of decorum also carries with it the acknowledgment of timing: there is a right time to say something, and speaking at the wrong time may result in negative consequences (for example, as seen when protestors interrupt legislative proceedings). In the

same way, the sense of right timing is integral to moral decorum. In order to find success, a rhetor must make sense of when the time is right to speak and act; specifically, they must be sensitive to *kairos*. *Kairos* has often been discussed as the “right” or “opportune” time, but has been undergoing a transformation in rhetorical theory. When understood as *sacred* time, *kairos* carries with it larger implications. *Kairos* as sacred time marks opportunities in the normal flow of time (otherwise known as *chronos*) when rhetors who are paying attention can seize the opening to act and positively change the future. Because of the connection between decorum and *kairos*, development of the theory of moral decorum also helps to better understand the potential applications in rhetorical analysis of *kairos* as sacred time.

Furthermore, moral decorum acknowledges that because the rhetor is responding to a moral crisis in their society, they are also acting in accordance with a personal ethical code. An ethical code might take the form of references to religious teachings (like the Bible, in the case of Angelina Grimke) or to other authoritative documents (such as the Constitution). The use of appeals to higher authorities functions as *evidence* supporting the rhetor’s reasons for ignoring the social rules of decorum, justifying their refusal to meet with normative expectations. Ultimately, these appeals make the rhetor’s message more persuasive than if they were to try to justify their unorthodox actions solely through their own personal sense of right and wrong. It is through these elements that moral decorum can function as an explanatory lens for analyzing how subversive rhetorics of protest and change can be successful, thus opening new avenues of inquiry for rhetorical critics.

As has been hinted at through the previous discussion, a distinction can be made between two types of decorum at play in a society: the social (the standard approach) and the moral. For the purposes of this thesis, I will refer to normative notions of decorum as “social

decorum” to differentiate from moral decorum. The indecorous rhetorical strategies, such as rhetorical refusals and indecorum that other theorists have identified (and that will be discussed in chapter two), are manifestations of what I regard as moral decorum. Although rhetorical discourse may be enacting rhetorical refusals or indecorum, these concepts have all been defined as the rhetor choosing not to do what is expected or normative, rather than acknowledging the supremacy of the rhetor’s moral obligation and ethical code, as moral decorum does. The existence of moral decorum does not reject the fact that social decorum can also fulfill a moral purpose. Still, there are unquestionably situations in which blindly following the precepts of social decorum could result in the denial of higher moral requirements, such as during the nascent stages of the women’s suffrage movement when moral decorum became necessary to transcend accepted precepts of social decorum.

In sum, the purpose of this thesis is to develop concepts central to the field of rhetoric (decorum, *kairos*, and *chronos*) by building upon existing rhetorical theory. Besides informing and expanding on the functions of these rhetorical terms and their application for analysis, I also aim to shed new light on Grimke’s speech through the use of the novel theoretical lens of moral decorum. Moral decorum includes two primary components: (1) Sensitivity to the moral-rhetorical situation, which includes what I will characterize as a sacred *kairos*, and (2) An ethical framework adhered to by the rhetor, accomplished through appeals to higher authorities (such as the Bible or the Constitution). Furthermore, I will argue that Angelina Grimke recognized the possibility of an immanent sacred time in the moment in which she spoke, and that by entering into this *kairos* and appealing to Biblical authority through her use of allusions, she was able to redefine the *chronos* of the situation for her audience and invite them to join her as she transgressed the bounds of social decorum.

### Chapter overview

To accomplish this agenda, in the first chapter I will continue by presenting a historical overview of the situation and context surrounding Grimke's speech and the space in which she delivered her address. In the second chapter, I will commence with a discussion of decorum and of modern ideas of anti-decorum, in order to contextualize and differentiate moral decorum from previously offered conceptions of normative, or social, decorum, before explicating the components of the theory. After discussing the rhetorical situations in which moral decorum is seen at work, I will then demonstrate the function of moral decorum by performing a conceptually oriented analysis of the 1838 abolitionist pre-suffrage *Pennsylvania Hall Address* by Angelina Grimke. The third chapter will be devoted to a concept-oriented criticism guided by the concept of sacred kairos (corresponding with the first main component of moral decorum), while the fourth chapter will concentrate on Grimke's use of Biblical allusion and personae (corresponding with the second main component of moral decorum). Finally, I will conclude in the fifth chapter by considering the broader implications of the theory and identifying appropriate next steps for research.

#### **Pennsylvania Hall, the temple of freedom**

Pennsylvania Hall was built as a mecca of free speech, a building prepared not only for antislavery purposes, but also for "any purpose not of an immoral character" (Association 6). The second story of the Hall "formed one large saloon," where the majority of speeches, including Grimke's, were held (Association 3). At the west end, the saloon contained a forum with a "superb desk or altar," around which were arranged chairs, tables, and sofas made of "Pennsylvania walnut of the richest quality;" and under an arch above the forum was emblazoned the motto "Virtue, Liberty, and Independence" in gold letters (Association 3). The whole of the room was also decorated in various kinds of blue fabric. The Hall was built

to respond to a moral exigency, at a critical moment in time, when slavery flourished unchecked. Essentially, the building's function was to position itself and its inhabitants within a sustained, sanctified time (a sacred *kairos*) for taking moral action. In a letter sent to be read at the dedication of the Hall on May 14<sup>th</sup>, 1838, Theodore Weld exulted in "the erection of your 'Temple of Freedom,' consecrated to Free Discussion and Equal Rights," and closed by saying "the times demand brief speeches, but mighty deeds. On, my brethren! uprear your temple!" (Association 8). This kairotic interpretation of the spiritual nature of the space was echoed both by the building's design elements and by other's responses to it.

On the 17<sup>th</sup> of May, 1838, Pennsylvania Hall was burnt down by a proslavery mob. This conflagration was the culmination of the building's four-day existence. As a space where "Liberty, and Equality of Civil Rights, could be freely discussed, and the evils of slavery fearlessly portrayed," the Hall's brief but tumultuous life was marked by a variety of abolitionist speeches (Association 6). Over the course of those four days, ceremonies, orations, and meetings were held to dedicate the space to the pursuit of civil liberties that centered on abolitionist efforts. However, the events that took place within the Hall were plagued by mob actions which became more active and violent, resulting in the arson that destroyed it the fourth day after it was dedicated. As reported by the Pennsylvania Hall Association, prior to the Hall's grand opening, placards had been posted around Philadelphia inciting protestors to oppose the activities carried out in the Hall (Association 4). A few months after the Hall's demise, a book was published by the Pennsylvania Hall Association, the group that had been responsible for the building's creation. This book was not merely an *apologia* for the events which had transpired, although that was also one of its functions. In fact, the book contained a collection of "all that was said and done in the Pennsylvania Hall,

during the brief period of its existence,” in order that a reflective public might judge for themselves the injustice of the destruction (Association 4). One of these collected speeches was the address made by Angelina Grimke.

**The spectacle of a woman orator: Abolitionism and women’s suffrage**

In the United States the women’s suffrage movement was first forged in the fires of abolitionism. The early stages of the suffrage movement, while still entwined with abolitionism, were tempestuous. Aside from the obvious external pressures aimed against women’s involvement in the public sphere and their active engagement in the fight against domestic slavery, internal pressures also constrained women from being too ostentatious and public in their involvement. To step outside their appointed domestic sphere and speak to “promiscuous” (mixed gender) public audiences was a social taboo for women (Carlacio 248; Japp 335; *Response* 316). For the suffrage movement to emerge and find eventual success, the societal norms, or decorum, constraining women’s speech and roles in public first had to be disrupted. Angelina Grimke had a profound influence on this transformation of decorum through her passionate involvement in the abolition movement.

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it was generally acknowledged that women held a place of moral supremacy, though they possessed little power to act publicly to change their world (Japp 344). While it was highly uncommon (and indecorous) for women to be involved in public works or public speaking, two of the individuals chosen and trained by the American Antislavery Society to speak against slavery were sisters Sarah and Angelina Grimke (Reid and Klumpp 316). Catching the notice of abolitionist Theodore Weld, Angelina Grimke and her sister were trained by the American Antislavery Society to deliver speeches against slavery (Reid and Klumpp 316). In the beginning, they gave decorous parlor speeches to small groups of women. However, their popularity as orators soon led to delivering public

speeches to large promiscuous audiences comprised of men and women, which caused them to face prejudice and verbal attacks from those who did not believe women should be speaking in public (Carlacio 248; Japp 336–7; Reid and Klumpp 316).

Nevertheless, to Angelina, the moral exigency of slavery overrode the social restrictions against women. As they spoke out against slavery, the sisters also came to realize “their own lack of freedom” as women in 19<sup>th</sup> century society (Japp 335). This understanding came to infuse Grimke’s rhetoric with feminist concerns, which, along with the efforts of other female abolitionists, helped to establish a rhetorical frame in which the suffrage movement would eventually arise. Far from an easy process, pioneering new freedoms of expression by breaking the social decorum that constrained women from speaking publicly took great courage and earned penalties that included not only being seen as “grotesque spectacles,” but also greater consequences for the whole of society as women crossed the boundaries of their appointed (private) sphere (Henry 330). A theory of moral decorum can help to explain how subversive, indecorous rhetorics, such as Angelina Grimke’s pre-suffragist feminist-tinged speech, could ultimately find success.

Angelina Grimke, speaking on the evening of the third day of the building’s life, addressed a public meeting in the Saloon of the Hall, which was filled with an audience anxious to hear her first-hand accounts of slavery gleaned from growing up in a slave-owning family (Association 117; Lovell 11). Disturbed by the conditions for enslaved people as she grew up in South Carolina, Grimke, along with her older sister Sarah, had broken away from their family in order to pursue a lifestyle that would allow them to protest racial injustice, and these experiences infused Grimke’s speech with a strong narrative of *witnessing* (Foletta 180). The day Grimke was scheduled to speak, The Pennsylvania Hall Association Managers

had incorrectly assumed the day's female speakers to be addressing the Antislavery Convention of American Women, which would not have been a flagrant breach of social decorum. Realizing their mistake, they carefully distanced themselves from the events that took place in the evening's proceedings, saying that "members of that Convention disapproved of the public address of women to promiscuous assemblies ... therefore, the meeting was not called or managed by them as a convention, but by a number of individuals whose views were different" (Association 117). As is clear from this quote, Grimke's actions as a rhetor were impactful for what she could say to the evils of slavery, as well as her role as a woman transgressing the boundaries of the domestic sphere to speak in a public space.

Nevertheless, as has been beautifully illuminated by Japp, the crisis of slavery "overrode social prohibitions and religious doctrines restricting female activities, giving her, in effect, divine sanction to speak," which empowered Grimke to seize the historical moment and act with bravery in the face of social restraints (337). For as Grimke herself would declare in her speech, "we have these rights, however, from our God." Although Grimke broke with the social decorum, she still successfully completed a strategic rhetorical act. This rhetorical situation illustrates the necessity for a new conceptualization of decorum that justifies rhetorical acts that purposely violate expectations in order to respond to a moral exigency. In the following chapter, the theory of moral decorum will be discussed through an examination of its primary components.

## CHAPTER 2. THE CONSTRAINTS OF DECORUM AND OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY OF MORAL DECORUM

When Angelina Grimke addressed the audience at Pennsylvania Hall, she was deliberately breaking with the expectations for how women should act and appear in public. This break with the social decorum constraining women's rhetorical and physical actions was not only noted by speakers who came after her, but also by the writers of the *History of Pennsylvania Hall* as they described how the Antislavery Convention of American Women "disapproved of the public addresses of women to promiscuous assemblies" (Association 117). Nevertheless, Grimke seized the kairotic moment and responded to what she saw as a moral exigency to chastise the North for violating standards of morality. Her response also successfully took advantage of the public audience to create an impetus for them to respond with moral actions. Despite the many interruptions from both her audience in the Hall and the mob outside as they protested her message, Grimke still persevered. Grimke broke with the social decorum and still completed a successful rhetorical act.

In this chapter, I propose a theory of moral decorum as a complement to both a traditional conceptualization of decorum and to more recent ideas of strategic breaks with decorum as offered by theorists such as Roberts-Miller, Schilb, and Rosteck and Leff. To accomplish this, I will first present a historical overview of decorum and of modern ideas of anti-decorum, which will contextualize and differentiate moral decorum from previously offered theories. I will then methodically define the components of moral decorum and offer examples of the rhetorical situations in which moral decorum can be seen at work. The explanation in this chapter will be applied in the following two chapters, where I will demonstrate the function of moral decorum by closely analyzing Grimke's *Pennsylvania*

*Hall Address*, focusing on her use of sacred *kairos* and Biblical allusion, both of which are related components of moral decorum.

