Assignment maximization
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2023-02
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© 2022 Wiley Periodicals LLC.
Abstract
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We present two mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first is Pareto efficient and undominated — in terms of the number of assignments — in equilibrium. The second is fair for unassigned agents and assigns weakly more agents than any stable mechanism in equilibrium.
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Comments
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Inácio Bó, and Bertan Turhan. "Assignment maximization." Journal of Public Economic Theory 25, no. 1 (2023): 123-138, which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/jpet.12602. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
JEL classification: D47, C78, D63.
Link to Economics Working Paper
JEL classification: D47, C78, D63.
Link to Economics Working Paper