Independent Identity: Influencers and Content of Ukrainian Identity during National Independence Movements and Related Events

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Abstract

Even though much has been written about Ukrainian national identity, research on Ukrainian national identity does not tend to address the evolution of identity or the moments and conditions of identity change. The focus of this paper is to review what scholars have written regarding Ukrainian national identity from approximately 1880 to 2017, during moments of widely recognized state instability and national upheaval, which include Ukraine's national awakening during the turn of the century, the chaos of World War I and Ukraine's first brief experience of independence, World War II and its aftermath, perestroika and independence, the Orange Revolution, and the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity. During these periods in its history, Ukraine was divided by two empires, experienced brief independence, became part of the USSR, and is now once again independent and still in the process of building a cohesive national identity. This review attempts to identify the categories that shape and provide content for identity during these different time periods, and to reveal how Ukrainian national identity has changed and evolved over time. The identified categories include: foreign aggression or repression, nation-building and nationalism, social movements, war and violence, language policies, Ukrainian national symbols, territorial issues, and independence.

Introduction

On August 24, 1991, the Supreme Soviet (the parliament) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

Republic overwhelmingly approved the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. This was not the

first time Ukrainians had made such a declaration in their more than 1000 year history. There had been

declarations of independence in Kyiv and Lviv in 1918, in Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939, and again in Lviv in

1941. However, those independence movements which had all occurred during the chaos of war were

short lived. Marxism-Leninism was supposed to remove national distinctions while creating a new class-

based identity of proletarian internationalism, however, in reality these national identities have

remained remarkably resilient, and have demonstrated considerable political power (Bracewell 1991).

Ukraine, like other post-communist countries, has struggled to form a cohesive national identity,

however, it has also had a history of national independence movements based on the principles of an

evolving national identity.

On December 1, 1991, there was a referendum in which 84% of Ukrainians participated. More

than 90% voted for the secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union - more than the ethnic Ukrainian

population of Ukraine, which was 73%. This demonstrated that there was wide support for

independence among the Russian, Jewish and other minority populations in Ukraine as well (Plokhy

321). "In 1991, Independent Ukraine emerged peacefully as an evolution of the USSR, not a violent

revolution (Hrytsak 2015, p.37)".

Even though Ukraine's newly acquired independence occurred peacefully in 1991, many

scholars have noted that since independence, Ukraine has struggled to build a cohesive national

identity:

Since 1991, the absence of the concept of a Ukrainian nation and national identity has led to a

controversial, often ambivalent process of identity formation…leaving Ukraine's people without

the internal and external social boundaries that define the meaning of the nation. (Korostelina

2013, p.294)

Throughout Ukraine's history, it has been divided and ruled by Poland, Lithuania, and the

Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian Empires. Due to these different experiences, and lack of a collective

history, people within the various regions of Ukraine perceive themselves as different and this makes it

difficult to build one national identity that all Ukrainians can agree on.

Definitions of National Identity

Abdelal et al. 2009, p.17, argue that despite the emerging interest in studying identities, "the

social sciences have not yet witnessed a commensurate rise in definitional consensus on the concept of

identity." Some scholars, including Brubaker and Cooper, have critiqued the study of identity and

suggest that it is vague and has complicated more things than it has discovered (Abdelal et al. 2009).

Below are a few definitions of national identity that scholars have proposed:

- "…national identity is viewed as a part of an individual's social identity, and as a collective phenomenon that unites people into national groups (Korostelina 2013, p.294)."
- "National identity can pertain to either an ethnic (cultural) or civic (political) community… (Kulyk 2016, p.590)."
- Kelman's definition as quoted in Korostelina 2013, p.294: "National identity is the group definition of itself as a group – its conception of its enduring characteristics and basic values; its strengths and weaknesses; its reputation and conditions of existence; its institutions and traditions; and its past history, current purposes, and future prospects."
- Members of a nation often define their in-group in contrast to, and in opposition to a foreign out-group. A national identity doesn't just exist – people must construct, modify and preserve it, and it can change over time (Shulman 1999). "Cultural characteristics of the members of a nation are the key features that give substance to national identity. Culture refers to the customs, values, beliefs and traditions of a people, including language, religion and the arts (Shulman 1999, p.1014)."

According to Abdelal et al., there is a "lack of consistency and clarity in defining and measuring

identities and the lack of coordination of identity research at both the cross-disciplinary and cross-

subfield levels (Abdelal et al. 2009, p.18)" Therefore they offer a framework to help define collective

identity as a social category that varies along two dimensions – content (including constitutive norms,

social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models), and contestation (in-group contestation

over this content to reach a level of agreement or disagreement about the norms, meanings, and

worldview of the group). The author summarized this framework (Table 1). While not directly

employed, the Abdelal et al. framework was used to inductively analyze and categorize the data

collected in forty journal articles and book chapters, and three entire books. While undoubtedly there

are more perspectives out there, this study examines the sources repeatedly cited and readily available

through various search engines and the university library.

Table 1

Abdelal et al.'s Framework for Defining Collective Identity (2009)

CONTENT – describes the <u>meaning</u> of the collective identity. The content of social identities may take the form of **<u>four nonmutually exclusive types:</u>**	**Examples:**
Constitutive norms refer to the formal and informal rules that define group membership	-the actions that lead others to recognize an actor as having a particular identity -norms help to define social meaning by establishing collective expectations and individual obligations
Social purposes refer to the goals that are shared by members of the group	-it may be purposive, the group may attach specific goals to its identity -helps to define group interests, goals or preferences -rise of nationalism in the former USSR is an example
Relational comparisons refer to defining an identity group by what it is not – that is, the way it views <u>other</u> identity groups, especially where those views about the other are a defining part of the identity	-the understanding of oneself in relationship to others -identities are fundamentally social and relational, defined by interaction with and relationship to others -in-group and out-group differentiation
Cognitive models refer to the worldviews or understandings of political material conditions and interests that are shaped by a particular identity	-a worldview, or framework that allows members to make sense of social, political and economic conditions -race, ethnicity, and nation are not things in the world but ways of seeing the world -ways of understanding and identifying oneself, identifying one's interests, and orienting one's actions -ways of recognizing, identifying, and classifying other people, interpreting sameness and difference -language, political and economic interests, preferences for political leaders and parties, ethnicity and region, perceptions of territory and culture
CONTESTATION – refers to the degree of <u>agreement</u> within a group over the content of the shared identity. Collective identities are not fixed and vary in the agreement and disagreement about their meanings.	-a process that occurs <u>within</u> groups, because it is the meanings that groups ultimately define for themselves that make up the content of collective identity -the degree of the in-group's agreement about the constitutive norms of an identity, consensus of the social purposes ascribed to an identity, agreement about meanings attached to out-groups, and coherence of shared cognitive models -how primordial its traits are, how exclusive membership is, how much status/legitimacy the identity is to out-groups -media, political debates, speeches, journalists, books, can play a role

Most scholars agree that identity is important in Ukrainian politics, however, there is a lack of research and understanding of exactly how and when identity matters. There is little agreement from scholars on what represents the concepts of identity. Thus far the research on Ukrainian national identity does not address how identity evolves over time, nor when and under what circumstances identity changes (Onuch et al. 2018).

The focus of this paper is on scholars of national identity and the themes they have focused on addressing the shaping and content of identity during different periods of modern Ukrainian history, which contained wars, national and social movements. By reviewing these themes readers can gauge identity change, perhaps an "evolution of national identity over time", and whether these events have led to more debate and contestation among the Ukrainian population, and a strengthening (or not) of a national identity. The structure of the paper will include information related to national identity recognized by scholars for the different time periods, and brief summaries.

The time periods covered in this paper are: the late 1880s-early 1900s: the Ukrainian National Awakening; 1917-1923: Revolution, Civil War, World War I, Independence, Soviet Union; 1939-1953: Independence Declarations, World War II, Sovietization; 1989 to 1995: RUKH, Independence and Nation-building; 2004-2005: the Orange Revolution; 2013-2017: Euromaidan, the Revolution of Dignity, Annexation of Crimea, War in Donbas.

Late 1880s-early 1900s: Ukrainian National Awakening

Scholars demonstrate that Ukrainian national identity building was both top-down and bottom-up as occupiers labeled and defined the Ukrainian population and Ukrainians reacted and labeled and defined the occupiers. It was the intellectual elites who recognized the peasants and the culture of the countryside as the backbone of Ukrainian identity, and encouraged peasants to join the nationalist movement.

