Impact Characterization of Cyber Attacks on Grid-Connected Microgrid Operations

Abstract

Microgrids are crucial for the modern power grid due to their ability to ensure reliable power supply, enhance resilience, and operate independently through islanding. However, rising cybersecurity concerns make them vulnerable to attacks, leading to inefficiency and higher operational costs. Therefore, understanding the system-wide impacts of cyber attacks is crucial for developing practical risk assessments and countermeasures for microgrids. This paper presents a methodology to analyze the impact of cyber attacks on microgrids, considering operational cost as an impact metric under optimized microgrid scenarios. NESCOR vulnerability classes are used to identify relevant attack vectors, and data integrity attacks on control and measurement signals are considered. A detailed assessment of the impacts is conducted within a cyber-physical system (CPS) testbed environment utilizing an open-source MATLAB model. The experimental results reveal that data integrity attacks on control signals exhibit higher severity than those on measurement signals, demonstrating that attackers can adjust control set points to compel the microgrid owner to draw more power from the grid, thereby increasing utility bills.