By way of defining moral decorum, I offer a theory that builds on the thinking of Plato and Aristotle. Plato's description of "the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it proves more or less pleasant to one's hearers" lends itself to the use of rhetoric for the moral edification of an audience regardless of that audience's desire to hear the message (123). Moreover, Aristotle's explanation that "Even inappropriate actions are noble if they are better and nobler than the appropriate ones would be" (199) points the way toward a morally-cognizant form of decorum. Breaking with the social decorum to support a "noble" cause, then, does not necessarily constitute a rhetorically unsuccessful act; rather, morally decorous rhetorical actions may be just as strategic and successful in their own way as their rhetorically decorous counterparts. Moral decorum, as a counterpart to a more traditional idea of decorum, is governed by an adherence to a moral sense of the *right* or *true* because a higher good is invoked, and it proceeds organically from historic understandings of decorum and modern concerns with the constraints of decorum.

### **Classical definitions of decorum**

As evidenced by the perspectives of Plato and Aristotle, the concept of decorum has been central to the art of rhetoric since the classical period in ancient Greece. Decorum is a powerful rhetorical means for fulfilling an audience's expectations in order to attain greater success with one's message by achieving the standard of what is fitting in public discourse (Enos 168). As a form of audience analysis, adhering to decorum involves understanding the *paideia* (cultural ideals) and values of a given society before addressing the audience, in order to say what is right given the societal expectations. Acting as "the guardian of moderation and common sense" (Enos 168), decorum is both a stylistic choice when

determining which words are most appropriate, and a persuasive philosophy when tailoring arguments and appeals to an audience. Throughout history, decorum has also been known as *aptum*, *prepon*, and *propriety*; and the definitions created by ancient rhetors were based on the norms of their societies and their personal philosophies (Jasinski 147).

Although never blatantly addressing decorum within his dialogues on rhetoric, Plato provides a glimpse into his likely definition. For Plato, the only appropriate use for rhetoric is the noble endeavor, which is “to make citizens’ souls as good as possible” (123). This attitude to decorum (what is appropriate) runs counter to a more sophistic definition and offers an idea of how what is considered *morally* right may be approached as superior to a *societal* view of rightness, or propriety. Indeed, to say what is best, in a Platonic sense, constitutes a decorum independent of an audience’s expectations for the appropriate. Therefore, the Platonic approach serves as the philosophical ideal for decorum. In contrast, other classical theorists like Isocrates viewed the purpose of decorum as fitting the rhetorical style to the occasion: “oratory is good only if it has the qualities of fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment” (73). Offering a more sophistic view of decorum, Isocrates subjects rhetoric to the situational expectations of place and audience. However, Isocrates’s definition still creates the necessity for understanding the exigency of the situation and having a sensitivity to the right timing, or *kairos*.

Aristotle’s view of decorum is slightly more nuanced. Within his approach to what constitutes effective rhetoric and successful oratory, as quoted earlier, Aristotle states that “Even inappropriate actions are noble if they are better and nobler than the appropriate ones would be” (199). Behavior, including rhetorical behavior, is not chained to societal norms when those norms are unjust. To break with expectations establishes a noble act when done

in service of the good, even if it undermines what is considered “appropriate.” In contrast, Quintilian addresses decorum as “propriety” that is best served by the rhetor keeping in mind “*what is becoming*, and *what is expedient*; but it is frequently *expedient*, and sometimes *becoming*, to make some deviations from the regular and settled order” (363). In this sense, to deviate from the prescribed decorum may be acceptable when in service of a more (ethically) appropriate course of action. Quintilian’s approach, like that of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle, opens the door to a more exceptional method of accomplishing decorum.

The inherent tension in social decorum which asks rhetors to follow societal precepts for behavior in all cases was recognized by Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero. Following these principles prescriptively will often reward the rhetor with oratorical success. But, as Cicero expressed, the orator should also have the integrity to choose the *becoming* or *moral* path, even if that will mean violating settled norms (363, 383). Undeniably, following the moral path has consequences when it comes to social decorum. Cicero himself acknowledges not only the challenge of determining what is appropriate, but also the fact that ignorance of social decorum will often lead to mistakes made in life as well as oratory (339). Nevertheless, for Cicero, enacting social decorum means orators are morally obligated to accommodate both thought and language to propriety (Remer 433).

### **The constraints of social decorum: Modern approaches**

Clearly, then, having a sensitivity to the decorums of public life helps create more effective rhetors (Enos 168). Yet, these same decorums can be restrictive and sometimes enable institutional injustice to flourish (Roberts-Miller 6). In fact, the “power of rhetoric is limited by the audience’s perception of what is possible” (Roberts-Miller 5); so we must ask, as did Roberts-Miller, “how does one disagree with convention without thereby identifying oneself as ill-mannered and immoral?” (16). While as measured against cultural expectations

it may be inevitable for the indecorous rhetor to be seen as ill-mannered, I intend to build upon the work of contemporary theorists to argue that moral decorum outweighs the cultural expectations in a situation of moral crisis, allowing the rhetor to respond to a moral exigency. The tension between the Scylla and Charybdis of “ill-mannered” and “immoral” has been recognized by modern scholars who have grappled with the restraints of decorum and the societal penalties that sometimes result from disruptions in decorous speech.

In his book *Rhetorical Refusals* (2007), John Schilb coins the term “rhetorical refusals” (3) as a designation for breaks in decorum. Schilb describes a rhetorical refusal as a rhetorical practice in which the rhetor purposefully refuses to act in accordance to what an audience considers rhetorically normative, thus seeking “the audience’s assent to another principle, cast as a higher priority” (3). With this term, Schilb believes rhetorical refusals must involve deliberate breaks with protocol and expectations and must suggest “that a higher principle trumps common rhetorical decorum” (4). However, this higher principle is not articulated as a moral dimension preceding the breaking of decorum. Rhetorical refusals are individualistic strategies that involve an utter suspension of dialogue, often through the rhetor seeking to end or prevent ongoing dialogue, and are justified through appeals to higher principles (5, 60). “Higher principles,” as described by Schilb, are intrinsic to the individual and arise from their own personal ideals, such as the intellectual ideal of the “willingness to converse with one’s possible critics” (13). Evaluation of the act of rhetorical refusal may also pertain to the issue the rhetor represents (52). Another factor of rhetorical refusals occurs when the rhetor declining to view what they are criticizing, while simultaneously calling for a boycott, a pointed *refusal* to engage with a problematic issue (60). This was blatantly not the case for Angelina Grimke, who cried out about slavery “I have seen it, I have seen it,”

and appealed directly to her status as an eyewitness as she crafted her arguments. While Schilb offers advice for evaluating whether or not a rhetorical refusal is “good” in a pedagogical context, meaning “ethical as well as effective,” this criteria of ethics is absent from a categorical definition of what constitutes a rhetorical refusal (177). In sum, Schilb’s definition does not fully account for the rhetoric of individuals like Angelina Grimke, who, rather than forestalling dialogue, instead attempt to morally persuade their challengers.

As identified by Schilb, justification is often a strategic element of indecorum. Utilizing justifications for indecorum can also be viewed as an effort to address Roberts-Miller’s concern with being seen as merely ill-mannered when engaged in indecorum. Offering a different perspective, Rosteck and Leff suggest that even a radically anti-decorous text “might be self-justifying by creating its own sense of decorum” (327). Creating a new sense of decorum is a rationalization that establishes a different framework for the rhetor to work within in which the rhetorical performance is both appropriate (well-mannered) *and* moral. As will be seen later, this rationalization is the function that the rhetor’s ethical framework accomplishes in moral decorum. In much the same vein as Rosteck and Leff, Stoneman argues that indecorum can be “elevated from a negative constraint on rhetorical performance to a political standard marked by dissensus...and the assumption of equality” (131). Through Stoneman’s description, indecorum does not have to function as a constraint of rhetorical success, but can in fact experience an elevation to a new standard of expected, approved behavior when reaching equality with the societal decorums already in place. As these theorists discuss, it is possible to justify indecorous acts, thus raising them to a level of societal respect and equality, especially when normative societal decorum is failing to produce the best outcomes.

Through this review of the literature surrounding non-traditional theories of decorum, it is clear that scholars have well established how purposeful breaks with decorum can be based on higher ideals. I intend to add to this body of work by articulating a theory of non-traditional decorum that appeals to moral justifications and relies on both *kairos* and an ethical framework in order to function. The indecorous rhetorical strategies previously discussed, such as rhetorical refusals and indecorum, are manifestations of what I deem as moral decorum. All moral decorum is a rhetorical refusal or indecorum, but not all rhetorical refusals and indecorum are moral decorum. Although rhetorical discourse may enact rhetorical refusals or indecorum, these concepts have all been defined as the rhetor choosing not to participate in what is expected or normative, not exploring how the rhetor may be acting according to a moral obligation and an ethical code. The existence of a moral decorum does not deny that social decorum can also fulfill a moral purpose. Still, there are unquestionably situations in which blindly following the precepts of decorum could result in the denial of higher moral requirements, such as during the struggle between abolitionists and proslavery supporters.

Higher moral requirements, such as a moral exigency, are an important deciding factor in whether or not a rhetorical act can be justifiably indecorous as moral decorum. One of the problems with traditional definitions of decorum is that they conceptually split philosophical concerns (what is moral and ethical) from the societal (what is expected). The ends of rhetoric, when divorced from the moral and ethical, can suppress responses to moral exigencies for the sake of convention. This was Plato's great fear and the root of his deep mistrust of the uses of rhetoric. Instead, philosophy was the greatest good for Plato because it was the *highest* ideal, a values system fixed on the True and noble regardless of whether or

not audiences found these ideas appropriate to their expectations (and enjoyment).

Traditional definitions of decorum may therefore be approached as *social decorum*, or the decorum which takes a prescriptive, sophistic approach to what society believes is appropriate without the necessity for recognizing a higher principle than convention.

Social decorum is directed by popular opinion and societal norms and may be enacted by the rhetor in most cases without sacrificing either integrity or conscience. Decorums for rhetorical expression manifest because they have been reliable indices of propriety and respectability and can be comfortably kept as the rules by which society tacitly agrees to live. In contrast, I argue that moral decorum is governed by an adherence to a moral sense of what is Right or True because a higher good is invoked in the face of a situation that is allowing the immoral or the unjust to flourish (as was the case in the Antebellum society in which Angelina Grimke lived). In short, moral decorum takes its meaning from what a given individual, group, or society holds as its moral lodestar, which encompasses such culturally-accepted frameworks as religious traditions, constitutional rights, humanism, and others. Plato's ethical framework would have been philosophical Truth or the good of the soul, and in the case of Angelina Grimke, her framework sprang from the Protestant Christian tradition as filtered through her Quaker faith.

I argue, then, that when a social decorum causes an unjust constraint on ethical behavior, it can be superseded by the use of a moral decorum. This is what Angelina Grimke enacted by rebuking the Northerners who were apathetic to slavery. It is too simple to merely call this flouting of social decorum an action fulfilling a personal whim because this type of discourse has clear rhetorical goals motivated by potent exigencies. Moral decorum is, in fact, decorum of a kind; it is just a decorum driven by different motivations. As has been

discussed, one of the failings of social decorum is that it can sometimes stifle the expression of rhetors who do not have cultural power and are deemed by society as unfit to be heard. Moral decorum offers a path to rhetorical justification for disenfranchised rhetors who might otherwise fail to enact a social decorum. In addition, as a tool for rhetorical critics, moral decorum offers a framework for evaluating the discourse of disenfranchised voices within the bounds of their own self-justifying framework. In short, moral decorum has the power to serve as the bridge between rhetorical ideas of successful discourse and philosophical ideals for just behavior, both for the rhetor and for the rhetorical critic.