Ukrainian nationalism traces its origins back to the middle of the 19th century (Kiryukhin 2015). "…quite apart from what their neighbors thought, a separate and distinct Ukrainian identity did take shape in the territories that now form modern Ukraine. From the end of the Middle Ages onwards, the people of this region shared a sense of who they were, often, though not always, defining themselves in opposition to occupying foreigners, whether Polish or Russian (Applebaum 5)."

Prior to the outbreak of World War I, Ukrainian speaking people were living in two different empires – the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Ukrainian homeland served as the homeland for many other groups including significant numbers of Russians, Jews, Poles, Slovaks, Germans and Hungarians (Liber 2015).

Under Romanov rule in the 1820s and 1830s, nationalists first attempted to construct a Ukrainian identity distinct from Russia's in central and eastern Ukraine, however, the tsarist authorities were threatened by the development of a Ukrainian identity separate from a broader Russian identity and repressed this effort, including banning the Ukrainian language (Abdelal 2002).

By the early 1880s, Ivan Franko had already become a Ukrainian cult figure, much like the great Taras Shevchenko in the 1860s, for creating novels, poems, and scholarly texts in Ukrainian language, which was no longer merely considered a peasant dialect. He addressed a land of industry, worker activists, liberated women, and socialist intellectuals, creating a social and cultural space for a new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals (Yekelchyk 2011).

During this same time Ukrainian activists in Austria-Hungary attempted to persuade Ukrainian-speaking peasants that they and their folk culture formed an important part of a larger Ukrainian world and identity. "In an environment of poverty, illiteracy, and political powerlessness, it proved difficult, but not impossible to attract the masses to this new vision of their homeland (Liber 2015, p.131)."

Under the Habsburgs, Ukrainian national activists, including Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Hrushevsky, enjoyed a relatively liberal political space to work on their nation-making project (Abdelal 2002). Austrian Galicia, which would later become western Ukraine, was the most influential region of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. The Habsburgs were generally supportive and encouraged Ukrainian identity building as it was also in opposition to Poland's influence in the region. Since the Habsburgs feared both the Polish and Russians, they supported the development of Ukrainian nationalism through schools, universities, craft guilds, clubs, church brotherhoods and other informal institutions, which would remain strong in the region and led to civil autonomy from the political regime (Delwaide 2011; Reznik 2016).

In the late 1880s, Ukrainians living under Habsburg rule in the west started to create content for a Ukrainian national identity which included east and central Ukrainians. The identity was defined by its difference from (against) that of Polish and Russian identities. "This identity project, the fashioning of Ukrainian national identity within Austrian territory but for a population that lived outside Austrian territory as well, required considerable intellectual flexibility on the part of nationally conscious Ukrainians who had never shared a province, much less a state, with Ukrainians who lived in the Russian Empire (Abdelal 2002, p.466)."

Ukrainian nationalists who lived in the eastern part of Ukraine, then part of the Russian Empire, went to Galicia to continue their work after the restrictions by tsarist authorities on Ukrainian language, identity and the national movement. At the same time Ukrainians in the Russian Empire did not develop a national movement, or a shared sense of a Ukrainian nation (Abdelal 2002).

1917-1923: Revolution, Civil War, World War I, Independence, Soviet Union

The end of World War I, the Russian Revolution and the collapse of the Russian and Habsburg Empires led to major chaos and a power vacuum which the Ukrainian Central Rada (parliament), led by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, took advantage of by declaring independence for the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918. Scholars view this period as one of nationalism building in content and territory.

During this time the revival of the Ukrainian language was popular, especially among the peasantry, Ukrainian again became synonymous with economic and political liberation and the public use of their native language also became a source of pride, serving as a "profound base of emotional support for the national movement (Applebaum 17)." Also during the Ukrainian People's Republic, ancient symbols of Kievan Rus' were reintroduced, including the currency called hryvnia, and the trident coat of arms.

The Ukrainian Central Rada was given a seat at the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, which ended the war on the Eastern Front. In February 1918, the Central Powers recognized a Ukraine separate from Russia, Austria and Poland, and raised the status of the Ukrainian national movement to that of a legitimate international actor, and Soviet Russia recognized the Ukrainian National Republic in March 1918 (Liber 2015). West Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia also declared independence, but that was also short-lived.

Stalin was appointed the People's Commissar for Nationalities and given the responsibility to negotiate with the non-Russian nations from the Russian Empire. Stalin's priorities for Ukraine were to undermine the national movement and to get hold of Ukrainian grain (Applebaum 27). In early 1918, Bolshevik forces took Kyiv for the first time. The forces were ordered to kill any suspected nationalists. Grain requisitions by the Red Army began in the Ukrainian countryside to feed the revolution. "The link between food and power was something that the Bolsheviks…understood very well (Applebaum 33)".

The chaos which occurred in Ukraine in 1919, with competing armies fighting for Kyiv, intellectuals working for a sovereign Ukraine and peasant rebellions, demonstrated to the Bolsheviks that Ukraine was a possible future military threat, as well as a dangerous threat to Soviet power. "There had not been a Soviet ideological revolution in Ukraine, the Red Army had to use force, not persuasion to pacify Ukraine (Applebaum 65). This concern regarding Ukraine would lead to future repression from the Soviet powers as they, especially Stalin later on, were obsessively concerned with losing Ukraine, as the tsars were before them. The Bolsheviks feared Ukrainian nationalism, which they identified with the Ukrainian language. They implemented a heavily centralized state in order to keep Ukraine in line, and were intent on the destruction of any independent political, cultural and economic institutions (Applebaum 83).

In March 1921, Ukraine was divided among four countries. The independence movement was not successful due to the immaturity of the Ukrainian national movement and the late arrival of the idea of independence. Big cities which were populated by many non-Ukrainians were not ideal to continue the independence movement, which relied on the support of the peasants. "Despite the failed effort to create one functioning state out of Habsburg and Dnieper Ukraine, the ideal of unified and independent statehood became central to the new Ukrainian credo (Plokhy 227)."

Soviet leaders created the Ukrainian SSR within the land borders declared by the Ukrainian Central Rada, in doing so they "reluctantly recognized the territory with its agricultural and industrial regions as the homeland of Ukrainians and implicitly acknowledging the leading role of Ukrainians in it (Liber 2015)."

Ukraine played a central role in the creation and evolution of the USSR due to the size of its territory and population, its location on the Soviet-Polish border, as well as its role as the breadbasket with strong agricultural resources and industrial significance (Delwaide 2011).

Lenin did not want to lose Ukraine, so in the early 1920s he decided to use a combination of Ukrainization and Sovietization to support the nationalist sentiment in Ukraine (Applebaum 84). This in turn resulted in ethnonational identities (nationalities) (Kulyk 2016) becoming firmly entrenched in the Soviet system. In fact the formation of the USSR republics were just by national criteria (Kryukhin 2015), even though there were later attempts to dismantle national identities (Bracewell 1991).

"A large part in the process of the development of national self-consciousness was played by population censuses…the USSR government used the institutionalization of ethnicity (nationality) as a tool for registering and monitoring the population…and after much debate between Soviet ethnographers, it was 'native language' that was chosen as the major criterion for determining affiliation to a nation (Kiryukhin 2015, p.2)."

This first Ukrainian national movement revealed that the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian countryside, folklore, religion, an independent spirit, are symbols of Ukrainian identity for ethnic Ukrainians. According to Shulman 1999 and others, the main carrier of Ukrainian culture was the peasantry in the countryside. Cossacks, frontiersmen with legendary bravery, who formed a well-organized political and military organization were also symbols of freedom and fighting for independence.

The Central Rada notably did request and gain the support of ethnic minority groups for the independence movement, so this was not an exclusively ethnic Ukrainian campaign. During this time period, as mentioned earlier Ukraine was the homeland to numerous ethnic minorities including Germans, Poles, Jews, Bulgarians, Greeks, Tatars and others.

"Although Ukrainian nationalists failed to establish an independent state in the course of the war, revolutions, and social upheavals between 1914-1923, Ukraine evolved from a territorial designation into the officially recognized homeland of the Ukrainians, who differed from the Russians and the Poles (Liber 2015, p.134)."

