Market Power and Efficiency in a Computational Electricity Market With Discriminatory Double-Auction Pricing

dc.contributor.author Nicolaisen, James
dc.contributor.author Petrov, Valentin
dc.contributor.author Tesfatsion, Leigh
dc.contributor.author Tesfatsion, Leigh
dc.contributor.department Economics
dc.date 2018-02-16T05:04:38.000
dc.date.accessioned 2020-06-30T02:04:30Z
dc.date.available 2020-06-30T02:04:30Z
dc.date.embargo 2015-04-16
dc.date.issued 2001-04-28
dc.description.abstract <p>This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market operating In the short run under systematically varied concentration and capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is determined by means of a clearinghouse double auction with discriminator}- midpoint pricing. Buyers and sellers use a modified Roth-Erev individual reinforcement learning algorithm to determine their price and quantity offers in each auction round. It is shown that high market efficiency is generally attained, and that market microstructure is strongly predictive for the relative market power of buyers and sellers independently of the values set for the reinforcement learning parameters. Results are briefly compared against results from an eariier study in which buyers and sellers instead eng</p>
dc.identifier archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_economicreports/53/
dc.identifier.articleid 1050
dc.identifier.contextkey 6994186
dc.identifier.s3bucket isulib-bepress-aws-west
dc.identifier.submissionpath econ_las_economicreports/53
dc.identifier.uri https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/handle/20.500.12876/21271
dc.source.bitstream archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_economicreports/53/EconReportSeries_52.pdf|||Sat Jan 15 00:50:00 UTC 2022
dc.subject.disciplines Behavioral Economics
dc.subject.disciplines Databases and Information Systems
dc.subject.disciplines Economic Theory
dc.subject.disciplines Growth and Development
dc.title Market Power and Efficiency in a Computational Electricity Market With Discriminatory Double-Auction Pricing
dc.type article
dc.type.genre report
dspace.entity.type Publication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication 1b45fd18-54a5-46e7-a853-62262cd64b39
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication 4c5aa914-a84a-4951-ab5f-3f60f4b65b3d
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