### **Decorum and kairos**

From classical definitions and through modern theorists' models of decorum, a close link emerges between decorum and kairos. Kairos was integral to the value the ancient sophists placed on the rhetor's sensitivity to the right moment for speaking, which was represented by "appropriateness of place, time, and context," and is now often defined as "the opportune moment" (Carlacio 254; Carter 105; Sloan 168). In some respects, kairos is nearly indistinguishable from decorum. Both kairos and decorum require a responsiveness to the rhetorical situation and to audience expectations. In creating a necessity for decisive action within the right moment, kairos also carries an inherent need for the expression of what is appropriate (Sloan 168; Sullivan 317). This relationship lends greater depth and nuance to an understanding of decorum, for within a kairotic understanding of time, what is appropriate must be interpreted situationally (Sloan 169). However, more recent scholarship conceives of kairos as a completely encompassing term, enfolding all possible contexts into its purview, including both the spatial and the temporal (Sheard 291). This complexity of scope means that kairos must be a consideration for the rhetor in all the steps of the rhetorical

process, up to and including the delivery itself. Because of these aspects of the term, Cynthia Sheard (292) likens *kairos* to the concept of rhetorical exigence – and, I would argue, decorum – through how it calls for and constrains rhetorical responses.

Taking the idea of *kairos* as a field of play for rhetoric a step further, Sheard suggests that in the *kairotic* moment of action, it is rhetoric that enters into *kairos*, rather than *kairos* that is used as a tool in rhetoric (Crosby 264; Sheard 306). This idea not only positions *kairos* as a global concept in the best sense of the term, but also as a philosophical entity that exists independently of rhetoric, making it a powerful instrument for further justifying the use of moral decorum. Utilizing such a perspective means that the rhetor's task is no longer merely to discern how to wield *kairos* as a tool, but is rather how to recognize the call of the spirit of *kairos* within a situation and then enter into its realm. To enter into *kairos* is also to accept its imperative for action, and to allow the *kairos* to animate one's discourse in response to the opportunity at hand. An imperative for action is also part of the nature of *kairos* to mark a crisis within the tension or conflict of a situation (Smith 11; Tillich, as quoted in Kermode, p. 47). This situational tension calls for a response from someone working within the *kairos* whose subsequent acts modify the circumstances. *Kairos* can also function as a destabilizing force in that it can mark a turning point in historical time, that, when acted within and upon, can affect the future trajectory of time as “history in the making” (Smith 11). Because of these elements, *kairos* can also empower a turning point in the use of decorum.

For the purposes of a discussion of how “sacred *kairos*<sup>1</sup>” differs from “*kairos*,” and how sacred *kairos* functions as a component of moral decorum, it will first be contrasted with its close relative: *chronos*. While both *kairos* and *chronos* are indeed words for “time,”

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<sup>1</sup> Sacred *kairos* will be thoroughly discussed and defined starting on page 27.

chronos is usually understood as *passing time*, and has most frequently been translated as related to the length and measure of time – specifically, the quantitative measures of time (Kermode 47; Kinneavy 433; Smith 5). Kairos, in turn, as related to qualitative time and the appropriate fulfillment of time, marks an opportunity (Kinneavy 433; Smith 11). Because it carries the significance of opportunity, kairos also “beckons us to identify” critical moments for action and decision that present themselves within the unrolling of chronos, such as the appropriate time for breaking with the social decorum (Harker 84). The relationship between chronos and kairos is summarized by Kermode as the successive unfolding of past to future; thus, what was chronos sometimes becomes kairos (46). In its Biblical sense, chronos can also be interpreted as “waiting time” that finds its fulfillment in the significant season of kairos as sacred time (Kermode 48). From these interpretations, chronos is not merely the prosaic march of time, but is also a season of waiting for the revelation of the kairos which will make sense of the past while shaping the future. By more clearly understanding chronos, a new light is also thrown on kairos as a bridging of the gap between past and future, reality and potentiality.

### **Defining moral decorum and its components**

Moral decorum is accomplished through adherence to a higher moral standard instead of through the normative rationale of a purely social decorum. Moral decorum relies on the use of strategies that necessitate appeals to sacred kairos as further justification of the moral timeliness of the rhetorical choices the rhetor makes and should be enacted in a public situation which has the potential for positive ethical change. Moral decorum, then, includes two primary characteristics: first, a sensitivity to the moral-rhetorical situation (which entails a responsiveness to a moral exigency and sacred kairos), and second, the ethical framework adhered to by the rhetor.

### **The moral-rhetorical situation**

First, in order for a moral decorum to be enacted, the rhetor must be sensitive to the moral-rhetorical situation, which is made up of a moral exigency and a sacred kairotic moment (which requires a more lengthy discussion).

#### **Moral exigency**

A moral exigency must be in place to create the opportunity for a rhetorical response that employs the tenets of moral decorum. As originally defined by Lloyd Bitzer, an exigency is an imperfection marked by urgency which can be affected by a rhetorical response (6).

Carolyn Miller later offered a different interpretation, discussing exigence as a “form of social knowledge” that “provides the rhetor with a sense of rhetorical purpose” and “provides an occasion, and thus a form, for making public our private version of things” (157). I would like to offer a modification to these definitions in the form of *moral* exigence, and argue that the “form” of expression created by the moral exigence is that of moral decorum. The aspects of a situation that make it *moral*, and thus provide an occasion and form for the use of moral decorum, include a topic of debate that hinges on its morality and a sense of urgency.

A moral issue can be identified by the nature of the claims made in the debate. Value claims about the “rightness” or “wrongness” of a course of action mark the moral situation (and thus, the moral exigency) through the agreement that exists between both sides of the issue on the necessity for settling whether the subject is *good* or *bad* for society. The nature of these claims means that the moral exigency identifies a very real sense of urgency that both *animates* discourse and is *employed* in discourse to bring to bear a sense that if this course of action is not corrected, the result will be moral chaos. Therefore, acting upon a moral exigency also enables the rhetor to tap into the moral sensibility of the audience. In the case of Angelina Grimke’s situation, slavery was morally contentious, and abolitionists

attacked the institution as morally depraved. From her perspective, slavery was considered an evil that did damage to all who were involved with it, including masters and passive observers, making the situational exigency a moral one that provided both a “form” and “occasion” for expression in moral decorum (Miller 157).

### **Sacred kairos**

A responsiveness to sacred kairos is also necessary to the moral-rhetorical situation. The thoroughly entwined relationship between kairos and decorum allows kairos to act strategically in creating and justifying acts that follow a moral exigency and are accomplished through moral decorum. In the Christian theological tradition, kairos involves making “the most of every opportunity, literally to ‘redeem the *kairos*’ ...looking for moments of *kairos*” in which to carry messages of proclamation (Sullivan 321). The idea of “redeeming the kairos” means that moments of kairos may be interpreted, like the concept of exigency, through a moral lens, leading to the enactment of moral decorum. This is the animating influence of sacred kairos, which can be contrasted with more traditional views of kairos. For a more complete understanding of sacred kairos’s role in moral decorum, a discussion of the evolution of the term is necessary.

In the field of rhetoric, Kairos as sacred time has been explored less thoroughly and applied more infrequently, with Dale Sullivan’s article *Kairos and the Rhetoric of Belief* an important exception. Kairos as sacred time dovetails both with a Judeo-Christian epistemological understanding of time and with a philosophy of kairos as a space that can be entered into. The mystical appeal of kairos as sacred time lies in the fact that it has the power to displace chronos and welcome the rhetor into a new realm of action as it mediates between reality as it is, and reality as it has the potential to be, when the fullness of time has been fulfilled. From a Biblical perspective, as translated and defined by Montesano, kairos “refers

to the ‘fullness of time’ in which a potent proclamation is delivered,” and thus accentuates the responsibility (and agency) of the auditor to choose how to respond, if at all, to the proclaimed message (164). As well, this function of *kairos* guides the rhetor’s choices by synthesizing *potentials* into imminent possibility (Montesano 169). Possibilities for action are events placed within the warp and weft of human movements in the tapestry of a divine plan; “periods of crisis or judgment” (Sheard 9) are therefore historical moments of culmination within a foreordained order of divine narrative (Crosby 135).

One important element of *kairos* as sacred time is that its coming cannot be predicted; therefore, the rhetor must be vigilant and ready to seize the opportunity for proclamation that has been afforded by the situation, or as within the Christian tradition, by the Holy Spirit (Montesano 170; Sullivan 321). A consequence of this understanding of time surfaces in the worship practices of the Quakers. As Sullivan narrates, “An essential part of their services is a time of silence in which worshippers come into the unity of God’s presence... When so moved, an individual may break the silence and become a vehicle for the divine message” (321). Likewise, to be a vehicle for the *kairos* is to be a vehicle for the divine message of the situation. Angelina Grimke, as a practicing Quaker, would have been fully sensitive to the potential for being filled with Divine inspiration in the *kairotic* space she occupied as a rhetor (Reid & Klumpp 316). Indeed, within the first minutes of her address, Grimke was invoking sacred *kairos* by utilizing the voice of John the Baptist, a prophet who had called in the wilderness to prepare the way for Jesus and proclaimed that the Kingdom of God was at hand (Montesano 170).

As discussed by Sullivan, Biblical *kairos* is loaded time that suggests that “there is an opportune time for something to occur, that there are special times determined by God,

shown by God, and filled with God” (321). Especially when viewed from a Christian protestant viewpoint (and a Quaker perspective in particular), it becomes apparent that kairos is not merely a tool to be implemented at will by the rhetor. Rather, the rhetor will often become an instrument of the sacred kairos, and by extension, God, in service of the divine plan. The rhetor must be mindful of the situation in order to determine the kairos that has been preordained by God; but more than this, God will *show* the rhetor the appropriate time, and the rhetor, filled with kairos in the presence of God’s timing, will accomplish his or her duty of proclaiming “the message of salvation” (Sullivan 321). Two other interpretations of kairos offered by Kermode are as “the coming of God’s time,” and as “the fulfilling of the time” (48). These definitions also speak to sacred kairos as an interruption within the chronos in order that steps in the divine plan might be carried out, or alternately, in order that the rhetor might upset the settled trajectory of linear time such that the proclamations of good news might be carried out in “assent to divine inspiration” (Crosby 136).

### **The rhetor’s ethical framework**

The final component of moral decorum is the rhetor’s ethical framework. Indeed, rhetoric and morality have had an intertwined relationship since ancient times, as was discussed in the overview of the philosophies of Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero. Practices of morality in a culture are regulated by societal standards that participants must honor, and these moral actions can be unified in such virtues as “courage, honesty, justice, and constancy” and provide a historical context for practice (Frentz 2–3). In this definition, morality, like rhetoric, is a field of action, echoing an Aristotelian notion of morality as tied to doing, rather than knowing (3). Interpretations of morality can be rhetorically negotiated, with these conversations impacting even the interlocutors’ perceptions of time, in which “past and potential conversations are experienced as a historical

unity emerging in the present – a unity whose evolving direction can be determined in part through cooperative action,” echoing sacred *kairos*’s role in bridging the past and future in a present that is ripe for action (Frentz 7).

This cooperative action, I contend, finds its fulfillment in the rhetor’s use of moral decorum in response to a moral exigency while addressing an audience. While it is certainly possible for moral decorum to transcend communicative context, because the scope of my study is to focus on a rhetorical critique of an exemplar of public address, I will be focusing on these elements in relation to a public audience. Critically speaking, for a given rhetorical artifact, the audience can also be analyzed for their reactions to the discursive use of moral decorum, with responses indicating the relative success of a given moral argument – or the extent to which social decorum has been defied. As well, when addressing a public audience, there is a greater social impetus for their response, as well as an increased weight of responsibility on the target of the rhetorical act due to the social pressures at play when a greater number of individuals have witnessed an act.

Classically, hearkening back to Quintilian, part of rhetoric’s *telos* was its use for the betterment of society by pursuing the moral and honorable, and this *telos* places priority on what is moral (Waltzer 270, 274). Whether or not there is a moral imperative to act (and speak) must first be decided on by the rhetor. Borrowing from Frentz (3), this decision exists in the broader context of a social foundation for moral-ethical standards. The social foundation becomes the basis for the rhetor’s ethical framework through the higher good invoked, such as through a religious or philosophical system of morality. As discussed previously, there must be an exigency that the rhetor interprets as a moral one, and this interpretation of a moral exigency is an outgrowth of the moral standards which the rhetor

holds as high ideals from their enculturation within society. Therefore, values and morals are generally public constructs that are shared and debated as part of a community, and are enforced publicly according to the norms of decorum. For Angelina Grimke, as demonstrated by the Biblical arguments and allusions she made, her concerns about the immorality of slavery were argued from a stance of Biblical authority. For members of a social movement such as women's suffrage, these ideals came primarily from a moral framework of equality based either in the Bible or the Constitution; for members of environmental groups, these ideals would likely be based on humanitarian and ecological ethics.