In 1923, the USSR demanded that all party members and government officials in Ukraine learn to speak Ukrainian, respect Ukrainian culture and try to recruit Ukrainians into the party ranks (Liber 2015). Russian and minority language could still be used. This Ukrainization policy lasted until the early 1930s.

Brief summary of this time period: This was an extraordinary period of chaos in Ukrainian history. The city of Kyiv changed hands more than a dozen times in 1919. The existence of an independent Ukraine - even though it was short-lived - had a lasting impact on the Ukrainian population. The Ukrainian people had a goal of independence and Ukraine had been recognized on the world stage. The Soviet regime was concerned about losing Ukraine from its sphere of influence, so it repressed Ukraine's identity and nation building projects, however, it did implement a top-down Ukrainization policy which lasted a few years, until there was a new round of even more violent repression, and near annihilation of Ukrainian national identity, during the Great Famine in 1932-1933.

1939-1953: Independence Declarations, World War II, Sovietization

Scholars demonstrate that from 1939 to 1953 the Ukrainian identity confronted two competing national projects. The first project was an early surge of nationalism that helped solidify the nation's geographic borders. The second project was the Soviet's deliberate attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation. Despite the unification of Ukrainians and the development of a more distinct geographic border, scholars largely argue that this period diminished the nation's salience and cultural borders.

Between World War I and World War II, Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia living under Polish rule became "even more committed to their national identity and to projects like autonomy and independent statehood, with which they increasing connected their nation (Abdelal 2002, p.467)."

In the late 1930s, Stalin purged many Ukrainian elites from Ukrainian institutions and replaced them with his allies and loyalists. "He hallowed out the structures and institutions that could promote

non-Russian national consciousness (and eventually national assertiveness), but allowed them to stay in place (Liber 2015, p.138)." Stalin's language policies in the late 1930s in Ukraine disbanded schools with languages of instruction other than Ukrainian or Russian. This affected Poles, Jews, Germans, Greeks, Romanians and other minority groups in Ukraine. (Liber 2015).

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was created in 1929. According to Snyder, "the OUN was an illegal, conspiratorial, and terrorist organization bound to destroy the status quo. Its goal was an independent Ukraine to include all Ukrainian territories (widely understood) but only Ukrainian people (narrowly understood) (Snyder 143)."

Dmytro Dontsov (1883-1973) was a Ukrainian nationalist, writer, journalist and intellectual whose views were the base of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Dontsov believed the main problem with Ukrainian nationalism was that it did not display enough ethnic hatred. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), was the "largest example of anti-communist resistance"…but was also responsible for the extermination of Poles and Jews (Hrytsak 2015, p.35).

On March 15, 1939, Carpatho-Ukraine - a region located in what was at the time a Czechoslovakian territory - declared independence to restore Ukrainian sovereignty for the first time since 1918, but it only lasted one day. Though the small Ukrainian army in that region fought heroically against a much larger invading Hungarian army, this declaration was mostly a symbolic attempt at independence (Granovsky 1940).

Many Ukrainians welcomed the German invasion in the summer of 1941. They were hoping for the end of the terror they had endured the previous several years during collectivization, the Great Famine (Holodomor), political repression and purges. Most of the peasants still had memories of the Holodomor and blamed the Soviet regime (Liber 2015). These people were soon very disappointed, as

the Nazis were in no way their saviors. One of the first groups to be disappointed by the Germans was a faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which collaborated with the Nazi regime under the leadership of Stepan Bandera (Motyl 2010). Bandera believed that Ukraine needed a national revolution, a peasant uprising like in 1917-1920, but that didn't transpire. The day after OUN and the first German troops entered Lviv, members of Bandera's faction of OUN made a proclamation of Ukrainian independence. The Germans turned on the OUN and arrested many of the members. The Germans told Bandera to denounce the declaration, he refused and was sent to a concentration camp in Germany (Hrytsak 2015).

Khrushchev and other Soviet authorities referred to nationalists who fought in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as "Banderites", however, not all UPA fighters shared a nationalist ideology or belonged to the OUN (Plokhy 280). Some nationalists in Western Ukraine continued to wage guerrilla warfare against the Soviets until 1953, well after the end of World War II. This mythology would play a role later on in the formation of a more contemporary national identity (Kiyukhin 2015). Towards the end of World War II, most Ukrainian nationalists felt that Dontsov's version of radical nationalism was too extreme and close to fascism so moved to more inclusive forms of nationalism (Hrytsak 2015). Many of the surviving UPA soldiers moved to the West and took control of many diaspora institutions in Europe, Canada and the USA (Hrytsak 2015).

The Nazi occupation crushed the intelligentsia's dream of joining Europe. The view of Europe they saw from Germany's occupation was not what they wanted to be part of. The Soviet authorities would use this disappointment as on-going propaganda comparing Ukrainian nationalism with German fascism (Plokhy 287). Soviet propaganda attempted to tarnish Lviv's patriotic reputation and historical memory by banning and repressing events and people (Kravchenko 2015).

In 1945, Stalin achieved a goal that many Ukrainian nationalists in eastern and western regions had strived for over the previous 100 years – he unified Ukrainians into a single state – the Ukrainian SSR (Abdelal 2002). By taking over largely Ukrainian-inhabited parts of the former Austria-Hungary claimed during the interwar period by Poland, Romania and Czech Republic, Stalin brought into Soviet Ukraine fairly well-developed traditions of autonomy, parliamentary democracy, and communal and national self-organization that had been nearly absent in central and eastern Ukrainian lands (Plokhy 288). Stalin used the policy of Ukrainization to give the new regions an opportunity to join Soviet society through its political and cultural life. This policy of Ukrainization and the background and memories of the nationalist insurgency, turned Western Ukraine into the center of national culture and political activism until the end of the Soviet Union (Plokhy 288). Western Ukraine profoundly influenced how the content of national identity was constructed and debated in the Ukrainian SSR (Abdelal 2002).

The practices of ethno-cultural identity in the USSR, were combined with the ideology of the formation of a special identity – the new 'Soviet person' under Khrushchev. During this time the Soviet government was also engaged with developing national cultures and a national intelligentsia in the republics to make sure they had loyal followers, and also promote Russian national-cultural tradition which was the main representative of Soviet culture (Kiryukhin 2015). During the process of Russification and Sovietization, Russian was used as the language of inter-ethnic integration and social mobility. Russian was considered to be more useful for getting good jobs and into university (Kulyk 2015).

Soviet authorities were concerned about the powerful national sentiment in western Ukraine and treated it carefully. The authorities allowed the local press to publish in Ukrainian, "and in general seeking primarily to influence the meaning of Ukrainian national identity, rather than Russifying the language and population (Abdelal 2002, p.468)." According to Kravchenko, modern Ukrainianness was

only located in the Western part of Ukraine, especially Lviv, while the rest of Ukraine was quite Russified and Sovietized (Kravchenko 2015).

"The demographic catastrophes of the twentieth century killed millions of Ukrainians, but they also decimated Ukraine's Jewish population, purged its Polish and German populations, expelled Armenians, Bulgarians, and the Crimean Tatars, and forcibly evacuated the remaining Polish and Jewish populations of those areas annexed to the USSR from Poland (Liber 2015, p.144)." There were also waves of deportations, forced evacuations and labor which removed Ukrainians from the territory. Migrants from other republics moved to Ukraine to replace the population. This led to a Russification and Sovietization of Ukraine, especially the southern and eastern regions. During this time Ukraine went from an agricultural to an industrialized modern country, but it also transformed from a highly multicultural region to a bilingual and bicultural republic (Liber 2015).

Brief summary of this time period: Due to the cruel tactics of collectivization, grain requisitions and the Holodomor in the 1930s, Ukrainian villages were nearly left void of their cultural heritage. In the late 1930s, there was also a great purge of Ukrainian intelligentsia, which damaged the national movement in Ukraine. The people were reeling from the aftermath of the Holodomor and war, and did not have agency to participate in a mass movement for independence in 1939 or 1941. Ukrainians were so demoralized during this time some of them briefly welcomed the invading Nazis as liberators. This period finally joined Galicia with the rest of Ukraine, which added a more assertive Ukrainian nationalism to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which differed from the other regions of Ukraine. However, the intensive Sovietization and Russification of Ukraine after World War II diminished Ukrainian identity. Perhaps, as Kiryukhin argues, Soviet national politics did play a crucial role in the formation of Ukrainian national-consciousness (identity) during the Soviet period; however, if that was true, the creation of a national identity was no longer led by Ukrainians, but by Moscow with goals of creating the identity of the new Soviet person.

