Locational Marginal Pricing: A Fundamental Reconsideration
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2024
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Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Abstract
This study establishes that Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) is conceptually problematic for grid-supported centrally-managed wholesale power markets transitioning to decarbonized grid operations with increasingly diverse participants, hence with increasingly uncertain and volatile net loads. LMP assigns a common per-unit price LMP(b,T) ( $/MWh) to each next unit (MWh) of grid-delivered energy, conditional on delivery location b and delivery period T. However, this entails a serious many-to-one benefit/cost measurement error: namely, the valuation of this next unit by a market participant or system operator will typically depend strongly on the dynamic attributes of the path of power injections and/or withdrawals (MW) used to implement its delivery at b during T. One option is to muddle through, forcing market participants and system operators to express benefit/cost valuations for next units of grid-delivered energy in per-unit form without regard for the true benefits and costs of flexible power delivery. Another option, advocated in this study, is to explore conceptually-coherent nodal multi-interval pricing mechanisms permitting grids to function efficiently as flexibility-support insurance mechanisms, i.e., as mechanisms enabling just-in-time nodal power deliveries to meet just-in-time nodal power demands as well as system reliability requirements.
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Locational Marginal Pricing: When and Why Not?
(Copyright 2023, The Author,
2023-10-11)
This study establishes that Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) is conceptually problematic for grid-supported centrally-managed wholesale power markets transitioning to decarbonized grid operations with increasingly diverse participants, hence with increasingly uncertain and volatile net loads. LMP assigns a common per-unit price LMP(b,T) ($/MWh) to each “next” unit (MWh) of grid-delivered energy, conditional on delivery location b and delivery period T. However, the valuation of this “next” unit by a market participant or system operator will typically depend strongly on the specific dynamic attributes of the path of power injections and/or withdrawals (MW) used to implement the delivery of this “next” unit at b during T. One option is to muddle through, forcing market participants and system operators to express benefit and cost valuations for “next” units of grid-delivered energy (MWh) in per-unit form ($/MWh) without regard for the true benefits and costs of flexible dynamic power delivery. Another option, illustrated in this study, is to explore alternative conceptually-coherent product definitions, settlement rules, and bid/offer contract formulations that permit electric power grids to function efficiently as flexibility-support
insurance mechanisms enabling just-in-time power deliveries to meet just-in-time customer power demands and grid reliability requirements.
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This article is published as L. Tesfatsion, "Locational Marginal Pricing: A Fundamental Reconsideration," in IEEE Open Access Journal of Power and Energy, vol. 11, pp. 104-116, 2024, doi: 10.1109/OAJPE.2024.3361751.
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Copyright 2024 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.