Moral decorum, more than just offering an explanatory framework for speeches that are flagrantly indecorous and undeniably successful, also offers a fascinating avenue for rhetorical analysis which may shed new light on rhetorical discourse dealing in elements of morality. In the ensuing chapters, two concept-oriented analyses of Grimke's *Pennsylvania Hall Address* will be performed, guided by the sacred kairos sub-component and the ethical framework component of moral decorum as outlined in this chapter. The following chapter will be devoted to an exploration of the role sacred kairos played in Grimke's address as she placed herself within the sacred kairos of the situation and space and invited her audience to join her by demonstrating associations between the temporal and spatial.

**CHAPTER 3. SACRED KAIROS IN THE *PENNSYLVANIA HALL ADDRESS*:  
GRIMKE’S NEGOTIATION OF THE TEMPORAL AND ETERNAL**

As has been discussed, sacred kairos justifies and enables a moral exigency to be responded to outside of the bonds of social decorum and creates a sense of a turning point in history that allows the rhetor to more easily recognize the moral exigency at hand. Marking a turning point or opportunity in historical time, sacred kairos beckons toward a possible future. These moments of sacred time, as interruptions in the steady unfurling of chronos, need not necessarily be fleeting. As Richard Crosby contends in *Cathedral of Kairos: Rhetoric and Revelation in the “National House of Prayer,”* the consecration of space for the enactment of specific acts of “spatially induced consciousness” may sustain “a kairic charge across time” (133, 137). When a kairotic space has been created, to enter that space is to enter into the kairos and become an instrument of the kairotic will (Crosby 137). Drawing upon the religiously inflected discussion of kairos, I argue that this version of a sacred kairos existed in Pennsylvania Hall; that a sustained sacred kairos was in place over the four days of the building’s life, and that it was into a rich kairotic atmosphere that Grimke stepped and recognized a divine imperative – a sacred kairos – that compelled her to speak in response to the moral exigency of the situation. It was this sacred-kairotic response to the circumstances of the Hall that enabled Grimke to enact a moral decorum.

For the purposes of this analysis, it is necessary to clarify how I will apply kairos as sacred time. This rhetorical analysis will focus on sacred kairos’s elements of *redeeming* the time and *fulfilling* the time, and as related to spatiality. Just as there is a “right” time for action, so too is there a “right” place for action where this fulfillment of time can be best materialized – the time cannot be successfully redeemed just anywhere. This more global interpretation of kairos, including its spatial element, which enables a reading of rhetoric as

entering into the philosophical concept of *kairos*, is partly owing to a rich theological tradition. The existentialist philosopher and theologian Paul Tillich, for example, described the relationship between time and space as “the powers of universal existence” (34). The theological underpinning of *kairos* as sacred time can also be seen in Tillich’s narrative of time’s relationship to the sacred: “Time is fulfilled in history, and history is fulfilled in the universal Kingdom of God, the Kingdom of justice and peace” (37). In the following section, I continue a discussion of the context of Pennsylvania Hall itself begun in chapter one, before transitioning to an analysis of sacred time in Grimke’s speech.

### **Further history of Pennsylvania Hall**

Pennsylvania Hall was the first building in the US created primarily as a meeting place for abolitionists, although its use was not restricted solely to antislavery purposes (“Pennsylvania Hall Historical Marker” 2011). The Hall was built in Philadelphia at the corner of Delaware Sixth Street and Haines Street, and its dimensions were sixty-two feet by one hundred feet (Association 3). The building was two stories tall; the lower story held a room to sell abolitionist books and newspapers, as well as a lecture room and two committee rooms (Association 3). The second story was one large chamber they called the saloon, with a forum at one end of the space that held “a superb desk or altar,” chairs for the president, vice presidents, and other officers, and all of which was illuminated by gas lamps (Association 3), a modern convenience that would later be used by the mob to accelerate the burning of the building (Tomek “Pennsylvania Hall” 2015). Because abolitionists in Pennsylvania had struggled to find meeting places due to public mistrust and opposition of their activities, the Pennsylvania Antislavery Society created a joint-stock company in order to raise the \$40,000 necessary to build the structure by selling \$20 shares, which were bought by both men and women (“Historical Marker” 2011; Association 6).

Laura Lovell, a woman who attended the dedication ceremonies and the proceedings of the Antislavery Convention of American Women, said in a report sent to the Fall River Antislavery Society that the saloon of Pennsylvania Hall was “A spacious room of plain, yet beautiful architecture” built “by a union of many, and for the special purpose of free discussion” (Lovell 4). Lovell went on to describe the circumstances of Grimke’s speech and instances of her courage, saying that when Grimke spoke, she thought her eloquent and interesting,

...but she could scarcely be heard or attended to. There was a constant roar from the mob around the house, which now and then would swell louder and higher, when the assembly within would begin to move, and at the same moment a simultaneous cry of ‘order’ would run through the house. These alarms occurred, I suppose, five or six times during the evening. Mrs. Weld [née Grimke] appeared perfectly calm, unmindful of the mob, except that she alluded to it once by saying, ‘we are sometimes told that, slavery has no influence on the North, - hear it, hear it,’ while she pointed towards the scene of confusion without. On concluding her address, she remarked that the conduct of her sisters on this occasion gave her great pleasure. She was ‘gratified to see so few *ladies*, and so many *women* present’ (12).

Lovell also went on to describe how on Thursday evening (the Hall would be destroyed later that night), as the meetings concluded,

Mrs. Weld proposed that we should, as far as possible, protect our colored sisters while going out, by taking each one of them by the arm. We passed out through a mob of two or three thousand, fierce, vile looking men, and large boys... We heard

the worst language, and saw the most hideous countenances, but I believe none were seriously molested (17).

It was, in fact, this very conduct by the women at the meetings that led to the spread of rumors of “racial amalgamation and inappropriate behavior at the hall” that increased resentment against the abolitionists (Tomek “Pennsylvania Hall” 2015). When the meetings of the abolitionist societies finished that Thursday evening, women and men, white and black, all left together, further incensing the mob gathering outside, leading to the decision by the board of managers of Pennsylvania Hall to cancel the meetings of the next day in order to protect attendees (“Historical Marker” 2011).

A mob estimated between 12,000 to 15,000 people were present for the destruction and burning of the Hall. The firefighters who responded to the blaze saved adjoining buildings, but did not turn their attentions to the Hall – those who tried were prevented by their colleagues (Caust-Ellenbogen “Pennsylvania Hall Association”). The mob, still not satisfied, continued their actions by attacking the Shelter for Colored Orphans, which was a charity that held no connection with the Antislavery Society (Caust-Ellenbogen “Pennsylvania Hall Association”). The burning of Pennsylvania Hall was one among a number of other incidents of mob violence that affected Philadelphia through the 1830s and 1840s, and that marked the “growing tensions between blacks and whites, abolitionists and the defenders of slavery, and Nativists and immigrants” during the decades preceding the beginning of the Civil War in 1861 (“Historical Marker 2011). Across the nation, mob violence increased from “seven incidents in the 1810s to twenty-one during the 1820s and 115 incidents in the 1830s,” with Philadelphia developing into a magnet for conflict because of the city’s quickly growing population and industrialization (“Historical Marker 2011).

Now that a fuller picture of the time in which the events taking place in Pennsylvania Hall has unfolded, in the following portion of the chapter, I will conduct an analysis of the temporal and eternal (the *chronos* and *kairos*) in Grimke's speech.

### **Exploring the “temporal and eternal” in Grimke’s address**

Throughout her address, Grimke places herself within the *kairos* of the situation and space, and invites her audience to join her in the *kairos* she has found by demonstrating associations between the temporal and spatial. Because slavery was spatially removed from her audience's immediate experience, Grimke needed to use rhetorical strategies to make it *present* for her audience. To accomplish this, she invoked a new (or rather, old) time and place so that her audience would interpret her words as having more power and authority. Through her use of rhetoric animated by the othered-time of sacred *kairos*, Grimke was thus imbued with the power to displace her audience temporally. This displacement in time was accomplished systematically throughout the course of her address by concentrating on Biblical time and space. First, in the very opening of her speech, Grimke places herself in a Biblical time by challenging her audience with her words "what came ye out for to see? A reed shaken with the wind? Is it curiosity merely, or a deep sympathy with the perishing slave, that has brought this large audience together?" This allusion to Jesus' words in the New Testament about John the Baptist temporally places her audience in New Testament times, and spatially places them beside the Jordan River, a time and place where nearly two millennia earlier, many had come to repent of their sins and be baptized (Matt 3:6).

If Grimke is taking up the mantle of John the Baptist, then her audience is implicitly positioned as repentant sinners ready to turn from their former ways. Grimke evokes John the Baptist's voice again later in the speech, saying "I was unaware that any efforts were made to deliver the oppressed – no *voice in the wilderness* was heard calling on the people to repent

and do works meet for repentance” (emphasis mine). John the Baptist’s coming was foretold by the prophet Isaiah in the Old Testament, who referred to him as a “voice of one calling in the desert.” Alluding to an Old Testament prophecy not only draws Grimke’s audience further into the past and into a Biblical time and space, but it also fully aligns Grimke with sacred *kairos*’s dual nature as both the *coming* of time and the *fulfillment* of time. Isaiah’s prophecy was fulfilled in John the Baptist; therefore, through her continual references to John the Baptist, Grimke is creating a kairotic argument for their (herself and her audience’s) existence within a fulfillment of time when (and where) slavery can be fully resisted. As well, there is an undefined sense of *coming* time. Biblically, this coming time was accomplished through the person of Jesus. However, in Grimke’s address, this coming time may instead be one of judgment for the nation’s sins in perpetuating slavery.

In essence, through her embodiment of John the Baptist’s role, Grimke is stepping into the sacred *kairos* of the situation by placing herself and her audience in a space of preparation in which the “fullness of time” can be revealed. Moreover, with her first allusion (“what came ye out for to see?”), an initial stride is taken toward a displacement of the *chronos* from which her audience is observing her. However, almost immediately, Grimke’s remarks are interrupted by the mob. Rather than ignoring the interruption, she calls the attention of those inside to the mob’s protestations, saying “Deluded beings! ‘they know not what they do;’” similar to words Jesus spoke on the cross about those who had placed him there, and words which would have been immediately recognizable to her audience. With this second step into the past, Grimke takes her audience with her on a journey through time from John the Baptist’s work preparing the way for Jesus, to the time of Jesus’ own fulfillment of his role through his death. Although unspoken, there is another connection here

between the mob which has just interrupted Grimke's remarks, and another mob which nearly two millennia earlier had called for Jesus' death. Through these allusions, Grimke is further situating her address as a necessary response to a time of crisis within the unfolding of a divine plan grounded in history.

Of the mob, Grimke goes on to say that "They know not that they are undermining their own rights and their own happiness, *temporal and eternal*" (emphasis mine), and also states that the mob is proof of the existence of the "spirit of slavery" outside of the walls of the Hall. The kairotic moment being constructed beckons toward a world free from slavery and injustice inside those sacrosanct four walls of the Hall. If we understand the *temporal* to refer to the passing time of *chronos*, then the *eternal* carries with it the implication of sacred *kairos* as the approach of God's time. At this juncture in the address, a relationship of contrast and tension is set up between the *chronos* of the temporal time outside of the walls, as represented by the mob, and the *kairos* of the eternal time inside the Hall, as represented by Grimke herself (and those who are willing to join her). This relationship is emphasized by Grimke's statement that "Those voices without tell us that the spirit of slavery is here, and has been roused to wrath by our abolition speeches and conventions: for surely liberty would not foam and tear herself with rage, because her friends are multiplied daily, and meetings are held in quick succession to set forth her virtues and extend her peaceful kingdom." The *quick succession* of abolition meetings are, accordingly, acts of witnessing to spread the virtues of liberty, here representing abolition efforts. Liberty's peaceful kingdom is imminent in its approach (the approach of God's time) as it reduces the territory of slavery which has been made present by "Those voices without."