1989 to 1995: RUKH, Independence and Nation-building

With independence Ukraine felt it needed to prove it was different than the Ukrainian SSR, and leaned toward nationalism to help build a Ukrainian identity. Several scholars note that there are two Ukraines divided by the East and West. Scholars have indicated in their writings, that these divisions are also found in linguistic, political and foreign policy preferences. These differences along with long-time Sovietization and Russification, have shown that creating a new national identity for Ukraine would be a challenge.

In 1989, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring, or Rukh was created. In the beginning, Rukh was careful to work within Gorbachev's framework of perestroika, supporting democratization, cultural and linguistic renewal, and economic autonomy, but not pushing for political independence. Most of Rukh's members and followers were intellectuals in Kyiv and western Ukraine. Western Ukraine was the leader for the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the late 1980s, as it was a century earlier. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Rukh was the single main source of the content of Ukrainian national identity (Abdelal 2002).

On August 24, 1991, the Supreme Soviet (the parliament) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic overwhelmingly approved the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. On December 1, 1991, there was a referendum in which 84% of Ukrainians participated. More than 90% voted for the secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union. "The percentage of those who voted for independence exceeded the number of ethnic Ukrainians (73 percent) and Ukrainian speakers (43 percent). This seemed to show a victory for the civic concept of Ukrainian identity (Hrytsak 2015, p.37)."

Kravchenko (2015) notes that the concepts of Ukrainian national revolution were applied in order to legitimize Ukrainian independence – newly independent Ukraine declared itself heir to the Ukrainian National Republic which had declared independence in 1918. National symbols of the

Republic were used again, including the trident (coat of arms), and the blue and yellow flag, representing fields of wheat and the sky. The hryvnia, a currency used during Kievan Rus, and then in 1917-1918, was also soon introduced.

Being a newly independent country, Ukraine had an opportunity to rebuild its national identity. According to Korostelina (2013), the movement from colonialism and totalitarianism to political pluralism is connected to the construction of a state and the reshaping of national identities (Korostelina 2013). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, identity problems in Ukraine turned out to be more important than the problem of establishing democratic institutions (Kiryukhin 2015).

"Ukraine was among those post-Soviet countries where neither nationalists nor former communists fully dominated national politics, thus preventing the government from pursuing a clear course (Kulyk 2019b, p.1033)." Former communist elites had much more political influence in the first decade after independence than nationalists who had more influence in western Ukraine (Kulyk 2019b). These elites played a key role in the construction of national identity in post-Soviet Ukraine via top-down policies (Kuzio 2001).

According to Kiryukhin (2015), Ukrainian state politics since independence had been focused on the homogeneity of culture and language with Ukrainian cultural traditions taking precedence, and the differences between Ukraine and Russia being highlighted. Russia has served as "the other" (or out-group) for Ukraine, and Ukrainian national identity has been created in opposition to Russia. The Soviet elites who were in power prior to independence remained in power after independence and they played a role in the process of identity formation. Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of Ukraine, took on this task as a way for Ukraine to prove to itself and others that it can be an independent country. Many on the political right criticized the government of not being able to choose between the East and the West. However, many of the Ukrainian intellectuals in the 1990s, were influenced by countries in Central and

Eastern Europe which held the notion that Russia was a threat to national and cultural identities of smaller European nations (Kiryukhin 2015).

"By the 1994 presidential elections Ukraine was sharply divided between an ethnically Ukrainian, and largely Ukrainian-speaking, west and center and a south and east that had large ethnic Russian minorities, was largely Russophone, and supported candidates promising closer relations with Russia (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2018, p.107)." The 1994 presidential election took place at a time when Ukraine was going into a deep economic and political crisis. Ukraine became more divided at this time due to the breakdown of the initial alliance who supported independence, including former Communist leaders, Ukrainian-speaking Western Ukraine and the worker movements in Donbas. According to Abdelal (2002), regional contestation of national identity prevented the government from decisively choosing a political-economic orientation toward either West or East.

Leonid Kuchma won the presidency in 1994 due to support of Russian-speaking voters in eastern Ukraine. He learned to speak Ukrainian and tried to calm the regional differences in Ukraine. He won the presidency again in 1999 with increased support from western Ukraine. The Kuchma years (1994-2004) brought stability, but also a huge increase in corruption, including regional oligarchs, and manipulated elections. Some argued that the civic concept of Ukrainian identity was the cause of the failure of a post-communist transformation in Ukraine, whereas Ukraine's neighbors which had a more ethnic based national identity, including Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were more successful in creating a national identity (Hrytsak 2015).

Both Kravchuk and Kuchma, sought to slowly enhance the role of the Ukrainian language as a factor of nation-building without encroaching on the use of other languages, especially Russian. Their policies upheld the status of Ukrainian as the state language, but also guaranteed the use of Russian and other minority languages. "The collapse of the Soviet Union turned oppressed and disdained languages

into vehicles of emancipation and keys to a far larger context, that of Europe and the world, from which the Soviet empire had cut off its subjects (Delwaide 2011, p.191)."

According to Shulman (2004), Ethnic Ukrainian national identity placed a priority on foreign policy for the integration with Europe and the West. The Eastern Slavic identity placed a priority on ties with Russia. The big question after independence was whether Ukraine should rejoin Europe, or remain within Eurasia with closer ties with Russia and other former Soviet countries (Kuzio 2001). Most states contain multiple ethnic groups, and cultural differences between ethnic communities can lead to disagreements over what foreign nations make up positive and negative reference groups (Shulman 1999). The positive reference group for ethnic Ukrainians are Europeans, the negative reference group are Russians. For Eastern Ukrainians, Russians are their positive reference group which causes a struggle to strengthen ethno-regional identities in Ukraine.

Similarly Kuzio, writes that, "national identity is forged and defined through a dual process of stressing the similarities of the in-group (the Self) and its differences with those outside the political community (the Others) (Kuzio 2001, p.343)." Ukraine's growing national self-identification is closely tied to differentiating itself from 'Others'. According to Kuzio (2001), after states become independent they need to forge a new national identity, and it is up to the elites to determine who the 'other' is in order to start nation- and state-building; when identities are similar it is more difficult to forge national identities. Even when states are close in language and culture this can often produce more, not less, conflict over national identity.

"In terms of the development of Ukrainian national identity and its implications for relations with Russia and the rest of the world, the divergent institutional histories of Galicia and the rest of Ukraine is the defining issue in the politics of Ukrainian nationalism (Abdelal 2002, p.477)."

When former President Leonid Kravchuk identified Russia as Ukraine's 'other', against whom Ukraine could build a new national identity, it provided an ideal opportunity for nation building. However, the elites had to be careful not to alienate 'our' Russians (Ukrainian Russian-speakers) as opposed to 'those' Russians living in the Russian Federation (Kuzio 2001).

"With the reshaping of identities in Russia and Ukraine, 'the perceptions of history' became a 'chief battleground in the struggle over identity' (Delwaide 2011, p.183)." The Soviet legacy was the historical legitimacy of the USSR, and one that was embedded in values, artifacts, memories and traditions. The base of it was the Great October Socialist Revolution. According to Kravchenko it was like a secular religion. After the collapse of the USSR and erosion of Soviet ideology, the formerly repressed Ukrainian identity debates began to occur in political and cultural life (Kravchenko 2015). Soviet Ukrainian study of history was very limited and controlled.   Kravchenko notes that the enduring influence of Soviet mythologies on society, including the social utopias of the totalitarian era were ingrained in institutions and values. The uncertainty and economic crisis that Ukrainians suffered after the collapse of the USSR kept the Soviet mythological component and its impact in the collective identity.

Beginning with perestroika, and the loosening of ideological controls in the last years of the Soviet Union's existence, the study of previously forbidden historical topics became possible (Yekelchyk 2011). There was little agreement in Ukrainian society on such topics as the Famine of 1932-1933 (Holodomor), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), but at least scholars could finally study, write, and debate about these topics during perestroika and after independence (Yekelchyk 2011).

