Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor supply

Date
2012-02-10
Authors
Andersen, Torben
Bhattacharya, Joydeep
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Altmetrics
Authors
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Economics
Organizational Unit
Journal Issue
Series
Abstract

A classic result in dynamic public economics states that there is no welfare rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions in a dynamically-efficient neoclassical economy with exogenous labor supply. Parenthetically, a welfare justification for PAYG pensions exists if the economy is dynamically inefficient. Under a sufficient condition that the old be no less risk-averse than the young, these results extend to an economy with endogenous labor supply.

Description
Keywords
pensions, social security, dynamic efficiency, pay-as-you-go, Diamond model, endogenous labor supply
Citation
DOI
Source
Collections