By referencing the animus of the mob as the spirit of slavery, Grimke also establishes an immediacy of *place*. Even though the actual deed of slavery may not be north of the Mason-Dixon Line, the spirit of slavery is *here*, outside these very walls, and has been roused to wrath. The spirit of slavery is not only in the South, but is also in the apathetic North, because, “This opposition shows that slavery has done its deadliest work in the hearts of our citizens,” and therefore must be cast out of the Northern soul. Because slavery is made by Grimke into an element of spirit that is animating human hearts, it is present in a very real way both in the gathering of the mob outside, and in the apathetic coldness and curiosity of those who believe the North has no responsibility to act. Sacred *kairos*, as discussed by Sheard, marks “periods of crisis or judgement” (9), and as interpreted by Grimke, the crisis represented by the migration of the spirit of slavery to the North requires immediate action from her audience. It is also important to remember that sacred *kairos* is not merely an entrance into a different time (the *potential future*), but also into a different space (a metaphoric space where action can foment), which highlights the differentiation Grimke is making between the sanctified Hall and the secular world outside its walls. The space and time of the Hall is where the spirit of slavery can be resisted. Multiplying the power of the *kairotic* charge of space and time for Grimke’s address, the mob is physical evidence of the spirit of slavery.

Another of the strategies employed by Grimke to establish a sense of immediate time is her use of *anthypophora* by asking questions and immediately providing answers to guide her audience to the right sense of the situation: “Do you ask, then, ‘what has the North to do?’ I answer, cast out first the spirit of slavery from your own hearts, and then lend your aid to convert the South. Each one present has a work to do, be his or her situation what it may.”

By delicately showing her audience both the correct question to ask *and* the correct answer, Grimke offers a choice to her auditors: they may either elect to stay mired in the chronos of inaction and spiritual torpor, or they may choose to accept a responsibility for acting within the kairos as instruments of divine possibility. Those who are present and choose the responsibility of kairos will become actors carrying out God's plans of reformation and salvation, for God "hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak to overcome the mighty." The sacred kairos of the situation also becomes a means of social justice in Grimke's deft hands; for it is not "the great men of this country" who will carry out this important work, because "they have become worldly-wise." Grimke's interpretation of becoming worldly-wise, in this sense, is not only to become inured in the impious chronos of society, but is also to cease to look for the moments of kairos that offer a chance for the displacement of linear time to favor the coming of God's time.

Grimke then justifies her presence as a speaker who is there to "bear testimony against slavery" by transitioning into a personal narrative of her own history, a recounting of her experience of chronos while in the South. She describes how she "witnessed for many years" the deleterious effects of slavery while in her native South Carolina. As she speaks, the mob again disturbs the meeting by making a great noise and throwing stones at the windows. Once again, Grimke folds this interruption into her flow of kairos, offering to her audience a vision of a potentiality of time through an extended anthyphora of "what if."

What is a mob? What would every breaking of every window be? What would the leveling of this Hall be? Any evidence that we are wrong, or that slavery is a good and wholesome institution? What if the mob should now burst in upon us, break up

our meeting and commit violence upon our persons – would this be any thing compared with what the slaves endure?

Grimke's answer to this is a resounding "no," for it would be unchristian not to consider themselves as bound with those enslaved and to "shrink in the time of peril." For it is a literal time of peril, a *kairos* marking a crisis in the *chronos*, encompassing the situation in which Grimke and her audience are interacting, as evidenced by the influence of the mob.

Not only does the mob bear responsibility for the effects of slavery through their active support, but also the other citizens of the North, who when they have tarried in the South "for a season," are eager to attribute hospitality and generosity to the slave owner. Worse yet are those "silent spectators," who "have naturally become callous" and have avoided choosing a course of action, whether in word, thought, or deed. Yet, were the Northerners to refuse to even passively advocate for the institution of slavery, "the destruction of Southern slavery" would be virtually accomplished. This forecasting of future time as all but assured through a Northern change of heart is echoed in Grimke's belief that "as fast as our principles prevail, the hold of the master must be relaxed." Therefore, Grimke makes apparent that the time is ripe for abolitionist actions to fast take hold of the hearts of those who are stuck in *chronos*.

As Grimke recounts, when she was in the "land of my birth," a space filled with the system of slavery, she was mired in the inaction of *chronos* and without hope. However, she "exiled myself from my native land because I could no longer bear to hear the wailing of the slave," effectively breaking free from the bonds of the *chronos* inherent in the spatiality of the South. Grimke places great emphasis on the *space* of the South as related to the passage of iniquitous time; saying "throughout her *territory* was *continual* suffering, on the one part,

and *continual* brutality and sin on the other” (italics mine). But, by fleeing from the space of the South and escaping to the North where she found like-hearted individuals, she became “animated with hope.” Changing her spatial citizenship enabled Grimke to enter into the sacred *kairos* of the abolitionist movement, which sought to disrupt the settled trajectory of the times to effect a national moral change. Through Grimke’s narration, the spaces of sacred *kairos* carry with them both hope and agency.

Fully aware of her emigration from the immoral *chronos* of the South to the (potentially) moral time of the North, and filled with the spirit of sacred *kairos*, Grimke makes explicitly clear to her audience that the physical space they occupy is by no means neutral either in *place* or in *time* because the sacred time has not yet been fulfilled. “We may talk of occupying neutral ground,” Grimke begins, “but on this subject, in its present attitude, there is no such thing as neutral ground.” In fact, Grimke’s metaphor of “neutral ground” is that of a space that has been sullied with the spirit of slavery and is occupying the *chronos* previously identified. To suppose oneself to be on neutral ground is to unknowingly align with the South and the “side of the oppressor.” Once again, Grimke is offering to her audience the choice that is inherent to the nature of sacred *kairos* – when the message of the *kairos* has been proclaimed, the auditor is free to choose how to respond.

Audience responses are constrained, however, through the recognition that there is no such thing as neutrality, either temporally or spatially. The impetus is to act as guided by conscience. Nevertheless, Grimke does not tell her audience (as in the *anthyphora* of previous statements) what the “correct” course of action is through an explicit answer. Instead, she goes on to offer a continual stream of encouragement to her hearers, inspiring them to enter, with her, into the sacred *kairos* and oppose those representing the evils of

slavery. While those who support slavery may be able to function temporally, there is nothing eternal to fear from them, for “the current is even now setting fast against them.” Grimke’s use of the image of a quickly changing current establishes a metaphor of the sacred *kairos* of the situation as resisting and bringing change to the steady, constant flow of the river of *chronos*. This metaphor also emphasizes an inevitability of *kairos* as foreordained time swiftly moving along an appointed path that has been marked out by *chronos*.

Once more, Grimke transitions into an *anthyphora*, signaling to her audience what they can do to fully enter into the *kairos* with her. As Grimke powerfully proclaims, “Here is an opportunity for doing something now.” This statement is at the crux of her address, and is the key to the way she interacts with the sacred *kairos* of the situation. “Here is an opportunity for doing something now” is also a beautifully succinct definition of *kairos* from Grimke herself. The opportunity of *kairos* reveals itself, ultimately, as the field of action in Grimke’s address; it is the antithetical contrast to the inertia of *chronos*, and this opportunity is right *here*, right *now*, in the ever unfolding present. Yet, it is a present that must be acted upon in order to transform it into future change; for if it is not grasped in time, it slips away into the past and into *chronos*. As Grimke continues, “Every man and every woman present may do something by showing that we fear not a mob . . . by opening our mouths for the dumb and pleading the cause of those who are ready to perish.” These opportunities for action require those who will become a part of Grimke’s crusade to make the most of these moments by acting courageously in the face of the mob and other threats.

At this point, almost at the end of her address, an intriguing turn in the dialogue is enacted as Grimke speaks specifically to her female hearers. She entreats the women of Philadelphia to “come up to this work,” and to petition. Women are to petition because they

cannot exercise their beliefs by voting, as they “have no such right.” The juxtaposition of societal constraints and compelling kairotic time places the women of the audience in a peculiarly dissonant position. They may have accepted the call to act, but once accepted, there are almost no courses of action open to them that are both legal and socially acceptable. Nevertheless, Grimke entreats the women to petition: “Do you say, ‘It does no good?’ The South already turns pale at the number sent.” Through petitioning, women must serve as an embodiment of the sacred kairos, calling “the attention of the South to the subject.” The imperative for doing something lies heavily upon women, regardless of their legal rights, for “We have these rights...from our God. Only let us exercise them: and though often turned away unanswered, let us remember the influence of importunity upon the unjust judge, and act accordingly.” This sentiment is a foreshadowing of the kairos for suffrage, but while the impending time requires preparation, the time has not yet come. It is enough, however, to act within the sacred kairos of the present time, for in so doing, Grimke concludes, “we may feel the satisfaction of having done what we could.”

Just as women needed to work within the existing social structures to enlarge their constrained domestic role in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Japp 344), so too was it necessary for Grimke to work within the kairos to take advantage of a historical moment for change. When framed as divine imperatives, political concerns (such as slavery and women’s rights), can empower kairos as a force for social change (Crosby 278). By asking her female hearers to take action, even as their actions were constrained, Grimke offered a subversive idea to her audience: women’s rights cannot be defined by man, but are granted by God. This consideration for kairos in social action places Grimke’s *Pennsylvania Hall Address* at the intersection of abolition and women’s suffrage. To take women’s rightful privileges as citizens would

require many decades yet of protest and change, but Grimke recognized the impending fullness of time that would lead to suffrage. And in the meantime, the opportunity was there to do something *now*, for as Grimke wrote in one of her letters, “*The time to assert a right is the time when that right is denied*” (Barnes and Dumond 428).

The next chapter will be the last of the two analysis chapters. Throughout her address, Grimke extensively uses rhetorical appeals based on her Christian religious framework (specifically, as a Quaker), seen in extensive quotations from and allusion to the Bible during her remarks. This use of allusion and embodiment of Biblical personae, coupled with her use of sacred kairos, made it possible for her to defy conventions of social decorum and successfully respond to the moral exigency. The Biblical allusions in her address will be explored as the expression of Grimke’s ethical framework.

#### **CHAPTER 4. BIBLICAL ALLUSION AND PERSONAE IN THE *PENNSYLVANIA HALL ADDRESS*: REDEEMING THE KAIROS AS A DIVINE MESSENGER**

In her *Pennsylvania Hall Address*, Grimke used Biblically-based appeals to adhere to a moral decorum. By quoting liberally from both the Old and New Testament<sup>2</sup>, Grimke established both the moral impact of the abolitionist actions which she hoped would result from her address, and her own authority as one who was there to pass judgment on the sins of the North. Grimke's ethical framework is clearly Biblical, as seen in extensive quotations from and allusion to the Bible throughout her remarks (see the Appendix for a list of direct allusions and other likely allusions Grimke makes throughout her speech). The moral exigencies impacting Grimke's appeals, which included the overarching exigency of slavery, the moral torpor of the North, and the mob, called for the use of Biblical allusions as additional authority. As well, Grimke was in need of additional "evidence" from a higher power as she spoke to a public audience that was skeptical of an indecorous woman addressing a promiscuous audience, and responded to a society (as represented by the mob) who were actively uninterested in her entreaties.

Grimke faced a challenging proposition as a woman trying to exhort her audience to take actions based on moral grounds. While many antislavery arguments relied on religious ethics for their foundation, there was still a distinct resistance on the part of many religious leaders to involve their congregations in social action from the pulpit. The previous year (1837), the Congregational Clergy of Massachusetts had met to address a number of trends they found troubling. They were concerned with women participating in controversial public activities, the undermining of pastoral authority by laity demanding a greater voice in church

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<sup>2</sup> Grimke makes 13 Old Testament allusions and 15 New Testament allusions.

affairs, and the divisive debates on the role the church should take in social reform (Reid and Klumpp 316). These concerns were expressed in the form of a Pastoral Letter. Both Angelina and Sarah Grimke were deeply annoyed by the arguments in the letter, especially those suggesting that women who made themselves ostentatious in the public sphere were “unchristian” (Reid and Klumpp 317). In 1837, Sarah responded to the letter by publishing her own epistle detailing women’s responsibilities as moral and accountable beings (Reid and Klumpp 321). Angelina would have had these incidents as an added impetus to use Biblical allusions to bolster her authority while sharing her message. As a speaker at the Hall, Grimke joined a tradition of Christian orators, who, as described by George Kennedy, become “a vehicle of God’s will to whom God will supply the necessary words” (8).