The Ukrainian diaspora, many of whom fled to the West after World War II, helped establish the dominance of the national paradigm.   Diaspora colleagues of post-Soviet Ukrainian historians took an active part in the reorientation of the Ukrainian historical profession by funding centers, journals, and

translation projects, and helping restore the national paradigm as preserved in the diaspora (Yekelchyk 2011).

Abdelal (2002), observes that "the regional contestation of Ukrainian national identity is a result of the shifting boundaries and changing institutional contexts within which Ukrainian nationalists, as well as Habsburg, Romanov, and Soviet bureaucrats, have sought their cultural, economic, and political goals (p.459)." Regarding regional differences in Ukraine, Shulman (1999) notes that the structure of Ukrainian society is bipolar, due to its geographical differences, which reinforce ethnic, religious, linguistic and economic cleavages. For example, western Ukraine is more agricultural, composed mainly of ethnic Ukrainians, with a longer association with Polish and Austro-Hungarian rule; whereas Eastern Ukraine is mostly industrial, with mostly ethnic Russians, with a longer association with Russian and Soviet rule.

The large number of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Eastern Ukraine along with the differing interpretations of ethnic Ukrainian culture to Russian and European cultures causes problems for the extension of the nationalist vision of ethnic Ukrainian identity to the national level – it does not take into consideration the views of Ukrainians in Eastern Ukraine (Shulman 1999). In short, Ukrainian nationalism that was focused on ethnicity had very little appeal in eastern and southern Ukraine (Hrytsak 2015).

In Ukraine, many people identify with two ethnic groups, most frequently the Ukrainian and Russian ones or do not have a stable identification with any of them, which often leads to the preference of some pan-ethnic identity (in the 1990s usually Soviet). "Such ambiguous and unstable identifications were particularly widespread in eastern and southern Ukraine with its high level of urbanization, mixed marriages and the predominant use of the Russian language by people of all 'nationalities' (Kulyk 2019, p.159)."

The promotion of Ukrainian language and the demotion of Russian language have complicated relations between Ukraine and Russia (Kuzio 2001). According to Kuzio, language plays a crucial role in self-identification as it is potentially a symbol of one's uniqueness, and language is often an important factor in differentiating ethnic communities (but not always).

Brief summary of this time period: With independence, Ukraine had to declare an "other" in order to define itself and its interests, and also determine what it is not, and who it does not include in its reference group. Russia was determined by elites to be the "other" (out-group) after independence. This can be a challenge since scholars have noted that the Soviet legacy, the influence of the USSR's culture and history, has remained a factor in the slow development of national identity in Ukraine. Many scholars note that major regional differences in Ukraine (mostly divided by East and West), may have led to a regional contestation and lack of consensus regarding a more unified Ukrainian national identity. Several scholars have indicated the lack of a decision from elites to follow an East or West foreign policy may have triggered confusion and stagnation in Ukraine, including its inability to create a cohesive national identity. Most scholars seem to agree that Ukraine has been quite divided, most clearly by the East and West, since independence in 1991.

2004-2005: the Orange Revolution

After two decades of independence, dealing with economic stagnation and corruption in all levels of government, the election fraud of the 2004 presidential election provided an opportunity for Ukrainians to demonstrate their disapproval with the situation in their country. Scholars have noted that participation in the Orange Revolution is seen as an example of civic identity and engagement, with protesters showing their political preferences and collective expectations for fair elections and against corruption, and a closer relationship with the West.

Elections provide political parties an opportunity to influence public opinion, and shape public discourse on identity issues. Elections also help the public show elites and fellow citizens their political, party and foreign policy preferences which may influence national identity (Melnykovska et al., 2011).

In the 2004 presidential campaign, Viktor Yushchenko was a charismatic candidate with an agenda of anti-establishment and moderate nationalist slogans. Viktor Yanukovych was a protégé of Kuchma, and used identity issues to present Yushchenko as a puppet of the West and an anti-Russian nationalist (Kulyk 2019b). Yanukovych won the presidential election due to election fraud.

"The Orange Revolution was a result of mass election falsifications, which led to a socio-political outburst (Reznik 2016, p.750)." The revolution started as civic protests, and protesters included a variety of people, from Ukrainian nationalists to Russian-speaking communists. "Still the protests led to a sharp division of Ukraine into two parts along linguistic lines apparently confirming the two Ukraines theory, except the West was now larger and, in fact covered a lot of territory in the East, stretching as far as the Russian-Ukrainian border (Hrytsak 2015, p.40)."

After protesters' demands were met for a new election, Yushchenko won the next election, but Yanukovych's Party of Regions still maintained a lot of support especially by Ukrainians who were concerned about Yushchenko's nationalist leaning policies regarding the Holodomor and national heroes. The historical and political revisionism of Yushchenko's government posthumously awarded Stepan Bandera the "Hero of Ukraine" title. As noted previously, Bandera was the controversial, nationalistic leader of the main faction of the OUN which collaborated with the Nazis in order to declare independence for Ukraine in 1941.

The elites of the Orange Revolution tried to build an inclusive civic identity, but since it was built on a strong Ukrainian ethnocultural base, it was difficult for members of other ethnolinguistic groups to

join (Kulyk 2016). However, according to Motyl, "thanks to the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukrainian national identity has become synonymous with democracy and the West (Motyl 2010, P.25)."

After the Orange Revolution there was a calling for a "paradigmatic shift from identities to values...the failure of the Orange Revolution was not due to the weakness of Ukrainian identity – that identity had proved to be relatively strong – but was due to the failure of the Orange leaders to deliver reforms (Hrytsak 2015, p.42)." According to Hrytsak, there needed to be a new elite with a new set of values and broad social support especially from the younger generation and from the middle class. From this perspective, the Orange Revolution was seen as a stepping stone for a more robust future social movement.

During the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, Ukraine had seen a significant growth of media freedom. According to Korostelina, the role of media is important because "in Ukraine, constructed narratives trickle down through TV and radio broadcasts, newspapers and new media, infiltrating the national consciousness of the general public and shaping the population's views on national identity (Korostelina 2013, p.294)."

Brief summary of this time period: Though the results of the Orange Revolution were mixed, it was an important event to prepare for and build upon for future opportunities. Scholars have indicated a possible shift to a more civic national identity – and a desire for a closer relationship with the West, reforms and democracy - though scholars still recognize a division in Ukraine split along linguistic and regional lines. The newly elected president, Viktor Yushchenko, failed to deliver political and economic reforms and set out to promote the Ukrainian language and a more nationalist version of history, which were not well-received by much of the population in the south and east of Ukraine. These policy miscalculations, along with political parties and elites, especially the Party of Regions - emphasizing

ethnic differences in order to gain votes - likely led to the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010.

2013-2017: The Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, Annexation of Crimea and War in Donbas
Scholars view this period as one of dynamic changes in Ukrainian national identity due to the influences of the events that occurred, which include protests, a revolution, violence from domestic sources, Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas.

When Yanukovych came to power in 2010, he wanted to revert to the Soviet interpretation of history, and take a pro-Russian stance on foreign policy (Motyl 2010). However, he had found that there had been a shift in public opinion in Ukraine due to Yushchenko's policies that leaned a bit more nationalistic (Kulyk 2019b).

The Euromaidan was a mass mobilization and wave of activist protest events. The protests lasted from November 21, 2013 until February 22, 2014. What started out as small protests grew to a mass mobilization. The participants were self-organized, ordinary citizens of Ukraine from a variety of backgrounds, including liberals, conservatives, socialists, students, pensioners, middle-class professionals and veterans. The average age was 36, the majority were men (59%), and most had a higher education and were employed. About 25% of them were Russian speakers (Onuch 2015).

The dramatic civic events that occurred during the Euromaidan, were caused by the refusal of the Ukrainian government to sign the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement. This was the first time a revolution in the post-Soviet Union was not connected to an election (Reznik 2016). Although the initial protests were due to Yanukovych's refusal to sign the EU agreement, the foreign media presented the revolution in Ukraine as a choice between Europe and Russia, however, the main focus was actually opposition to the Yanukovych regime, indicating that the Euromaidan was more of a domestic issue, not a foreign policy issue, according to Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec (2017).

