Slede: a domain-specific verification framework for sensor network security protocol implementations

dc.contributor.author Hanna, Youssef
dc.contributor.author Rajan, Hridesh
dc.contributor.author Zhang, Wensheng
dc.contributor.department Department of Computer Science
dc.date 2019-09-14T23:49:32.000
dc.date.accessioned 2020-06-30T01:54:31Z
dc.date.available 2020-06-30T01:54:31Z
dc.date.copyright Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 UTC 2008
dc.date.embargo 2017-10-06
dc.date.issued 2008-03-31
dc.description.abstract <p>Finding flaws in security protocol implementations is hard. Finding flaws in the implementations of sensor network security protocols is even harder because they are designed to protect against more system failures compared to traditional protocols. Formal verification techniques such as model checking, theorem proving, etc, have been very successful in the past in detecting faults in security protocol specifications; however, they generally require that a formal description of the protocol, often called model, is developed before the verification can start.</p> <p>There are three factors that make model construction, and as a result, formal verification is hard. First, knowledge of the specialized language used to construct the model is necessary. Second, upfront effort is required to produce an artifact that is only useful during verification, which might be considered wasteful by some, and third, manual model construction is error prone and may lead to inconsistencies between the implementation and the model.</p> <p>The key contribution of this work is an approach for automated formal verification of sensor network security protocols. Technical underpinnings of our approach includes a technique for automatically extracting a model from the <em>nesC</em> implementations of a security protocol, a technique for composing this extracted model with models of intrusion and network topologies, and a technique for translating the results of the verification process to domain terms. Our approach is sound and complete within bounds, i.e. if it reports a fault scenario for a protocol, there is indeed a fault and our framework terminates for a network topology of given size; otherwise no faults in the protocol are present that can be exploited in the network topology of that size or less using the given intrusion model. Our approach also does not require upfront model construction, which significantly decreases the cost of verification.</p>
dc.description.comments <p>This is a manuscript of a proceeding published as Hanna, Youssef, Hridesh Rajan, and Wensheng Zhang. "Slede: a domain-specific verification framework for sensor network security protocol implementations." In Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security, pp. 109-118. ACM, 2008. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1352533.1352551" target="_self">10.1145/1352533.1352551</a>. Posted with permission.</p>
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.identifier archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_conf/26/
dc.identifier.articleid 1025
dc.identifier.contextkey 10868438
dc.identifier.s3bucket isulib-bepress-aws-west
dc.identifier.submissionpath cs_conf/26
dc.identifier.uri https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/handle/20.500.12876/19832
dc.language.iso en
dc.source.bitstream archive/lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_conf/26/2008_Rajan_SledeDomain.pdf|||Fri Jan 14 23:01:12 UTC 2022
dc.source.uri https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1317&context=cs_techreports
dc.subject.disciplines Computer Sciences
dc.subject.disciplines Information Security
dc.title Slede: a domain-specific verification framework for sensor network security protocol implementations
dc.type article
dc.type.genre conference
dspace.entity.type Publication
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication f7be4eb9-d1d0-4081-859b-b15cee251456
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