Because of the closely intertwined use of sacred kairos and Biblical allusion in Grimke’s address, many of the same quotes discussed in chapter three will be analyzed in this section. It is a testament to the rhetorical richness of Grimke’s address that two lenses (sacred kairos and Biblical allusion) may be applied to the same quotes bringing to light different insights through each. Through her employment of Biblical allusion, and consequently, an assumption of specific Biblical personae, Grimke was able to navigate the swirling flux of sacred kairos (as discussed in the previous chapter) to successfully enact moral decorum. On a larger scale, this use of moral decorum allowed Grimke to produce rhetoric that disrupted the social decorum in place at the time and pave the way for other female rhetors to disrupt the decorum, a pattern that would eventually result in the establishment of a new decorum in which the women’s suffrage movement could be debated and eventually flourish. The following analysis will focus on how Grimke builds her morally-decorous ethical framework through her use of Biblical allusions (concentrating on

her most explicit allusions), taking on the role of *messenger* to her people while embodying various Biblical personas, primarily the prophet Isaiah in the Old Testament and John the Baptist in the New Testament.

### **Uncovering the Biblical allusions in Grimke's address**

Grimke begins her speech with a New Testament allusion, first saying "what came ye out for to see? *A reed shaken with the wind?*"<sup>3</sup> Is it curiosity merely, or a deep sympathy with the perishing slave, that has brought this large audience together?" A "reed shaken with the wind" is a direct quote from Matthew 11:7<sup>4</sup> (and of Luke 7:24), in which Jesus asks the "multitudes concerning John [the Baptist], What went ye out into the wilderness to see? *A reed shaken with the wind?*" By this statement, Grimke is pointedly asking her audience to consider whether they have come merely to observe the spectacle of a woman speaking in public, or to ponder her message. In addition, Grimke uses this allusion to equate herself with John the Baptist, the Biblical prophet whose coming was foretold by the Old Testament prophet Isaiah (another favorite source for Grimke), and whose role was to prepare the people for Jesus's coming. Indeed, Jesus, in Matthew 11:10, calls John a "messenger." While Grimke takes on elements of the personas of both John and of Isaiah, metaphorically speaking, her true role is that of *messenger* to her people. In the Old Testament, Isaiah had been a messenger of the coming destruction of the nation of Israel at the hands of Assyria, which was described as a consequence of Israel straying from the laws of morality God had laid out for them (a parallel to how Grimke viewed the moral landscape of America at the time). In the New Testament, John the Baptist had been a messenger of the coming salvation

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<sup>3</sup> When discussing Grimke's quotations and Biblical allusions, corresponding portions of her quotes and their Biblical origins will be in italics.

<sup>4</sup> Throughout this chapter, Biblical quotations are taken from the King James Version, which is what would have been available to Grimke.

through the person of Jesus, preaching a message of repentance of sins to receive forgiveness. Throughout her address, Grimke combines these two perspectives, acting as a messenger by holding out to her audience two paths: one of “judgment” for their sins if they continue on the same path (as of Isaiah), and one of “salvation” through repentance if they take action and change their ways (as of John).

Through her first reference to John the Baptist, Grimke begins to illustrate how she will embody his role as a messenger preparing the hearts of her Northern audience to hear the good news of abolition. Almost immediately after Grimke makes this allusion, the mob’s first interruption occurs. It is at this point, as Grimke deviates from her planned remarks, that she begins to more fully enter into the sacred *kairos* of the situation (as discussed in chapter 4) and to animate her speech with a cohesive set of impromptu Biblical allusions that allow her to personify herself as a *messenger*, styled not only after Isaiah warning his sinful people of their coming destruction, but also after John calling to his people to repent in order to receive salvation. If Grimke were not consciously acting as a messenger, she may have elected to ignore the mob and proceed with her planned remarks. Instead, the mob becomes an illustration to her immediate audience of the sinful “spirit of slavery” that is present even here in the North. When she is interrupted by the mob, Grimke calls the attention of those inside to the mob’s protestations, saying “Deluded beings! *‘they know not what they do.’*” “They know not what they do” are the same words spoken by Jesus in Luke 23:34 as he is crucified amongst a crowd of people and is derided by “the rulers also with them.” Indeed, what may have prompted Grimke to make this allusion is the parallel between the mob outside of Pennsylvania Hall and the mob nearly two millennia earlier which had shouted for Jesus’ death, with the similarity between the two images perhaps strengthening Grimke’s

sense of calling as a messenger. Regardless of the decorousness of her discourse, Grimke is there to bring moral truths home to the North, fulfilling her responsibility to bear testimony to what she has witnessed as a daughter of slaveholders.

This moral responsibility (or rather, acknowledgment of the moral exigency) is thus extended by Grimke into a call to action for her audience. Her audience is not to rest easily in a belief that the more powerful will rectify the national sin of slavery:

Each one present has a work to do, be his or her situation what it may, however limited their means, or insignificant their supposed influence. The great men of this country will not do this work; the church will never do it. A desire to please the world, to keep the favor of all parties and of all conditions, makes them dumb on this and every other unpopular subject. They have become worldly-wise, and therefore God, in his wisdom, employs them not to carry on his plans of reformation and salvation. *He hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak to overcome the mighty.*

This responsibility of action must be taken by the citizens themselves, since “the great men” and “the church” will never do it because of a moral turpitude that has led to apathy. The portion of the quote in italicized text is a direct allusion to 1 Corinthians 1:27 – “But God *hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty.*” This quote may have resonated with Grimke’s female hearers because of the interesting parallel in this allusion to how women were thought of in the 19<sup>th</sup> century as foolish and weak compared with men. In essence, Grimke is further splintering the social decorum of the situation by establishing a sense of responsibility for action in *everyone* she addresses, including the women. Although

Grimke may say “*his*” or “*her*” situation, she is implicitly addressing the women as she speaks of the “limited means” and “insignificant” influence that they have to act. Because the men who had been sanctioned to act in the public sphere would not redeem the moral exigency, it was left to the women to serve as the instruments of God to carry out his “plans of reformation and salvation” and to purify the North from the miasma of slavery.

One of the next key moments in the speech occurs when Grimke makes an allusion to a popular proslavery argument, saying, “It is admitted by some that the slave is not happy under the worst forms of slavery. *But I have never seen a happy slave.* I have seen him dance in his chains, it is true; but he was not happy.” This seems a pointed retort to Thomas R. Dew’s 1832 essay *Abolition of Negro Slavery*, a highly influential proslavery tract, in which he stated that “A merrier being does not exist on the face of the globe than the negro slave of the United States.” In another portion of his essay, Dew also claimed that “we shall soon see that all those dreadful calamities which the false prophets of our day are pointing to, will never in all probability occur.” With this work in mind, Grimke would have been aware of her role as messenger in pointing out to the North the “dreadful calamities” that could occur as divine judgment for the nation’s sin of slavery. Even disregarding “dreadful calamities,” the sins of the North have been sins of omission, because as Grimke says, the “slave had no place in their thoughts,” and because there was “*no ear to hear* nor heart to feel and pray for the slave,” which is an allusion to Ezekiel 12:1–2 (“The word of the Lord also came unto me, saying, Son of man, thou dwellest in the midst of a rebellious house, which have eye to see, and see not; *they have ears to hear, and hear not*”). Grimke, in this case, is the messenger of God’s word to her own rebellious house, her adopted home of the North.

One of Grimke's next direct Biblical quotations occurs after the mob once again interrupted the flow of her remarks, an occurrence described in the *History of Pennsylvania Hall* as "Just then, stones were thrown at the windows, -- a great noise without, and commotion within." Grimke addresses this disruption powerfully by asking her audience, "What is a mob? "What if the mob should now burst in upon us, break up our meeting and commit violence upon our persons -- would this be any thing compared with what the slaves endure? No, no: and we do not remember them "as bound with them," if we shrink in the time of peril." Remembering those enslaved "as bound with them" is a direct allusion to Hebrews 13:3: "Remember them that are in bonds, as bound with them; and them which suffer adversity, as being yourselves also in the body." This is a radical allusion for two different reasons. First, rather than being defined as an economic norm, those who are enslaved are equated through this quote with those who were jailed for their religion in the early years of the church. Slavery is therefore further underscored as an unnatural state that is at odds with freedom, including spiritual freedom. Second, Grimke's mostly white, Northern audience is asked not only to look upon people bonded in slavery as brethren in Christian community, but also as the *same* as themselves, even to the extent of being considered as *one* "in the body" of Christ. Thus, this admonition becomes part of how Grimke frames a Christian's moral duty to advocate for and defend those who are enslaved, creating for her audience the same kind of moral exigency she herself feels.

The next key allusion Grimke makes is a crucial step in her metaphoric embodiment of the *messenger* role, tying together her personification of Isaiah and John the Baptist. Saying that when in her native Pennsylvania, "I knew of none who sympathized in my feelings -- I was unaware that any efforts were made to deliver the oppressed -- *no voice in the*

*wilderness was heard calling on the people to repent and do works meet for repentance* – and my heart sickened within me.” This quotation is a direct allusion to both the Old Testament and the New Testament, specifically, Isaiah 40:3, “*The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God,*” and Mark 1:2–3, “As it is written in the prophets, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare the way before thee. *The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight*” (similar quotes are also found in Matthew 3:2–3, Luke 3:4, and John 1:23). This dual allusion works in two ways for Grimke. First, it places her into an Isaiah-like role (as has been noted by Japp) of one who is warning her people of potential destruction and the future fulfillment of such a “highway for our God.” Second, it positions her to embody a John the Baptist-like role of one who is calling on her people to repent (Matthew 3:2 – “And saying, Repent ye: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand”) and turn from their sinful ways. Yet, even more than a moral call, Grimke is asking her audience to take action and absolve the North by doing *works meet for repentance*; further in the speech, Grimke offers suggestions for potential “works” her audience could elect to undertake.

The North is certainly not innocent in Grimke’s eyes (theirs have been “sins of omission”), and the lack of sympathy she found in Northerners for people enslaved caused her turmoil of spirit as she questioned whether to “shut up my grief in my own heart,” or to share her message. This spiritual tumult is expanded on by Grimke as she says, “What will it avail, cried I in bitterness of spirit, to expose to the gaze of strangers the horrors and pollutions of slavery, when there is no ear to hear nor heart to feel and pray for the slave. The language of my soul was, *“Oh tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon.”*

This direct allusion to 2 Samuel 1:19–21 requires more context for clarity. While the allusion could be taken on face value representing a hesitation to air her country’s dirty laundry in public (“publish it not in the streets of Askelon”), the allusion has more weight of mourning than is immediately apparent. The full quote from 2 Samuel 1:19–21 is part of David’s (who would later become King of Israel) lamentation over the death of King Saul and his son Jonathon, who were killed along with other Israelites at the hands of the Philistines: “The beauty of Israel is slain upon the high places: how are the mighty fallen! *Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon*; lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph.” Grimke seems to imply that America’s beautiful freedom has been slain through practices of slavery, and rejoiced in by a different kind of Philistine – the slave owner. This changeling Philistine is represented, perhaps, by the proslavery mob. In this sense, slaveholders and proslavery sympathizers are further equated with the Philistines who brought about a horrific war in Israel, a fascinating foreshadowing of the American Civil War.

The tone of Grimke’s quote discussed above (and its Biblical counterpart) is bitter and lacking in hope. However, immediately after the previously discussed quote, Grimke goes on to say:

But how differently do I feel now! Animated with hope, nay, with an assurance of the triumph of liberty and good will to man, *I will lift up my voice like a trumpet, and show this people their transgression*, their sins of omission towards the slave, and what they can do towards affecting Southern mind, and overthrowing Southern oppression.

The tone struck by this quote and its allusion is almost triumphant, and is (as Grimke herself says) fully animated with hope. Interestingly, the portion of her quote in italics is a direct allusion to yet another passage from Isaiah (58:1), “Cry aloud, spare not, *lift up thy voice like a trumpet, and shew my people their transgressions, and the house of Jacob their sins.*”

Through this allusion, Grimke is acknowledging her mission as a messenger to show her auditors “their transgression” and their sins. However, Grimke is not only acting as an Isaiah, but also as a John the Baptist. Just as John the Baptist offered to his listeners a path to salvation through repentance, so will Grimke show her listeners the path to redemption by acting to overthrow “Southern oppression.” It is at this point in the address that a very different emotional tone of hope and action is struck as Grimke illustrates what can be done to end slavery, “that curse of nations.”