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The Revolution of Dignity was a way for people from various backgrounds to demonstrate their political and foreign policy preferences, as well as orient their actions to their goal of removing Yanukovych and his regime from power. On February 18, 2014, Yanukovych authorized a special police force loyal to him to use lethal force, and the killing of protesters began. By February 20, one hundred protesters had been killed. Due to the extraordinary events of the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2018) share their expectation that identities will be more important and more salient after the revolution than before.

Media and social media had a significant impact during the Euromaidan and Revolution. Since most of the owners of the largest media groups in Ukraine were at one time loyal to Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, the Euromaidan protesters increased online media's prominence as an alternative news source (Shore 127). According to Leshchenko, Yanukovych's underestimation of the Internet helped to cause his downfall. Online news coverage during Euromaidan was a way to combat the spread of propaganda broadcast by Russian television news sources (Leshchenko 2014).

Social media was used as a political tool to challenge authority and mobilize people for protest activity and had been an ally for the anti-government protestors during the Euromaidan and Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine (Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec 2017). Social media unlike mainstream media, helped set the agenda and frame protest claims allowing people to debate, organize and influence others (Onuch 2015). According to Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec (2017), "online participation can lead to the creation of a communal identity and contribute to discussion (p.774)."

According to a quote from an activist interviewed by Onuch (2015, p.217), during Euromaidan "protest signage and speeches remained bilingual and protest leaders countered any xenophobic minorities, demanding that they remember that Ukraine is a multilingual and multi-ethnic country-something that never happened in 2004 (during the Orange Revolution)." Activists attempted to frame the Euromaidan protest in terms of civil and human rights. This was demonstrated by their posters

which showed messages of citizenship, political rights, and anti-state discourse, rather than the anti-Russophone and anti-Donbas messaging which was more prevalent in the 2004 protests (Onuch 2015). Bureiko and Moga note that "the shift towards a 'civic consciousness' began to develop in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution and, most obviously, since the beginning of the Euromaidan protests in 2013 (Bureiko and Moga 2019, p.142)."

Civil society is gaining strength and growing in Ukraine. NGOs helped support the Euromaidan and Revolution protests, and a new generation of activists were trained. There have been stronger and more coordinated demands by activists and NGOs to make government more accountable for their actions, and to combat corruption. Volunteers have worked together to supply and fund the army, as well as assist with the more than one million internally displaced citizens from Donbas (Wilson 2015). Participation in the protests, and greater growth and involvement in NGOs and civil society, are examples of a group defining its goals and interests, which is a step toward building a cohesive national identity.

Shortly after the Revolution of Dignity, on March 1, 2014, the Putin administration authorized the armed intervention in Ukraine in order to protect Russian-speaking compatriots living there. Putin believed that all native Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians should be protected (Delwaide 2011). This is an example of kin-state nationalism and an assertive foreign policy (Cheskin and Kachuyevkyi 2019). This policy is part of Russia's vision of the "Russian World", which is defined by culture rather than territory. The Russian World offers a supra-national tier of identity. Russia claims that it is the guardian of the rights of Russian-speakers, including those that live outside Russia's borders.

Several scholar have identified this Russian aggression as a renewed East-West divide. Harris (2020), argues that Ukraine is seeking to get out of Russia's sphere of influence, and Russia is having some difficulties coming to terms with its loss of Ukraine and is trying to exploit the loyalties and

identities of Ukrainians living in eastern Ukraine. Putin has made comments that Ukraine does not exist.

However, he miscalculated by thinking that the people in Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine would

welcome Russia's invasion to help them (Wilson 2015).

Several scholars have acknowledged how violence and an external threat can affect national

identity, especially when the threat is coming from a former "in-group" entity.

Below are notable quotes from scholars regarding how violence and conflict can impact identity:

"The repetition of narratives about the traumatic event constructs the group's identity in opposition to the identity of the opponent who caused the trauma, and as such becomes a social reality for those who participate in this discourse. A common identity, a 'we-feeling', is shared between the people who recall the same painful past, rendering their social interaction meaningful, while reproducing the boundary between self/other (Buckley-Zistel 2006, p.8)."

"The outbreak of war with Russia brought Ukrainian citizens a new experience of defending one's country and/or expecting an attack of a foreign army, an experience that was widely claimed to increase both identification with Ukraine and alienation from Russia (Kulyk 2019a, p.176)."

"Theorists often link the hardening of ethnic, linguistic, and national identity to the aggravation of conflicts, thereby strengthening the widespread assumption that identity is central to the crisis and conflict in Ukraine (Onuch et al. 2018, p.80)."

"The study of identities struggles to capture the moments and dynamics of identity change. A crisis moment provides a rare insight into such processes (Sasse and Lacker 2018, p.1)."

"Political and economic crises and wars are settings that disrupt the equilibria underpinning seemingly stable identities. The disruption of everyday life, structures, networks, and loyalties can facilitate identity shifts (Sasse and Lackner 2018, p.4)."

"…violence tends to harden or remake identities (Guiliano 2018, p.159)."

"Ongoing conflict with Russia has increased attachment to Ukraine among Russian speakers (Cheskin and Kuchuyevski 2019, p.19)".

Through Russia's aggression, Ukrainian identity has shifted due to relational comparisons as

noted by Abdelal et. al 2009, and the scholars above – more Ukrainians are seeing other Ukrainians

(even those who speak a different language than them) as the in-group, and seeing Russians as the out-

group; and Russian speakers are gaining an increased attachment to Ukraine, and alienation from Russia.

Ukraine has been called a country divided into two linguistic groups (Russian and Ukrainian), however, the fact is most Ukrainians are bilingual (Kuzio 2015). Kulyk (2019a), notes that the prevalence of Russian language may merely be a choice of communication convenience or comfort. Bureiko and Moga (2019), warn that scholars should not limit the importance of language to national identity to only two main language groups because that would exclude Ukraine's linguistic diversity. According to Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2018), due to tolerance for the administrative use of Russian and other minority languages, there is "a level of mass acceptance for a Ukrainian state that is multiethnic and multilingual (p.112)."

According to Kulyk (2016, p.90), "the Euromaidan and the subsequent Russian aggression further detached language use from national identity, as many Russian speakers came to identify strongly with the inclusive Ukrainian nation without abandoning their accustomed language or even adding Ukrainian as an active part of their communicative repertoire."

Throughout the years, language has played a central role in determining national identity, especially as an indicator of ethnicity during the USSR. What scholars are currently observing is a change towards a more liberal consideration and acceptance of language in national identity and self-identification. A Ukrainian can speak Ukrainian or Russian, or both and still be considered a Ukrainian.

According to Delwaide, and many other scholars who wrote nearly identical quotes, "Ukrainian identity does not stand or fall with the Ukrainian language (Delwaide 2011, p.193)."

Politics in Ukraine has long been characterized as regionally divided between a pro-European west and pro-Russian east (Kuzio 2015), though a crude east-west (two Ukraines) divide has been critiqued as overly simplistic by Barrington and Heron (2004). The Euromaidan protests and reaction to

them seemed to provoke polarization along regional lines (Guilano 2018). This was in large part due to Russian propaganda - some ethnic Russians in Ukraine were unnerved by the anti-Russian sentiments of Euromaidan - as well as the seeming rise in radical Ukrainian nationalist groups (Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec 2017).

Despite months of heightened Russian propaganda supporting separatism among Russian-speakers in Donetsk and Luhansk, the vast majority did not support separatism - slightly less than a third of the population surveyed in Donetsk and Luhansk backed separation (Guilano 2018). According to Guiliano, most people who supported separatism in Donetsk and Luhansk did not reference strong Russian identity-based themes or pro-Russian foreign policy issues, they instead indicated their main concerns were local and that they felt abandoned by Kyiv. People in the Donbas were more supportive of the Russian-backed Customs Union agreement than with the EU agreement. However, their concerns were driven more by "rational economic calculation than by geopolitical identity or historical sympathy for Russia (Guiliano 2018, p.173)."

According to Kravchenko, history divides Ukrainians even more than language, regional or political differences. He believes that history is "still influenced by Russian politics of identity, in which historical amnesia and the glorification of Stalinism prevail (Kravchenko 2015, p.464)." However, according to Kulyk, the "Euromaidan and the war greatly diminished support for the preservation of ties with Russia and cultural legacies it aggressively asserted (Kulyk 2019b, p. 1036)."

