R&D: Competition, Risk, and Performance

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dc.contributor.author Quirmbach, Herman
dc.contributor.department Department of Economics (LAS)
dc.date 2018-02-16T04:23:25.000
dc.date.accessioned 2020-06-30T02:04:31Z
dc.date.available 2020-06-30T02:04:31Z
dc.date.embargo 2015-04-13
dc.date.issued 1991-03-01
dc.description.abstract <p>Anticipated post-innovation collusion encourages R&D effort, but realized collusion later yields deadweight losses. In balancing this trade-off, Bertrand industries sometimes outperform Cournot; sometimes not. Both usually out perform perfectly collusive industries. The optimal level of collusion is often less collusive than Cournot duopoly...</p>
dc.identifier archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_economicreports/7/
dc.identifier.articleid 1024
dc.identifier.contextkey 6977566
dc.identifier.s3bucket isulib-bepress-aws-west
dc.identifier.submissionpath econ_las_economicreports/7
dc.identifier.uri https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/handle/20.500.12876/21274
dc.source.bitstream archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_economicreports/7/EconReportSeries_26.pdf|||Sat Jan 15 01:33:55 UTC 2022
dc.subject.disciplines Business Administration, Management, and Operations
dc.subject.disciplines Growth and Development
dc.subject.disciplines Organization Development
dc.subject.disciplines Science and Technology Policy
dc.title R&D: Competition, Risk, and Performance
dc.type article
dc.type.genre report
dspace.entity.type Publication
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication 4c5aa914-a84a-4951-ab5f-3f60f4b65b3d
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