In keeping with the tone of Grimke’s characterization of the culpability of the North (their “sins of omission”), she declares that in this battle to end slavery, “there is no such thing as neutral ground. *He that is not for us is against us, and he that gathereth not with us, scattereth abroad.*” “He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad” is a quotation of Jesus from Matthew 12:30 (and from Luke 11:23) that refers to the Christian path to salvation. By borrowing Jesus’s words, Grimke does not leave any room for justification of inaction available to her audience. Although the South may sneer that the abolitionists are nothing, Grimke refutes this, saying “Ay, in one sense they were nothing, and they are nothing still. But in this we rejoice, that ‘*God has chosen the things that are not to bring to nought things that are.*’” Through this quote, Grimke alludes to 1 Corinthians 1:28, “And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and *things which are not, to bring to nought things that are.* That no flesh

should glory in his presence.” Casting “this subject, in its present attitude” in terms of either-or morality, Grimke makes clear to her audience that even indirect influence through inaction can be seen as an aid to slavery, especially in the eyes of the supporters of slavery. Inaction is inexcusable, so Grimke works to give her audience a stream of encouragement that any action they might take will not be futile. Moreover, *all* are responsible for taking action, because *all* can be used as instruments in the hands of God to bring to nought the existing, immoral, social structure of slavery.

Toward the very end of her speech, Grimke introduces a new theme, overtly involving her female auditors and showing them how to make use of their limited influence. Indeed, Grimke calls out a specific entreaty to the “Women of Philadelphia” to petition. This seemingly indirect form of action is the only effort available to women because while men “may settle this and other questions at the ballot-box ... you [women] have no such right.” Even though petitioning may seem ineffective in the grand scheme of things, Grimke reassures her female audience that petitioning does, in fact, exert influence over those in positions of power, if only to shame them into moral action. Yes, the same men who rule over those who are enslaved also rule over women, denying “our right to petition and to remonstrate against abuses of our sex and of our kind.” Even so, action is an obligation, and women’s rights to take these actions are “from our God.” This is the source of the moral justification for Grimke’s indecorous discourse and the source of the ethical framework which enables her moral decorum to function.

Grimke’s acknowledgement of women’s divine source of power and agency (rather than granted through the laws of men) is amplified through one last, powerful Biblical allusion. Of women’s rights for action Grimke says, “Only let us exercise them: and though

often turned away unanswered, let us remember the *influence of importunity upon the unjust judge*, and act accordingly.” Grimke is alluding to a parable in Luke 18:3–6, in which a widow (someone with very low status and almost no power in the ancient world) begs a judge in her city to obtain vengeance over her adversary, “And he [the judge] would not for a while: but afterward he said within himself, Though I fear not God, nor regard man; Yet because this widow troubleth me, I will avenge her, lest by her continual coming she weary me. And the Lord said, Hear what the unjust judge saith.” The parallels to women’s place in 19<sup>th</sup> century society are striking. While petitioning may not have seemed impactful, women could effectively “weary” the unjust judge (i.e., the lawmakers) with the sheer volume sent, wearing these men down with “importunity” (another word for pestering) until they give in to the women’s requests. Petitioning was in fact very efficacious, and so many petitions were sent by female activists to the U.S. House of Representatives, that in 1836 frustrated proslavery Representatives instated a “gag rule” that automatically tabled antislavery petitions. This resolution was in effect until John Quincy Adams was able to gather enough support for its repeal in 1844 (“The House ‘Gag Rule’”). As Grimke triumphantly concludes, it is through these actions that “we may feel the satisfaction of having done what we could,” achieving a satisfaction which stems from fulfilling a moral responsibility in accordance with a strong moral exigency and within a kairotically-charged moment, regardless of the social decorum.

There is no way of knowing how much of Grimke’s address was written and rehearsed ahead of time – perhaps as her standard abolition parlor speech – and how much was improvised, in the moment, as she allowed the sacred kairos to animate her discourse and as she responded to the interruptions of the mob (as well as how much content she

changed from the time she delivered her speech to the time she sent a manuscript of it to the Pennsylvania Hall Society). It is evident, however, that Grimke deviated substantially from what she had planned in response to the mob's disruptions. A truly fascinating element of Grimke's address is that regardless of the impromptu or rehearsed nature of her remarks, her speech is saturated with explicit and implicit quotations and allusions to the Bible. Grimke's method of quoting from the Bible without making it clear that she is quoting, a practice which is continued throughout the speech, makes it possible for her to both *embody* and make *present* those she alludes to, altering the kairos of the situation. The two personae she "puts on" most obviously (and frequently) are those of the prophet Isaiah and of John the Baptist, allowing her to transform the purposes of both figures into her own role as a *messenger* to her people to show them their transgressions and call them to repent. Grimke makes allusions even-handedly to both the Old and New Testament, situating her speech at once in an expectation for a *coming* fulfillment of moral action (the impetus of Old Testament allusions) and *within* the fulfillment of that moral action, if she and her audience are able to redeem the moment (the impetus of New Testament allusions).

In the next (and final) chapter, I will summarize how Grimke constructed the moral decorum of her discourse through appeals to sacred kairos and Biblical authority as the moral justification for her public break with decorum. The further implications of the theory of moral decorum and of this new perspective on Grimke's address will also be discussed, including how moral decorum may also be used to analyze more current rhetorics of change, offering a way to view these groups' responses to moral imperatives as rhetorically strategic, successful acts.

## CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

### **Grimke's *Pennsylvania Hall Address: Before and after*(math)**

Grimke was preceded in her address by William Lloyd Garrison, who concluded his remarks by extolling the efforts of women, taking English women as an example, in their efforts to abolish slavery and achieve emancipation (Association 122). When he finally took his seat, there was a great tumult from the rioters within the building, which was interrupted by Mariah W. Chapman (another well-known abolitionist), who expressed a “desire that the Spirit of divine truth might so far penetrate the hearts of all present, that they would be prepared to listen to the wail now coming up to them from the burning fields of the South.” An awareness of sacred *kairos* as a divine juncture in worldly time, and the inherent morality of the exigence gathering them together, can be seen in the brief comments of the others who responded to the situation in the Hall. Indeed, Grimke was not the only rhetor that evening to respond in terms of moral decorum – the woman who spoke briefly after her, Abby Kelly (an abolitionist from Massachusetts), stood, saying:

...nor is it now the maddening rush of those voices, which is the indication of a moral whirlwind, nor is it the crashing of those windows, which is the indication of a moral earthquake, that calls me before you. No, not these. These pass unheeded by me. But it is the still small voice within, which may not be withstood, that bids me open my mouth for the dumb, – that bids me plead the cause of God's perishing poor – ay, *God's poor* (Association 126).

Kelly's recognition of the moral exigency (the *moral whirlwind* and *moral earthquake*), her response to the animation of the sacred *kairos* of the situation (the “still small voice” that “bids me open my mouth”), and the influence of a Biblical ethical framework, all animate her

brief remarks. The indecorum these women courted through their discourse was also remarked upon by Lucretia Mott, a Quaker and an advocate for both abolition and women's rights, saying she hoped the attitude that considered it improper for women to address promiscuous assemblies – “such false notions of delicacy and propriety,” as she put it – would soon pass “in this enlightened country” (Association 127).

After Grimke's speech, it was reported in a letter from the President of the Board of the Pennsylvania Hall Association (addressed to the Mayor's office), that while she was addressing her audience,

...our house was assaulted by a ruthless mob, who broke our windows, alarmed women, and disturbed the meeting very much, by yelling, stamping, and throwing brickbats and other missiles through the windows. The audience consisted of more than three thousand persons, a majority of whom were respectable and intelligent women. (194).

The disturbances were of course a great concern for the Association, who sought to preserve lives it was a great object to secure from the violence of the mob” (Association 183). The following evening, a large collection of individuals came to reinforce the mob, extinguished the public lights in the area, and began trying to batter down the doors (Association 186). Besides those making up the mob, thousands of others gathered to observe their actions. As stated by Pennsylvania Hall Association, the building “was burnt down in the presence of thousands of our citizens, without a single arm being raised in its defense” (Association 188). The Hall's short-lived career as a sanctuary for abolition and free speech created and sustained a unique moment in time for the proclamation of civil rights. Grimke's address, in which she elected to “lift up my voice like a trumpet, and show this people their

transgression,” eloquently negotiated a complex concatenation of circumstances as she responded to her audience and the mob outside.

Angelina Grimke constructed the moral decorum of her discourse through appeals to Biblical authority as the moral justification for her public break with decorum, and she did so in a moment in US history when women’s suffrage was beginning to emerge from the actions of abolition. Like Grimke, other minority and overlooked groups throughout the last two centuries have struggled with the same dilemma: if to publicly speak out is to break with decorum and face the consequences of such a (supposedly) rhetorically unsuccessful choice, how then can you respond to the exigency of injustice? The rhetorics of protest and change, by necessity, must respond to moral exigencies regardless of the cost in defying social decorum. As was discussed in chapter two, other theorists have recognized this quandary in their identification of specific strategies of indecorum, such as those of “rhetorical refusals” (Schilb 3) and indecorum (Rosteck and Leff 338), although these concepts lack a moral foundation and justification. It has been my goal for this work to unify and justify these strategies under the aegis of the term *moral decorum*, while maintaining that moral decorum is a species of decorum driven by different motivations.

### **Moral decorum: In Pennsylvania Hall, and elsewhere**

The central question of Roberts-Miller’s work on indecorum – “how does one disagree with convention without thereby identifying oneself as ill-mannered and immoral?” may never be fully answered, but moral decorum can at least repudiate the charge of being seen as immoral when engaging in acts of indecorum (16). While moral decorum may not hold explanatory power for every breach in social decorum, there are undoubtedly morally-charged exigencies and debates, in every society and throughout history, that lend themselves well to a moral and unconventional response on the part of the rhetor seeking to bring about

change. In contrast with Schilb's theory of rhetorical refusals, which seek to suspend dialogue (13), moral decorum insistently seeks to engage an audience in dialogue or to persuade them, with a feeling gifted from the *kairos* of the situation that change is possible if others can be mobilized to act *now*. This realization of the possibility for positive moral change was the driving force behind Grimke's *Pennsylvania Hall Address* and prompted her violation of the social decorum of 19<sup>th</sup> century society, resulting in a speech steeped in the elements of moral decorum – a result also seen in the remarks of Mariah Chapman, Abby Kelly, and Lucretia Mott.

Moral decorum cannot exist without a moral exigency which can be identified through a societal debate hinging on value claims (right or wrong, good or bad) and which invites a societal response. A moral exigency must then be in place within a situation animated by *sacred kairos*, or a sense of a fullness of time filled with the possibility for action, for a rhetor to justifiably (and effectively) break with the social decorum (Montesano 164, 169). This break with decorum, to respond to a moral exigency, in a time ripe for action, is accomplished through the ethical appeals the rhetor makes in order to connect with their audience's conscience. These appeals may take the form of reasoning from a religious tradition or secular philosophy, but must remain ethical. Although indecorous, moral decorum does not authorize the use of *any* rhetorical means to achieve the desired ends: when examining the "available means of persuasion," the rhetor is still bound by standards. The "means" still need to be moral and ethical, even if the audience disagrees. In sum, moral decorum is an interrelated structure of concepts that can orient a rhetorical analysis and has potential as an applied theory for rhetors to use to structure their breaks with social decorum.

As has been illustrated through the analysis of Grimke's *Pennsylvania Hall Address*, moral decorum seems a natural fit with abolitionist and religious rhetoric, and in fact, my inspiration for the theory grew out of my interaction with Grimke's speech. Moral decorum works very well within the framework of 19<sup>th</sup> century morality and the Christian Biblical perspective, but it becomes more challenging now as secular humanism is the basis of moral structure and there is more emphasis on individualism, concomitant with a loss of both community and communal prophetic voices. Nevertheless, moral decorum may certainly be applied to more "modern" artifacts with similarly rich results. One such example is Mary Fisher's 1992 speech "A Whisper of AIDS" at the Republican National Convention. Mary Fisher was a Republican who did not fit the usual risk factors for the disease, but had contracted it from her ex-husband. AIDS was a taboo subject within the Republican Party at the time, and Fisher herself was an unexpected advocate coming from a privileged background, setting the stage for a breach in decorum for her situation. The message she shared was not one her audience was expecting (or desiring) to hear, but Fisher was responding to the moral exigency of the epidemic of AIDS as she strategically chose a transcendent kairotic moment – a national convention during a national health crisis – "to bring our silence to an end" (645). Her ethical framework, which provided the justification for the appeals she made to her audience, included pleas for "compassion," and could be summed up as a cry for her audience to love their neighbors as themselves. An extensive analysis would be more telling, but I hope this brief example shows the flexibility of moral decorum in illuminating other works.