Harris believes that there is a new national identity in post-Soviet Ukraine, which is trying to remove itself from Russia's influence and rejects Ukraine's Soviet past and includes a more nationalist historical narrative which originated in western Ukraine and has been promoted by elites who are more focused on the West (Harris 2020). Of course this nationalist narrative could possibly alienate some residents of eastern and southern Ukraine who already may feel that their own life experiences were

being erased with the removal of statues of Lenin, other symbols of the USSR, and the changing names of streets and cities (Wilson 2015).

The topics covered by scholars in this time period demonstrate many changes occurring in Ukraine. For example, the protests of the Euromaidan (which took place in many cities across Ukraine) and the Revolution of Dignity have been seen as more inclusive and widely accepted and supported than the Orange Revolution. Social media has allowed more debate and discussion by people and also assists with organization and more involvement in the building of a civil society. Russia's military annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas has given the opportunity for Ukrainians to assess who is in their in-group, and how to relate to their out-group. Language preference is not seen as contentious as it has in the past, and views of the Soviet historical past and the impact on Ukraine are being evaluated due to Russia's annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Donbas.

According to many scholars, these above mentioned occurrences have led to a possible shift from a more ethnic identity to a more civic identity in Ukraine. Below are a few notable quotes from scholars sharing their findings:

"The very meaning of belonging to the Ukrainian nation has changed, a change most vividly manifested in the increased alienation from Russia and the greater embrace of Ukrainian nationalism as a worldview and accordingly, as a historical narrative (Kulyk 2016, p.607)."

"Ethnicity is a major issue that is related to language use, though ethnicity is not necessarily closely tied to language practice, with many Russian-speakers self-identifying as ethnically Ukrainian (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2018, p.108)."

"The increasingly civic nature of Ukrainian national identity, particularly since Euromaidan, seems to be an important factor that allows people to speak Russian and still identify strongly with the Ukrainian nation (Bureiko and Moga 2019, p138)."

"The reverse side of Russian-speakers' greater willingness to identify themselves as Ukrainians is a changed meaning of Ukrainianness, that is, a shift from an ethnic to a civic criterion for membership in the Ukrainian nation (Kulyk 2019a, p.169)."

Kulyk believes measuring people's perceived identities belonging to both ethnic groups, including hybrid identities, and civic nations is important and that is why he uses the term ethnonational rather than only ethnic. As more people of various ethnic backgrounds start to identify themselves only or partly as Ukrainians, Kulyk expects they will perceive their new identity as "chosen rather than inherited, civic and/or cultural rather than purely ethnic (Kulyk 2018, p.130)."

Korostelina (2014) suggests that the "acceptance of Ukraine as multiethnic with different cultural vectors of development will create a foundation for a peaceful shared society (p.285)." She also states that "only through systemic dialogue can common ground be established and a cohesive national identity developed; one based on unifying ideas, including ideas of civic society and a civic concept of national identity, human rights and the equality of every citizen independent of his or her religion, ethnicity, and language (p.285)." Korostelina says that "in situations of social transition and rapid change, social groups can be transformed into charismatic communities that are empowered to produce new national narratives and become agents of change (Korostelina 2014, p.286)."

Barrington's study of citizenship as a form of identity has two main points. The first is that citizenship is more than just a category of law, people have a deeper connection to citizenship and many Ukrainians consider it an important part of who they are. The second is the extent to which a civic national identity in Ukraine is already taking shape. According to Barrington, "citizenship is a shared membership that – unlike ethnicity, religion and language – is common to nearly the entire population of Ukraine (Barrington 2020, p.15)." Barrington's advice to gain even broader acceptance of civic national identity is to find ways to incorporate Ukrainian language and culture into what is defined as the Ukrainian "We" without alienating ethnic Russians and Russian speakers (Barrington 2020).

Recent changes in Ukrainian national identity include an increase in individuals' self-identification as Ukrainian, greater pride in the Ukrainian state, stronger attachment to symbols of

nationhood, enhanced solidarity and readiness to defend Ukraine, and an increased confidence in the power of people to change the country for the better (Kulyk 2016). Kulyk found that "the years after Euromaidan and the Russian aggression were characterized by a kind of bottom-up de-Russification of the Ukrainian population, that is, a popular drift away from Russianness that included significant changes in identifications, language practices, and language policy preferences (Kulyk 2018, p.134)." Kulyk also finds that the majority of Ukrainians agree on the main elements of its national identity content, which includes a pro-Western foreign policy, the historical narrative and the legitimacy of Russian and Ukrainian languages (Kulyk 2016).

Kiryukhin is one of the few scholars who argues that Ukrainian identity may not be turning as "civic" as many other scholars believe. According to Kiryukhin, Ukraine is described as a civil nation, however, schools, state holidays, social rituals and symbolic expressions of the Ukrainian state include ethnic components which dominate everyday practices. The Ukrainian national identity that is being established is ethnocultural. This is an issue for Ukrainian citizens whose native language may not be Ukrainian, including Russian-speakers and other minority language speakers. These Ukrainians can face problems of self-identification and identity conflicts (Kiryukhin 2015).

According to Wilson, many people believe that the Euromaidan and the war are creating a "new Ukraine that is bilingual, multi-ethnic, and multi-confessional" and have come to regard its diversity as a source of strength. "Despite the loss of key territories, the rest of Ukraine is more united than ever. A new nation is arguably in the making (Wilson 2015, p.265)."

Brief summary of this time period: Even more than the Orange Revolution, the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity made the world take note that Ukraine is not Russia. Many Ukrainians also for the first time realized that Russia may not be the "brothers" (in-group) they thought they were. Many scholars indicate that war and violence can lead to identity shifts in populations, providing a clearer

understanding of "Us" (in-groups) and "Them" (out-groups). Scholars have noted an increase in the

debate and discussion among Ukrainians of political preferences, expectations, collective action and

goals, including a new, more developed Ukrainian worldview. This has been demonstrated by a growing

civil society and volunteerism, use of social media as a political tool, as well as rules of engagement

during the Revolution of Dignity, and willingness to fight for Ukraine's territorial integrity in the Donbas

region. Many scholars have indicated an identity shift from a more ethnic Ukrainian identity to a more

inclusive civic identity or at least a mixed or hybrid identity, and a clearer understanding of what it

means to be Ukrainian.

Discussion

This review of scholars' research on Ukrainian national identity, included three entire books, and

forty journal articles and book chapters. While undoubtedly there are more perspectives out there, this

study examines the sources repeatedly cited and readily available through various search engines and

the university library. The informal and scholarly prevalence tentatively indicates these sources as the

most dominant perspectives on Ukrainian identity.

Categories which scholars identified as shaping and describing the content of Ukrainian national

identity most consistently throughout the various time periods include: Foreign aggression or

repression; Nation-building and nationalism; Social movement; War/Violence; Language policies;

National symbols; Independence; and Territorial issues. These categories can be viewed in Table 2.

Table 2

Categories identified in the literature that shape and describe content of national identity

	Foreign aggression or repression*	Nation-building and nationalism	Social movement	War/Violence*	Language policies	Ukrainian national symbols	Independence*	Territorial issues*
1880 to 1900	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
1917 to 1923	1	1	1	1	1	1	1 (briefly)	1
1939 to 1953	1	0 (Soviet)	0	1	1	0	0	1
1989 to 1995	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
2004 to 2005	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
2013 to 2017	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

*the shaded categories shape national identity; the unshaded categories describe the content of national identity

1880 to 1900

This time period established peasants as the backbone of Ukrainian folk culture and as symbols and creators of national identity content. Intellectuals during this time were writing in Ukrainian and working to build a national movement for independence encouraging the peasants to join the effort. At this time Ukraine was also the homeland for a diverse ethnic minority population. Ukraine was divided in two different territories, one under the rule of the Russian Empire, which implemented policies halting the development of a separate Ukrainian identity; and the other was under Austrian rule, where Ukrainians had more space to work on nation-building projects with encouragement and support from the Austrians. The Russian authorities repression of Ukrainian nation-building, including the banning of the Ukrainian language, most likely led to an urgency for Ukrainians in Austrian controlled Ukraine to work on the national project preparing for an opportunity to implement an independence movement.

