To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That Is The Question

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Date
1988-05-01
Authors
Lapan, Harvey
Lapan, Harvey
Sandler, Todd
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Economics
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Economics
Abstract

We use economic analysis in a simple game-theory framework to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. From the government viewpoint, we examine both the choice of deterrence expenditure (i.e., expense meant to reduce terrorist logistical success during incidents) and whether to negotiate or not.

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This is an article from The American Economic Review 78 (1988): 16. Posted with permission.

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