Moral decorum outweighs cultural expectations. Therefore, other sites rich for analysis include current protests with an ethical grounding where there is a sense of moral

imperative compelling people to speak out. Two such examples for future research include the Dakota Access Pipeline protests and demonstrations by Native Americans and other concerned citizens to protect their sacred and cultural lands from eminent domain seizure for a private oil company, and the #MeToo movement which has been bringing to light the experiences of victims of sexual assault and breaking the stigma and silence surrounding the subject, resulting in the fall from grace of many national figures. Each of these movements has generated controversy through their unconventional (i.e., indecorous) methods of discourse, resulting in national conversations on the morality of the issue at hand. Moral exigencies result in a call for a societal response because there is a concern shared by both the rhetor and the given audience about the impact of a course of action (i.e., the originator of the moral exigency). The very idea of audience, within moral decorum, presupposes a collection of individuals, who while possibly not agreeing with the speaker's value claims, are willing to debate these claims (implicitly or explicitly) for their societal import. This is the greatest strength of moral decorum as a rhetorical strategy: regardless of consensus and resultant action, the use of moral decorum generates debate and discussion.

### **Pursuing the (moral) *telos* of rhetoric**

Moral decorum is, at heart, a social movement theory. It is most readily observed in use by people who are acting outside of the social norms and who do not easily fit in with normative social decorums. People who do not have power, either societally or institutionally, are able to enact moral decorum to leverage a societal response, whether it be through action or debate. This is not to say those with power or privilege are unable to use moral decorum, but it is “outsiders” who are empowered by moral decorum to share their dream for a better future, because those on the outside (of society or of an issue) often have a fuller vision of what is going wrong. Using moral decorum motivates people to shift and

expand their norms, which points to a sense of communal responsibility for moral action. Part of being in a larger community is the duality of sharing responsibility for positive change while acting honorably within this larger framework. Moral decorum is an intrinsically communal act, in contrast to the individuality of other theories, such as rhetorical refusals.

It will never be possible to condense an understanding of decorum into unchanging guidelines for every time and situation (Jasinski 150) because the societal rules for decorum are continually shifting and expanding through rhetorical acts that push or disregard the existing limits. Indecorous acts of moral decorum, as I have argued throughout this thesis, are not rhetorical failures in meeting audience expectations. Rhetorically enacting a moral rather than a normative social decorum is a strategic act which can, to quote Rosteck and Leff, “lead through an impiety to a new piety” by expanding the horizons of an existing decorum, or by establishing entirely new standards for decorum (330). Because what is morally appropriate sometimes violates modes of conventional conduct and politeness, *moral decorum* must exist as a deliberate and successful rhetorical strategy (Enos 169). Moral decorum points the way toward acknowledging that conventions of appropriateness in *social decorum* may just as easily be used to “stifle expression as to perfect it” (Enos 169).

I hope that through this analysis, new light has been shed not only on the functions of Grimke’s address, but also on how a theory of moral decorum can be applied as a lens for analysis. In the same way as I have demonstrated with Grimke’s *Pennsylvania Hall Address*, other critics of abolitionist, suffrage, and religious rhetorics might consider how a concept of moral decorum may be used to analyze more current rhetorics of change, offering a way to view these groups’ responses to moral imperatives as rhetorically strategic, successful acts. I

believe that because moral decorum provides an ethical response to the constraints of public expectations, it will continue to be valuable in understanding the rhetorical acts of protestors, social movement pioneers, and individuals seeking to enact positive social change by initiating debate. Moral decorum has the potential to redeem some of the traditional elements of social decorum which limit discourse based on what a community anticipates and enact part of rhetoric's original *telos* of bettering society through pursuing the moral (Waltzer 270).

Pennsylvania Hall may have only existed for four days, but the proceedings that took place there still resonate today. Abolitionist's ideals may have been seen as radical by much of society (and even by those who were more conservative antislavery gradualists), but without their pamphlets, newspapers, and speeches bringing light to the moral darkness of slavery, the nation's conscience might never have been stirred to action. It is important to remember that although they were acting within societal constraints for appropriate behavior that limited their opportunities, women played a key role in spurring those in power to set the wheels in motion for abolishing slavery through their petitioning and speaking. Moral decorum takes courage, and Angelina Grimke's courage, despite societal stigma against women speaking to promiscuous audiences, and in the face of violent mob disruptions because of the content of her message, is remarkable. In the end, she conveyed the speech she felt morally compelled to deliver as an ethical response to the constraints of public expectation, and could enjoy the satisfaction of "having done what we could."

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**APPENDIX. LIST OF BIBLICAL ALLUSIONS (KJV) IN ANGELINA GRIMKE'S  
PENNSYLVANIA HALL ADDRESS**

1. **“what came yet out for to see? A reed shaken with the wind?”**
  - Allusion to Matthew 11:7 – “And as they departed, Jesus began to say unto the multitudes concerning John, What went ye out into the wilderness to see? A reed shaken with the wind?”
  - Allusion to Luke 7:24 – “And when the messengers of John were departed, he began to speak unto the people concerning John, What went ye out into the wilderness for to see? A reed shaken with the wind?”
  - Context: further in Matt 11:7–10, Jesus asks his hearers once again what “went ye out for to see? A prophet? yea, I say unto you, and more than a prophet, for this is he, of whom it is written, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee.”
  
2. **“Deluded beings! **they know not what they do.**”**
  - Allusion to Luke 23:34 – “Then said Jesus, Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do. And they parted his raiment, and cast lots.
  - Context: It is at this point in Luke 23:33–35 that Jesus is crucified amongst a crowd of people and is derided by “the rulers also with them.”
  
3. **“They know not that they are undermining their own rights and their own happiness, **temporal and eternal.**”**
  - Potential allusion to 2 Corinthians 4:17–18 – “For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal.”
  
4. **“Hear it – hear it.”**
  - Potential allusion to Isaiah 28:23 – “Give ye ear, and hear my voice; hearken, and hear my speech.”
  - Context: Grimke makes key allusions to the book of Isaiah throughout her address; as well, Isaiah was the prophet who foretold the coming of John the Baptist whose persona Grimke takes on. It seems likely that Grimke would be echoing the voice of Isaiah here, too.
  
5. **“I answer, **cast out first the spirit** of slavery from your own hearts”**
  - Potential allusions to the books of Matthew, Mark, and Luke in the NT. As Jesus went about his ministry, he cast out “unclean spirits” from those he met.

6. “They have become worldly-wise, and therefore God, in his wisdom, employs them not to carry on his plans of reformation and salvation. **He hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak to overcome the mighty.**”
- Allusion to 1 Corinthians 1:27 – “But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty;”
  - Context: The entire section reads as: “For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called: But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty; And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are: That no flesh should glory in his presence.”
  - Potential allusion to 1 Corinthians 3:18–20 – “Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written, He taketh the wise in their own craftiness. And again, The Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain.”
7. “When hope is extinguished, they say, **let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.**”
- Allusion to Isaiah 22:13 – “And behold joy and gladness, slaying oxen, and killing sheep, eating flesh, and drinking wine: let us eat and drink; for to morrow we shall die.”
  - Allusion to 1 Corinthians 15:32 – “If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink; for to morrow we die.”
8. “No, no: and we do not remember them as **bound with them,** if we shrink in the time of peril, or feel unwilling to sacrifice ourselves, if need be, for their sake.”
- Allusion to Hebrews 13:3 – “Remember **them** that are in bonds, as **bound with them;** and **them** which suffer adversity, as being yourselves also in the body.”
  - Potential allusion to Ezekiel 34:4 – “The diseased have ye not strengthened, neither have ye healed that which was sick, neither have ye **bound up** that which was broken, neither have ye brought again that which was driven away, neither have ye sought that which was lost; but **with force and with cruelty have ye ruled them.**”

9. “I thank the Lord that [...] **conscience** is not so completely seared as to be unmoved by the **truth of the living God**.”
- Potential allusion to 2 Corinthians 3:3 – “Forasmuch as ye are manifestly declared to be the epistle of Christ ministered by us, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the **living God**; not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the **heart**.”
10. “no **voice in the wilderness was heard calling** on the people to **repent** and do works meet for repentance...”
- Allusion to Isaiah 40:3 – “The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God.
  - Allusion to Matthew 3:2–3 – “And saying, Repent ye: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. For this is he that was spoken of by the prophet Esaias, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make is paths straight.”
  - Allusion to Mark 1:2–3 – “As it is written in the prophets, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee. The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.”
  - Allusion to Luke 3:4 – “As it is written in the book of the words of Esaias the prophet, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.”
  - Allusions to John 1:23 – “He [John the Baptist] said, I am **the voice** of one crying **in the wilderness**, Make straight **the way of the Lord**, as said **the prophet Esaias**.”
11. “...and my **heart sickened** within me” and “I therefore shut up my **grief** in my own heart.”
- Potential allusion to Jeremiah 13:17 – “But if ye will not hear it, my soul shall weep in secret places for your pride; and mine eye shall weep sore, and run down with tears, because the Lord's flock is carried away captive.”
  - Potential allusion to Psalm 143:4 – “Therefore is my spirit overwhelmed within me; my heart within me is desolate.”
12. “I wonder when I reflect under what influence I was brought up that my **heart is not harder than the nether millstone**.”
- Probable allusion to Job 41:24 – “His heart is as firm as a stone; yea, as hard as a piece of the nether millstone.”

13. “I **fled to the land** of Penn; for here, thought I, sympathy for the slave will surely be found.”
- Potential allusion to Matthew 10:23 – “But when they persecute you in this city, **flee ye into another**: for verily I say unto you, Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel, till the Son of man be come.”
14. “What will it avail, cried I in **bitterness of spirit**”
- Potential allusion to Job 7:11 – “Therefore I will not refrain my mouth; I will speak in the anguish **of my spirit**; I will complain in the **bitterness of** my soul.”
15. “What will it avail [...] when **there is no ear to hear** nor heart to feel and pray for the slave.”
- Potential allusion to Ezekiel 12:1–2 – “The word of the Lord also came unto me, saying, Son of man, thou dwellest in the midst of a rebellious house, which have eyes to see, and see not; **they have ears to hear, and hear not**: for they are a rebellious house.”
16. “The language of my soul was, ‘**Oh tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon.**’”
- Allusion to 2 Samuel 1:19–21 – “The beauty of Israel is slain upon thy high places: how are the mighty fallen! **Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon**; lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph. Ye mountains of Gilboa, let there be no dew, neither let there be rain, upon you, nor fields of offerings: for there the shield of the mighty is vilely cast away, the shield of Saul, as though he had not been anointed with oil.”
17. “...I will **lift up my voice like a trumpet, and show this people their transgressions**, their sins of omission towards the slave”
- Allusion to Isaiah 58:1 – “Cry aloud, spare not, **lift up thy voice like a trumpet, and shew my people their transgression**, and the house of Jacob their sins.”
18. “... on this subject, in its present attitude, there is no such thing as neutral ground. **He that is not for us is against us, and he that gathereth not with us, scattereth abroad.**
- Allusion to Matthew 12:30 – “He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad.”
  - Allusion to Luke 11:23 – “He that is not with me is against me: and he that gathereth not with me scattereth.”

19. “But in this we rejoice, that ‘**God has chosen things that are not to bring to nought things that are.**’”
- Allusion to 1 Corinthians 1:28 – “And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are: That no flesh should glory in his presence.”
20. “Every man and every woman present may do something by showing that we fear not a mob, and, in the midst of threatenings and revilings, **by opening our mouths for the dumb and pleading the cause of those who are ready to perish.**”
- Allusion to Proverbs 31:8–9 – “**Open thy mouth for the dumb** in the cause of all such as are appointed to destruction. Open thy mouth, judge righteously, and **plead the cause of the poor and needy.**”
21. “Give your money no longer for things which pander to pride and lust, but aid in scattering ‘**the living coals of truth**’ upon the naked heart of this nation”
- Potential allusion to Proverbs 25:21–22 – “If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink: For thou shalt **heap coals of fire upon his head**, and the Lord shall reward thee.”
22. “Only let us exercise them: and though often turned away unanswered, let us remember the **influence of importunity upon the unjust judge**, and act accordingly.”
- Allusion to Luke 18:3–6 – “And there was a widow in that city; and she came unto him, saying, Avenge me of mine adversary. And he would not for a while: but afterward he said within himself, Though I fear not God, nor regard man; Yet because this widow troubleth me, I will avenge her, lest by her continual coming she weary me. **And the Lord said, Hear what the unjust judge saith.** And shall not God avenge his own elect, which cry day and night unto him, though he bear long with them?”