1917 to 1923

Much of this time period was very chaotic. The intellectuals in Kyiv and in Austrian Ukraine took advantage of the chaos and declared independence for Ukraine in 1918. During this time there was a revival of symbols from the time of Kievan Rus'. Independent Ukraine was recognized by other world powers, but independence only lasted one year. The Bolsheviks took power in Kyiv, and having seen the

strong independence movement and lack of enthusiasm for Soviet power among Ukrainians, they were

afraid of losing Ukraine, as were the tsars before them. In 1922, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

was created, and became the officially recognized homeland of the Ukrainians. Lenin implemented a

top-down Ukrainianization policy, which lasted a few years. There were elements of nation-building,

war, language policies, foreign aggression, national symbols, and independence during this time period.

Ukraine had a brief glimpse of long-awaited freedom, but ultimately found itself under the control of a

new power.

1939 to 1953

By 1939, Ukraine had endured the Great Famine (Holodomor), as well as purges of its

intellectuals and elites. When the Nazis invaded some people welcomed them as liberators, but soon

found out that wasn't the case. There was a growth of assertive nationalism in Western Ukraine with

the founding of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

(UPA). One of the leaders of the UPA, Bandera, declared independence in Lviv in 1941, but that did not

last long and he was sent to a German prison camp. An earlier declaration of independence in

Carpatho-Ukraine lasted less than one day. After World War II, Western Ukraine was finally united with

the rest of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. Western Ukraine continued to influence the content and

construction of Ukrainian national identity. During WWII many Ukrainians and ethnic minorities in

Ukraine were killed or deported. Many Russians and migrants from other republics moved to Ukraine to

repopulate. Ukraine became more bicultural and bilingual, with Russian language being important for

moving up in the party, academically and professionally. Though there were a couple attempts for

independence, they did not have support from the masses due to the ongoing world war and the

population's lack of agency. After WWII, the USSR concentrated more on the creation of a Soviet

identity, the "Soviet person". Along with this Sovietization, Russification was implemented as the

overarching cultural tradition of the USSR. Ukrainians did not have influence over their own national

identity at this time, and more language policies were implemented in Ukraine by Moscow, including the disbanding of schools teaching in minority languages.

1989-1995

Perestroika gave the opportunity for intellectuals to consider topics of democratization and cultural and linguistic renewal in Ukraine. Rukh, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring, was the main source of Ukrainian national identity content in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1991, the population of Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for the secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union. Independent Ukraine brought back symbols of the trident coat of arms and currency, which were used during Kievan Rus' and during the time of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918. Ukraine at this time was said to be divided by the East and the West due to the populations having different linguistic and political preferences, as well as different interpretations of history. Russia was identified as Ukraine's "other" in order to build a new national identity. Some in eastern and southern Ukraine were not comfortable with this choice, as they felt closer to the Soviet historical narratives and achievements (the Soviet legacy), which included a strong attachment to Russia. Elites had to be careful with language policies because they did not want to alienate Russian speakers in the east and south who in general were not supporters of the themes of Ukrainian national identity proposed by the more nationalist western Ukraine. Ukraine was finally independent, but there was not a clear cohesive national identity. Elites were blamed for not following a clearer foreign policy relationship towards Europe or Russia. Ukrainians at this time did not have to contend with foreign aggression or war, so they could focus more inward.

2004-2005

This time period was one of civic engagement and social movement. The Orange Revolution started due to election fraud, and because of the population's frustration with economic stagnation and

corruption in politics and in many layers of society. With more political parties in Ukraine since

independence, elections provided an opportunity for the people to demonstrate their political, party

and foreign policy preferences. At this time there are still regional differences, and an East-West divide

in the country. The more nationalist policies of the Yushchenko regime led to some feelings of

alienation of the people in the eastern and southern parts of the country who do not share the same

history and views as the population in the western part of Ukraine. The Orange Revolution was a major

event for Ukraine. It showed the world that Ukraine is not Russia. It also demonstrated to Ukrainians

that they do have ability to make changes. The revolution was an indicator of progress and a move

towards democracy and away from the influences of the Soviet era. This was also a time period when

there was no foreign aggression or war occurring.

2013-2017

The Euromaidan started when Yanukovych declined to sign the EU Association Agreement. The

protests grew as more violence was approved by orders of Yanukovych. The protests became less about

the EU agreement and more a call to oust the Yanukovych regime, which intensified once protesters

started to be killed by special police loyal to Yanukovych. During this time social media was used as a

political tool - as a platform to organize volunteers and activists, and to post messages that also led to

political discussions and debates. The protesters of Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity were

from different age groups, ethnicities, income and educational levels, which has been identified as more

developed and mature than the Orange Revolution due to more of a focus on civil and human rights and

civic consciousness. As a result of these protests, a stronger civil society was developed, as well as more

political engagement and volunteerism. Shortly after the revolution, Russia annexed Crimea and started

an armed intervention in Donbas in order to protect Russian speakers and the idea of the Russki Mir

(Russian World). As explained by scholars, violence and trauma can affect national identity by identity

shifting to more of a "we" feeling of the in-group, and further alienation from the out-group (Russia).

According to scholars this situation may be blurring the regional divide in Ukraine. Even though Russia used intense propaganda in eastern Ukraine, only a minority of the population in Donbas wanted to separate from Ukraine and join Russia. Euromaidan and the war seem to have led to a desire to have decreased ties with Russia and its cultural legacies, and to consider more what it means to be Ukrainian. The majority of Ukrainians agree on the main elements of national identity content, including a pro-Western foreign policy and the legitimacy of both Ukrainian and Russian languages. Citizenship has been seen as a form of identity – a meaningful, shared membership in Ukrainian society; and there has been an increase in individuals' self-identification as Ukrainian.

Most of the authors of the reviewed articles used surveys and statistics to study national identity, which is very interesting and a useful way to get a lot of information quickly; however, I really appreciated the few scholars who interviewed individuals. It was interesting to read the richer dialogue regarding "why" people feel a certain way regarding a variety of issues on a more personal level.

Regarding language and the divide between Russian-speakers and Ukrainian-speakers – only two scholars mentioned that language preference may be due to comfort and convenience, rather than a more political or ethnic reason. It is unrealistic to think that adults who grew up going to Russian schools, working in Russian language workplaces, can and will decide to all of a sudden speak Ukrainian. Yes, Ukrainian and Russian are somewhat similar, but they truly are not the same language. It takes time and effort to learn a new language, especially in adulthood. There is an increase in the number of children who speak mainly, or only, Ukrainian now, so the language question may become even less of an issue in the future.

Only a few scholars mentioned the existence of languages other than Ukrainian and Russian, or ethnic minorities living in Ukraine besides Russians. Scholars seem to concentrate more on the East/West divide in Ukraine rather than what (or who) lies in between and on the edges. I assume there

are articles regarding ethnic minorities, and languages spoken in Ukraine other than Russian and Ukrainian, but I did not concentrate on searching for such articles either.

Conclusion

By reviewing the shaping and content of Ukrainian national identity over the years it is clear that it has evolved. Ukrainians are now in control of the creation and building of their own identity. They were prevented from building their own identity from 1918, until once again independent in 1991; which at that time it was necessary to start rebuilding a national identity after decades of Sovietization and Russification, which had overshadowed the Ukrainian national identity.

The Euromaidan and Revolution of Dignity proved that Ukrainians on a grassroots level do have power to change and influence the narrative. Russia's irredentist politics, have backfired as Russian speakers in Ukraine were for the most part not supporters of Putin's desire to "protect" them. In fact these aggressive actions by Russia of annexing the Crimea and instigating the war in Donbas, have made Ukrainians throughout the country identify more closely with the Ukrainian "homeland". Scholars have mentioned a bottom-up de-Russification of Ukrainians who formerly identified as ethnic Russians. There has been an increase in mixed and hybrid identities, which shows a popular shift away from Russianness, and an identity shift from ethnic identity to a more inclusive civic identity. Even though there has been a divide in Ukraine, it has survived without any real conflict. The blood that has been shed was due to the authorization of force against his own citizens by a disgraced ex-president who was forced to flee his country by the protesters and supporters of the Revolution of Dignity.

This summer Ukraine will celebrate its 30th anniversary of independence. Ukraine is a bit smaller now than it was in 1991, but it also appears to be more unified. The more memories and experiences Ukrainians share, the easier it will be to build a more cohesive national identity together.

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